This paper critically examines the relation between problems and the formation and development of concepts in Bergson’s work, as well as in Bachelard, Canguilhem and Deleuze. Building on work by Elie During, I argue that it is not only Bergson but also Deleuze who shares with the French epistemological tradition an “anti-positivist” conception of concept formation, founded upon the posing and solving of novel problems as opposed to the acquisition and verification of empirical facts. Contrary to During, however, I (...) argue that it is not Bergson but Deleuze who furnishes us with an “anti-positivist” conception of problems that is adequate to this anti-positivist conception of concept formation. Deleuze’s anti-positivist view of problems holds, firstly, that genuine problems require the creation of novel terms in which to state and solve them. He shares this view with Bergson, Bachelard and Canguilhem. Secondly, however, Deleuze holds that a problem’s “truth” is not to be evaluated with reference to its eventual solutions, nor with reference to some privileged and contentful experience of reality, but is rather a matter of its purely intrinsic productivity. (shrink)

This paper examines Bohdan Boichuk’s poetry by looking into the role his childhood memories played in forming his poetic imagination. Displaced by World War II, the poet displays a unique capacity to transcend his traumatic experiences by engaging in creative writing. Eyewitnessing war atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis does not destroy his belief in the healing power of poetry; on the contrary, it makes him appreciate poetry as the only existentially worthy enterprise. Invoking Gaston Bachelard’s classic work The Poetics (...) of Reveries: Childhood, Language, and the Cosmos, I argue that Boichuk’s vivid childhood memories, however painful they might be, helped him poetically recreate and reimagine fateful moments of his migrant life. (shrink)

A mecânica quântica instituiu uma linguagem matemática inteiramente inédita. Essa mudança na física exigiu que físicos e filósofos repensassem os conceitos pelos quais se podiam representar a realidade, uma vez que as noções clássicas se revelaram limitadas na compreensão dos fenômenos atômicos. O filósofo francês G. Bachelard e o físico alemão W. Heisenberg são autores que discorreram acerca das grandes modificações que ocorreram no seio da física, e, com isso, trataram do problema da linguagem na mecânica quântica. Neste artigo, (...) o objetivo é recorrer aos argumentos de ambos os autores para evidenciar relações entre suas ideias acerca da temática referida. Destaca-se que Bachelard e Heisenberg criticam a aplicação da linguagem usual e dos conceitos filosóficos da modernidade na nova física, mas, mediante sua noção de ruptura, o filósofo francês propõe que a mecânica quântica se restrinja à linguagem matemática. Ideia esta que vai contra ao princípio de complementaridade de Bohr, admitido por Heisenberg na compreensão dos fenômenos quânticos e para uma interpretação da física quântica. (shrink)

Le philosophe français G. Bachelard est né à la fin du siècle dernier et est mort en octobre 1962, après un destin intellectuel très brillant. Par sa vie d'éternel étudiant, c'est-à-dire en état de recyclage continu, par sa culture finalement polyvalente et par son œuvre multidisciplinaire, ce philosophe et ce savant nous apparaît aujourd'hui comme un témoin très lucide, exceptionnel même, d'une époque bouleversée, et comme un interprète génial, un prophète en quelque sorte, dont la voix connaît une influence (...) chaque jour grandissante. Il nous apparaît aussi comme un médecin et un éducateur pour l'homme d'aujourd'hui. Le renouveau culturel que sa pensée suscite est à bien des égards analogue à l'avènement en Occident de la culture cartésienne, et précisément complémentaire de celle-ci devenue aujourd'hui gravement insufissante. (shrink)

Outside France the epistemology of G. Bachelard is unknown ; in France his influence is considerable, especially on philosophers like L. Althusser, M. Foucault, G. Canguilhem, J. Hyppolite, M. Serres, G. G. Granger, D. Lecourt and many others. Bachelard occupies a strategic point on the crossroads of all theoretical debates concerning science. The fact that he seems to give satisfactory answers on the problems which have risen after the breakdown of the logical-positivistic philosophy of science, justifies an exposition (...) and evaluation of his original contribution to philosophy. The author distinguishes the following items. 1. The determination of Bachelards philosophy as a scientific philosophy which is wedded to a history of the sciences, especially the natural sciences. 2. The 'systematicity' as the criterium of science against other, traditional, criteria like empiricalness, logical deducibility, correspondence with reality and so on. 3. The rectification-principle : the formation of a scientific system cannot be conceived otherwise than as the restructuring or reorganisation of the ruling system or system-sets. 4. The transformation of scientific knowledge shows many discontinuities in all its phases and branches. Bachelard calls them ruptures. 5. The translation of a theory into another, more coherent and comprehensive one, is baptised as a 'dialectisation' of the concept. By a dialectisation a system is both generalised and specified. Formal logic, which is based on identity and the principle of the excluded middle, is not able to interprete this dynamic aspect of scientific thinking. 6. Central in Bachelards philosophy is also the concept of recurrence. Each new organisation of the scientific system (global or partial) sheds new light on their history and their logical foundations. History has to be rewritten after each progress. Recurrence, however, also has systematic implications. Science always desimplifies its own evidences. 7. The scientist has to demolish the obstacles which he made himself by surcharging the content of the concepts not in use and by not assimilating them in the system. 8. Bachelards philosophy of science is both idealistic and realistic ; the phenomenology becomes phenomenotechnique under the hands and in the brains of the scientist. 9. He always denies (negativity) the earlier theories and objects by incorporating them in new relationships. 10. This constructive aspect of theory formation is the same in natural science and mathematics. Bachelard opposes the logical-positivistic idea that these are methodically dissimilar. In a critical commentary the author discusses the question of 'dialectical logic' in the sciences, in relation to some recent research in this field by I. Lakatos en Errol E. Harris. In his opinion the epistemology of Bachelard affords a creative renewal of the understanding of science, although further research is needed in many aspects. (shrink)

Se establece un diálogo hermenéutico entre las concurrencias y bifurcaciones del idealismo simbólico de Cassirer y el racionalismo alado de Bachelard en tres momentos. Primero, a partir de indicios bio-bibliográficos se construye el contexto de significación vital donde se anclan sus respectivas ideas; segundo, se establecen entre ellos paralelismos fundamentales, y, tercero, se ofrecen ejemplos de la terminología bachelardiana, cercana a la hermenéutica simbólica contemporánea. Con ello se expande la comprensión de los análisis de Cassirer acerca del pensamiento indirecto (...) e interpretativo hacia las relaciones del hombre y la cultura, así como al papel del símbolo en el tránsito de la naturaleza a la cultura. The article establishes a hermeneutical dialogue between the convergences and divergences of Cassirer's symbolic idealism and Bachelard's winged rationalism. First, on the basis of bio-bibliographical evidence, it reconstructs the context of vital signification in which the authors' respective ideas are rooted; secondly, it identifies the fundamental parallelisms between them; and, finally, it provides examples of Bachelardian terminology that resembles that of contemporary symbolic hermeneutics. This results in a broader understanding Cassirer's analyses of indirect and interpretive thought regarding the relations between man and culture, as well as of the role of the symbol in the shift form nature to culture. (shrink)

Se establece un diálogo hermenéutico entre las concurrencias y bifurcaciones del idealismo simbólico de Cassirer y el racionalismo alado de Bachelard en tres mo mentos. Primero, a partir de indicios bio-bibliográficos se construye el contexto de significación vital donde se anclan sus respectivas ideas; segundo, se establecen entre ellos paralelismos fundamentales, y, tercero, se ofrecen ejemplos de la terminología bachelardiana, cercana a la hermenéutica simbólica contemporánea. Con ello se ex pande la comprensión de los análisis de Cassirer acerca del (...) pensamiento indirecto e interpretativo hacia las relaciones del hombre y la cultura, así como al papel del símbolo en el tránsito de la naturaleza a la cultura. (shrink)

Si l'on veut bien définir le rationalisme comme une pensée d'organisation, on devra lui accorder une matière à organiser, des éléments à assembler, des expériences à ajuster. On devra le juger au terme même de cette organisation, après son effort synthétique, après son travail de mise en ordre. Il y a peu de justice à le taxer d'incapacité à propos d'une analyse de ce qu'il prend comme éléments de sa construction. Autant dire que le rationalisme est une philosophie fonctionnelle, une (...) philosophie d'opérations - ou plutôt, comme nous le montrerons plus explicitement dans notre livre sur la Mécanique ondulatoire, une philosophie d'opérateurs. Ce n'est pas une philosophie existentielle. Le rationalisme ne prétend pas pénétrer dans l'individualité d'une existence. Il ne commence à penser qu'en établissant des relations. (shrink)

The essays in this volume discuss the life and work of French philosopher Gaston Bachelard, exploring the context of his thought, the relationship between his work on science and on poetry, and his approach to language. Contents: include: 1. "Bachelard in the Context of a Century of Philosophy of Science," by Colin Smith; 2. "Gaston Bachelard: Phenomenologist of Modern Science," by Alfons Grieder; 3. "Gaston Bachelard and Ferdinand Gonseth: Philosophers of Scientific Dialectics," by Henri Lauener; 4. (...) "Science and Poetry in the Ontology of Human Freedom: Bachelard's Account of the Poetic and the Scientific Imagination," by Noel Parker; 5. "Bachelard and the Refusal of Metaphor," by Jean-Claude Margolin; 6. "The Place of Alchemy in Bachelard's Oneiric Criticism," by John G. Clark; "Unfixing the Subject: Gaston Bachelard and Reading," by Mary McAllester. Co-published with the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology. (shrink)

Pour Gaston Bachelard, le « non » signifie dépasser et compléter le savoir antérieur, la philosophie de la connaissance scientifique doit englober les contradictions. Il établit le profil épistémologique de l’évolution, du réalisme naïf au surrationalisme en passant par le rationalisme classique et élargit le domaine de l’intuition à ce qu’il appelle une « intuition travaillée»s’exerçant dans un espace non analytique.

En 32 romans, publiés entre 1934 et 1982, cet auteur d'origine australienne a élaboré autour de son protagoniste principal, l'inspecteur Roderick Allen de Scotland Yard, un ensemble de romans policiers d'enquête dans la meilleure tradition britannique.

Dans ce premier ecrit qu'est sa these principale (1927), Bachelard etudie le processus d'affinement de la connaissance scientifique. Le role de la connaissance approchee est defini dans les sciences experimentales, ou le degre de precision, confronte au contingent et a l'indivisible, atteint necessairement une limite; ainsi que dans les sciences mathematiques qui, soumises a ce meme fractionnement epistemologique et ontologique, se pretent neanmoins a une approximation illimitee, puisque l'infini mathematique permet de creer toujours de nouveaux etres irrationnels assurant la (...) continuite de l'indefini des nombres rationnels. Par consequent, on atteint jamais qu'un fait rectifie et provisoire. La connaissance de la realite se verifie progressivement a chacune de ses acquisitions, et cette rectification constitue la veritable realite epistemologique, car elle exprime la pensee dans son dynamisme profond: l'approximation, c'est l'objectivation inachevee, mais c'est l'objectivation prudente, feconde, vraiment rationnelle puisqu'elle est a la fois consciente de son insuffisance et de son progres. En marge des debats du pragmatisme, les concepts de realite et de verite sont investis d'un sens nouveau par une philosophie de l'inexact. (shrink)

The publication of FRAGMENTS OF A POETICS OF FIRE is a milestone in Bachelard studies that will influence the way we think about his themes & method for a long time to come. Dissatisfied with his earlier attempt to come to terms with the element of fire in "The Psychoanalysis of Fire" (1937), Bachelard returned to this theme in the book he was working on at the time of his death in 1962. Because of delays in &, eventually, (...) the abandonment of a projected edition of his complete works, these FRAGMENTS OF A POETICS OF FIRE remained unpublished & their very existence unknown to all but a handful of Bachelard's readers. The author's daughter, Suzanne Bachelard, edited them for separate publication over a quarter-century later in 1988. For the first time we have an insight into the way Bachelard constructed his remarkable books. Miss Bachelard's introduction & extensive notes are an indispensable guide to the workings of his mind as "he shapes a meandering series of observations on the phoenix, Prometheus, & Empedocles into a coherent & engaging structure that respects the fluidity & openness of a living image - the powerful image of fire.". (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

Utilisant les concepts psychanalytiques, l'auteur montre comment, dans la science, le language constitue le véhicule privilégié de l'anthropomorphisme et comment les projections affectives constituent autant d'obstacles épistémiologiques à son développement.

Meillassoux seeks knowledge of transcendental reality, blaming Kant for the ‘correlationist’ proscription of independent access to either thought or being. For Meillassoux, correlationism blocks an account of the meaning of ‘ancestral statements’ regarding reality prior to humans. I examine three charges on which Meillassoux’s argument depends: (1) Kant distorts ancestral statements’ meaning; (2) Kant fallaciously infers causality’s necessity; (3) Kant’s transcendental idealism cannot grasp ‘the great outdoors’. I reject these charges: (1) imposes a Cartesian misreading, hence Meillassoux’s false assumption that, (...) for Kant, objects don’t exist without subjects; (2) misreads Kant, who infers causality’s necessity from the possibility of experience; (3) casts Kant’s idealism as subjective, ignoring his perspectival portrayal of it. (shrink)

The metaphysics of dust -- Realist atomism -- Problems of the composition of phenomena -- Positivist atomism -- Critical atomism -- Axiomatic atomism.