The study of classes of models of a finite diagram was initiated by S. Shelah in 1969. A diagram D is a set of types over the empty set, and the class of models of the diagram D consists of the models of T which omit all the types not in D. In this work, we introduce a natural dependence relation on the subsets of the models for the 0-stable case which share many of the formal properties of forking. This (...) is achieved by considering a rank for this framework which is bounded when the diagram D is 0-stable. We can also obtain pregeometries with respect to this dependence relation. The dependence relation is the natural one induced by the rank, and the pregeometries exist on the set of realizations of types of minimal rank. Finally, these concepts are used to generalize many of the classical results for models of a totally transcendental first-order theory. In fact, strong analogies arise: models are determined by their pregeometries or their relationship with their pregeometries; however the proofs are different, as we do not have compactness. This is illustrated with positive results as well as negative results . We also give a proof of a Two Cardinal Theorem for this context. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the proof of the following upward categoricity theorem: Let K be a tame abstract elementary class with amalgamation, arbitrarily large models, and countable Löwenheim-Skolem number. If K is categorical in ‮א‬₁ then K is categorical in every uncountable cardinal. More generally, we prove that if K is categorical in a successor cardinal λ⁺ then K is categorical everywhere above λ⁺.

Let K be the class of atomic models of a countable first order theory. We prove that if K is excellent and categorical in some uncountable cardinal, then each model is prime and minimal over the basis of a definable pregeometry given by a quasiminimal set. This implies that K is categorical in all uncountable cardinals. We also introduce a U-rank to measure the complexity of complete types over models. We prove that the U-rank has the usual additivity properties, that (...) quasiminimal types have U-rank 1, and that the U-rank of any type is finite in the uncountably categorical, excellent case. However, in contrast to the first order case, the supremum of the U-rank over all types may be ω (and is not achieved). We illustrate the theory with the example of free groups, and Zilber's pseudo analytic structures. (shrink)

We study the class of elementary submodels of a large superstable homogeneous model. We introduce a rank which is bounded in the superstable case, and use it to define a dependence relation which shares many (but not all) of the properties of forking in the first order case. The main difference is that we do not have extension over all sets. We also present an example of Shelah showing that extension over all sets may not hold for any dependence relation (...) for superstable homogeneous models. (shrink)

We study the class of elementary submodels of a large superstable homogeneous model. We introduce a rank which is bounded in the superstable case, and use it to define a dependence relation which shares many (but not all) of the properties of forking in the first order case. The main difference is that we do not have extension over all sets. We also present an example of Shelah showing that extension over all sets may not hold for any dependence relation (...) for superstable homogeneous models. (shrink)

We present Saharon Shelah's Stability Spectrum and Homogeneity Spectrum theorems, as well as the equivalence between the order property and instability in the framework of Finite Diagrams. Finite Diagrams is a context which generalizes the first order case. Localized versions of these theorems are presented. Our presentation is based on several papers; the point of view is contemporary and some of the proofs are new. The treatment of local stability in Finite Diagrams is new.

We present a self-contained exposition of the basic aspects of simple theories while developing the fundamentals of forking calculus. We expound also the deeper aspects of S. Shelah's 1980 paper Simple unstable theories. The concept of weak dividing has been replaced with that of forking. The exposition is from a contemporary perspective and takes into account contributions due to S. Buechler, E. Hrushovski, B. Kim, O. Lessmann, S. Shelah and A. Pillay.

This paper is concerned with extensions of geometric stability theory to some nonelementary classes. We prove the following theorem:Theorem. Let [Formula: see text] be a large homogeneous model of a stable diagram D. Let p, q ∈ SD(A), where p is quasiminimal and q unbounded. Let [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. Suppose that there exists an integer n < ω such that [Formula: see text] for any independent a1, …, an∈ P and finite subset C ⊆ Q, but (...) [Formula: see text] for some independent a1, …, an, an+1∈ P and some finite subset C ⊆ Q.Then [Formula: see text] interprets a group G which acts on the geometry P′ obtained from P. Furthermore, either [Formula: see text] interprets a non-classical group, or n = 1,2,3 and•If n = 1 then G is abelian and acts regularly on P′.•If n = 2 the action of G on P′ is isomorphic to the affine action of K ⋊ K* on the algebraically closed field K.•If n = 3 the action of G on P′ is isomorphic to the action of PGL2(K) on the projective line ℙ1(K) of the algebraically closed field K.We prove a similar result for excellent classes. (shrink)

We introduce Lascar strong types in excellent classes and prove that they coincide with the orbits of the group generated by automorphisms fixing a model. We define a new independence relation using Lascar strong types and show that it is well-behaved over models, as well as over finite sets. We then develop simplicity and show that, under simplicity, the independence relation satisfies all the properties of nonforking in a stable first order theory. Further, simplicity for an excellent class, as well (...) as the independence relation itself, is uniquely determined. Finally, we show that an excellent class is simple if and only if it has extensible U-rank . We deduce that any excellent class of finite U-rank is simple, and that any uncountably categorical excellent class has an expansion with countably many constants which is simple. (shrink)

Djordjević [Dj 1] proved that under natural technical assumptions, if a complete L n -theory is stable and has amalgamation over sets, then it has arbitrarily large finite models. We extend his study and prove the existence of arbitrarily large finite models for classes of models of L n -theories (maybe omitting types) under weaker amalgamation properties. In particular our analysis covers the case of vector spaces.

We give a complete and elementary proof of the following upward categoricity theorem: let be a local abstract elementary class with amalgamation and joint embedding, arbitrarily large models, and countable Löwenheim–Skolem number. If is categorical in 1 then is categorical in every uncountable cardinal. In particular, this provides a new proof of the upward part of Morley’s theorem in first order logic without any use of prime models or heavy stability theoretic machinery.

. We study a local version of the order property in several frameworks, with an emphasis on frameworks where the compactness theorem fails: (1) Inside a fixed model, (2) for classes of models where the compactness theorem fails and (3) for the first order case. Appropriate localizations of the order property, the independence property, and the strict order property are introduced. We are able to generalize some of the results that were known in the case of local stability for the (...) first order theories, and for stability for nonelementary classes (existence of indiscernibles, existence of averages, stability spectrum, equivalence between order and instability). In the first order case, we also prove the local version of Shelah's Trichotomy Theorem. Finally, as an application, we give a new characterization of stable types when the ambient first order theory is simple. (shrink)

We show that any (atomic) excellent class K can be expanded with hyperimaginaries to form an (atomic) excellent class Keq which has canonical bases. When K is, in addition, of finite U-rank, then Keq is also simple and has a full canonical bases theorem. This positive situation contrasts starkly with homogeneous model theory for example, where the eq-expansion may fail to be homogeneous. However, this paper shows that expanding an ω-stable, homogeneous class K gives rise to an excellent class, which (...) is simple if K is of finite U-rank. (shrink)

Un essai sur l'avant-garde des années 1990 (un recueil des textes les plus significatifs d'Olivier Zahm – co-fondateur et directeur du magazine Purple, concepteur de plus d'une cinquantaine d'expositions dans le monde –, écrits sur les trente dernières années, qui offre une lecture radicale de l'art, des années 1990 à nos jours).

La philosophie de l'éducation n'est pas une doctrine mais un questionnement qui remet radicalement en cause tout ce que nous croyons savoir en ce domaine. Elle s'interroge donc également sur le sens et les limites des sciences de l'éducation. Dans cet ouvrage, le lecteur trouvera une réflexion sur l'éducation, du point de vue de sa finalité et de ses institutions, ainsi qu'une interrogation sur les valeurs transmises par la pédagogie. Enfin, s'il se demande quel est le critère d'une éducation réussie, (...) le philosophe lui répondra qu'on n'en finit jamais de devenir un homme. (shrink)

Dans les nations industrialisées, les goûts des individus sont désormais employés à doper la consommation. L'industrialisation de la jouissance privilégie le superflu au nécessaire, la sensibilité à la raison, la séduction à la faculté de juger. Pourtant, avec l'exploitation du goût, le capitalisme est loin d'avoir découvert une terre inconnue. A l'âge classique, la noblesse de cour cultivait un style de vie commandé par les loisirs et le goût, tout en faisant du bon goût un critère de distinction et de (...) promotion individuelle. Ces relations de compétition entre courtisans ont-elles été les premières notes en prélude au libéralisme? Si l'improductivité, au sens économique, a pu constituer une valeur fondatrice du goût, comment l'industrie a-t-elle pu transformer le goût en moteur économique de la consommation? Le devenir esthétique du capitalisme repose sur la captation et la conversion de ce qu'il aurait de plus individuel en valeurs mesurables, échangeables et massifiables, susceptibles de coloniser les moindres recoins de l'existence et de al culture. L'ouvrage montre que les enjeux du capitalisme esthétique excèdent le territoire angélique des agréments : les batailles esthétiques sont au cœur d'une guerre économique pour le contrôle des émotions et des affections. (shrink)

Dans nos sociétés complexes et pluralistes, les interrogations sur le droit sont de plus en plus nombreuses et il est difficile de comprendre les débats qu'elles suscitent - a fortiori d'y prendre part - sans être muni des repères intellectuels permettant de prendre la mesure de leurs enjeux théoriques. Le but de ce Dictionnaire est d'apporter de tels repères forgés par la pensée juridique, en présentant une analyse des grandes œuvres fondamentales qu'elle a produites. Mais ce Dictionnaire entend rendre compte (...) des principaux " moments " de cette pensée juridique en adoptant la démarche la plus ouverte possible, selon les deux principes directeurs suivants. Veiller d'abord à présenter les œuvres majeures qui relèvent de traditions juridiques plurielles. Cela implique de renvoyer autant au monde antique et médiéval qu'au monde moderne ou à l'époque contemporaine, mais aussi à la culture juridique de langue française autant qu'à celles de langue anglaise, allemande, italienne ou espagnole, à l'aire américaine autant qu'européenne ou non occidentale, en marquant un intérêt particulier aux grandes traditions juridiques juive, musulmane, chinoise et indienne. Ensuite, admettre qu'une œuvre ne doit pas nécessairement procéder de la plume du seul juriste - de l'Ecole ou du Palais - pour être identifiable comme une " grande œuvre juridique ". Pour ce Dictionnaire, celle-ci est présente dès lors qu'elle féconde la pensée juridique, même si son auteur est philosophe, sociologue, anthropologue, historien ou linguiste. Et c'est avec le même souci d'ouverture qu'il a aussi été fait appel, pour la rédaction des entrées, aux contributions des plus éminents spécialistes de sciences sociales autant que des disciplines juridiques proprement dites. (shrink)

Of all the things we do and say, most will never be repeated or reproduced. Once in a while, however, an idea or a practice generates a chain of transmission that covers more distance through space and time than any individual person ever could. What makes such transmission chains possible? For two centuries, the dominant view was that humans owe their cultural prosperity to their powers of imitation. In this view, modern cultures exist because the people who carry them are (...) gifted at remembering, storing and reproducing information. How Traditions Live and Die proposes an alternative to this standard view. What makes traditions live is not a general-purpose imitation capacity. Cultural transmission is partial, selective, often unfaithful. Some traditions live on in spite of this, because they tap into widespread and basic cognitive preferences. These attractive traditions spread, not by being better retained or more accurately transferred, but because they are transmitted over and over. This theory is used to shed light on various puzzles of cultural change and to explain the special relation that links the human species to its cultures. Morin combines recent work in cognitive anthropology with new advances in quantitative cultural history, to map and predict the diffusion of traditions. This book is both an introduction and an accessible alternative to contemporary theories of cultural evolution. (shrink)

The main contention of this article is that current approaches to ontological emergence are not comprehensive, in that they share a common bias that make them blind to some conceptual space available to emergence. In this article, I devise an alternative perspective on ontological emergence called ‘flat emergence’, which is free of such a bias. The motivation is twofold: not only does flat emergence constitute another viable way to fulfill the initial emergentist promise, but it also allows for making sense (...) of some emergence ascriptions that traditional accounts are unable to accommodate. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that it is not a conceptual truth about laws of nature that they are immutable (though we are happy to leave it as an open empirical question whether they do actually change once in a while). In order to do so, we survey three popular accounts of lawhood—(Armstrong-style) necessitarianism, (Bird-style) dispositionalism and (Lewis-style) ‘best system analysis’—and expose the extent, as well as the philosophical cost, of the amendments that should be enforced in order to leave (...) room for the possibility of changing laws. (shrink)

Sixteen years after Kim’s seminal paper offering a welcomed analysis of the emergence concept, I propose in this paper a needed extension of Kim’s work that does more justice to the actual diversity of emergentism. Rather than defining emergence as a monolithic third way between reductive physicalism and substance pluralism, and this through a conjunction of supervenience and irreducibility, I develop a comprehensive taxonomy of the possible varieties of emergence in which each taxon—theoretical, explanatory and causal emergence—is properly identified and (...) defined. This taxonomy has two advantages. First, it is unificatory in the sense that the taxa it contains derive from a common unity principle, which consequently constitutes the very hallmark of emergentism. Second, it can be shown that the emergence taxa it contains are able to meet the challenges that are commonly considered as being the hot topics on the emergentists’ agenda, namely the positivity, the consistency and the triviality/liberality challenges. (shrink)

Some generic generalizations have both a descriptive and a normative reading. The generic sentence “Philosophers care about the truth”, for instance, can be read as describing what philosophers in fact care about, but can also be read as prescribing philosophers to care about the truth. On Leslie’s account, this generic sentence has two readings due to the polysemy of the kind term “philosopher”. In this paper, I first argue against this polysemy account of descriptive/normative generics. In response, a contextualist semantic (...) theory for generic sentences is introduced. Based on this theory, I argue that descriptive/normative generics are contextually underspecified. (shrink)

In this article, we first describe our general inhibitory-control theory and, then, we describe how we have tested its specific hypotheses on reasoning with brain imaging techniques in adults and children. The innovative part of this perspective lies in its attempt to come up with a brain-based synthesis of Jean Piaget’s theory on logical algorithms and Daniel Kahneman’s theory on intuitive heuristics.

This paper defends a realist account of the composition of Newtonian forces, dubbed ‘residualism’. According to residualism, the resultant force acting on a body is identical to the component forces acting on it that do not prevent each other from bringing about its acceleration. Several reasons to favor residualism over alternative accounts of the composition of forces are advanced. (i) Residualism reconciles realism about component forces with realism about resultant forces while avoiding any threat of causal overdetermination. (ii) Residualism provides (...) a systematic semantics for the term ‘force’ within Newtonian mechanics. (iii) Residualism allows us to precisely apportion the causal responsibility of each component force in the ensuing acceleration. (iv) Residualism handles special cases such as null forces, single forces, and antagonistic forces in a natural way. (v) Residualism provides a neat picture of the causal powers of forces: each force essentially has two causal powers⎯the power to bring about accelerations (sometimes together with other co-directionnal forces) and the power to prevent other forces from doing so⎯exactly one of which is manifested at a time. (vi) Residualism avoids commitment to unobservable effects of forces: forces cause either stresses (tensile or compressive) or accelerations. (shrink)

Emergentism is often misleadingly described as a monolithic “third way” between radical monism and pluralism. In the particular case of biology, for example, emergentism is perceived as a middle course between mechanicism and vitalism. In the present paper I propose to show that the conceptual landscape between monism and pluralism is more complex than this classical picture suggests. On the basis of two successive analyses—distinguishing three forms of tension between monism and pluralism and a distinction between derivational and functional reduction—I (...) define three different versions of emergentism that can be considered as consistent middle courses between monism and pluralism . I then emphasise the advantage of this taxonomy of the concepts of emergence by applying the results of my analysis to the historical controversy that pertains to the relationship between life and matter. (shrink)

Several philosophers have recently tried to define natural kinds in epistemic terms only. Given the persistent problems with finding a successful metaphysical theory, these philosophers argue that we would do better to describe natural kinds solely in terms of their epistemic usefulness, such as their role in supporting inductive inferences. In this paper, I argue against these epistemology-only theories of natural kinds and in favor of, at least partly, metaphysical theories. I do so in three steps. In the first section (...) of the paper, I propose two desiderata for a theory of natural kinds. In the second section, I discuss one example of a ‘general’ epistemology-only theory, proposed by Marc Ereshefsky and Thomas Reydon, and argue that theories like theirs fail to provide adequate criteria of natural kinds. In the third section, I focus on one example of a ‘specific’ epistemology-only theory, proposed by P. D. Magnus, and use it to show why such theories cannot justify the claim that the proposed epistemic criteria account for the naturalness of kinds. (shrink)

In this paper, I put forward a benchmark account of emergence in terms of non-explainability and explicate the relationship that exists between its synchronic and diachronic declinations. I develop an argument whose conclusion is that emergence is essentially a “two-faceted” notion, i.e. it always encapsulates both synchronic and diachronic dimensions. I then compare this account with alternative recent accounts of emergence that define the concept through the notion of unpredictability or topological non-equivalence.

Generic stereotypes are generically formulated generalizations that express a stereotype, like “Mexican immigrants are rapists” and “Muslims are terrorists.” Stereotypes like these are offensive and should not be asserted by anyone. Yet when someone does assert a sentence like this in a conversation, it is surprisingly difficult to successfully rebut it. The meaning of generic sentences is such that they can be true in several different ways. As a result, a speaker who is challenged after asserting a generic stereotype can (...) often simply dismiss the objection and maintain that the stereotype is true in a way that is compatible with the challenger’s objection. In this paper, a semantic theory for generics is presented that accounts for this type of defensive shifting in upholding generic stereotypes. This theory is then used to develop two strategies to object more efficiently. The first strategy is to immediately deny that either of the two possible ways in which a generic can be true obtains. The second strategy is to deny the satisfaction of an additional condition that is necessary for a generic sentence to be true. (shrink)

Scientists often communicate using generic generalizations, which are unquantified generalizations such as ‘Americans overestimate social class mobility’ or ‘sound waves carry gravitational mass’. In this paper, I explain the role of such generic generalizations in science, based on a novel theory about their characteristic meaning. According to this theory, a scientific generalization of the form ‘Ks are F’ says that F is one property based on which category K qualifies as a scientific kind. Because what it takes to qualify as (...) a scientific kind varies depending on the discipline, what a generic sentence entails also varies. Based on this semantic theory, I discuss the benefits and drawbacks of using generic language in science. (shrink)

The amount of information conveyed by linguistic conventions depends on their precision, yet the codes that humans and other animals use to communicate are quite ambiguous: they may map several vague meanings to the same symbol. How does semantic precision evolve, and what are the constraints that limit it? We address this question using a multiplayer gaming app, where individuals communicate with one another in a scaled-up referential game. Here, the goal is for a sender to use black and white (...) symbols to communicate colors. We expected that the players’ mappings between symbols and colors would grow more specific over time, through a selection process whereby precise mappings are preferentially copied. We found that players become increasingly more precise in their use of symbols over the course of their interactions. This trend did not, however, result from selective copying of precise mappings. We explore the implications of this result for the study of lexical ambiguity, Zipf's Law of Meaning, and disagreements over semantic conventions. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2022.

Depuis 70 ans, les avocats peuvent créer des structures d’exercice pour exercer en commun la profession d’avocats. Depuis 1990, la grande innovation réside dans la possibilité pour les avocats de structurer leur activité au moyen de sociétés commerciales particulières, les sociétés d’exercice libéral (SEL), dont l’objectif est la préservation de l’indépendance et de la déontologie des professionnels qui exercent en son sein. En 2015, les avocats sont autorisés à avoir recours aux sociétés commerciales de droit commun (SA, SAS, SARL), sauf (...) celles qui confèrent à leur associé la qualité de commerçant (SNC et SCA). Ce dispositif vient d’être réformé par la très récente ordonnance no 2023-77 du 8 février 2023 qui soulève la difficile distinction entre les SEL et les sociétés de droit commun. L’étude de cette distinction met en lumière la caractéristique de ces sociétés, l’exercice en commun d’une profession libérale réglementée, dont le régime juridique est posé par des règles professionnelles d’ordre public. (shrink)

This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science's classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind. _Enaction_, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in _The Embodied Mind_, breaks from CTM's formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied (...) action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. _Enaction_ offers a range of perspectives on this exciting new approach to embodied cognitive science. Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge as testimony to the originality and specificity of enaction as a paradigm: the relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. Taken together, the chapters offer nothing less than the framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science. Contributors: Renaud Barbaras, Didier Bottineau, Giovanna Colombetti, Diego Cosmelli, Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. Andreas K. Engel, Olivier Gapenne, Véronique Havelange, Edwin Hutchins, Michel Le Van Quyen, Rafael E. Núñez, Marieke Rohde, Benny Shanon, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Adam Sheya, Linda B. Smith, John Stewart, Evan Thompson. (shrink)

One primary goal for metaphysical theories of natural kinds is to account for their epistemic fruitfulness. According to cluster theories of natural kinds, this epistemic fruitfulness is grounded in the regular and stable co- occurrence of a broad set of properties. In this paper, I defend the view that such a cluster theory is insufficient to adequately account for the epistemic fruitfulness of kinds. I argue that cluster theories can indeed account for the projectibility of natural kinds, but not for (...) several other epistemic operations that natural kinds support. Natural kinds also play a role in scientific explanations and categorizations. A theory of natural kinds can only account for these additional kind-based epistemic practices if it also analyzes their causal structure. (shrink)

This book is a long-term history of optics, from early Greek theories of vision to the nineteenth-century victory of the wave theory of light. It is a clear and richly illustrated synthesis of a large amount of literature, and a reliable and efficient guide for anyone who wishes to enter this domain.

The first of its kind, this book is an in-depth history of hydrodynamics from its eighteenth-century foundations to its first major successes in twentieth-century hydraulics and aeronautics. It documents the foundational role of fluid mechanics in developing a new mathematical physics. It gives full and clear accounts of the conceptual breakthroughs of physicists and engineers who tried to meet challenges in the practical worlds of hydraulics, navigation, blood circulation, meteorology, and aeronautics, and it shows how hydrodynamics at last began to (...) fulfill its early promise to unify the different worlds of flow. Richly illustrated, technically thorough, and sensitive to cross-cultural effects, this history should attract a broad range of historians, scientists, engineers, and philosophers and be a standard reference for anyone interested in fluid mechanics. (shrink)

What is the contrary of pleasure? “Pain” is one common answer. This paper argues that pleasure instead has two natural contraries: unpleasure and hedonic indifference. This view is defended by drawing attention to two often-neglected concepts: the formal relation of polar opposition and the psychological state of hedonic indifference. The existence of mixed feelings, it is argued, does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure.

How far can one ascribe a spatial meaning to pain? When I have a pain, for instance, in my leg, how should one understand the “in” in the “pain in my leg”? I argue (contrary to Noordhof) that pain does have a spatial meaning, but (contrary to Tye) that the spatiality of pain is not to be understood in the standard sense of spatial enclosure. Instead, spatiality has a special meaning with regard to pain. By defining pain in phenomenological terms (...) as a disturbed form of bodily perception, I contend that the “in” in “pain in my body” has a dual spatial meaning: firstly, it signifies my internal perceptual relation to a disturbing part of my body; secondly, it denotes the external perceptual relation to my environment that the disturbance forces me to take. Once the spatiality of pain is understood in terms of such a perceptual relation, it is not restricted to localisable hurts, but pertains to all forms of pain, such as affliction and agony. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je me propose de réfléchir, à partir de certains travaux de Thomas Nagel, sur la nature de la réflexion métaphysique. Nous qualifions certains problèmes de métaphysiques et leur attribuons par là une certaine unité. Il est cependant difficile de caractériser cette unité, et l’ensemble de ces problèmes peut apparaître comme une simple rhapsodie : quel rapport existe-t-il entre des questions comme « sommes-nous libres? », « quelle est la place de l’esprit dans la nature? » ou « (...) pouvons-nous connaître la réalité extérieure? ». J’avance une hypothèse à propos de l’origine, de la nature et de l’unité de ces problèmes, ainsi que de la fonction de leur examen à l’intérieur de la métaphysique, du moins à propos de certains d’entre eux, ceux qui portent sur ce qui est et non sur ce en quoi consiste le fait d’être. J’essaie également de dégager de cette hypothèse une compréhension plus précise de la nature d’une part centrale de l’enquête métaphysique. (shrink)

This book recounts a few ingenious attempts to derive physical theories by reason only, beginning with Descartes' geometric construction of the world, and finishing with recent derivations of quantum mechanics from natural axioms.

This study examines to what extent different types of CEOs in family firms influence external and internal stakeholder-related CSP as compared to CEOs in nonfamily firms. Linking family CEO and nonfamily CEO with CSR outcomes, we provide evidence that family CEOs are positively associated with both external and internal CSR, whereas nonfamily CEOs within family firms tend to be negatively associated with both external and internal CSR. We show that the incumbent CEO’s age moderates the above relationships, indicating the existence (...) of shifting family priorities and suggesting a tendency toward CSR conformity as the salience of succession concerns increases. (shrink)

Evaluative theories of emotions purport to shed light on the nature of emotions by appealing to values. Three kinds of evaluative theories of emotions dominate the recent literature: the judgment theory equates emotions with value judgments; the perceptual theory equates emotions with perceptions of values, and the attitudinal theory equates emotions with evaluative attitudes. This paper defends a fourth kind of evaluative theory of emotions, mostly neglected so far: the reactive theory. Reactive theories claim that emotions are attitudes which arise (...) in reaction to perceptions of value. (shrink)