In the following pages I intend to bring to attention the way in which the concrete effort of comprehension (as sensitive yet lucid grasping of a state of affairs) becomes critical reflection. I am constantly referring to several of Aurel Codoban’swritings, using as a departure point his 2001 book, Sign and intepretation. A postmodern introduction in semiotics and hermeneutics, whose pages might serve as a good guide for such a discussion. I remark than that criticalreflection manifests in several ways: as (...) a reflexive philosophical exercise (when the conscience of the self is assuming her actual philosophical condition), as a careful examination of the phenomenon of communication and of our world of signs and, lastly, as hermeneutical ontology. This is a type of reflections that leaves space to critical judgement, sharp irony and free, relaxed meditation, in equal proportion. Such an effort is always laudable in a philosophical community and, consequently, worthy of appreciation. (shrink)

Following mainly Ricoeur’s understanding of ideology and assuming as fundamental premise the idea that this phenomenon is rooted in the exact same ground as the metaphysics of everyday life, the author argues that every ideology, at a social level, has two types effects: vulgar effects (in the originary sense of the word) and limit effects defined as those types of effects which exceed any institutional or communitarian reason and whose distinctive mark is the excessive violence in an arbitrary or pathological (...) form. The paper centres on this latter type and traces its history in the sphere of philosophy since Pythagoras, through Socrates Boethius, Descartes, Schelling and up to Russian or Romanian philosophy of our times. (shrink)

I start from a relatively simple idea: the human being is constantly making a multiple experience of truth (once again, in reference to Gadamer's statement), both scientifical and technical, as well as religious or aesthetic. Still, what is the relationship between those experiences of truth? Can they express somehow, precisely by their multiplicity, a neutral ethos of today's man, or do they manage to take part in a larger and more elevated experience of truth? In the following paper I will (...) try to bring into focus precisely such issues. I return to the meaning given by Gadamer to the experience of truth. Then I make the distinction between the common sense and the proper sense of alternative. The later concerns the correlation - sometimes paradoxical - of different experiences of truth. For instance, the correlation between the technical and the religious experience. So one can understand that religious experience is above all an experience of human finitude. (shrink)