David Hume is well known for his philosophical doubts about such things as whether there is an external world beyond our sense perception, and whether there are any rational grounds for believing that the future will resemble the past. But what would it be like to entertain such doubts in the context of one’s everyday life? In this paper, a fictional dialogue is provided in which a descendent of David Hume who brings such skeptical doubts to life, and (...) consequently suffers from Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), is counseled by a Logic-Based Therapy practitioner. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas describes the Christian as homo viator: the "human wayfarer" or pilgrim journeying through this world to the heavenly city. This journey is vulnerable to "worldly sin" or "worldliness": an excessive attachment to wealth, status, honors, prestige, and power. A major cause of apathy to the poor and the underprivileged, worldliness treats our identity as purely this-worldly and therefore shuts the door to eschatological hope through subtle forms of presumption and despair. Drawing upon Aquinas and other sources in the (...) Western theological tradition, this essay argues that Christians should retrieve worldliness as a moral category to better understand threats to hope. As a remedy to worldliness, Elliot proposes hope's beatitude of poverty of spirit, suggesting that it both increases solidarity with the poor and helps one grow in the theological virtue of hope. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Politics of Practical Reason: Why Theological Ethics Must Change Your Life by Mark RyanDavid ElliotThe Politics of Practical Reason: Why Theological Ethics Must Change Your Life Mark Ryan eugene, or: cascade books, 2011. 229 pp. $20.80If the spirited debate between Stanley Hauerwas and Jeffrey Stout remains front-page news in theological ethics, then Mark Ryan’s subtle and penetrating The Politics of Practical Reason will help keep it there. (...) Ryan argues that practical reason is the hinge of ethical thinking and that it is “political” in the sense of shaping the community or polis. Given this hinge, the pressing question is of course, “Whose practical reason?” To answer this, Ryan probes major contemporary ethicists from Charles Taylor to Alasdair MacIntyre, but the book always circles back to Hauerwas and Stout. Their debate is ultimately decided by proxy, through a mediating philosopher whose work on practical reason Ryan sees both as the gold standard and as the indispensable background for understanding Hauerwas. Expecting this to be MacIntyre, the reader may be surprised—and perhaps even convinced—that the philosopher who best explains and possibly vindicates Hauerwas is in fact Elizabeth Anscombe, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s protégé, close friend, and translator.The book opens with Anscombe’s Intention (1957), which Donald Davidson called “the most important treatment of action since Aristotle.” In it, Anscombe argued that intention presupposes desire and is declared in public language within a context of social practices presupposed for agency to be intelligible. The implication is that we form intentions as members of a community with a particular form of life sustained by social practices. With human desire as its motivating nisus, Ryan insists that intention “is part of the very form of practical reasoning, then, to be political” (144).Having retrieved Anscombe’s model of practical reason, Ryan examines the field of contemporary ethics to see who measures up. Charles Taylor fails to place agents in a particular community, locating us instead in that bloated abstraction called “modernity.” Ryan therefore concludes that Taylor’s is an “ethics for anybody,” which leaves the self finally disembodied (94–98). Stout fares little better due to his refrain that Hauerwas went astray when he abandoned justice talk. Ryan counters that Stout’s sort of justice should be abandoned; lacking a substantive vision of the good and a teleology of freedom, Stout’s justice is reckoned a blind guide who cannot see or say why the polis should pursue one end and not another. Hauerwas, on the other hand, specifies a particular polis within which practical reason can intelligibly function: the church. It has [End Page 218] a substantive vision of the good (i.e., the peaceable kingdom) located in a scriptural narrative displayed by social practices requiring formation in the virtues (119–21). Ryan therefore endorses Hauerwas’s politics of practical reason, indebted to MacIntyre and made possible by Anscombe.I see one lacuna in this otherwise excellent book. Ryan seemingly advocates a pragmatic model of practical reason that is wholly internal to the polis rather than grounded in “truths of human nature as such” (101). This makes Anscombe an uneasy ally. Her “Modern Moral Philosophy” famously proposed a retrieval of virtue that required an overhauled “account of human nature … and above all of human flourishing” (41). This move opened the door for ethical naturalism, perhaps even natural law—both of which Anscombe and the later MacIntyre endorse. But these look suspiciously like what Ryan calls an “ethics for anybody.” So in the end are Anscombe and MacIntyre turncoats, or do Hauerwas and Ryan not follow them far enough? This crucial question remains unanswered.Despite this wrinkle, Ryan’s book is the best intervention in the Hauerwas–Stout debate that we now have. It throws light on Hauerwas, challenges Stout, shows why Anscombe matters, and gives practical reason its generous due. Philosophically deft and charitable in tone, it deserves to be read and studied as a major contribution to the field.David ElliotUniversity of Notre DameCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The theological virtue of hope has long been neglected in Christian ethics. However, as social, civic and global anxieties mount, the need to overcome despair has become urgent. This book proposes the theological virtue of hope as a promising source of rejuvenation. Theological hope sustains us from the sloth, presumption and despair that threaten amid injustice, tragedy and dying; it provides an ultimate meaning and transcendent purpose to our lives; and it rejoices and refreshes us 'on the way' with the (...) prospect of eternal beatitude. Rather than degrading this life and world, hope ordains earthly goods to our eschatological end, forming us to pursue social justice with a resilience and vitality that transcend the cynicism and disillusionment so widespread at present. Drawing on Thomas Aquinas and virtue ethics, the book shows how the virtue of hope contributes to human happiness in this life and not just the next. (shrink)

This article examines the important role and historical context of spiritual ‘training’ ( exercitium) in St. Thomas Aquinas’s account of infused virtue growth. The traditional practice of spiritual training or discipline confronted the dangers of mediocrity, lukewarmness and relapse in the moral life, seeking further to train us into virtuous conduct through prayer, fasting, vigils, recitation of psalms, examination of conscience, meditation on Scripture, and so forth. Thomas strongly advocated this praxis as crucial to growth in infused virtue. I examine (...) the concept of spiritual training as he knew it, and in particular bring into view the unfamiliar context and landscape which gave it intelligibility. To this end I articulate the patristic and medieval sources which he relied upon and show what is distinctive in his account relative to that of his contemporaries. While his account is not parochial to Dominican life, I argue that the Order's literature regulating the formation of friars sheds crucial light on how Thomas conceived of spiritual training in practice, and conclude by suggesting some implications for moral theology and virtue theory. (shrink)

This article discusses the nature of and challenges to the theological virtue of hope in the Ars moriendi or ‘art of dying’. It proposes a renewed ascesis of hope whose shared eschatological vision and set of practices help sustain from despair and prepare Christians for a hopeful and ‘good death’.

kerekh 1-2. Maʼamarim rishon ṿe-sheni -- kerekh 3-4. Maʼamarim shelishi u-reviʻi -- kerekh 5. Maʼamar ḥamishi u-firḳe mavo.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Politics of Practical Reason: Why Theological Ethics Must Change Your Life by Mark RyanDavid ElliotThe Politics of Practical Reason: Why Theological Ethics Must Change Your Life Mark Ryan eugene, or: cascade books, 2011. 229 pp. $20.80If the spirited debate between Stanley Hauerwas and Jeffrey Stout remains front-page news in theological ethics, then Mark Ryan’s subtle and penetrating The Politics of Practical Reason will help keep it there. (...) Ryan argues that practical reason is the hinge of ethical thinking and that it is “political” in the sense of shaping the community or polis. Given this hinge, the pressing question is of course, “Whose practical reason?” To answer this, Ryan probes major contemporary ethicists from Charles Taylor to Alasdair MacIntyre, but the book always circles back to Hauerwas and Stout. Their debate is ultimately decided by proxy, through a mediating philosopher whose work on practical reason Ryan sees both as the gold standard and as the indispensable background for understanding Hauerwas. Expecting this to be MacIntyre, the reader may be surprised—and perhaps even convinced—that the philosopher who best explains and possibly vindicates Hauerwas is in fact Elizabeth Anscombe, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s protégé, close friend, and translator.The book opens with Anscombe’s Intention (1957), which Donald Davidson called “the most important treatment of action since Aristotle.” In it, Anscombe argued that intention presupposes desire and is declared in public language within a context of social practices presupposed for agency to be intelligible. The implication is that we form intentions as members of a community with a particular form of life sustained by social practices. With human desire as its motivating nisus, Ryan insists that intention “is part of the very form of practical reasoning, then, to be political” (144).Having retrieved Anscombe’s model of practical reason, Ryan examines the field of contemporary ethics to see who measures up. Charles Taylor fails to place agents in a particular community, locating us instead in that bloated abstraction called “modernity.” Ryan therefore concludes that Taylor’s is an “ethics for anybody,” which leaves the self finally disembodied (94–98). Stout fares little better due to his refrain that Hauerwas went astray when he abandoned justice talk. Ryan counters that Stout’s sort of justice should be abandoned; lacking a substantive vision of the good and a teleology of freedom, Stout’s justice is reckoned a blind guide who cannot see or say why the polis should pursue one end and not another. Hauerwas, on the other hand, specifies a particular polis within which practical reason can intelligibly function: the church. It has [End Page 218] a substantive vision of the good (i.e., the peaceable kingdom) located in a scriptural narrative displayed by social practices requiring formation in the virtues (119–21). Ryan therefore endorses Hauerwas’s politics of practical reason, indebted to MacIntyre and made possible by Anscombe.I see one lacuna in this otherwise excellent book. Ryan seemingly advocates a pragmatic model of practical reason that is wholly internal to the polis rather than grounded in “truths of human nature as such” (101). This makes Anscombe an uneasy ally. Her “Modern Moral Philosophy” famously proposed a retrieval of virtue that required an overhauled “account of human nature … and above all of human flourishing” (41). This move opened the door for ethical naturalism, perhaps even natural law—both of which Anscombe and the later MacIntyre endorse. But these look suspiciously like what Ryan calls an “ethics for anybody.” So in the end are Anscombe and MacIntyre turncoats, or do Hauerwas and Ryan not follow them far enough? This crucial question remains unanswered.Despite this wrinkle, Ryan’s book is the best intervention in the Hauerwas–Stout debate that we now have. It throws light on Hauerwas, challenges Stout, shows why Anscombe matters, and gives practical reason its generous due. Philosophically deft and charitable in tone, it deserves to be read and studied as a major contribution to the field.David ElliotUniversity of Notre DameCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In The Virtuous Therapist, authors Elliot D. Cohen and Gale Spieler Cohen provide a systematic, philosophical approach to mental health ethics. Their comprehensive model of ethical decision making is developed to a number of difficult ethical problems counselors will experience. The issues raised in the book are timely, ethically engaging, and of practical importance to those working in the field.

Patients with persistent pain who lack adetectable underlying disease challenge thetheories supporting much of biomedicalbody-mind discourse. In this context,diagnostic labeling is as inherently vulnerableto the same pitfalls of uncertainty that besetany other interpretative endeavour. The endpoint is often no more than a name ratherthan the discovered essence of a pre-existentmedical condition. In 1990 a Committee of theAmerican College of Rheumatology (ACR)formulated the construct of Fibromyalgia in anattempt to rectify a situation of diagnosticconfusion faced by patients presenting withwidespread pain. It was (...) proposed thatFibromyalgia existed as a ``specific entity'',separable from but curiously able to co-existwith any other painful condition. Epistemological and semiotic analyses ofFibromyalgia have failed to find any sign,clinical or linguistic, which coulddifferentiate it from other diffusemusculoskeletal pain states. The construct ofFibromyalgia sought to define a discernablereality outside the play of language and topass it off as a natural phenomenon. However,because it has failed both clinically andsemiotically, the construct also fails the testof medical utility for the subject inpersistent pain. (shrink)

Le mouvement général des sciences est de fournir les moyens théoriques d'une reconstruction des phénomènes, en élaborant des lois explicitant leurs régularités sous-jacentes. Aujourd'hui, l'attitude générale en sciences repose sur l'a priori des déterminismes, quelle que soit leur forme. La pensée humaine, dans ses rapports au monde, est une confrontation permanente aux systèmes complexes qui nous habitent et dans lesquels nous habitons. Chacun des systèmes possède une histoire propre qui le rend singulier et source continue de surprises. On se prend (...) à le penser comme système autonome avec ses lois et ses degrés de liberté interne. Quand il s'agit de penser l'être humain, la tentation est encore plus forte de lui prêter un libre arbitre. La question fondamentale est donc celle de la compatibilité entre la pensée scientifique en quête de déterminismes, et la compréhension des complexités, génératrice d'indéterminismes. Comment obtenir une conciliation quand, de la physique à l'éthique, en passant par la cellule biologique, les êtres multicellulaires et les sociétés, on remonte les niveaux d'organisation? Peut-on y parvenir quant à l'être humain et la société sans remettre en question certains aspects cruciaux comme la responsabilité et l'éthique? Ce livre a pour but de revisiter ce débat fondamental, auquel fleuri Atlan a consacré une grande partie de son œuvre, en s'appuyant, d'une part, sur les approches récentes de la modélisation des systèmes complexes et, d'autre part, sur la tradition philosophique multimillénaire. (shrink)

Can philosophy help ordinary people confront their personal or interpersonal problems of living? Can it help a couple whose marriage is on the rocks, or someone going through a midlife crisis, or someone depressed over the death of a significant other, or who suffers from anxiety about making a life change? These and many other behavioral and emotional problems are ordinarily referred to psychologists, psychiatrists, clinical social workers, or other mental health specialists. Less mainstream is the possibility of consulting a (...) philosophical counselor or practitioner. Yet, there is presently a steadily increasing, world-wide movement among individuals with postgraduate credentials in philosophy to harness their philosophical training and skills in helping others to address their life problems. But is this channeling of philosophy outside the classroom into the arena of life a good idea? Are philosophers, as such, competent to handle all or any of the myriad emotional and behavioral problems that arise in the context of life; or should these matters best be left to those trained in psychological counseling or psychotherapy? Through a diverse and contrasting set of readings authored by prominent philosophers, philosophical counselors, and psychologists, this volume carefully explores the nature of philosophical counseling or practice and its relationship to psychological counseling and psychotherapy. Digging deeply into this relational question, this volume aims to spark more rational reflection, and greater sensitivity and openness to the potential contributions of philosophical practice. It is, accordingly, intended for students, teachers, scholars, and practitioners of philosophy, counseling, or psychotherapy; as well as those interested in knowing more about philosophical counseling or practice. (shrink)

Edwin J. Delattre, Character and Cops: Ethics in Policing Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989, xviii + 247 pp.

ABSTRACTThe financial crisis of 2008 was unforeseen partly because the academic theories that underpin policy making do not sufficiently account for uncertainty and complexity or learned and evolved human capabilities for managing them. Mainstream theories of decision making tend to be strongly normative and based on wishfully unrealistic “idealized” modeling. In order to develop theories of actual decision making under uncertainty, we need new methodologies that account for how human actors often manage uncertain situations “well enough.” Some possibly helpful methodologies, (...) drawing on digital science, focus on the role of emotions in determining people's choices; others examine how people construct narratives that enable them to act; still others combine qualitative with quantitative data. (shrink)

Demonstrating the practical relevance and import of many historically significant philosophers , Critical Thinking Unleashed presents a practical, non-technical, and comprehensive approach to critical thinking. In contrast to other treatments of practical reasoning, Elliot D. Cohen not only teaches students how to identify and refute irrational premises_he also teaches them how to construct rational antidotes to combat the personal, social, and political obstacles they confront in everyday life.

This paper sets the framework for a hybrid theory of Logic-Based Therapy and Psychoanalysis through an examination of Sigmund’s Freud’s theory of perfectionism.

The American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy (ASPCP) was founded on the premise that philosophical and psychological practices are interdependent and mutually supportive. While psychological practice can benefit from becoming more philosophical, the converse is also true. In contrast, the American Philosophical Practitioner’s Association, under the direction of Louis Marinoff, has driven a wedge between these two practices. In this paper, I show how philosophical therapies such as my own Log­ic-Based modality, and psychological therapies, especially Rational-Emotional Behavior Therapy (REBT) (...) work together synergistically. I hold that the APPA bifurcation of psycho­logical from philosophical practice is artificial, impractical, and self-defeating. Further, I maintain that Marinoff’s position that there is a distinct class of “sane” clients appropriate for the latter form of therapy serves to propagate a dangerous popular stereotype, that clients who “need” conventional psychological therapy must therefore be “insane.”. (shrink)

This case-based approach to the philosophical practice modality of logic-based therapy demonstrates the utility, versatility, and accessibility of LBT for dealing effectively with the emotions of everyday life, such as anxiety, worry, guilt, anger, and sadness. Through engaging, illustrative case studies, this book serves as a guidebook for philosophical and psychological practitioners, as well as a text for instructors of philosophy and psychotherapy who wish to demonstrate the practical value of philosophy in their respective fields.

Who blows the whistle — a loner or a well-liked team player? Which of them is more likely to lead a successful opposition to perceived organizational wrongdoing? The potential influence of co-worker pressures to conform on whistle-blowing activity or the likely effects of whistle-blowing on the group have not been addressed. This paper presents a preliminary model of whistle-blowing as an act of nonconformity. One implication is that the success of an opposition will depend on the characteristics of the whistle-blower (...) and how the complaint is pursued. Specific hypotheses and general suggestions for future research and practice are offered. (shrink)

--Do patients have the right to know their physician's HIV status?-Can a dentist refuse treatment to an HIV-positive patient?-How do educators determine whether to allow an HIV-positive child to attend school, and if they do, should the parents of other children be informed?-Should a counselor break confidentiality by disclosing to a wife that her husband is infected with HIV?This collection of original essays carefully examines the difficult moral choices the AIDS pandemic has presented for many professionals-physicians, nurses, dentists, teachers and (...) school administrators, business managers, psychotherapists, lawyers, clergy, journalists, and politicians. In the workplace, problems posed by HIV and AIDS have led to a reexamination of traditional codes of ethics. Providing systematic and reasoned discussions, the authors explore the moral, legal, and ethical issues involved in the reconsideration of policies, standards of conduct, and the practicality of balancing personal and professional ethics. Author note: Elliot D. Cohen is Professor of Philosophy at Indian River Community College and Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of Applied Philosophy.Michael Davis is Senior Research Associate at the Center for the Study of Ethics in Professions, Illinois Institute of Technology. (shrink)

Counseling Ethics for the 21st Century prepares students to address ethical issues arising in contemporary counseling practice. Drawing on their own clinical and practical experiences, authors Elliot D. Cohen and Gale Spieler Cohen present detailed, realistic, and engaging clinical case studies along with a comprehensive five-step model that can be used to manage the complex ethical problems raised throughout the book. Each chapter focuses on particular virtues in the context of examining a particular counseling issue, including online (...) counseling, digital record keeping, and social media. Students will be empowered to define problems, identify relevant facts, conduct ethical analyses, and make the best decisions for their clients. (shrink)