This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

One of the main issues that dominates Neoplatonism in late antique philosophy of the 3rd–6th centuries A.D. is the nature of the first principle, called the ‘One’. From Plotinus onward, the principle is characterized as the cause of all things, since it produces the plurality of intelligible Forms, which in turn constitute the world’s rational and material structure. Given this, the tension that faces Neoplatonists is that the One, as the first cause, must transcend all things that are characterized by (...) plurality—yet because it causes plurality, the One must anticipate plurality within itself. This becomes the main mo- tivation for this study’s focus on two late Neoplatonists, Proclus (5th cent. A.D.) and Damascius (late 5th–early 6th cent. A.D.): both attempt to address this tension in two rather different ways. Proclus’ attempted solution is to posit intermediate principles (the ‘henads’) that mirror the One’s nature, as ‘one’, but directly cause plurality. This makes the One only a cause of unity, while its production of plurality is mediated by the henads that it produces. Damascius, while appropriating Proclus’ framework, thinks that this is not enough: if the One is posed as a cause of all things, it must be directly related to plurality, even if its causality is mediated through the henads. Damascius then splits Proclus’ One into two entities: (1) the Ineffable as the first ‘principle’, which is absolutely transcendent and has no causal relation; and (2) the One as the first ‘cause’ of all things, which is only relatively transcendent under the Ineffable. -/- Previous studies that compare Proclus and Damascius tend to focus either on the Ineffable or a skeptical shift in epistemology, but little work has been done on the causal framework which underlies both figures’ positions. Thus, this study proposes to focus on the causal frameworks behind each figure: why and how does Proclus propose to assert that the One is a cause, at the same time that it transcends its final effect? And what leads Damascius to propose a notion of the One’s causality that no longer makes it transcendent in the way that a higher principle, like the Ineffable, is? The present work will answer these questions in two parts. In the first, Proclus’ and Damascius’ notions of causality will be examined, insofar as they apply to all levels of being. In the second part, the One’s causality will be examined for both figures: for Proclus, the One’s causality in itself and the causality of its intermediate principles; for Damascius, the One’s causality, and how the Ineffable is needed to explain the One. The outcome of this study will show that Proclus’ framework results in an inner tension that Damascius is responding to with his notion of the One. While Damascius’ own solution implies its own tension, he at least solves a difficulty in Proclus—and in so doing, partially returns to a notion of the One much like Iamblichus’ and Plotinus’ One. (shrink)

Study of Dvādaśāranayacakra, work by Mallavādikṣamāśramaṇa, 5th cent., on the metaphysical doctrine of partial manifestation (naya) according to the Śvetāmbara Jainism.

Study on seven treatises of Buddhist logical doctrines (sapta-pramāṇa-śāstra) of Acharya Dignāga, 5th cent.

Paradoxes and their Resolutions is a ‘thematic compilation’ by Avi Sion. It collects in one volume the essays that he has written in the past (over a period of some 27 years) on this subject. It comprises expositions and resolutions of many (though not all) ancient and modern paradoxes, including: the Protagoras-Euathlus paradox (Athens, 5th Cent. BCE), the Liar paradox and the Sorites paradox (both attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, 4th Cent. BCE), Russell’s paradox (UK, 1901) and its (...) derivatives the Barber paradox and the Master Catalogue paradox (also by Russell), Grelling’s paradox (Germany, 1908), Hempel's paradox of confirmation (USA, 1940s), and Goodman’s paradox of prediction (USA, 1955). This volume also presents and comments on some of the antinomic discourse found in some Buddhist texts (namely, in Nagarjuna, India, 2nd Cent. CE; and in the Diamond Sutra, date unknown, but probably in an early century CE). (shrink)

Medieval philosophy redefined: the Latin age, c. 400-1635 -- The geography of the Latin age -- The fading light of antiquity: Neoplatonism and the tree of Porphyry, c. 3rd-5th cent. AD -- Founding fathers of the Latin Age: Augustine ([d.] 430) and Boethius ([d.] c. 525) -- The five centuries of darkness, c. 525-1025 -- Dawning of the main development : Anselm ([d.] 1109), Abaelard ([d.] 1142), Lombard ([d.] 1160) -- Enter Aristotle, c. 1150 -- Albert ([d.] 1280) and (...) Aquinas ([d.] 1274): focusing the challenge of reason -- After Aquinas ([d.] 1274) but before Fonesca ([d.] 1599): Bacon ([d.] 1292), Scotus ([d.] 1308), Ockham ([d.] 1349), D'Ailly ([d.] 1420), Soto ([d.] 1560) -- Poinsot's triumph (1632): the success and failure of the Latin Age -- The crash and burn of scholasticism, c. 1600-1650 -- After Poinsot ([d.] 1644): Peirce ([d.] 1914). (shrink)

Several modern commentators of Dignaga have puzzled over the 5th century Buddhist philosopher1s theory of the triple condition of the inferential sign. Th. Stcherbatsky (1932), Richard Hayes (1988) and Bimal K. Matilal (1986) have wondered at the reasons for Dignaga’s insistence on the inclusion of the secondcondition, which seems to be the logical equivalent of the third condition. Do the three criteria together furnish patterns of valid inference which differ from those patterns furnished by criteria one and three (...) alone? In this paper, I detail three types of cases which underline the importance of the inclusion of the second criterion. (shrink)

Investigation of the Percept is a short work that focuses on issues of perception and epistemology. Its author, Dignaga, was one of the most influential figures in the Indian Buddhist epistemological tradition, and his ideas had a profound and wide-ranging impact in India, Tibet, and China. The work inspired more than twenty commentaries throughout East Asia and three in Tibet, the most recent in 2014.This book is the first of its kind in Buddhist studies: a comprehensive history of a (...) text and its commentarial tradition. The volume editors translate the root text and commentary, along with Indian and Tibetan commentaries, providing detailed analyses of the commentarial innovations of each author, as well as critically edited versions of all texts and extant Sanskrit fragments of passages. The team-based approach made it possible to study and translate a corpus of treatises in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese and to employ the methods of critical philology and cross-cultural philosophy to provide readers with a rich collection of studies and translations, along with detailed philosophical analyses that open up the intriguing implications of Dignaga's thought and demonstrate the diversity of commentarial approaches to his text.This rich text has inspired some of the greatest minds in India and Tibet. It explores some of the key issues of Buddhist epistemology: the relationship between minds and their percepts, the problems of idealism and realism, and error and misperception. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of consciousness can be divided along several major fault lines, but one of the most prominent concerns the question of whether they accept the principle that a mental state's being conscious involves essentially its subject being aware of it. Call this the awareness principle: For any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious only if S is aware of M. Although analytic philosophers divide sharply on whether to accept the principle, the philosophy-of-mind literature appears to (...) contain mainly arguments against it, rather than for it. One reason is that those who accept the principle often find themselves in a certain dialectical... (shrink)

Like many of their counterparts in the West, Buddhist philosophers realized a long time ago that our linguistic and conceptual practices are rooted in pre-predicative modes of apprehension that provide implicit access to whatever is immediately present to awareness. This paper examines Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s contributions to what has come to be known as “Buddhist epistemology” (sometimes referred in the specialist literature by the Sanskrit neologism pramāṇavāda, lit. “doctrine of epistemic warrants”), focusing on the phenomenological and epistemic role of perception (...) and self-awareness. The central argument is that reliance on accurate observations and on an understanding of the contextual and dispositional factors that constrain, condition, and direct our perceptual and intentional states gives this tradition of epistemic inquiry a pragmatic focus unique in premodern Indian philosophy. (shrink)

The chapter offers a sustained comparison between American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars and Buddhist philosopher Dignaga and argues that while their views are prima facie inconsistent with one another, there are important areas of agreement worthy of exploration.

Pramāṇavādins are antirealists on the problem of universals by virtue of the fact that they deny the existence of real universals. Dignāga, therefore, offered apoha theory to explain how the denotation of objects is possible without postulating real universals. According to Apohavāda, a word, for instance “cow”, denotes a cow not by referring to a real universal “cowness,” but by excluding it from those which are non-cows, such as horses. In recent years, there is a discussion about what the genuine (...) cause of exclusion in Dignāga’s apoha theory is. One line of interpretation suggests that, in the case of the word “cow,” the cause of exclusion is _sāsnādidarśana_ (perception of dewlap, etc.). On the other hand, some scholars maintain that it should be _adṛṣṭ__i_ (non-observation) or _adarśanamātra_ (mere non-observation) instead of _sāsnādidarśana_. The present paper consists of two parts. The first part will be an elaboration on the philosophical implications of the abovementioned philological inquiry. I will show that if the cause of exclusion is _sāsnādidarśana_, then Dignāga should be considered as a conceptualist about universals and a foundationalist about human cognitions. On the contrary, if it is _adṛṣṭ__i_, then Dignāga should be characterized as a nominalist as well as an antifoundationalist. In the second part, l will explore what the cause of exclusion is through a Mādhyamika critic of Dignāga, namely Bhāviveka. I will demonstrate that the critique of apoha theory launched by Bhāviveka indicates that Dignāga does not regard _sāsnādidarśana_ as the cause of excluding non-cows. (shrink)

In Classical Indian philosophy, except Cārvākas all other schools unanimously recognize inference as an instrument of valid knowledge. However, the validity of an inference depends on the validity of hetu and its relation to pakṣa on the one hand and sādhya on the other. If the relation in question is dubious, the inference, which is based on it, turns out to be invalid. In Buddhist epistemology, inference is accepted as a legitimate valid source of knowledge along with perception and they (...) felt it necessary to draw a distinction between proper inference and a fallacious inference. The validity of an inference depends on the validity of the pratijñā and other constituent parts of it. If there is anything wrong with any of its members, the syllogism as a whole becomes fallacious. Hence, there will be as many fallacies of inference as there are fallacies of its component parts, from the first proposition down to the conclusion. Therefore, we may speak of fallacies of the pratijñā, fallacies of hetu, and fallacies of udāharaṇa. Accordingly, in the Buddhist logical tradition Dignāga and Dharmakīrti onward these three kinds of fallacies are recognized. In against to the Buddhist tradition, the Naiyāyikas holds that the fallacies of inference ultimately arise out of the fallacious hetu. The Naiyāyikas bring out the fallacies of inference under the fallacies of the reason (hetvābhāsa) and consider a separate treatment of the inferential fallacies due to the propositum, example, etc. (i.e., pratijñābhāsa, dṛṣṭāntābhāsa) as unnecessary and superfluous. An attempt has been made in this paper to do a philosophical exposition and discuss critically each fallacy with reference to the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists in general and among Buddhist logicians, namely Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in particular. (shrink)

To answer the question about an internal object serving as a cause of cognition, in his Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti, Dignāga elaborates two types of causality in the significance of object-support : simultaneous causality and successive causality. Simultaneous causality is characterized as invariably concomitant, which refers to the inevitable co-existence of an object and its cognition. Successive causality is characterized as resemblance, which refers to a definite causal relationship between the immediate previous consciousness and its subsequent consciousness. That is, the preceding consciousness remains (...) a potential power that transmits gradually to the subsequent consciousness. The potential power is carried with an object appearance in the stream of consciousness and becomes an actual internal object similar to the previous object in the subsequent consciousness. There are two alternatives of Dignāga’s ambiguous interpretation: either the internal object of the previous consciousness or the potential power can be regarded as an object-support for the subsequent consciousness. However, in his Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā, Śubhagupta criticizes both alternatives, writing that neither of these two serves as an object-support because neither appears in the subsequent consciousness. Therefore, they fail to fulfil the first requirement of an object-support even though they could fulfil the second requirement of an object-support. In addition, Śubhagupta argues that the causal relationship between the preceding consciousness and its subsequent consciousness is not necessary. (shrink)

I discuss two critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology, one from Candrakīrti and another from Jayarāśi. I argue that they are two versions of what I call the core problem: if the content of Dignāga’s epistemology were correct, two fundamental beliefs within this epistemological theory could not be established or known to be true, as Dignāga claims they are. In response to objections found within the classical Indian tradition as well as several plausible contemporary objections, I then argue that the core problem (...) remains a serious issue with which those sympathetic to Dignāga ought to contend. (shrink)

Au cours de ses cent dix ans d’existence la Revue de synthèse a connu des périodes différentes chaque fois caractérisées par des prédilections, des actions et des modes de publication particuliers. Au fil de ce long itinéraire, elle a préservé un lieu de référence pour la réflexion historiographique et pour le dialogue entre les sciences. Elle a aussi été un aiguillon pour l’histoire intellectuelle, l’histoire des sciences et de l’ épistémologie. L’article retrace cet itinéraire et en propose des clés (...) utiles aujourd’hui. (shrink)

The concept of “self-awareness” ( svasaṃvedana ) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and - vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means (...) of valid cognition and its result ( pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala ), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of selfawareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s own mental states and factors. (shrink)

Following Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, PS I 9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness is the result of a means of valid cognition. It has also been understood that Dignāga accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramāṇaphala: in PS ad I 8cd he regards the cognition of an external object as the result; in PS ad I 9ab–cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the (...) result. Dignāga’s text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. In fact Dignāga presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the cognition of an external object is the result. In I 9ab he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas. Althogh the Sautrāntika sākāravāda essentially has an internal structure, Dignāga presupposes that an external object can be regarded as the object of cognition because it is similar to the image of object. He assumes that the objects of pramāṇa and phala, both being external objects, are identical. Criticizing Dignāga’s claim that bāhyārthajñāna is the phala, Kumārila points out that there is a serious gap between the objects of pramāṇa and phala. Consequently Dharmakīrti has to admit that even in the Sautrāntika view an external object is not directly cognized and instead proposes as the second view of Sautrāntikas that svasaṃvitti is the phala. At the same time he reinterprets Dignāga and defends from Kumārila’s criticism by introducing the two different levels. When investigating the real nature, i.e. in the paramārtha level, svasaṃvitti is the phala, whereas in the upacāra level, bāhyārthajñāna or bāhyārthaniścaya is the phala. Thus, Dharmakīrti avoids Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga. Kumārila triggers Dharmakīrti’s new introduction of the second view of Santrāntikas that svasaṃvitti is the phala. (shrink)

This is the best book to date on Buddhist theory of perception as found in the Pramänasamuccaya of Dignäga, 480 to 540 A.D. The book offers seventy pages of translation, copious notes, and two Tibetan editions in transliteration of Dignäga's chapter on perception. The translation is strikingly good with the necessary additions carefully bracketed to allow as much as possible a fluent reading if one disregarded the brackets. The translation is a presentation of the theory of perception, an examination of (...) a definition of perception found in a work attributed to Vasubandhu, followed by examinations of non-Buddhist theories of perception: Nyäya, Vaisesika, Sämkhya, and Mïmämsaka. Mistakenly Hattori says, "Unlike his predecessors, Dignäga does not accept the unconditional authority of Scripture." If that were true, then Dignäga's teacher Vasubandhu, his teacher's brother Asanga, the great Nägärjuna, and many other Buddhist scholars who differentiated between scriptures requiring interpretation and those not requiring interpretation would have to be accused of unconditionally accepting all scriptures. Also, he says, "There is a commentary... by the great Tibetan scholar Darma Rinchen. However, I have not utilized it since I thought that the examination of it might serve to clarify only the Tibetan interpretation of Dignäga's thought." Rather, it would seem that this dimly lit field needs as much light as possible even if from the tinted lanterns of Tibet. However, all in all the book is excellent; it is not light reading or even particularly appealing to those whose interest is religious practice.--P. J. H. (shrink)

A reasoned argument or tarka is essential for a wholesome vāda that aims at establishing the truth. A strong tarka constitutes of a number of elements including an anumāna based on a valid hetu. Several scholars, such as Dharmakīrti, Vasubandhu and Dignāga, have worked on theories for the establishment of a valid hetu to distinguish it from an invalid one. This paper aims to interpret Dignāga’s hetu-cakra, called the wheel of grounds, from a modern philosophical perspective by deconstructing it into (...) a simple probabilistic mathematical model. The objective is to understand how and why a vāda based on a probabilistically weaker hetu can degrade into a Jalpa or vitaṇḍā. To do so, the paper maps the concept of ‘Bounded Rationality’ onto the hetu-cakra. Bounded Rationality, an idea coined by the management thinker Herbert Simon, is often employed in understanding decision-making processes of rational agents. In the context of this paper, the concept would state that the prativādin and ālocaka (debater) may not hold unbounded information to back their pratijñā (proposition). The paper argues that within the probabilistically deconstructed hetu-cakra model, most people argue in the ‘Zone of Bounded Rationality’, and thus, the probability of a debate degrading into Jalpa or vitaṇḍā is high. -/- . (shrink)

According to Dignāga, the word “cow” makes one understand all cows in a general form by excluding non-cows. However, how does one understand the non-cows to be excluded? Hattori answers as follows: “On perceiving the particular which is endowed with dewlap, horns, a hump on the back, and so forth, one understands that it is not a non-cow, because one knows that a non-cow is not endowed with these attributes.” Hattori regards observation of a dewlap, etc. as the cause of (...) excluding non-cows. Akamatsu presents a view similar to Hattori’s. Tanizawa, however, criticises Akamatsu by pointing out that then the apohavādin would have accepted positive elements such as a dewlap as defining characteristics of a cow. Stating that X is not a cow because it is not endowed with a dewlap, etc., amounts to accepting that the dewlap, etc. are the defining characteristics of a cow. Instead of a real universal cowness the apohavādin would have accepted a dewlap, etc. Akamatsu’s understanding of apoha, if it was correct, implies Tanizawa, would destroy the essence of the Buddhist theory of apoha. Continuing the view of Hattori and Akamatsu, Yoshimizu recently published two articles on Dignāga’s theory of apoha. He claims that “the word “cow” excludes all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on them.” Thus, “the word “cow” can exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that none of them has all the members of the set of characteristics that form the worldly definition of “cow”.” Horns, one of the characteristic features of cows, are indeed mentioned by Dignāga in PS 5:43. Yoshimizu understands Dignāga’s semantics as being parallel to the modern semantics of componential analysis. A question arises: what does Dignāga, the founder of the Buddhist theory of apoha, really think regarding this issue? The present article sheds light on the incompatibility of the two interpretations by investigating the relevant source texts. It further shows that the issue Tanizawa deals with was already discussed by Dignāga. Examining Dignāga’s discussions shows that Tanizawa is right in his understanding of apoha. The interpretation by Hattori and other scholars is not supported by Dignāga’s text. The present conclusion is also supported by Mādhava, Uddyotakara and Kumārila. None of them assumes Dignāga’s theory to be as Hattori, etc. take it. (shrink)

Among the means of valid cognition, the one which appears first in every enumeration, which was considered as being the basis of all other means of knowledge and which was considered as a legitimate method of knowledge by all schools of Indian thought is perception (pratyakṣa). With regard to perception, we can naturally expect such questions as ‘what is it to perceive’ or ‘what do we mean when we say that something is perceived’. It is generally believed that the philosophical (...) theories of perceptions are really theories about what we mean by ordinary perceptual statements. In considering our knowledge about the external world, the philosopher tends to consider the way in which perception can and does provide us with the knowledge and the nature, extent and certainty of knowledge it provides us with. It is a well acknowledged fact that perception is the fundamental source of knowledge. In Buddhist epistemology, a systematic discussion on perception is found in the writings of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya with vṛitti, who belongs to Yogācāra school of Buddhism of Mahayana tradition. An attempt has been made in this paper to explain and examine critically the first chapter of Pramāṇasamuccaya with vṛitti, i.e., perception with special reference to Non-Buddhist schools, namely Nyāyayikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṁkhyans and Mīmāṁsakas. To explain it, the paper has been divided into three sections. Section I deals with Dignāga’s theory of perception and examination of non-Buddhist school's theory of perception, section II deals with Dignāga’s examination of nature of Perception with reference to non-Buddhists schools and section III deals with conclusion. (shrink)

A mesure que le XIXe siècle a donné la priorité à l'économie, on a cessé collectivement de vouloir rendre "l'homme meilleur". Mais avec la post-modernité, nouvel avatar d'une domination qui ne supporte plus qu'on lui apporte la contradiction, c'est en nuisant au "meilleur de l'homme" que l'économie poursuit sa conquête mondialisée. Pour ce qui est de cette nuisance particulièrement inconséquente, reconnaissons à la présente époque une efficacité inégalée dans l'Histoire. Quelque chose comme une volonté de mettre effectivement fin à l'Histoire.

The problem of empty terms is one of the focal issues in analytic philosophy. Russell’s theory of descriptions, a proposal attempting to solve this problem, attracted much attention and is considered a hallmark of the analytic tradition. Scholars of Indian and Buddhist philosophy, e.g., McDermott, Matilal, Shaw and Perszyk, have studied discussions of empty terms in Indian and Buddhist philosophy. But most of these studies rely heavily on the Nyāya or Navya-Nyāya sources, in which Buddhists are portrayed as opponents to (...) be defeated, and thus do not truly reflect Buddhist views on this issue. The present paper will explore how Dignāga, the founder of Buddhist logic, deals with the issue of empty subject terms. His approach is subtle and complicated. On the one hand, he proposes a method of paraphrase that resembles Russell’s theory of descriptions. On the other, by relying on his philosophy of language—the apoha theory, he tends to fall into a panfictionalism. Through the efforts of his follower Dharmakīrti, the latter approach would become more acceptable among Indian and Tibetan Buddhists. Dignāga’s Chinese commentators, who were free from the influence of Dharmakīrti, dealt with the empty term issue in three ways: (1) by adhering to Dignāga’s method of paraphrase; (2) by allowing exceptions for non-implicative negation; and (3) by indicating the propositional attitude of a given proposition. Among these, the third proved most popular. (shrink)