razdel I. Istoriko-filosofskie issledovanii︠a︡ -- razdel II. Filosofskie i sot︠s︡ialʹno-politicheskie problemy -- razdel III. Istorii︠a︡ v lit︠s︡akh.

From the Editors:Such was the topic considered by members of a new discussion club, "The Free Word" [Svobodnoe slovo] , along with specialists from the Institute of Philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Chastʹ I. Ėsteticheskie uchenii︠a︡ filosofov antichnogo mira -- Chastʹ II. Iskusstvo v suzhdenni︠a︡kh pisateleĭ antichnogo mira.

Книга включает материал, охватывающий основной курс проблем философии науки, социологии и истории знания, научного творчества, являющихся сферой интересов Г. Ф. Миронова. В качестве специального раздела представлены работы молодых исследователей.

İhtilaflar fıkhını, hilâf ilmini ve mukayeseli fıkıhı tanım ve oluşum açısından ayırdım. Fıkıhçıların ihtilaflarının öne çıkan faydalarını zikrettim ve ihtilaflar fıkhı alanında eser yazarken kullanılan altı yöntemi kitap ve fıkhî problem örnekleri ile belirttim. Alanda çalışanların günümüzde ve geçmişte kullanılan eser yazma yöntemini göstermesi için hilâf ilminde kullanılan bir yöntemi, mukayeseli hukukta ise dört yöntemi zikrettim.

Philosophy, Arab; 20th century; congresses.

İslam hukuku tarihine baktığımızda fıkıh usûlünün bir süreç içerisinde geliştiğini söylemek mümkündür. Bu süreç içerisinde, mezhep imamları de-diğimiz müçtehitler başta olmak üzere birçok âlimin, fıkıh usûlü ilminin yapısını oluşturan katkılarından bahsedilebilir. Örneğin İmam Ebû Hanîfe’nin istihsana başvurması, İmam Mâlik’in amel-i ehli Medine ile amel etmesi ve İmam Şafiî’nin hem Ehl-i rey hem de Ehl-i hadisin fıkhını mezcederek elde ettiği formasyonla “er-Risâle” adlı eserinde bir usûl ortaya koyması fıkıh usûlü ilminin yapısını oluşturan katkıların başında gelmektedir. Bu katkıların yanında özellikle mezheplerin kurumsallaştığı (...) dönem ve sonrasında Gazalî, İbn Teymiyye, öğrencisi İbn Kayyım ve Şâtıbî gibi âlimlerin, fıkıh usulüne dinamizm kazandırmak adına söz konusu ilme yönelik birtakım yenileme çabaları ortaya koydukları bilinmektedir. Modern dönemde ise fıkıh usûlünü yenileme çabalarının klasik döneme göre daha net ve yaygın olduğu görülmektedir. Bu dönemde fıkıh usulüne yönelik yenileme çabalarını iki merhalede değerlendirmek mümkündür. Bu merhalelerin birincisi, fıkıh usûlünü yenilemeye çağrı merhalesi, ikincisi ise fıkıh usûlünü yenilemenin amelî merhalesidir. İkinci merhalede âlimlerin dinî, siyasî, sosyal ve felsefî eğilimlerine bağlı olarak kendi içinde de farklı tezler içeren “fıkhî ve usûlî yaklaşım” ve “fikrî ve felsefî yaklaşım” olmak üzere iki temel yaklaşımdan bahsedilebilir. Bu çalışmada kendi içinde de farklı eğilimlere sahip fikrî ve felsefî yaklaşımın fıkıh usûlünü yenilemeye dair görüşlerini, Fazlurrahman,, Hasan Turabî ve Muhammed Müctehid Şebusterî örnekliğinde sunmaya çalıştık. (shrink)

Collection of Buddhist philosophical texts written by Mongolian monks and scholars.

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) (151 E-152C); as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils (152C-160D). Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) ; as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils. Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken.In that part of the dialogue where the question is under examination whether or not knowledge and perception are the same, Socrates uses an idealized concept of knowledge. That is, he restricts the use of the word by setting down what he will consider to be the essential characteristics of knowledge, the sufficient and necessary conditions of its being instantiated. An excellent piece of philosophical procedure. (shrink)

It is not quite as easy to see that there is in fact no formula of this modal language having the same truth conditions (in terms of S5 Kripke semantics) as (1). This was rst conjectured by Allen Hazen2 and later proved by Harold Hodes3. We present a simple direct proof of this result and discuss some consequences for the logical analysis of ordinary modal discourse.

Because anticipated and retrospective regret play important roles in practical deliberation and motivation, better understanding them can illuminate the contours of human agency. However, the possibility of self-ignorance and the fact that we change over time can make regret—especially anticipatory regret—not only a poor predictor of where the agent will be in the future but also an unreliable indicator of where the agent stands. Granting these, this paper examines the way in which prospective and, particularly, retrospective regret can nevertheless yield (...) important insight into the sorts of creatures we are, both generally and individually. The experience of retrospective regret can show a person she values something in a way she did not know or that she is (or was) a different person than she had thought, insights which can factor into forward-looking, or prospective, deliberation. Such instances of revelatory regret reveal something to the agent about herself as agent. I examine two cases of agential self-ignorance. In the first, the experience of regret reveals what the agent values, not only to others but even to the agent himself. In the second, the agent anticipates experiencing regret for an action but does not experience the regret, suggesting that the agent did not value the rejected alternative in the way she thought. Anticipatory regret is forward-looking and can play an important role in practical deliberation. But insofar as anticipatory regret flows from one’s imperfect judgment and prospection about oneself, retrospective regret can be an important corrective in helping the agent understand her own standpoint. (shrink)

Within the framework of the Kershaw approach and of a hypothesis on spatial stochasticity, the relativistic equations of Lehr and Park, Guerra and Ruggiero, and Vigier for stochastic Nelson mechanics are obtained. In our model there is another set of equations of the hydrodynamical type for the drift velocityv i(x j,t) and stochastic velocityu i(x j,t) of a particle. Taking into account quadratic terms in l, the universal length, we obtain from these equations the Sivashinsky equations forv i(x j,t) in (...) the caseu i →0. In the limit l →0, these equations acquire the Newtonian form. (shrink)