This contribution is an essay of formal philosophy—and more specifically of formal ontology and formal epistemology—applied, respectively, to the philosophy of nature and to the philosophy of sciences, interpreted the former as the ontology and the latter as the epistemology of the modern mathematical, natural, and artificial sciences, the theoretical computer science included. I present the formal philosophy in the framework of the category theory (CT) as an axiomatic metalanguage—in many senses “wider” than set theory (ST)—of mathematics and logic, both (...) of the “extensional” logics of the pure and applied mathematical sciences (=mathematical logic), and the “intensional” modal logics of the philosophical disciplines (=philosophical logic). It is particularly significant in this categorical framework the possibility of extending the operator algebra formalism from (quantum and classical) physics to logic, via the so-called “Boolean algebras with operators” (BAOs), with this extension being the core of our formal ontology. In this context, I discuss the relevance of the algebraic Hopf coproduct and colimit operations, and then of the category of coalgebras in the computations over lattices of quantum numbers in the quantum field theory (QFT), interpreted as the fundamental physics. This coalgebraic formalism is particularly relevant for modeling the notion of the “quantum vacuum foliation” in QFT of dissipative systems, as a foundation of the notion of “complexity” in physics, and “memory” in biological and neural systems, using the powerful “colimit” operators. Finally, I suggest that in the CT logic, the relational semantics of BAOs, applied to the modal coalgebraic relational logic of the “possible worlds” in Kripke’s model theory, is the proper logic of the formal ontology and epistemology of the natural realism, as a formalized philosophy of nature and sciences. (shrink)

In this paper we analyse the conditions for attributing to AI autonomous systems the ontological status of “artificial moral agents”, in the context of the “distributed responsibility” between humans and machines in Machine Ethics (ME). In order to address the fundamental issue in ME of the unavoidable “opacity” of their decisions with ethical/legal relevance, we start from the neuroethical evidence in cognitive science. In humans, the “transparency” and then the “ethical accountability” of their actions as responsible moral agents is not (...) in contradiction with the unavoidable “opacity” (unawareness) of the brain process by which they perform their moral judgements on the right action to execute. In fact, the moral accountability of our actions depends on what is immediately before and after our “moral judgements” on the right action to execute (formally, deontic first order logic (FOL) decisions). I.e., our moral accountability depends on the “ethical constraints” we imposed to our judgement before performing it in an opaque way. Anyway, our moral accountability depends overall on the “ethical assessment” or explicit “moral reasoning” after and over the moral judgement before executing our actions (deontic higher order logic (HOL) assessment). In this way, in the light of the AI “imitation game”, the consistent attribution of the status of ethically accountable artificial moral agents to autonomous AI systems depends on two similar conditions. Firstly, it depends on the presence of “ethical constraints” to be satisfied in their Machine Learning (ML) supervised optimization algorithm during its training phase, to give the system ethical skills (“competences”) in its decisions. Secondly – and definitely—, it depends on the presence in an AI autonomous system of a deontic HOL “ethical reasoner” to perform an automatic, and fully transparent assessment (metalogical deontic valuation) about the decisions taken by the ethically skilled ML algorithm about the right action to execute, before executing it. Finally, we show that the proper deontic FOL and HOL for this class of artificial moral agents is Kripke’s modal relational logic, in its algebraic topological formalization. This is naturally implemented in the dissipative QFT unsupervised deep learning of our brains, based on the “doubling of the degrees of freedom” (DDF), and then in the so-called “deep-belief” artificial neural networks for the statistical data pre-processing. This unsupervised learning procedure is also compliant with the usage of the “maximin fairness principle”, used as a balancing aggregation principle of the statistical variables in Sen’s formal theory of fairness. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the possibility of giving a justification of the “semantic information” content and measure, in the framework of the recent coalgebraic approach to quantum systems and quantum computation, extended to QFT systems. In QFT, indeed, any quantum system has to be considered as an “open” system, because it is always interacting with the background fluctuations of the quantum vacuum. Namely, the Hamiltonian in QFT always includes the quantum system and its inseparable thermal bath, formally “entangled” like (...) an algebra with its coalgebra, according to the principle of the “doubling” of the degrees of freedom between them. This is the core of the representation theory of cognitive neuroscience based on QFT. Moreover, in QFT, the probabilities of the quantum states follow a Wigner distribution, based on the notion and measure of quasiprobability, where regions integrated under given expectation values do not represent mutually exclusive states. This means that a computing agent, either natural or artificial, in QFT, against the quantum Turing machine paradigm, is able to change dynamically the representation space of its computations. This depends on the possibility of interpreting QFT system computations within the framework of category theory logic and its principle of duality between opposed categories, such as the algebra and coalgebra categories of QFT. This allows us to justify and not only to suppose, like in the “theory of strong semantic information” of L. Floridi, the definition of modal “local truth” and the notion of semantic information as a measure of it, despite both measures being defined on quasiprobability distributions. (shrink)

This is a collection of new investigations and discoveries on the theory of opposition (square, hexagon, octagon, polyhedra of opposition) by the best specialists from all over the world. The papers range from historical considerations to new mathematical developments of the theory of opposition including applications to theology, theory of argumentation and metalogic.

This is a collection of new investigations and discoveries on the theory of opposition by the best specialists from all over the world. The papers range from historical considerations to new mathematical developments of the theory of opposition including applications to theology, theory of argumentation and metalogic.

In Posner & Raichle's (1994) book, two essential and strictly related limitations of cognitive neurophysiology are not sufficiently enhanced: (1) The problem of “coding,” namely the capability of a natural brain to redefine its own “basic symbols” as a function of a changing environment; (2) the inadequacy of a Hebbian rule to reckon with complex computational problems such as those solved by real brains.

This Handbook offers a broad yet unified treatment of many philosophical issues connected with climate change, ranging from foundational puzzles to detailed applications. It extends to many branches of philosophy that are relevant to the understanding of the premises and implications of the impacts of climate change on human and nonhuman life on Earth. More specifically, the handbook examines the scientific accounts of climate change as well as its causes. It explores the tools offered by social sciences and humanities to (...) study the societal premises and impacts of climate change as well as delving deeper into the ethical and political issues connected with and resulting from climate change. By doing so, it puts it all in an ecological and historical context. In addition, the book offers solutions to some important philosophical puzzles and problems, and indicates paths of interaction between philosophy and other disciplines. The discussion about climate change and the mitigation/adaptation policies spans many areas and levels – from abstract science and philosophy to current on-the-ground politics. However, climate change is also a great a philosophical puzzle. Indeed, its existential and practical relevance can be thought to largely derive from the philosophical complications it engenders. Climate change is applied philosophy par excellence. Preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change needs very good philosophy applied to concrete and specific practical issues. Climate change is an area where scholars from very different provenances should cooperate on equal terms, having in view a common, and really important, purpose – contribute to preventing great burdens and even the extinction of humankind and the destruction of hospitable and valuable non-human nature. (shrink)

Goethe en una carta de 1825 a su sobrino, Alfred Nicolovius, acuñaba un vocablo curioso destinado a definir el futuro que estaba surgiendo: veloziferisch, «velocifero», un cruzamiento entre «velocidad» y «Lucifer». Y lo describía como un tiempo que «no deja madurar nada, donde el momento siguiente se traga completamente al anterior». Será precisamente la meta hacia la cual tenderá la tentación de Mefistófeles para con Fausto, aunque al final aspirará a un «momento hermoso» y perfecto, en la práctica a la (...) eternidad, que no tiene ya la amargura de la disolución del pasado ni la pesadilla del futuro. (shrink)

This paper deals with the nature of perceptual appearances. It argues that they are objective relational properties of external objects. In perceptual experience, we are acquainted with such appearances. These are not sense data, as usually understood, and they are not identical to the properties we attribute to external objects through the usage of qualitative concepts such as ‘red’, ‘square’ and ‘sweet.’ We use such concepts in order to describe properties that are manifest in perception, not in order to describe (...) appearances. One and the same property, such as the bent shape of a stick, can appear in different ways in different contexts. None of those ways is more or less appropriate, because things simply appear the way they do. The choice of a certain context determines the normal conditions for the possession of qualitative concepts. Standard perceptual illusions are perceptual experiences. They mislead us, not because they are incorrect, but because they prompt us to use concepts that are not appropriate under the obtaining conditions. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

This Handbook offers a broad yet unified treatment of all the philosophical issues connected with climate change, ranging from foundational puzzles to detailed applications. It addresses the philosophical foundations of the discussion on the ethical, social, political and legal impacts of climate change. It covers all branches of philosophy that are relevant to the understanding of the premises and implications of the impacts on human, animal and natural life on Earth. More specifically, the Handbook examines the scientific accounts of climate (...) change as well as its causes. It explores the tools offered by social sciences and humanities to study the societal impact of climate change. It studies the ethical and political issues connected with and resulting from climate change, and puts it all in an environmental and historical context. In addition, the book offers solutions to the main philosophical puzzles and problems, and provides paths of interaction between philosophy and other disciplines. The discussion about climate change and the mitigation/adaptation policies spans many areas and levels – from abstract science and philosophy to current on-the-ground politics. However, climate change is also a great a philosophical puzzle. Indeed, its existential and practical relevance can be thought to largely derive from the philosophical complications it engenders. Climate change is applied philosophy par excellence. Preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change needs very good philosophy applied to concrete and specific practical issues. Climate change is an area where scholars from very different provenances should cooperate on equal terms, having in view a common, and really important, purpose – contribute to preventing great burdens and even the extinction of humankind and the destruction of hospitable and valuable non-human nature. (shrink)

A experiência da conversão é habitualmente ligada ao contexto religioso.Contudo, autores como Pierre Hadot e Michel Foucault destacaram a presença de uma conversão filosófica, ao longo dos séculos. Se é possível verificar como nas tradições apocalípticas de caráter religioso se instaura uma conversão que visa alcançar uma manutenção do mundo em épocas de crise, também no contexto filosófico a diagnose nietzscheana do niilismo foi seguida por experiências filosóficas, como as de Simone Weil e de Georges Bataille, que visam a definição (...) de uma vida filosófica capaz de enfrentar o apocalipse. Através da abordagem do antropólogo Ernesto De Martino, tentarei mostrar, por um lado, o caráter apocalíptico-cultural do niilismo, e, por outro, como uma conversão filosófica, enquanto experiência interior, pode encarar este hóspede do nosso tempo. (shrink)

This is a brief historical note on game theory. We cover its historical roots (prior to its formal definition in 1944), and look at its development until the late 1960's.

Direct realism with respect to perceptual experiences has two facets, an epistemological one and a metaphysical one. From the epistemological point of view it involves the claim that perceptual experiences provide immediate justification. From the metaphysical point of view it involves the claim that in perceptual experience we enter into direct contact with items in the external world. In a more radical formulation, often associated with naive realism, the metaphysical conception of direct realism involves the idea that perceptual experiences depend (...) on the items in the external world they are related to. This paper describes a simple account that makes room for immediate justification provided by perceptual experience. The simple account establishes an explanatory relation between the justificatory role of a perceptual experience and the fact that such an experience provides a reason for a belief. The account is evaluated in the light of some objections. Different ways to react to those objections are discussed. It will appear that in order to preserve the explanatory relation established by the simple account, one has to accept naive realism. By breaking the connection between reason and justification, on the other side, one jeopardizes the possibility for perceptual experience to deliver immediate justification. (shrink)

In Heidegger’s thought, it is possible to recognize an accurate reflection about the pain that afflicts modern man, as well as a particular indication for its cure. In pain, man experiences his being destined to metaphysics like something incurable, which requires to think the topology of the gift of being. Pain and convalescence will be exposed in that topology, under the light of The Turn [die Kehre], The Event [Ereignis] and the line between Overcoming [Überwindung] and Twisting [Verwindung] of Metaphysics, (...) in order to recognize that, in Heidegger’s reflection, it is in pain “itself” where the cure of the incurable can be possible: the passion of human finitude, the experience of the giving of being and the care of nothingness. Before overcoming [überwunden] the Metaphysics, with its intention of appropriate the being, Metaphsyisics must be reestablished [verwunden] in its inappropriate truth. (shrink)