A mecânica quântica instituiu uma linguagem matemática inteiramente inédita. Essa mudança na física exigiu que físicos e filósofos repensassem os conceitos pelos quais se podiam representar a realidade, uma vez que as noções clássicas se revelaram limitadas na compreensão dos fenômenos atômicos. O filósofo francês G. Bachelard e o físico alemão W. Heisenberg são autores que discorreram acerca das grandes modificações que ocorreram no seio da física, e, com isso, trataram do problema da linguagem na mecânica quântica. Neste artigo, (...) o objetivo é recorrer aos argumentos de ambos os autores para evidenciar relações entre suas ideias acerca da temática referida. Destaca-se que Bachelard e Heisenberg criticam a aplicação da linguagem usual e dos conceitos filosóficos da modernidade na nova física, mas, mediante sua noção de ruptura, o filósofo francês propõe que a mecânica quântica se restrinja à linguagem matemática. Ideia esta que vai contra ao princípio de complementaridade de Bohr, admitido por Heisenberg na compreensão dos fenômenos quânticos e para uma interpretação da física quântica. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the relation between problems and the formation and development of concepts in Bergson’s work, as well as in Bachelard, Canguilhem and Deleuze. Building on work by Elie During, I argue that it is not only Bergson but also Deleuze who shares with the French epistemological tradition an “anti-positivist” conception of concept formation, founded upon the posing and solving of novel problems as opposed to the acquisition and verification of empirical facts. Contrary to During, however, I (...) argue that it is not Bergson but Deleuze who furnishes us with an “anti-positivist” conception of problems that is adequate to this anti-positivist conception of concept formation. Deleuze’s anti-positivist view of problems holds, firstly, that genuine problems require the creation of novel terms in which to state and solve them. He shares this view with Bergson, Bachelard and Canguilhem. Secondly, however, Deleuze holds that a problem’s “truth” is not to be evaluated with reference to its eventual solutions, nor with reference to some privileged and contentful experience of reality, but is rather a matter of its purely intrinsic productivity. (shrink)

Le philosophe français G. Bachelard est né à la fin du siècle dernier et est mort en octobre 1962, après un destin intellectuel très brillant. Par sa vie d'éternel étudiant, c'est-à-dire en état de recyclage continu, par sa culture finalement polyvalente et par son œuvre multidisciplinaire, ce philosophe et ce savant nous apparaît aujourd'hui comme un témoin très lucide, exceptionnel même, d'une époque bouleversée, et comme un interprète génial, un prophète en quelque sorte, dont la voix connaît une influence (...) chaque jour grandissante. Il nous apparaît aussi comme un médecin et un éducateur pour l'homme d'aujourd'hui. Le renouveau culturel que sa pensée suscite est à bien des égards analogue à l'avènement en Occident de la culture cartésienne, et précisément complémentaire de celle-ci devenue aujourd'hui gravement insufissante. (shrink)

Outside France the epistemology of G. Bachelard is unknown ; in France his influence is considerable, especially on philosophers like L. Althusser, M. Foucault, G. Canguilhem, J. Hyppolite, M. Serres, G. G. Granger, D. Lecourt and many others. Bachelard occupies a strategic point on the crossroads of all theoretical debates concerning science. The fact that he seems to give satisfactory answers on the problems which have risen after the breakdown of the logical-positivistic philosophy of science, justifies an exposition (...) and evaluation of his original contribution to philosophy. The author distinguishes the following items. 1. The determination of Bachelards philosophy as a scientific philosophy which is wedded to a history of the sciences, especially the natural sciences. 2. The 'systematicity' as the criterium of science against other, traditional, criteria like empiricalness, logical deducibility, correspondence with reality and so on. 3. The rectification-principle : the formation of a scientific system cannot be conceived otherwise than as the restructuring or reorganisation of the ruling system or system-sets. 4. The transformation of scientific knowledge shows many discontinuities in all its phases and branches. Bachelard calls them ruptures. 5. The translation of a theory into another, more coherent and comprehensive one, is baptised as a 'dialectisation' of the concept. By a dialectisation a system is both generalised and specified. Formal logic, which is based on identity and the principle of the excluded middle, is not able to interprete this dynamic aspect of scientific thinking. 6. Central in Bachelards philosophy is also the concept of recurrence. Each new organisation of the scientific system (global or partial) sheds new light on their history and their logical foundations. History has to be rewritten after each progress. Recurrence, however, also has systematic implications. Science always desimplifies its own evidences. 7. The scientist has to demolish the obstacles which he made himself by surcharging the content of the concepts not in use and by not assimilating them in the system. 8. Bachelards philosophy of science is both idealistic and realistic ; the phenomenology becomes phenomenotechnique under the hands and in the brains of the scientist. 9. He always denies (negativity) the earlier theories and objects by incorporating them in new relationships. 10. This constructive aspect of theory formation is the same in natural science and mathematics. Bachelard opposes the logical-positivistic idea that these are methodically dissimilar. In a critical commentary the author discusses the question of 'dialectical logic' in the sciences, in relation to some recent research in this field by I. Lakatos en Errol E. Harris. In his opinion the epistemology of Bachelard affords a creative renewal of the understanding of science, although further research is needed in many aspects. (shrink)

Se establece un diálogo hermenéutico entre las concurrencias y bifurcaciones del idealismo simbólico de Cassirer y el racionalismo alado de Bachelard en tres momentos. Primero, a partir de indicios bio-bibliográficos se construye el contexto de significación vital donde se anclan sus respectivas ideas; segundo, se establecen entre ellos paralelismos fundamentales, y, tercero, se ofrecen ejemplos de la terminología bachelardiana, cercana a la hermenéutica simbólica contemporánea. Con ello se expande la comprensión de los análisis de Cassirer acerca del pensamiento indirecto (...) e interpretativo hacia las relaciones del hombre y la cultura, así como al papel del símbolo en el tránsito de la naturaleza a la cultura. The article establishes a hermeneutical dialogue between the convergences and divergences of Cassirer's symbolic idealism and Bachelard's winged rationalism. First, on the basis of bio-bibliographical evidence, it reconstructs the context of vital signification in which the authors' respective ideas are rooted; secondly, it identifies the fundamental parallelisms between them; and, finally, it provides examples of Bachelardian terminology that resembles that of contemporary symbolic hermeneutics. This results in a broader understanding Cassirer's analyses of indirect and interpretive thought regarding the relations between man and culture, as well as of the role of the symbol in the shift form nature to culture. (shrink)

Se establece un diálogo hermenéutico entre las concurrencias y bifurcaciones del idealismo simbólico de Cassirer y el racionalismo alado de Bachelard en tres mo mentos. Primero, a partir de indicios bio-bibliográficos se construye el contexto de significación vital donde se anclan sus respectivas ideas; segundo, se establecen entre ellos paralelismos fundamentales, y, tercero, se ofrecen ejemplos de la terminología bachelardiana, cercana a la hermenéutica simbólica contemporánea. Con ello se ex pande la comprensión de los análisis de Cassirer acerca del (...) pensamiento indirecto e interpretativo hacia las relaciones del hombre y la cultura, así como al papel del símbolo en el tránsito de la naturaleza a la cultura. (shrink)

The essays in this volume discuss the life and work of French philosopher Gaston Bachelard, exploring the context of his thought, the relationship between his work on science and on poetry, and his approach to language. Contents: include: 1. "Bachelard in the Context of a Century of Philosophy of Science," by Colin Smith; 2. "Gaston Bachelard: Phenomenologist of Modern Science," by Alfons Grieder; 3. "Gaston Bachelard and Ferdinand Gonseth: Philosophers of Scientific Dialectics," by Henri Lauener; 4. (...) "Science and Poetry in the Ontology of Human Freedom: Bachelard's Account of the Poetic and the Scientific Imagination," by Noel Parker; 5. "Bachelard and the Refusal of Metaphor," by Jean-Claude Margolin; 6. "The Place of Alchemy in Bachelard's Oneiric Criticism," by John G. Clark; "Unfixing the Subject: Gaston Bachelard and Reading," by Mary McAllester. Co-published with the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to show the importance of transferring metaphors from our aesthetic experiences to social praxis. I will therefore focus on reverberation, a phenomenon in the perceptual field of sound, to argue that it offers a deep understanding of social experiences. Reverberation is a secondary concept in Paul Ricœur's hermeneutic phenomenology, but it plays a crucial role in his analysis of imagination. Firstly, I will examine Ricœur's analysis of the phenomenon of reverberation within the framework of his (...) phenomenology of imagination. Secondly, I will read Ricœur's reference to G. Bachelard, considering the reverberation in the poetic image. Thirdly, I will study his reference to E. Minkowski, who thinks about reverberation within a cosmological scope. Finally, based on these analyses, I will outline the transfer of the phenomenon of reverberation to the field of social praxis. (shrink)

This article provides an overview of the historical and philosophical context from which originated G. Bachelard's concept of "phenomenotechnique". It analyzes why phenomenotechnique is crucial for science studies. By incorporating the concept of phenomenotechnique into Hacking's and Galison's models of science, I argue that we can avoid the radicalism of both while also preventing the analysis of scientific practices from collapsing into the interpretive frames mandated by social constructivists.

"Dans les années 1960, Gilbert Durand, marqué par Gaston Bachelard, a développé une conception globale, complexe, transdisciplinaire de l'imagination, centrée sur le mythe langagier et les langages visuels. Parallèlement à Claude Lévi-Strauss, qui mettait en avant la notion de structure mythique et d'enracinement neuronal de la culture, G. Durand opta pour un "structuralisme figuratif" où la signification des images, tout en s'enracinant dans le biologique, relevait aussi d'une symbolisation, plus proche des psychanalyses et de G. Bachelard que de (...) la sémiotique. L'imagination et ses œuvres individuelles et collectives sont la résultante d'un "trajet anthropologique" qui s'étend des soubassements neurobiologiques aux matrices des mythes sociaux et religieux et vice versa. Plus de cinquante ans après, les avancées des sciences physiques et biologiques, neurologiques et cognitives permettent de jeter un regard nouveau sur l'ensemble des fonctions mentales, ainsi que sur les théories modernes du vivant et du cerveau. En quoi ces savoirs nouveaux éclairent-ils l'imagination et l'imaginaire, dans quelle mesure viennent-ils converger avec les références anciennes de G. Durand, quelle nouvelle anthropologie post-durandienne de l'imaginaire peut-on voir émerger?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The question of whether it is possible to philosophize outside the categories of rationalist philosophy is not limited to methodology. It has ideological overtones. Namely, the rationalism that has developed in philosophy in modern times, after Descartes, is inevitably supplemented by mechanics. The world is seen as a machine, the living is reduced to mechanisms. Rationalism becomes a machine of mentality. Taking it as a model of normal thinking, giving it a universal value, we thereby impose Western way of thinking (...) on other cultures with a different mentality. The question, therefore, is not about the method of scientific knowledge but about the power realized through the transformation of mentality. Scientific knowledge conquers space. Philosophy produces a transformation of mentality. New rationalism, according to G. Bachelard, is in dialectical relation with the usual realism of the natural Sciences. In this process, there is the implementation of new schemes developed in the complex interaction of “ratio” and experiment. Modern science is the collective creation of a new reality. This is the reality of the “picture of the world.” There is another view of science, rationalism and modern philosophy. According to him, rationalism is dualism, atomism and social individualism. These features reveal the anti-traditional and anti-metaphysical spirit of modern Western civilization. The traditional approach is non-duality, unity provided by metaphysical principles. The new rationalism in science is characterized by the belief in the infinite progress of knowledge. But knowledge itself, from the point of view of tradition, is devoid of great value. Philosophy uses categories of ancient Greek philosophy or German classical philosophy, but they cannot be considered universal. They corresponded not only to the time and place, the conditions in which they arose, but also to the characteristic mentality of the peoples and individuals who created them. They are not suitable for understanding the metaphysical doctrines of traditional cultures. The language of traditional cultures is symbolic and synthetic in contrast to the analytical language of Western science and philosophy. (shrink)

Présentation de la spécificité de l'épistémologie en France, entre philosophie de la connaissance et philosophie des sciences, à travers un panorama de son histoire depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, de ses grands courants et de ses grandes figures : A. Comte, A. Cournot, C. Bernard, G. Bachelard, H. Poincaré, etc.

Phenomenology, New Materialism, and Advances In the Pulsatile Imaginary: Rites Of Disimagination brings together scholars from art history and image theory, literary studies and philosophy. Chapters of this volume engage with the overarching theme of imagination as a pulsatile force embedded in words, images, and all imaginative modes of instantiation of the work of art in their elemental aspects, expressed in visual arts, and literature, as well as bodily schemata of choreographic and musical performances. The papers employ contrasting and complementing (...) methods from literary studies and image theory, especially phenomenology and new materialism, such as G. Bachelard and M. Merleau-Ponty, G. Bataille, J. Kristeva, P. Lacoue-Labarthe and J. Sallis, G. Didi-Huberman, H. Belting and A. Warburg, J. Bennett and Jason M. Wirth, as well as performance studies. Chapters in this volume inquire into the imaginative forces that disrupt and disinhibit the traditional habits of imagination to create pulsatile imaginaries, i.e., a dynamic process of “emergence-resurgence” of image manifested in the act of creation and in perception. This process does not properly imply a destruction of image, but rather a withdrawal of image from the realm of representation to give way to new images and new imaginative experiences. The newly coined term “rite of disimagination” points out to this operation, consecutively implying imagining and disimaging that both denies, as well as validates image – it valorizes matter. The affirmation of the materiality of image is “the re-incarnation of image.”. (shrink)

English summary: The collected essays in this volume examine the question of experience and consciousness in philosophy, from the ancient Greeks, Descartes, and German Idealism, to contemporary phenomenology. French description: Ce volume est consacre au concept de phenomene. Les etudes rassemblees se proposent de contribuer a son intelligence en revenant sur quelques-uns des moments les plus marquants de son histoire, sans pretendre a l'exhaustivite. L'ouvrage s'ouvre par deux etudes de philosophie antique. Arnaud Mace restitue tout d'abord la problematique seminale du (...) phenomene, telle qu'elle s'elabore chez les presocratiques (Homere, Anaxagore, Parmenide) et chez Platon. Baptiste Bondu etudie ensuite la question du phenomene dans l'ecole stoicienne. Suivent deux contributions qui expose, pour l'une, la philosophie cartesienne des phenomenes (Delphine Bellis) et examine, pour l'autre, les principes et les difficultes du phenomenisme de Berkeley (Luc Peterschmitt). Deux articles attestent du renouvellement de l'approche philosophique des phenomenes dans l'idealisme allemand. Francois Calori rappelle le role decisif joue par le criticisme et explicite la definition kantienne du phenomene comme objet indetermine d'une intuition empirique. Comme le souligne Olivier Tinland, Hegel compose avec le legs de la philosophie kantienne tout en deplacant le site meme de la reflexion conduite sur les phenomenes, puisqu'il refere desormais l'apparaitre a une idealite objective. Concernant la periode contemporaine, Laurent Perreau examine la redefinition du concept de phenomene operee par la phenomenologie husserlienne. Enfin, la contribution de Vincent Bontems est consacree a la philosophie de G. Bachelard: informee des developpements historiques de la science physique, cette derniere voit dans le phenomene le produit d'une construction a la fois theorique et experimentale. (shrink)

The philosophical thought of Perelman is characterized with criticism of all philosophies seeking the first, unshakable and absolute principles. Such philosophies are trying to attain their aim among others through referring to obviousness. The trends of this kind are characteristic for classical rationalism (e.g. Cartesian philosophy). R. Descartes thinks that cognizance worthy of being called "knowledge" should be such cognizance, which is characterized with perfection and homogeneousness. Perelman rejects existence of absolute criteria and emphasizes that a cognizing mind is shaped (...) by the intellectual tradition and education. Philosophical cognizance is able to improve and change itself continually when it is supported by certain reasons. The Belgian philosopher's thought resembles, in many respects, the concepts of the so-called new rationalism (F. Gonseth, G. Bachelard, J. Piaget). Simultaneously, however, Perelman stresses the fact of irreducibility of philosophy to science as philosophical problems are characterized with constant contestability, controversial character, and openness to new solutions. Generally speaking, the philosophical thought in question may be called "antiabsolutist" and "pluralistic". (shrink)

In what sense can the sciences be said to constitute a (set of) specific cultural tradition(s) within broader culture? This is the proper way of posing the problem of the 'two cultures' today. For G. Bachelard the opposition between 'poem' and 'theorem' was fundamental, the elements of poetical imagination being radically different from the symbolical constructions of conceptual invention. In this article a sophisticated version of this point of view is proposed. The nowadays popular attempts to bridge all gaps (...) between the cultures by an appeal to creative imagination ('science as art', 'mathematics and poetry') are criticized. The real basis of considering research traditions nevertheless as cultural realities in a nontrivial sense is not to be found in a mediation between cognitive faculties, but has to be revealed by a comparative analysis of their respective products. In fact, science, as well as other cultural practices, is subject to variations of style (Granger, Hacking ...). Research styles are not in the first place due to external, sociological determinants, but to such factors as the necessity of individuating any idea in a work, the presence of changing images of science within each discipline, and the fundamental role of the not-yet-explicit, given the specific temporal structure of conceptual innovation with its „essential tension” (Kuhn) between the old and the new. (shrink)

This text represents comments to the article by T.D. Sokolova “Conceptualization of scientific progress. A Case of Historical Epistemology”. Her article combines the concepts of differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge, on the one hand, and the concept of the progress of science interpreted by the historical epistemology of G. Bachelard, on the other, which ultimately is designed to solve the “paradox of interdisciplinarity” and the problem of disciplinary separation of scientific knowledge. The problem posed is highly significant for (...) understanding modern science. At the same time, its formulation can be elaborated and even reformulated, and its premises clarified, since they themselves are the subject of extensive discussions. To do this, it is necessary to revise the widely known definitions of interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity in such a way as to detect the value-worldview content relevant to science as a socio-cultural system that includes the idea of progress. (shrink)

_ _From the frozen landscapes of the Antarctic to the haunted houses of childhood, the memory of places we experience is fundamental to a sense of self. Drawing on influences as diverse as Merleau-Ponty, Freud, and J. G. Ballard, _The Memory of Place___ __charts the memorial landscape that is written into the body and its experience of the world._ Dylan Trigg’s _The Memory of Place_ _ __offers a lively and original intervention into contemporary debates within “place studies,” an interdisciplinary field (...) at the intersection of philosophy, geography, architecture, urban design, and environmental studies. Through a series of provocative investigations, Trigg analyzes monuments in the representation of public memory; “transitional” contexts, such as airports and highway rest stops; and the “ruins” of both memory and place in sites such as Auschwitz. While developing these original analyses, Trigg engages in thoughtful and innovative ways with the philosophical and literary tradition, from Gaston Bachelard to Pierre Nora, H. P. Lovecraft to Martin Heidegger. Breathing a strange new life into phenomenology, _The Memory of Place___ __argues that the eerie disquiet of the uncanny is at the core of the remembering body, and thus of ourselves. The result is a compelling and novel rethinking of memory and place that should spark new conversations across the field of place studies. Edward S. Casey, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Stony Brook University and widely recognized as the leading scholar on phenomenology of place, calls _The Memory of Place _“genuinely unique and a signal addition to phenomenological literature. It fills a significant gap, and it does so with eloquence and force.” He predicts that Trigg’s book will be “immediately recognized as a major original work in phenomenology.”. (shrink)

RésuméCet article a été inspiré par l'opposition qui semble exister entre les deux grands courants animant l'œuvre de M. Bachelard.Les auteurs rappellent la différence existant entre une organisation predicative et une organisation dialectique de la connaissance. La connaissance objective est de structure dialectique. Il en résulte que l'évolution de cette connaissance s'accompagne d'un processus obligé de dévalorisation et de revalorisation relative de ses formes antérieures.Ce même processus rend aussi compte des rapports de la pensée poétique et de la pensée (...) objective et scientifique.Dans cette perspective, l'unité d'inspiration de l'œuvre de M. Bachelard est parfaitement évidente. — F. et J.‐P. G. (shrink)

The analysis of philosophically important themes can depart from two different angles. The first one investigates the various answers that have been given to a certain issue, like that of the problem of knowledge, the justification of theories, the notion of culture, etcetera. These answers are often mutually contradictory which, by the way, facilitates their overview (like the schemes of rationalism-empiricism, justification-discovery, universalism-relativism). A second approach starts from the problems (or: “problematique”) behind the divergent answers (e.g., foundationalism behind both, empiricism (...) and rationalism).In the following sections the issue of discovery is discussed. Here the second line of approach has been followed, not only by making visible a same problematique, but more by trying to set out the common context of the discussion about context of discovery and context of justification. The idea is that this discussion, or better the shift taking place in that discussion, finds its reason in a context in which the distance between traditional methodology and contemporary scientific practice, also between scientific knowledge and the experience of reality has become greater. This is related to the deepening awareness of the cultural context of scientific method. Man and world, scientific method and cultural context are always interacting.From this point of view quite different philosophical approaches show nevertheless similar features pointing to new solutions. A more psychological approach to scientific method (like: Gordon's and Grmek's, even perhaps Gutting's reinterpretation of Popper) and a sociological one (e.g., Barnes, Bloor, and already Durkheim) are opposed to a more logically structured analysis of Nagel, Hempel, and also Popper. Nevertheless the view on the flexibility of scientific method defended along different lines by for instance Achinstein, Bachelard, Hesse, Piaget, Polanyi, Toulmin manifests a certain convergence in those divergent standpoints, the more so since often the cultural context of science is being stressed (e.g., Ladriére, Prigogine, Needham).The miscellany of philosophical orientations, presented in the following sections, can in this way perhaps give profile to deeper tendencies: to relate again scientific method to the context of culture and of human strategy in general. This does not blend, however, the distinction between context of justification and context of discovery. By changing their roles a new overview of this dilemma becomes possible. There is no juxtaposition of both, nor has the one to be absorbed by the other. The conclusion will be that there are still two contexts, but that one is wider, less defined and demarcated from the wider field of daily culture, and that the other is more restricted, functioning as a kind of safetydevice on behalf of the wider strategy of discovery. In such a way discovery is regarded as the wider context of the more restricted context of justification. (shrink)