Depuis longtemps, la recherche met en relief les influences françaises et allemandes de la pensée de Georges Gurvitch. De récents travaux ouvrent désormais la voie à l’étude de ses sources russes. Cet article vise à poser les bases de l’étude des sources russes de la pensée de Gurvitch. Pour ce faire, il recourt à onze articles publiés par Gurvitch, entre 1924 et 1931, dans la revue russe de l’émigration Annales contemporaines, dont il dégage une propension marquée à l’endroit des totalités (...) sociales. L’article comprend, en outre, une brève étude du parcours russe de Gurvitch ainsi qu’une traduction intégrale de la dernière partie de l’article « Éthique et religion ». (shrink)

Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

In Flip Thinking, Berthold Gunster, the founder of the Dutch omdenken--or flip thinking--philosophy, presents fifteen strategies to transform your thinking away from limitations and negativities and towards possibilities and opportunities. From disrupting (turn all the rules upside down) to flaunting (play up what you want to hide) and from importing (get the enemy on board) to amplifying (do more of what works), Gunster's strategies and stories will have you approaching even the most challenging problems--from an annoying neighbor to an (...) angry colleague to an unhappy partner--in a whole new way. (shrink)

To celebrate the 270th anniversary of the De Gruyter publishing house, the company is providing permanent open access to 270 selected treasures from the De Gruyter Book Archive. Titles will be made available to anyone, anywhere at any time that might be interested. The DGBA project seeks to digitize the entire backlist of titles published since 1749 to ensure that future generations have digital access to the high-quality primary sources that De Gruyter has published over the centuries.

Faber, W. Martin Buber über Erziehung.--Bohnsack, F. Das Problem der pädagogischen Absicht bei Martin Buber.--Simon, S. Martin Buber, der Erzeiher.--Klafki, W. Dialog und Dialektik in der gegenwärtigen Erziehungswissenschaft.--Faber, W. Reale Bildung.--Caselmann, C. Martin Buber als Erzieher.

When Humpty-Dumpty had his great fall nobody could put him together again. A vastly more moderate challenge is to reunite the two partial beams of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus with such precision that the original spin state is recovered. Nevertheless, as we demonstrate, a substantial loss of spin coherence always occurs, unless the experimenter is able to control the magnetic field's inhomogeneity with an accuracy of at least one part in 105.

AU cœur de la vie politique des hommes gît un trésor, aujourd'hui perdu. Les révolutionnaires du XVIIIe siècle pouvaient encore le nommer. En Amérique on l'appelait " bonheur public ", dans la France des Lumières son nom était " liberté publique ". EN certaines circonstances, rares et précaires, ce trésor sans âge ressurgit dans l'action politique conduite à plusieurs, lorsqu'elle se crée un espace public où la liberté peut paraître. Alors un lien se noue, qui déploie entre les hommes un (...) monde commun. Tel est le bien public. En évoquant ce trésor perdu, la philosophie d'Hannah Arendt nous invite à retrouver, à l'écart de tout pragmatisme comme de tout moralisme, le sens instituant de l'action politique qui a le monde comme condition et comme fin. C'est dans la mesure où les actions sont politiques que le monde peut être partagé ; et dans la mesure où elles visent un monde commun que ces actions sont proprement politiques. Toute politique s'apprécie au regard du monde qu'elle est susceptible d'instaurer. N'est-ce pas pourtant à l'aliénation du monde que la politique moderne nous condamne au contraire? Le trésor serait-il pour nous définitivement perdu? Ce livre suggère que, loin de proposer une philosophie politique parmi d'autres, la réflexion arendtienne inaugure une intelligence de l'action politique qui redonne sens au " vivre-ensemble ". En son cœur se tient l'analyse originale et décisive de ce qu'on peut nommer l'acosmisme du monde moderne, cette perte du monde éprouvée aussi bien dans le système totalitaire que dans la prétention technoscientifique de nos sociétés à maîtriser les conditions de l'existence. (shrink)

In examining Hegel's and Kierkegaard's theories of language, I argue that both entail conceptions of the therapeutic power of language to heal us from madness and despair. I show that whereas Hegel quite straightforwardly celebrates the emancipatory power of language, Kierkegaard is more ambivalent; on the one hand, he devotes his life to a maieutic authorship in service of aiding the reader, but on the other, he believes that ultimately it is only faith in God that can cure us, and (...) that faith requires silence. I use Lacan's psychoanalytic account of the role of language to explore Hegel's view that language constitutes the self and Kierkegaard's experimentation with an indirect form of communication that he hopes will enable him to fulfill each of his apparently conflicting goals, to write and yet to remain silent. (shrink)

The meaning of Christian rationalism -- The handmaiden of theology -- The doctrine of double truth -- Appendix : Texts of John the Jandun on the relations between reason and faith -- The historical significance of Thomism -- Reasoning by analogy in Campanella -- Theology and Cartesian innatism -- Descartes, Harvey, and scholasticism -- Appendix: William Harvey's critique of the Cartesian theory of the movement of the heart -- Cartesian and scholastic meteors.

De alledaagse leefwereld. Dingen die we zien en horen. De hedendaagse mens wordt opgeslokt door de consumptiecultuur van de markteconomie en verkeert haast permanent in een virtuele werkelijkheid. Individualisme. De liefdesrelatie als meest basale vorm van gemeenschap is hierdoor op de helling gekomen. Welke therapeutische perspectieven kunnen we verbinden aan de gestelde diagnose? We zijn aangewezen op een mentaliteitsverandering, die wordt bepaald door het ‘morele kapitaal’ waarmee een gemeenschap kan voortbestaan. De auteur opereert binnen de traditie die Montaigne en Kierkegaard (...) introduceren en waaiert voortdurend uit door geregeld zijn rol als dienende gastheer voor die van zoekende filosoof te verruilen. Hij laat tijdslijnen door elkaar lopen. Toch is sprake van intrinsieke ordening: ideeënimprovisaties worden weerspiegeld in een afwisseling tussen levende herinneringen en abstracte argumenten. Zo krijgt de alledaagsheid een filosofische lading. Kleine verhalen en anekdotes zijn nodig om grote verhalen een persoonlijk karakter te geven. Aldus ontstaat een collage, waarin niets is gelogen, maar alles is verzonnen. Een waargebeurde, fictieve levensgeschiedenis op grond van herinneringen, een portret waarin verslag wordt gedaan van een gedreven zoektocht naar zinvolheid. De lezer is genoodzaakt zich te laten meevoeren over hoofd- en zijwegen, bemodderde bospaden, drassige velden, gevaarlijke bochten, grillige slingerpaden, solide bruggen en wankele bruggetjes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Talking Cures, the Clinic, and the Value of the IneffableDaniel Berthold (bio)KeywordsMadness, disease, the normal, the abnormal, the ineffable, Hegel, Kierkegaard, LacanI am most grateful to my readers, James Phillips and Louis Sass, who have led me to several new insights by suggesting ways of complicating my reading of a Lacanian approach to Hegel's and Kierkegaard's conceptions of madness. I am a Kierkegaard and Hegel scholar, with very (...) little pretense to expertise about Lacan and regrettably even less about the theory and practice of psychiatry. In submitting my essay to Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Philosophy, I was hoping to entice a community of practitioners and theoreticians I have great respect for to consider the musings of a philosopher on topics which engage them as thinkers and actors in their professions. I could not possibly have hoped for more intelligent and provocative replies than I have been given by my two respondents.Phillips' framing of his response in terms of the distinction between the "madness of the philosophers" and the "madness of the clinic" is very helpful. It is a distinction that is indeed central to the question of the possibility of dialogue between philosophers and clinicians—so central, in fact, that it is generous of Phillips not to reproach me for failing to mention it. On the one hand, the challenge for philosophers is to show that their descriptions are not merely metaphoric and that their preoccupation with the dark side of human experience connects in some way with the reality of disease, so that there is some way for clinicians to translate their language into the language of psychiatry. Otherwise, philosophers will have only poetic or literary interest for the psychiatrist or psychologist.On the other hand, the challenge for clinicians is the extent to which they are open to moving beyond a reduction of "mental illness" to a purely biological conception of disease. One needn't go so far—nor should we—as Thomas Szasz or Michel Foucault in seeing "mental disease" as itself merely a metaphor. But granting the evidence of underlying organic disorder, symptoms nevertheless display themselves as mental and behavioral states (what Hegel calls "shapes of consciousness") that, as Hegel argued, are paralleled in "normal" experience, so that the distinction between disease and normality (and hence illness and metaphor) is often elusive. Madness "has the healthy consciousness for its presupposition," Hegel writes, because the healthy mind is still grappling with the same sorts of contradictions and feelings of alienation, the same "infinite pain" which characterizes insanity. Madness is not the absolute "other" of rationality, but an echo of it (1978, 3:382, 408).Hegel himself accepted the medicalization of madness that began to occur in the late eighteenth [End Page 325] century, and rejected the metaphysical and theological categories of what was called "romantic medicine." But he also cautioned against the narrowness of the "somatic" school which he felt lacked sufficient explanatory value if not connected to a "speculative" (i.e., philosophic) framework (see Berthold-Bond 1995, ch. 2).It might even be argued that every person seeking therapy is first of all suffering from "philosophic" madness, at least in the sense that initially she does not understand her own suffering as "disease," but experiences her torment in the vocabulary of the philosopher. Thus the philosopher's descriptions are the closest to the subject's own self-understanding, and while the therapist must seek to rephrase these descriptions into the vocabulary of the clinic (just as Hegel, for example, translated his own philosophic description of the madness of his friend Hölderlin in the Phenomenology as the "lost soul" whose "light dies away within it" into the medical category of Wahnsinn—mania or frenzy, which today we would call schizophrenia—in the classificatory scheme of mental disorder he gives in the Encyclopaedia; 1977, 400; 1978, 408)—there is a real question about which vocabulary is a metaphor for the other.The second main point Phillips addresses, which is taken up in different ways by Sass as well, has to do with the relation between speech and silence in madness. Phillips finds that Kierkegaard offers a more complex and subtle view than... (shrink)

A unitary transformation replaces the given description of a quantum system by an equivalent one. It is observed, however, that not all members of a set of unitarily equivalent Hamilton operators are equally well suited for identifying the corresponding classical systems. A criterion is proposed for recognizing the privileged representatives of the set. A few explicit examples are reported that show the criterion at work.

The important work, exquisitely translated by Mark Wauck, brings the essential elements of philosophy into view as a cohesive, readily understandable, and erudite structure, and does so rigorously in the best tradition of St. Thomas.

Perspective, Symbol, and Symbolic Form: Concerning the Relationship between Cassirer and Panofsky During the last two decades of the twentieth century, there was a sudden surge of interest in Ernst Cassirer’s major work, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923–29), and Erwin Panofsky’s essay, ‘Perspective as Symbolic Form’ (1927), an interest that has continued uninterrupted to the present day. Particularly amongst art historians, however, a serious misunderstanding remains evident here – the confusing of ‘symbolic form’ with ‘symbol’. Cultural and perceptual mediations, (...) in which objects (and subjects) are only just in the process of forming, are carelessly turned into arbitrary, isolated objects of art history or pictorial history. Every work, in this view, is regarded as a ‘symbolic form’ to the extent that a representation of the world is ‘expressed’ in it. This article initially reviews Panofsky’s essay in order to establish the context in which the art historian uses the term ‘symbolic form’. His use of it is then compared with Cassirer’s original understanding of the term. A careful distinction is made between ‘symbol’, ‘symbolic pregnance’, and ‘symbolic form’, and this is followed by an analysis of scattered remarks in Cassirer’s writings, and particularly in his posthumous manuscripts and notes, on ‘art’ as symbolic form and on the spatial form that is prior to all perception and art production, as well as his call for a kind of art history that conceives of itself as a scholarly discipline. The article concludes with the recognition that Panofsky not only deliberately, but justifiably – that is, in the spirit of Cassirer, at least – transferred the expression ‘symbolic form’ to ‘perspective’. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)