The following article examines the theoretical foundations and practical consequences of Slavoj Žižek's critique of Foucauldian discourse analysis. It does so by uncovering Žižek's idiosyncratic approach to the question of ideology critique. The aim of our investigation is twofold. First, we attempt to demonstrate the implications of Foucault's failure to theorize the generative principle of sociosymbolic formations; second, we argue that by conceiving the Real of class antagonism as the disavowed core of ideological fantasy, Žižek rectifies Foucault's inconsistency while simultaneously (...) opening up a vital political space for the reconceptualization of the paradigm of ideology critique. Our article does not attempt to bring into dialogue Foucault's theory of discourse with Žižek's theory of ideology; rather, it stages an encounter between the two. The encounter involves a contrastive comparison, the tertium comparationis of which is the problematic of how Foucault's and Žižek's respective frameworks may help us conceptualize political change. Against this background and criterion it is possible to establish where and why their social theories differ, and to assess the extent to which Žižek's theoretical choices are preferable to Foucault's. (shrink)

One of the possible ways to explain the experience of visual richness is to posit a level of nonconceptual or phenomenal experience. The contents of this level of experience have recently been equated with the contents of sensory memory. It will be argued that sensory memory cannot provide these contents along two broad points. First, the conception of sensory memory relied on by these authors conflates the phenomena of visible and informational persistence, and makes use of an outdated “iconic” model (...) of visual short-term memory. Second, the way in which subjects’ reports are used to show that specific unreported contents are nevertheless experienced on a phenomenal level is questioned, using evidence on gist and high-level categorical perceptual processing. It is concluded that sensory memory, properly understood, cannot provide the kind of visual content required to support a level of richly detailed phenomenal experience, or a pictorial account of perception. Finally, alternative ways of explaining visual richness are suggested. (shrink)

Certain recent experiments are often taken to show that people are far more likely to classify a foreseen side-effect of an action as intentional when that side-effect has some negative normative valence. While there is some disagreement over the details, there is broad consensus among experimental philosophers that this is the finding. We challenge this consensus by presenting an alternative interpretation of the experiments, according to which they show that a side-effect is classified as intentional only if the agent considered (...) its relative importance when deciding on the action. We present two new experiments whose results can be explained by our hypothesis but not by any version of the consensus view. In the course of doing so, we develop a methodological critique of the previous literature on this topic and draw from it lessons for future experimental philosophy research. (shrink)