In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives towards building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and their environment. The claim is substantiated with reference to recent developments in the (...) study of “mindreading” and debates on emotions. We claim that the current practice in cognitive (neuro)science has undergone, in effect, a silent mechanistic revolution, and has turned from initial binary oppositions and abstract proposals towards the integration of wide perspectives with the rest of the cognitive (neuro)sciences. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of distributed cognition in the context of classic questions posed by mainstream cognitive science. We support our remarks by appealing to empirical evidence from the fields of cognitive science and ethnography. Particular attention is paid to the structure and functioning of a cognitive system, as well as its external representations. We analyze the problem of how far we can push the study of human cognition without taking into account what is (...) underneath an individual’s skin. In light of our discussion, a distinction between DCog and the extended mind becomes important. (shrink)

The aticle presents several different ways of popularizing scientific knowledge. It is not scientific in the sense that it is not a report on a systematic study of the literature or empirical research. It is a tool room: a repository we can turn to in search of tools to help us solve a problem. The article offers three tools. The first is a typology of forms of participation in science. I treat the typology as a tool, too, because defining a (...) problem can be seen as part of the problem-solving process. It's important to understand that there are different forms of science popularization and citizen science participation: each form requires different competencies and will work in a different situation. It's also important to understand that there is a difference between science communication (i.e., what scientists do as part of their work) and science communication (i.e., dissemination of scientific results outside of science). These are two different modes of communication and require separate skills. The second tool is a set of heuristics that may be of interest to those already parsing science communication, but having difficulty communicating science. The last tool is a proposal for a science popularizer's checklist. It is based on my own experience. Anyone interested in science communication can check this tool in action, modify it for themselves, or create their own list, which I encourage you to do. (shrink)

The paper is an introduction to the anthropology of infrastructures. We define how infrastructure is understood on the grounds of anthropology and science and technology studies. We show what is the significance of various infrastructures for the functioning of modern and late societies. The text discusses extensively the methodological challenges of studying infrastructures. We not only explain why analyzing infrastructures is difficult but also discuss several methodological tricks we can resort to when trying to uncover infrastructures. We elaborate the methodological (...) guidelines on the margins of two research projects. The first dealt with social aspects of epidemics, and the second with urban clusters of innovative companies. (shrink)

O tym, że nauka polega na rozwiązywaniu problemów, pisało już wielu autorów. Jednak kto rozwiązuje owe problemy? Jakie mechanizmy wykorzystuje się w tym celu? Odpowiedź na te pytania nie jest wcale oczywista. Kiedy spojrzymy na standardową wizję nauki, łatwo dostrzeżemy w niej opowieść, w której główne role odgrywają jednostki dokonujące przełomowych odkryć. Jest to historia gigantów, którzy wyznaczają nowe ścieżki rozwoju ludzkości - historia, która jest zarazem heroiczna i sentymentalna. Jednocześnie jest to wizja, która zakłada, że nauka to praca przede (...) wszystkim (jeżeli nie wyłącznie) intelektualna. Problem w tym, że ta wizja w żaden sposób nie przystaje do funkcjonowania współczesnej nauki. Jak zatem to wszystko działa? Jaka jest rola jednostki w procesie naukowym? Jakie funkcje pełnią czynniki społeczne i materialne? Jak rzeczywiście wygląda praktyka rozwiązywania problemów? To pytania, od których wychodzi autor pracy "Modele, artefakty, kolektywy". Książka ta jest oryginalną próbą syntezy współczesnych studiów nad nauką i technologią. Autor rozpoczyna od klasycznych podejść filozoficznych Thomasa Kuhna i Ludwika Flecka, rekonstruuje najważniejsze elementy socjologii wiedzy naukowej, by przejść do współczesnych antropologicznych i kognitywnych analiz praktyk badawczych. Efektem jest nie-heroiczna i nie-sentymentalna wizja nauki, w której kluczowe role odgrywają kolektywny wymiar procesu badawczego oraz interakcje uczonych z elementami ich materialnego środowiska - zarówno skomplikowanymi instrumentami laboratoryjnymi, maszynami obliczeniowymi, jak i prozaicznymi przedmiotami codziennego użytku. (shrink)

The authors' commentary on Bruno Latour's "Technology is society made durable" provides the reader with an opportunity to become acquainted with actor-network theory.

Handling Digital Brains proves that ethnography of the laboratory is still capable of making a significant contribution in the field of social studies on science and technology. The reviewed work presents details of interactions between researchers, as well as between researchers and their material equipment, which are key to explaining the methods of solving research problems when analyzing brain scans generated during fMRI experiments. Significantly, the reconstructed multimodal embodied practices shed light not only on the process of scientific cognition, but (...) also on a broader spectrum of human cognitive activities. The book constitutes a challenge of a kind to neurocognitive sciences. As the author shows, cognitive neuroscientists utilizing fMRI declare that they study the embodied mind; yet, in practice, they reduce the body to the brain, and cognition – to purely internal processes. Such a model of cognition, (tacitly) assumed by experimental neurocognitive scientists, turns out to be insufficient when used reflexively in order to explain the way neuroscientists themselves solve problems. (shrink)