Las desigualdades sociales en Chile incluyen desigualdades territoriales que permanecen no observadas cuando se enfoca exclusivamente las regiones administrativas. Un conjunto entrelazado de tipos de territorios representativos del proceso de urbanización en un nivel subregional, es propuesto para el estudio de las desigualdades sociales desde una perspectiva territorial. Un territorio es delimitado por un mercado de trabajo común, lo que es medido por la conmutación o movilidad territorial.

In this paper, we provide an analysis about the relationship between expert and pragmatic categories used to name and categorize social space, from the point of view of the social hierarchies that structure it. Taking the case of Chile, and applying an experimental simulation methodology, we seek to contribute to the epistemological debate about the representations that individuals elaborate about social space, from a cognitive and interactionist perspective of everyday life. We analyse in particular the scope of the concept of (...) social class as an element of expert description of social reality, but also as a categorization used by ordinary subjects. We argue that although classifications used by ordinary people to describe members of society are not consistent with the most common academic class schemes, they nevertheless share the same logic and ranking system, adding evaluative and normative elements to the cognitive distinction, in the social construction of reality. En este artículo, presentamos un análisis acerca de la relación entre categorías expertas y categorías pragmáticas usadas para nombrar y categorizar el espacio social, desde el punto de vista de las jerarquías sociales que lo estructuran. Tomando el caso de Chile y aplicando una metodología experimental de simulación, aportamos al debate epistemológico acerca de las representaciones que los sujetos sociales elaboran acerca del espacio social, desde una perspectiva cognitiva e interaccionista situada en la vida cotidiana de las personas. Analizamos en especial el alcance del concepto de clase social en cuanto elemento de descripción experta de la realidad social, contrastándolo con la categorización de la misma de parte de sujetos comunes y corrientes. Postulamos que si bien las clasificaciones que ocupan las personas comunes y corrientes para describir a los integrantes de la sociedad no se condicen con las clasificaciones académicas más comunes, comparten sin embargo las mismas lógicas clasificatorias de jerarquización y ordenamiento, agregándose a la distinción cognitiva elementos normativos que aportan a la construcción social de la realidad. (shrink)

A vibrant portrait of four college friends-Iris Murdoch, Philippa Foot, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Mary Midgley-who formed a new philosophical tradition while Oxford's men were away at war.

Dorian Gray pays a hefty price for years of sin and vice in this completely unabridged edition of The Picture of Dorian Gray.

SummaryIn the Social Contract, Rousseau predicted that Europe would experience a cycle of increasingly intense wars, culminating in invasion from the east: first, Russia would conquer Europe's exhausted and war-torn states; then, Russia would itself become overextended and Europe would ultimately be overrun by the Tartars. The future of the modern state would be a version of the fall of Rome. The present essay provides an explanation of why Rousseau held such apocalyptic views by placing them in the context of (...) projects to reform Europe's political economy in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War. In 1767, when Catherine the Great was planning a major revision of the Russian legal code, she outlined her goals in a manifesto called the Grand Instruction, key sections of which were derived from Montesquieu's analysis of depopulation of the countryside caused by uncontrolled industrialisation. The Grand Instruction became the subject of a critical exchange between the Physiocrat Le Trosne and Diderot, who, drawing upon Rousseau, was by turns both sympathetic to and sceptical of Physiocracy. This discourse reveals a triangular debate about the possibility of stabilising the international order by imposing a balance between the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of Europe's rapidly growing economies. (shrink)

Om ett värdeobjektivistiskt inslag i Hägerströms moralfilosofiska teorier.--Till försvar för Zenon från Elea.--Den speciella relativitetsteoriens förhållande til de newtonianska föreställningarna om rum och tid.

In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised. This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings concerning what this means. Next, (...) it rejects the idea that there are different kinds of speciesism. Such an idea may result from confusion because there are (1) different ways in which speciesism can be defended; and (2) different speciesist positions, that is, different positions that assume speciesism among their premises. Depending on whether or not these views assume other criteria for moral consideration apart from speciesism, they can be combined or simple speciesist positions. But speciesism remains in all cases the same idea. Finally, the paper examines the concept of anthropocentrism, the disadvantageous treatment or consideration of those who are not members of the human species. This notion must be conceptually distinguished from speciesism and from misothery (aversion to nonhuman animals). Anthropocentrism is shown to be refuted because it either commits a petitio principia fallacy or it falls prey to two arguments: the argument from species overlap (widely but misleadingly known as “argument from marginal cases”) and the argument from relevance. This rebuttal identifies anthropocentrism as a speciesist view. (shrink)

Engaging and thought-provoking, this book examines how we see and treat animals and argues that we should extend equal rights to all species, human and non-human alike. Our world is plighted by 'isms' - racism, sexism and ageism to name a few - but we have one more to add: speciesism. Speciesism is a form of discrimination against those who don't belong to a certain species and it is a concept which raises controversial questions over humanity's very complicated relationship with (...) animals. Forgetting that humans are animals too, this mindset allows us to see animals as objects, rather than individuals with their own interests and with the ability to feel and suffer. This book questions all of these assumptions. Human feelings of superiority have allowed us to feel entitled to own animals as pets, to eat them, to use them for entertainment and to treat them with unkindness and cruelty. Looking at both the use of animals for the production of food, as well as the suffering of wild animals, this book advocates for society to seriously take into account the interests of all animals and argues that we have a duty to treat animals with much greater care, consideration and respect. For all who care about the rights and welfare of animals, this book is essential reading. (shrink)

Oscar Masotta (Buenos Aires, 1930- Barcelona, 1979) is all but forgotten now, except perhapsin the field of Lacanian studies. This is because in the 1970s,Masotta would challenge the master psychoanalyst on hisown turf, creating his own post-Lacanian school of psychoanalysisin Barcelona. But in 1965, aged just 27, Masottataught at the University of Buenos Aires, lectured at theDi Tella, and edited a book series on communication andmedia. A product of the newly open post-Perón era." Page 91.. This is the first exhibition (...) organized with materials from the archive Juan Acha, and includes reactivations of non-object-based art and artistic documentation. (shrink)

It is often said nowadays that to understand pleasure we must understand it as affording us a reason for or an explanation of action. It is only from the standpoint of the agent that we can avoid being misled. Both Professor Nowell-Smith and Mr. Manser have argued along these lines; and Dr. Kenny has written that “pleasure is always a reason for action” and has elucidated what he means by a footnote: “I do not mean that a thing’s being pleasant (...) is always a sufficient reason for doing it; there may be strong reasons for abstaining. I mean merely that it is always silly to ask a man why he wants pleasure.” When I first saw this point made, I had the perhaps not uncommon philosophical experience of immediately finding it both lucid and convincing, but then, afterwards gradually becoming less and less clear about the source of my conviction. The reasons for my obfuscation are as follows. In one crucial sense anything can afford an agent with a reason for action. It depends upon what the agent wants and upon the projects in which he is engaged. Moreover, without having any strong reasons for abstaining from what will give me pleasure, I may not be at all moved by the prospect of pleasure. As I write this paper I can list a dozen activities or experiences which would afford me pleasure. I have no strong reason for abstaining; I do not particularly enjoy writing papers; I am not writing with a great sense of urgency; I have the time and the money to indulge myself. Yet I do not rush to open a Guinness or Mr. Alfred Grossman’s new novel. So that far from it being silly to ask me why I do not apparently want pleasure at the moment, it is a question that I find forced upon me. But if this question makes sense, there is at least a problem as to why “it is always silly to ask a man if he wants pleasure.” For one might expect the two questions to stand or fall together. This is the problem to which I address myself in this paper. But in order to do so I must first take up certain points from recent discussions which are in danger of preventing a solution. (shrink)

This article tries to define what discrimination is and to understand in particular detail its most important instances: those in which the satisfaction of interests is at stake. These cases of discrimination will be characterized in terms of deprivations of benefits. In order to describe and classify them we need to consider three different factors: the benefits of which discriminatees are deprived, the criteria according to which such benefits are denied or granted, and the justification that such deprivation of benefits (...) may have (or lack). This definition intends to present discrimination as a concept that may be useful not only to examine certain social phenomena, but also, more widely, to ethical theory in general. (shrink)

This selection is an argument for the pharmacology of cannabinoids. It also provides a phenotypical account of the botany of cannabis.

Insofar as development implies economic growth, the term 'sustainable development' appears to some as a contradiction in terms. However, such conclusions still lack a thorough examination of the conceptual structure of the two terms between which there is a purported contradiction. In order to address this issue, the present paper scrutinises some of the assumptions which underwrite the ideologies of sustainability and of development. It is argued that there are key assumptions which both ideas have in common, and that sustainable (...) development is thus perfectly coherent on a conceptual level. It is alternatives which retain either term (such as 'sustainable degrowth') that are embroiled in paradox. The paper then examines two concepts for criticising the ideology of economic growth in other terms: dépense and conviviality. It is argued that the latter is preferable to the former for the purpose of developing post-sustainable critiques of growth. (shrink)

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects (...) of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: European Positivism Latin American Positivism Martí Rodó Vaz Ferreira Ingenieros References Further Reading.

Este trabajo analiza algunas de las dimensiones fundamentales de la influencia de la obra temprana de Martin Heidegger sobre la teoría política de Hannah Arendt. Como se sabe, la pensadora judía cursó algunos de sus más cruciales años universitarios bajo la tutoría del profesor alemán. En tal sentido, tanto la perspectiva hermenéutico-fenomenológica como los conceptos de “mundo” y praxis resultaron decisivos para definir, junto con la experiencia del totalitarismo, el sentido y la profundidad de la teoría política arendtiana. En líneas (...) generales, se espera que la investigación permita no solo entender varias de las nociones centrales del pensamiento de Arendt dentro de su horizonte de sentido original, sino además visibilizar algunas de las potencialidades que la obra temprana de Heidegger posee a la hora de repensar la política y la pluralidad humana. (shrink)

Reconstruction is a central notion in Dewey’s account of inquiry and in his metaphilosophical commitments. In his work, Dewey made a call for reconstruction of philosophy, in the reconstruction of central notions of the discipline, like knowledge, logic, truth, the good, reason, and experience. Inquiry itself is reconstructive, according to Dewey, involving the transformation of an indeterminate situation into one which is determinate and understood. Dewey’s philosophical views should therefore be of interest to those taking part in the recent turn (...) towards revisionary philosophical methodologies, like conceptual engineering, explication, and amelioration. In light of the recent developments in revisionary methodologies, I aim to explore Dewey’s conception of concepts in relation to the conceptual engineering literature, suggesting that it provides a useful conception of concepts for conceptual engineering, and to suggest a Deweyan model of philosophical inquiry where concepts are the objects of inquiry. In both cases, I hope to show a productive interaction between Dewey’s ideas and contemporary discussions of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

An individual's health, genetic, or environmental-exposure data, placed in an online repository, creates a valuable shared resource that can accelerate biomedical research and even open opportunities for crowd-sourcing discoveries by members of the public. But these data become “immortalized” in ways that may create lasting risk as well as benefit. Once shared on the Internet, the data are difficult or impossible to redact, and identities may be revealed by a process called data linkage, in which online data sets are matched (...) to each other. Reidentification, the process of associating an individual's name with data that were considered deidentified, poses risks such as insurance or employment discrimination, social stigma, and breach of the promises often made in informed-consent documents. At the same time, re-ID poses risks to researchers and indeed to the future of science, should re-ID end up undermining the trust and participation of potential research participants. The ethical challenges of online data sharing are heightened as so-called big data becomes an increasingly important research tool and driver of new research structures. Big data is shifting research to include large numbers of researchers and institutions as well as large numbers of participants providing diverse types of data, so the participants’ consent relationship is no longer with a person or even a research institution. In addition, consent is further transformed because big data analysis often begins with descriptive inquiry and generation of a hypothesis, and the research questions cannot be clearly defined at the outset and may be unforeseeable over the long term. In this article, we consider how expanded data sharing poses new challenges, illustrated by genomics and the transition to new models of consent. We draw on the experiences of participants in an open data platform—the Personal Genome Project—to allow study participants to contribute their voices to inform ethical consent practices and protocol reviews for big-data research. (shrink)

Se analizan fragmentos de Diodoro Sículo donde se manifiestan algunos de los mecanismos de dominación de los amos sobre los esclavos. Observamos larepresentación que se hace desde el discurso dominante del ejercicio del control social y el ocultamiento de las prácticas violentas propias de la relación esclavista. Se trata de fragmentos en donde aparecen referidas situaciones concretas, ocurridas tanto en el ámbito doméstico como en los espacios productivos. La teoría de la dominación social de O. Patterson y los conceptos del (...) análisis del discurso son fundamentos sobre los que se elabora nuestra perspectiva metodológica. (shrink)

This paper briefly examines the concept of the ancient mode of production as expressed in Karl Marx’s Formations. It looks at how twentieth-century Marxist historiography picks up this concept in its characterisation of the Greco-Roman city-state. It explores the feasibility of the use of the concept in relation to the advancement of knowledge of the city-state, especially through the development of archaeology. It examines how social classes are structured and relations of exploitation are presented. And it analyses the need for (...) politics in the organisation of this socio-economic form in terms of how it is joined up with the social relations of production. (shrink)

1. Barry and Cullity (2022b) argue that when morally assessing a person’s climate actions,1 we should ask how these actions affect other people’s prospects.2 For the present purposes, we can unders...

Finance is an area that, in practice, is plagued by accusations of unethical activity; the study of finance had adopted a largely nonbehavioral approach to business ethics research. We address this gap in by assessing whether individual ethical orientations predict the acceptability of questionable decisions about financial issues. Results show that individual ethical orientations are associated with different levels of acceptability of questionable decisions about financial issues, though the pattern of these differences varies across individual ethical orientations assessed. These results (...) represent evidence that ethical individual differences are associated with the acceptability of questionable finance decisions and are discussed in terms of methodological limitations and future directions in finance ethics research. (shrink)

When Sartre arrives late to meet Pierre at a local establishment, he discovers not merely that Pierre is absent, but Pierre’s absence, where this depends, or so Sartre notoriously supposes, on a frustrated expectation that Pierre would be seen at that place. Many philosophers have railed against this view, taking it to entail a treatment of the ontology of absence that Richard Gale describes as ‘attitudinal’ – one whereby absences are thought to ontologically depend on psychological attitudes. In this paper, (...) I aim to make Sartre’s intuition respectable. What Sartre perceives is an absential location, only the boundaries of which are circumscribed by what Sartre is doing at that place: meeting Pierre. I explain how this Sartrean view, though not specifically attributable to Sartre, nonetheless honours some of the phenomenological data described, if a little opaquely, in Being and Nothingness. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Repugnant Conclusion which the Mere Addition Paradox generates is not the same as the one which a sum-aggregative view like impersonal total utilitarianism leads to, but a slightly more moderate version of it. Given a spectrum of outcomes {A, B, C, …, X, Y, Z} such that in each of them there is a population that is twice as large as the previous one and has a level of wellbeing that is just barely lower than (...) the previous one, the Mere Addition Paradox implies that while almost all the outcomes of the spectrum are better than A, the last ones, such as Y and Z, will not, lest we accept that adding lives at a negative level is positive or neutral. This affects the way the Mere Addition Paradox should be presented. (shrink)