Las ciencias de la vida, a la luz de la teoría de la evolución, están aportando, según A. Moya, un territorio mestizo que obliga a pensar desde la ciencia cuestiones que parecían patrimonio exclusivo de las humanidades: la naturaleza y sentido del ser humano y de la vida. Las preguntas metafísicas sobre el ser humano y la vida, propias de la tradición humanista, pasan ahora inexorablemente por la ciencia, por los hallazgos recientes en biología molecular y evolutiva, biogénetica, bioquímica, neurobiología, (...) sociobiología, psicología evolutiva, biocomputerización, etc. Entre cientificismo antihumanista y humanismo espiritualista, entre el desprecio de las humanidades y el desprecio de las ciencias —desprecio basado en la ignorancia mutua y/o en presupuestos ideológicos—, cabe un cientismo humanista, fiel a la mejor tradición intelectual de nuestra cultura. Contra este desencuentro, poco ilustrado, Moya muestra su convencimiento de que se debe y se puede superar ese hiato profundo, a partir, sobre todo, de los avances que la biología evolutiva, y en general las ciencias de la vida, podrían proporcionar como territorio común sobre el que pensar y desde el que pensar tanto la misma ciencia como la vida, tanto el sentido de la ciencia como el sentido de la vida humana. La aventura intelectual de A. Moya se presenta como un ejemplo de honestidad y de rigor, abogando contra cualquier reduccionismo por mantener abiertas las tensiones creativas entre biología y espíritu. (shrink)

El debate de la teoría de la evolución sigue vivo en torno a cuestiones fronterizas suscitadas desde la ética y desde la religión. Francisco J. Ayala, biólogo darwiniano y científico humanista, propone un equilibrio elegante en las relaciones entre ciencia, ética y religión, contra fundamentalismos cientistas y religiosos, considerando la teoría darwiniana de la selección natural como un regalo para la ciencia y para la teología, y defendiendo la compatibilidad de ambas para una visión más rica de la vida humana. (...) Los tres apartados de este escrito pueden valer como una primera introducción al pensamiento filosófico del profesor Ayala, que piensa desde la ciencia, pero más allá de la ciencia: 1) la revolución darwiniana, 2) la naturaleza humana biológica y cultural y 3) la complementariedad entre ciencia y religión. (shrink)

Through the explorations of excellent scholars, this book provides a new understanding of Plato's _Theaetetus_, an absolute masterpiece which contains fundamental insights – about the nature of human cognition, perception, rationality – which are still at the centre of the contemporary debate.

The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true (...) of w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A” as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway. (shrink)

cal basis of consciousness. We continue by discussing the relation between spatiotem- One of the outstanding problems in the cog- poral patterns of brain activity and con- nitive sciences is to understand how ongo- sciousness, with particular attention to pro- ing conscious experience is related to the cesses in the gamma frequency band. We workings of the brain and nervous system. then adopt a critical perspective and high-.

O inconsciente, a grande descoberta freudiana, foi o responsável por toda a composição da teoria psicanalítica. Como toda teoria, passou por adaptações de acordo com as descobertas de Freud, que se via na necessidade de reestabelecer as regras e os meios de funcionamento do aparelho psíquico. Através das antinomias pulsionais, das topologias relativas ao inconsciente e, em particular, da melancolia como pivô entre tópicas, mostraremos como Freud possibilita pensar não só as consequências da perda objetal, mas como esta influencia na (...) composição do Eu. Elegendo-a como fundamental à instauração da segunda tópica, advogaremos que é a partir da melancolia que Freud nos permite compreender o Eu como descentrado e despossuído por uma “cena outra” que o coloca numa situação perpetuamente deficitária. Do advento da segunda tópica, defenderemos que Freud foi capaz de desvelar um Eu que é, também, inconsciente. (shrink)

Dos estudos que Merleau-Ponty dedica à noção de corpo, este projeto versará sobre os modos como a relação entre sexualidade e existência pode ser compreendida à luz de uma reinterpretação ontológica e fenomenológica da psicanálise freudiana. Com efeito, a partir de Três Ensaios sobre e Teoria da Sexualidade, veremos, num primeiro instante, como os atos humanos não são determinados apenas por um inconsciente falho e involuntário; dado que as produções do inconsciente do outro influem sobre as fontes do inconsciente subjetivo (...) (e vice-versa), em Freud o teor destes atos possuiriam antes uma significação pulsional de ordem sexual e conflitiva que se estenderia da infância (onde é predominantemente polimorfa, perversa e autoerótica) à vida adulta (onde coloca-se à serviço da função reprodutora, sob o primado da zona genital) e que, objetiva e causal, deveria ser medida e direcionada para mantermos, em termos de economia libidinal, o controle de nossa vida sexual frente a ordem social. No entanto, haveria, aí, algo censurável, pois, se o analista – ao refletir sobre sua pratica – serve-se de uma teoria formulada em terceira pessoa e se distancia do discurso produzido em primeira pessoa pelo consulente, a sexualidade seria antes uma força biológica que, distante, determinaria as ações humanas. Assim, se desejamos devolver a vida mental ao mundo da vida sem, contudo, perder o aspecto essencialmente sexual de nossos desejos e paixões, será em Maurice Merleau-Ponty onde estes atos não serão mais objetos de contemplação, e sim vivências que, em carne e osso, expressam a maneira pela qual co-pertencemos a um mundo inter-humano. Para este, o corpo – nem puramente objetivista, nem puramente subjetivista – remete à nossa forma ampla de inserção no mundo da vida: na junção entre natureza e liberdade, é potência exploratória e é por ele que o ser vai ao mundo. E se assim o for, a partir de obras como A Estrututra do Comportamento, Fenomenologia da Percepção, O Visível e o Invisível, etc., o mesmo só pode ser compreendido a partir da relação que mantem com outras realidades sensíveis, para além de uma experiência para mim. Será preciso, portanto, considerar a afetividade e a sexualidade como modos de ser que evidenciam nossa relação com as coisas (partes constituintes do nosso trato com o mundo), sem apresentar-se independente da infraestrutura existencial humana. Partindo da própria estrutura psicanalítica, a obra de Merleau-Ponty revelará, na sexualidade, uma atmosfera que não é nem transcendência da vida humana, nem imagem de representações conscientes ou inconscientes, mas coextensiva à vida. Evitando certos pressupostos segundo os quais a sexualidade – seguindo uma causalidade própria – determinaria as demais esferas da vida, veremos que grande parte dos problemas descritos pela psicanalise não remetem necessariamente à uma estrutura sexual, mas estão antes ligados à atitude geral de ser no mundo, que envolve sempre o campo sexual. Posta de bases fenomenológicas, veremos, portanto, que a reinterpretação de Merleau-Ponty acerca da sexualidade não apenas devolve o ser a sua vivência de mundo, como dissolve a ideia de uma identidade estática e objetiva, pois esta, sendo corpo no mundo em relação com a alteridade, será sempre implícita e misteriosa. (shrink)

This article analyzes the notion of malaise resulting from the tension impulses between individuals and cultures, according to the results achieved by Freud's psychoanalytic reflexes. Despite certain moments in his work, it is possible to envision a certain possibility of emancipation of the individual through reflection or clinical analysis itself, or the psychoanalyst does not fail to notice a certain entropy present not only in the human being, but in the whole being alive. It is a movement within the organism (...) itself that leads to its exhaustion, meeting its demand in decline. (shrink)

Dos estudos que Maurice Merleau-Ponty dedica à noção de corpo, este artigo versa sobre os modos como a questão da sexualidade pode ser compreendida. Com efeito, dentro desta perspectiva, o corpo não se confunde com aquilo que se pode pensar dela a partir de uma perspectiva tanto objetivista quanto subjetivista, mas diz respeito à nossa forma ampla de inserção no mundo da vida. Na junção entre natureza e liberdade, o corpo não é da ordem do “eu penso”, mas do “eu (...) posso” – é potência exploratória. Assim, ser corpo é estar amarrado a certo mundo; é só por ele que o ser vai ao mundo. Todavia, se assim o for, o mesmo só pode ser compreendido a partir da relação que mantem com outras realidades sensíveis, para além de uma experiência para mim. Deste modo, será, pois, preciso passar a considerar a afetividade e a sexualidade como partes constituintes do nosso trato com o mundo. Enquanto modo de ser que evidencia nossa relação com as coisas, sem apresentar-se, contudo, independente da infraestrutura existencial humana, revisitaremos, portanto, O Corpo como Ser Sexuado presente na Fenomenologia da Percepção e veremos como este a) nos abre para o outro, b) revela o nosso estilo de ser e c) nos mostra a promiscuidade entre existência e vida sexual. (shrink)

The present paper has two, interrelated objectives. The first is to analyze the different senses in which arguments are characterized as persuasive in the extant writings of Sextus Empiricus. The second is to examine the Pyrrhonist’s therapeutic use of arguments in the discussion with his Dogmatic rivals – more precisely, to determine the sense and basis of Sextus’ distinction between therapeutic arguments that appear weighty and therapeutic arguments that appear weak in their persuasiveness.

In this article, I draw upon the ‘post-Kantian’ reading of Hegel to examine the consequences Hegel’s idea of God has on his metaphysics. In particular, I apply Hegel’s ‘recognition-theoretic’ approach to his theology. Within the context of this analysis, I focus especially on the incarnation and sacrifice of Christ. First, I argue that Hegel’s philosophy of religion employs a distinctive notion of sacrifice (kenotic sacrifice). Here, sacrifice is conceived as a giving up something of oneself to ‘make room’ for the (...) other. Second, I argue that the idea of kenotic sacrifice plays a fundamental role in Hegel’s account of Christ. Third, I conclude by sketching some of the consequences of Hegel’s idea of a God who renounces his own divinity for an idealistically conceived metaphysics. My main thesis is that the notion of incarnation is conceived by Hegel as the expression of a spirit that advances only insofar as it is willing to withdraw and make room for the other. A kenotic reading of the Hegelian notion of the incarnation is also useful in terms of a clarification of the dispute between ‘left Hegelians’ and ‘right Hegelians’ concerning the status of the idea of God in Hegel’s philosophy. (shrink)

En este paper ofrezco una lectura global de _De Anima _III 4 de Aristóteles, en la que pretendo develar la rigu­rosa estructura argumentativa del capítulo. Así, mues­tro que el capítulo exhibe el típico patrón aristotélico de investigación filosófica: el estableci­mien­to de los pro­blemas básicos que han de ser resueltos, el camino dia­léctico para la postulación de una hipótesis, la deri­va­ción, a partir de ella, de las características indivi­dua­li­zantes relevantes del objeto (algunas de las cuales son ya manifiestas y explicadas _como_ (...) derivables de la hipó­tesis), y la emergencia de _aporiai_ que _prima_ _facie_ pare­cen invalidar la hipótesis pero que finalmente po­si­bili­tan una comprensión más profunda de ella. Pro­curo cla­rificar la progresión especulativa del capí­tu­lo al consi­derar incialmente el _Principio de Actuali­dad_ como sub­yacente a su _Modelo de Asimilación_ de la cog­nición (S conoce F _si y solo si_ el principio cognitivo de S deviene F debido a un objeto conocido O que es F en acto). Aristóteles, además, deriva la no-mezcla a partir de la carencia de límites (_Asunción de Ilimita__­ción_), que es una carac­terística manifiesta del _nous_. De la no-mezcla deriva la _Separabilidad_ (estas im­plica­cio­nes se clarifican en la primera _aporia_), de la Se­pa­rabi­li­dad deriva la _Espontaneidad_ y de la Esponta­neidad la _Autointelección_ del _nous_ (clarificada en la segunda _aporia_). Aunque examino el capítulo completo, me en­foco específicamente en el valor teórico y meto­doló­gico de la introducción y discusión de las dos _aporiai_. (shrink)

Current biological sciences standardly ascribe proper functions to biological parts, traits and mechanisms. In addition, realism about proper functions has an important space within the ongoing debate in philosophy of biology. Functional ascriptions are often conceived of as tracking objective, observer-independent higher-level features of the inquired object, rather than merely depending on a methodological, descriptive or epistemic attitude. In this paper, I argue for a realist account of proper bio-functions based on standard causal explanations of an organism’s behaviour: such explanations (...) are most intelligible if the autonomy of special sciences rests on the ontological and causal autonomy of their respective objects. I take into consideration the Aristotelian theoretical framework on teleological causation and reconstruct his arguments against his reductionist rivals. Finally, I consider the recent revival of Emergentism and try to establish to what extent the Neo-emergentist framework fits with the Aristotelian model, which I show to be partially valid also within an evolutionist view. (shrink)

One of the central aims of the neo-mechanistic framework for the neural and cognitive sciences is to construct a pluralistic integration of scientific explanations, allowing for a weak explanatory autonomy of higher-level sciences, such as cognitive science. This integration involves understanding human cognition as information processing occurring in multi-level human neuro-cognitive mechanisms, explained by multi-level neuro-cognitive models. Strong explanatory neuro-cognitive reduction, however, poses a significant challenge to this pluralist ambition and the weak autonomy of cognitive science derived therefrom. Based on (...) research in current molecular and cellular neuroscience, the framework holds that the best strategy for integrating human neuro-cognitive theories is through direct reductive explanations based on molecular and cellular neural processes. It is my aim to investigate whether the neo-mechanistic framework can meet the challenge. I argue that leading neo-mechanists offer some significant replies; however, they are not able yet to completely remove strong explanatory reductionism from their own framework. (shrink)

South Africa shared with the world the warning of a new strain of SARS-CoV2, Omicron, in November 2021. As a result, many high-income countries (HICs) instituted complete travel bans on persons leaving South Africa and other neighbouring countries. These bans were unnecessary from a scientific standpoint, and they ran counter to the International Health Regulations. In short, South Africa was penalized for sharing data. Data sharing during pandemics is commonly justified by appeals to solidarity. In this paper, we argue that (...) solidarity is, at best, an aspirational ideal to work toward but that it cannot ground an obligation to share data. Instead, low-and-middle income countries (LIMCs) should be guided by the principle of reciprocity, which states that we ought to return good for good received. Reciprocity is necessarily a conditional principle. LMICs, we argue, should only share data during future pandemics on the condition that HICs provide enforceable assurances that the benefits of data sharing will be equitably distributed and that LMICs won’t be penalized for sharing information. (shrink)

Some authors have called into question the normativity of logic, using as an argument that the bridge principles for logical normativity (MacFarlane, In what sense (in any) is logic normative for thought, 2004 )? are just by-products of general epistemic principles for belief. In this paper, I discuss that suggestion from a formal point of view. I show that some important bridge principles can be derived from usual norms for belief. I also describe some possible ways to block this derivation (...) by modifying the epistemic norms or weakening the bridge principles. Finally, I discuss different philosophical interpretations of these results. (shrink)

Is skeptical theism tenable once one acknowledges, as the proponent of that view does, one's cognitive limitations vis-à-vis religious matters? In this article, I aim to answer that question both by examining the apparent radical skeptical implications of the skeptical component of skeptical theism and by comparing this view with both fideism and Pyrrhonism, which also lay emphasis on our cognitive limitations. My ultimate purpose is to determine which of the three stances it makes more sense to adopt once the (...) limitations of human cognitive powers are recognized. (shrink)

In An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications, W. Feller established a way of ending the St. Petersburg paradox by the introduction of an entrance fee, and provided it for the case in which the game is played with a fair coin. A natural generalization of his method is to establish the entrance fee for the case in which the probability of heads is θ. The deduction of those fees is the main result of Section 2. We then propose (...) a Bayesian approach to the problem. When the probability of heads is θ the expected gain of the St. Petersburg game is finite, therefore there is no paradox. However, if one takes θ as a random variable assuming values in the paradox may hold, which is counter-intuitive. In Section 3 we determine necessary conditions for the absence of paradox in the Bayesian approach and in Section 4 we establish the entrance fee for the case in which θ is uniformly distributed in, for in this case there is a paradox. (shrink)

According to methodological anti-exceptionalism, logic follows a scientific methodology. There has been some discussion about which methodology logic has. Authors such as Priest, Hjortland and Williamson have argued that logic can be characterized by an abductive methodology. We choose the logical theory that behaves better under a set of epistemic criteria. In this paper, I analyze some important discussions in the philosophy of logic, and I show that they presuppose different methodologies, involving different notions of evidence and different epistemic values. (...) I argue that, rather than having a specific methodology such as abductivism, logic can be characterized by methodological pluralism. This position can also be seen as the application of scientific pluralism to the realm of logic. (shrink)

How should automated vehicles react in emergency circumstances? Most research projects and scientific literature deal with this question from a moral perspective. In particular, it is customary to treat emergencies involving AVs as instances of moral dilemmas and to use the trolley problem as a framework to address such alleged dilemmas. Some critics have pointed out some shortcomings of this strategy and have urged to focus on mundane traffic situations instead of trolley cases involving AVs. Besides, these authors rightly point (...) out the political nature of the most interesting debates involving AVs. However, in our view, they do not offer an adequate account of the distinction between ethics and politics and still see their proposals as contributions to the ethics of AVs. We argue that many of the interesting questions about how AVs should behave, both in emergency and other situations, are of political, and not moral, nature. This view is based on a conception of politics and political normativity that we have developed elsewhere and that we call “political minimalism.” Additionally, we show that this proposed perspective has significant consequences for the design, management, and regulation of transport systems. (shrink)

The discussions of these past twenty years have significantly improved our knowledge about the foundation of bioethics and the meaning of the four bioethical principles with concern to at least three different points: that they are organised hierarchically, and therefore not “prima facie” of the same level; that they have exceptions, and consequently lack of absolute character; and that they are neither strictly deontological nor purely teleological. The only absolute principle of moral life can be the abstract and unconcrete respect (...) of human beings. But when determining the material content of this respect, principles become contingent and relative. Therefore, moral reasoning must have necessarily no less than three moments, one absolute but merely formal, namely respect for all human beings, and the other two relative and material. The first material moment is comprised of the four bioethical principles, divided into two levels, one private, including the principles of autonomy and beneficence, and the other one public, including those of nonmaleficence and justice. The second material moment deals with specific cases, and requires analysis of their context, including their circumstances and consequences. Only when following these steps, and therefore balancing principlism and contextualism, can moral reasoning be correct and complete. (shrink)

In The Uses of Argument, Toulmin proposed a distinction between fielddependent and field-invariant standards for argument appraisal that gave rise to a relativistic understanding of his theory. The main goal of this paper is to show that epistemological relativism is not a necessary consequence ofToulmin's model of argument. To this end, I will analyze the role that fields are to play within this model, given a certain conception of one of its key elements: the warrant of an argument.

A growing group of institutional investors use divestment strategically to deter misconducts that are harmful for the climate and society. Based on Kantian ethics, we propose that divestment represents investors’ universal and absolute moral commitment to socially responsible investing (SRI). Following categorical and hypothetical imperatives and reciprocity as a norm, we hypothesize how institutional investors’ commit to SRI through a divestment strategy against ethically reprehensible behaviour of banks, especially when these investors represent banks themselves. Using a hand-collected database of the (...) revelation dates of enforcement actions on banks, we find evidence that banks are less likely to divest equity holding on banks with misconduct (fined banks) than their non-bank institutional investors peers. Banks that commit to invest responsibly by signing for the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) are not significantly more likely to divest on fined banks stocks than non-signatory banks. Moreover, divestment of fined banks whose own legitimacy to operate is in question is not significantly different from non-fined banks divestment. We find that European banks are more inclined to sell their holdings permanently on fined banks than their United States peers. Therefore, bank’s moral commitment to SRI via divestments is influenced more by cultural and reciprocity norms than their moral commitment to participate in the PRI. (shrink)

Suppose that a team of neurosurgeons and bioengineers were able to remove your brain from your body, suspend it in a life-sustaining vat of liquid nutrients, and connect its neurons and nerve terminals by wires to a supercomputer that would stimulate it with electrical impulses exactly like those it normally receives when embodied. According to this brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, your envatted brain and your embodied brain would have subjectively indistinguishable mental lives. For all you know—so one argument goes—you could be (...) such a brain in a vat right now.1 Daniel Dennett calls this sort of philosophical thought experiment an “intuition pump” (Dennett 1995). An intuition pump is designed to elicit certain intuitive convictions, but is not itself a proper argument: “intuition pumps are fine if they’re used correctly, but they can also be misused. They’re not arguments, they’re stories. Instead of having a conclusion, they pump an intuition. They get you to say ‘Aha! Oh, I get it!’ (Dennett 1995, p. 182). Philosophers have used the brain-in-a-vat story mainly to raise the problem of radical skepticism and to elicit various intuitions about meaning and knowledge (Putnam 1981). The basic intuition the story tries to pump is that the envatted brain, though fully conscious, has systematically false beliefs about the world, including itself. Some philosophers reject this intuition. They propose that the envatted brain’s beliefs are really about its artificial environment or that it.. (shrink)

Using matrix iterations of ccc posets, we prove the consistency with ZFC of some cases where the cardinals on the right hand side of Cichon’s diagram take two or three arbitrary values (two regular values, the third one with uncountable cofinality). Also, mixing this with the techniques in J Symb Log 56(3):795–810, 1991, we can prove that it is consistent with ZFC to assign, at the same time, several arbitrary regular values on the left hand side of Cichon’s diagram.