Some metabolic pathways are nearly ubiquitous among organisms: the genes encoding the enzymes for such pathways must therefore be ancient and essential. De novo pyrimidine biosynthesis is an example of one such metabolic pathway. In animals a single protein called CADAbbreviations: CAD, trifunctional protein catalyzing the first three steps of de novo pyrimidine biosynthesis in higher eukaryotes; CPS, carbamyl phosphate synthetase domain; CPSase, carbamyl phosphate synthetase activity; ATC, aspartate transcarbamylase domain; ATCase, aspartate transcarbamylase activity; DHO, dihydroorotase domain; DHOase, dihydroorotase activity; (...) GLN, glutaminase subdomain or subunit of carbamyl phosphate synthetase, GL Nase, glutaminase activity; SYN, synthetase subdomain or subunit of carbamyl phosphate synthetase; SYNase, synthetase activity. carries the first three steps of this pathway. The same three enzymes in prokaryotes are associated with separate proteins. The CAD gene appears to have evolved through a process of gene duplication and DNA rearrangement, leading to an in‐frame gene fusion encoding a chimeric protein. A driving force for the creation of eukaryotic genes encoding multienzymatic proteins such as CAD may be the advantage of coordinate expression of enzymes catalyzing steps in a biosynthetic pathway. The analogous structure in bacteria is the operon. Differences in the translational mechanisms of eukaryotes and prokaryotes may have dictated the different strategies used by organisms to evolve coordinately regulated genes. (shrink)

Structured interviews were held with 149 registered nurses in seven countries in America, Asia, Australia and Europe concerning the feeding of severely demented patients who do not accept food. The most common reasons for nurses being willing to change their decision to feed or not to feed were an order from the medical head, a request from the patient's husband and/or the staff meeting. There was a connection between the willingness to feed and the ranking of ethical principles. Nurses who (...) were most prone to feed the patient most often gave a high rank to the ethical principle of sanctity of life, while those who primarily chose not to feed the patient gave a high rank to the ethical principle of autonomy. All nurses stressed the ethical principle of beneficence. Des interviews structurés ont eu lieu avec 149 infirmiers/ères dans sept pays en Amérique, Asie, Australie et Europe concernant l'alimentation des malades gravement dément qui refusent de manger. La raison la plus générale pour des infirmiers/ères d'être prêt à changer leures décisions de donner à manger ou non sont: un ordre du médecin, la demande du mari de la malade ou de la réunion du personnel. Il y avait un lien entre la volonté de nourir et le rang des principes éthiques. Les infirmiers/ères les plus enclins de nourir la malade le plus souvent donnaient un rang supérieur au principe éthique de la sainteté de vie, pendant que ceux et celles qui choisissaient de ne pas nourrir la malade donnaient un rang supérieur au principe éthique de l'autonomie. Tous insistaient sur l'importance du principe éthique de la bienfaisance. Konstruktive Interviews wurden mit 149 ausgebildeten Krankenschwestern und Pfleger in sieben Ländern in Amerika, Asien, Australien und Europa gehalten über die Ernährung von schwer von Dementia praecox leidenden Patienten, die das Essen verweigern. Die gewöhnlichsten Gründe des Pflegepersonals für die Bereitwilligkeit, ihre Entscheidung, zu ernähren oder nicht, zu ändern, waren Anordnungen vom medizinischen Chef, Anfragen vom Ehemann der Patientin und/oder einer Personalsitzung. Es bestand ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Bereitwilligkeit zur Ernährung und dem Rang der ethischen Prinzipien. Die Pflegenden, die sich am meisten neigten, die Patientin zu ernähren, gaben dem ethischen Prinzip der Heiligkeit des Lebens einen hohen Rang, während die, die meistens vorzogen, die Patientin nicht zu ernähren, gaben dem ethischen Prinzip der Autonomie einen hohen Rang. Alle Pflegenden legten grossen Wert auf das ethische Prinzip der Wohltätigkeit. (shrink)

Reminiscences of Peter, by P. Oppenheim.--Natural kinds, by W. V. Quine.--Inductive independence and the paradoxes of confirmation, by J. Hintikka.--Partial entailment as a basis for inductive logic, by W. C. Salmon.--Are there non-deductive logics?, by W. Sellars.--Statistical explanation vs. statistical inference, by R. C. Jeffre--Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice, by R. Nozick.--The meaning of time, by A. Grünbaum.--Lawfulness as mind-dependent, by N. Rescher.--Events and their descriptions: some considerations, by J. Kim.--The individuation of events, by D. Davidson.--On properties, (...) by H. Putnam.--A method for avoiding the Curry paradox, by F. B. Fitch.--Publications (1934-1969) by Carl G. Hempel (p. [266]-270). (shrink)

This w ork starts from a reali t y , that of the immense number of forced mi g rants/ refugees w ho, as victims of forces th e y cannot control resulting from the mass i v e economic, social and political uphe a v als, go to and fro in rapid and ceaseless m o v ement. This fl o w of millions of ind i viduals is not e f fect i v e l y r e (...) gulated b y the states. The l e gal-political inst r uments, w hich in the past confronted on l y v ague l y similar pro b lems, are tod a y complete l y inadequate. The concept of citizenship based on national identity is un a b le to sol v e the di f f iculties arising from a g r o wing demand for justice, for rights, b y a population that w ants to stop being treated as an object but that does not belong to a speci f ic identity nor desires it . Th e solution proposed is the defense of a un i v ersal conception of human rights requiring inte r national cou r ts capa b le of enforcing them. (shrink)

The weathered stone, collapsed lintels and hollow roofs of the ruin have long evoked a sense of pathos, standing as monuments to the disastrous contours of history and the possibility of alternative futures. In this article, I ask: What is the meaning of the ruin in the postcolonial context of the Caribbean? There are few physical ruins in the Caribbean, resulting in a feeling of lack: the architectural landscape fails to speak to the catastrophes of slavery and colonialism. Dub, a (...) subgenre of Jamaican reggae, responds to this sense of deprivation. The dub producers of the 1970s decomposed reggae songs, creating ruinous constructions where crucial elements of the original version are missing. Fragmented dub compositions act as icons of the traumatic history of the Caribbean and a utopian pique to the imagination, forcing the listener to fill in the gaps and imagine the world remade. (shrink)

Qual é a relação entre uma razão e uma ação quando a razão explica a ação, dando a razão do agente para fazer o que fez? Podemos chamar tais explicações de racionalizações, e dizer que a razão racionaliza a ação. Neste artigo quero defender a posição antiga — e de senso comum — de que a racionalização é uma espécie de explicação causal b. A defesa sem dúvida exige alguma reelaboração, mas não parece necessário abandonar a posição, como muitos autores (...) recentes insistem. (shrink)

Belief in propositions no longer brings about the sorts of looks it did when Quine's affinity for desert landscapes held sway in the Anglo-American philosophical scene. People are doing work in the metaphysics of propositions, trying to figure out what sorts of creatures propositions are. In philosophers like Frege, Russell, and Moore we have strong shoulders upon which to stand. But, there is much more work that needs to be done. I will try to do a bit of that work (...) here. In the paper, I will probe the notion that propositions are structured entities, and that it is useful to think of their structure as resembling the structure of the sentences which express them. First, I will speak briefly to the issue of why one might find it rational to believe that propositions exist. In the second part of the paper, I will argue that we should think of propositions as having structure. In the last section, I will examine the nature of the structure of propositions. I will consider a recent account given by Jeffrey King of the nature of the relation that unifies constituents. I conclude by sketching my own view of the relation that holds between propositional constituents in virtue of which they compose a proposition. 1 I Why Believe in Propositions? Propositions are taken to be abstract entities that are a) the primary bearers of truth and falsity, b) the objects of our propositional attitudes, and c) the referents of "that-. (shrink)

L’idea che vi sia una netta dicotomia tra fatti e valori è uno dei dogmi dell’empirismo. Secondo questa concezione, i giudizi fattuali, in quanto verificabili o falsificabili empiricamente, riguardano le aree di razionalità «pura» e omogenea e sono ancorati naturalisticamente al mondo. Gli enunciati di valore, invece, sarebbero da relegare nella sfera di ciò che è semplicemente «soggettivo», emotivo, irrazionale. Questo assunto, che ha dominato per molto tempo le scienze e la filosofia, è stato messo in dubbio dai pragmatisti e (...) da alcuni dei più influenti pensatori contemporanei, che, intervenendo al dibattito sull’oggettività dell’etica, hanno mostrato come la presunta eterogeneità tra giudizi descrittivi e giudizi valutativi sia ormai insostenibile. Sulla scia della prospettiva inaugurata da questi pensatori, gli autori di questo libro mostrano come la dicotomia fatto/valore abbia corrotto il nostro pensiero, impedendoci di rivolgere l’attenzione alle intersezioni, le sinergie e le relazioni che esistono tra processi cognitivi e coefficienti valutativi, tra scienza e etica. Con saggi di S. Clough, D. Copp, D. Davidson, G. Marchetti, H. Putnam, R. A. Putnam B. Stroud, K. A. Taylor, V. Walsh. (shrink)

In recent years, images of climate catastrophe have become commonplace. However, Black visions of the confluence of the Anthropocene and the apocalypse have been largely ignored. As we argue in this article, Black social thought offers crucial resources for drawing out the implicit exclusions of dominant representations of climate breakdown and developing an alternative account of the planet’s future. By reading a range of critical race theorists, from Frederick Douglass and W. E. B. Du Bois to Octavia Butler and Ta-Nehisi (...) Coates, we propose a rethinking of the climate apocalypse. The African American theoretical and cultural tradition elaborates an image of the end of the world that emphasises the non-revelatory nature of climate catastrophe, warns against associating collapse with rebirth, and articulates a mode of maroon survivalism in which the apocalypse is an event to be endured and escaped rather than fatalistically expected or infinitely delayed. (shrink)

This collection brings together previously unpublished works by well-known philosophers on the philosophy of action, the metaphysics of causality, and the philosophy of psychology. Nine of the essays directly discuss Donald Davidson's work on these topics, while three others challenge a Davidsonian approach through discussion of independent but related issues. These essays are followed by replies from Davidson, including a previously unpublished essay, "Adverbs of Action.".

Se busca presentar y analizar críticamente la filosofía interpretacionista de Günter Abel como una de las reflexiones más recientes y originales sobre el fenómeno de la interpretación. Al recoger atisbos provenientes de diversos horizontes teóricos (Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Goodman, Davidson), Abel ..

Heidegger's central concern is the question of being (Seinsfrage). The paper reconstructs this question at least for the young (pre- Kehre) Heidegger in the light of two interconnected hypotheses: (1) the substantial content of the question of being can be identified by seeing it as a response to (Marburg) neo-Kantianism; and (2) this content centres around the claim that, pace the neo-Kantians, 'epistemological' concerns are grounded in 'ontological' ones, for which reason 'ontology' must precede 'epistemology' as a form of philosophical (...) inquiry. In section I the general position of (Marburg) neo-Kantianism is sketched. In section II the implications of the neo-Kantian position for the concepts of truth and reality, reason, and experience, are outlined; significant similarities to Sellars, Davidson, and Brandom are revealed. Finally, in section III Heidegger's analysis of everydayness is shown to yield a distinct critique of the neo-Kantian relativization of the concept of the real to the theoretically knowable. From this critique it emerges why Heidegger thinks that 'ontology' precedes 'epistemology'. The project of fundamental ontology marked by the question of being thus shows itself to be at least in part a response to the aporia of Marburg neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

This is the best collection of essays on Rorty’s philosophy that has been published in the last decade. It will be of great interest not only to Rorty specialists but to anyone concerned with the difficulties contemporary analytic philosophy faces in its search for a viable self-understanding. The contributors are Barry Allen, Akeel Bilgrami, Jacques Bouveresse, Robert Brandom, James Conant, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, Jürgen Habermas, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, Bjørn Ramberg, and Michael Williams. Rorty himself has also written (...) an essay, plus individual and fairly extensive replies to each of his critics. (shrink)

Abstract McDowell's contributions to epistemology and philosophy of mind turn centrally on his defense of the Aristotelian concept of a ?rational animal?. I argue here that a clarification of how McDowell uses this concept can make more explicit his distance from Davidson regarding the nature of the minds of non-rational animals. Close examination of his responses to Davidson and to Dennett shows that McDowell is implicitly committed to avoiding the following ?false trichotomy?: that animals are not bearers of (...) semantic content at all, that they are bearers of content in the same sense we are, and that they are bearer of "as if" content. Avoiding the false trichotomy requires that we understand non-rational animals as having concepts but not as making judgments. Furthermore, we need to supplement McDowell's distinction between the logical spaces of reasons and of the realm of law with what Finkelstein calls ?the logical space of animate life?. Though McDowell has taken some recent steps to embrace a view like this, I urge a more demanding conception than what McDowell has thus far suggested. (shrink)