Results for 'value bearer'

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  1. Hedonism, preferentialism, and value bearers.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):463-472.
    While hedonism has been subjected to much criticism over the years, it is still a widely endorsed axiological view. One objection that appears to be generally recognised as especially troublesome to hedonists is that their central claim, that final value accrues only to experiences of pleasure gives us a narrow view of value. Much more than pleasure is valuable for its own sake. A competing theory, preferentialism, is another widespread theory about value. According to one version of (...)
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  2.  50
    The bearers of truth-values.Norman Swartz - manuscript
    Thesis: Such things as beliefs, statements, assertions, remarks, hypotheses, and theories are those things that are true or false . (Example: we do say such things as "Her belief that her mother had phoned was false." Or, "His assertion that Alberta is smaller than British Columbia is true.").
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  3. The Bearers of Value in Environmental Ethics.Katie McShane - 2013 - In Avram Hiller, Ramona Ilea & Leonard Kahn (eds.), Consequentialism and environmental ethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 17-34.
    I argue that different approaches to environmental ethics can be traced to different ways of thinking about value. In particular, it can be traced to different understandings of what kinds of things are the primary bearers of value and different views about how we should respond to that value. These different ways of thinking about value are thought to have their origins in consequentialism and Kantianism, respectively. I briefly describe these theoretical differences and consider how they (...)
     
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  4.  74
    Bearers of value.Ramon M. Lemos - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):873-889.
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  5. Value perception, properties, and the primary bearers of value.Graham Oddie - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press.
     
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  6.  56
    The Bearers of Intrinsic Value.Noah M. Lemos - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 181--190.
  7. Tropic of Value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 213--226.
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value , which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question.Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention (...)
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  8. Instrumental values – strong and weak.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23 - 43.
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental (...)
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  9.  89
    Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23-43.
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental (...)
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  10. Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):367-392.
    A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value-bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value-bearers he has (...)
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  11. Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy.Cristian Constantinescu - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):57-70.
    Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it (...)
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  12.  24
    Primordial Givenness in Husserl and Heidegger [Constitution of cultural objects (values and their bearers): equipment/tools,, works of art, etc].Panos Theodorou - 2015 - In Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordiality, and the Categorial. Cham: Springer.
    In his Ideas I (1913), with his thought experiment of world-annihilation, Husserl becomes persuaded that the beings of which we are conscious do not simply lie ‘out there’ in themselves, enjoying an independent (realistic) existence. Our experience of beings in a world, qua total horizon of beings, is the achievement of our intentional consciousness, which unfolds its overall constitutive possibilities. It is because of this that in our everyday meaningful comportments, we are always intentionally correlated with what is “Vorhanden” for (...)
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  13. A Moorean View of the Value of Lives.Kris McDaniel - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):23-46.
    Can we understand being valuable for in terms of being valuable? Three different kinds of puzzle cases suggest that the answer is negative. In what follows, I articulate a positive answer to this question, carefully present the three puzzle cases, and then explain how a friend of the positive answer can successfully respond to them. This response requires us to distinguish different kinds of value bearers, rather than different kinds of value, and to hold that among the (...) bearers are totality states of affairs. The final section of the article discusses the possibility of organic unification without organic unities. (shrink)
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  14.  26
    Digital technologies as truth‐bearers in health care.Ruth Bartlett, Andrew Balmer & Petula Brannelly - 2017 - Nursing Philosophy 18 (1):e12161.
    In this paper, we explore the idea of digital technologies as truth‐bearers in health care and argue that devices like SenseCam, which facilitate reflection and memory recall, have a potentially vital role in healthcare situations when questions of veracity are at stake (e.g., when best interest decisions are being made). We discuss the role of digital technologies as truth‐bearers in the context of nursing people with dementia, as this is one area of health care in which the topic of truth‐telling (...)
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  15.  40
    Symbolic Values.Ryan W. Davis - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (4):449-467.
    When a symbol is a marker of a primary bearer of value and, secondarily, a bearer of value itself, then it has symbolic value. Philosophers have long been suspicious of symbolic values, often regarding them as illusory or irrelevant. I suggest that arguments against symbolic values either overgeneralize or else require premises that can only be supported if the normative significance of some symbolic considerations is presupposed. Humans need symbols to represent identity facts to themselves (...)
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  16. Tropic of Value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):389-403.
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake), which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question.Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano‐inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses (...)
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  17. Fact/Value Holism, Feminist Philosophy, and Nazi Cancer Research.Sharyn Clough - 2015 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):1-12.
    Fact/value holism has become commonplace in philosophy of science, especially in feminist literature. However, that facts are bearers of empirical content, while values are not, remains a firmly-held distinction. I support a more thorough-going holism: both facts and values can function as empirical claims, related in a seamless, semantic web. I address a counterexample from Kourany where facts and values seem importantly discontinuous, namely, the simultaneous support by the Nazis of scientifically sound cancer research and morally unsound political policies. (...)
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  18.  9
    Tropic of value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2001 - In Jan Österberg, Erik Carlson & Rysiek Śliwiński (eds.), Omnium-gatherum: philosophical essays dedicated to Jan Österberg on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Uppsala: Dept. of Philosophy, Uppsala University. pp. 263-277.
    In Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen, we defended the following claims: Not only states of affairs, or facts, but also concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value ; The final value of a concrete object need not be intrinsic, i.e., it need not be exclusively based on the internal properties of its bearer; The final value of a concrete object is not reducible to the value of some states of affairs that involve the (...)
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  19.  8
    Values.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - In Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag. pp. 139-171.
    ValuingValuing is an important and ordinary endeavor, which pervades all our practices, activities, and institutions. The nature and criteria for valuing decisively depend on the alleged nature of values. First of all, are there values? If so, how to access them, and how do they inform our choices? Second, what kinds of value are there, and how do we identify them conceptually? Sections 1–2 identify these problems, which are the core of debates in meta-ethics and substantive theory, respectively. The (...)
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  20.  5
    Truth and Truth Bearers: Meaning in Context, Volume Ii.Mark Richard - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    This book collects nine seminal essays by Mark Richard published between 1980 and 2014, alongside four new essays and an introduction that puts the essays in context. Each essay is an attempt, in one way or another, to understand the idea of a proposition. Part I discusses whether the objects of thought and assertion can change truth value over time. Part II develops and defends a relativist view of the objects of assertion and thought; and Part III discusses issues (...)
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  21.  85
    Science, values and the human dimensions.Ladislav Tondl - 2001 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 32 (2):307-327.
    The presented paper substantiates the principle that values are an immanent component of science and any rational cognitive activity. This principle belongs to the European cultural tradition starting from the book of Genesis of the Old Testament, the values of certainty in the antique Greek philosophy and Francis Bacon's coincidence of knowledge and power. Values in science form complicated structures inconnection with different types of knowledge including “the knowledge that”, empirical evidence, various types of generalizations or rules, methods, directions, algorithms, (...)
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  22.  47
    Epistemic Value. Curiosity, Knowledge and Response-Dependence.Nenad Miščević - 2016 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):393-417.
    The paper addresses two fundamental issues in epistemic axiology. It argues primarily that curiosity, in particular its intrinsic variety, is the foundational epistemic virtue since it is the value-bestowing epistemic virtue. A response-dependentist framework is proposed, according to which a cognitive state is epistemically valuable if a normally or ideally curious or inquisitive cognizer would be motivated to reach it. Curiosity is the foundational epistemic virtue, since it bestows epistemic value. It also motivates and organizes other epistemic virtues, (...)
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  23. The value of knowledge and the pursuit of survival.Sherrilyn Roush - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (3):255-278.
    Abstract: Knowledge requires more than mere true belief, and we also tend to think it is more valuable. I explain the added value that knowledge contributes if its extra ingredient beyond true belief is tracking . I show that the tracking conditions are the unique conditions on knowledge that achieve for those who fulfill them a strict Nash Equilibrium and an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in what I call the True Belief Game. The added value of these properties, intuitively, (...)
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  24.  8
    Truth and truth bearers.Mark Richard - 2015 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book collects nine seminal essays by Mark Richard published between 1980 and 2014, alongside four new essays and an introduction that puts the essays in context. Each essay is an attempt, in one way or another, to understand the idea of a proposition. Part I discusses whether the objects of thought and assertion can change truth value over time. Part II develops and defends a relativist view of the objects of assertion and thought; it includes discussions of the (...)
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  25.  35
    The Goodness of Means: Instrumental and Relational Values, Causation, and Environmental Policies.Patrik Baard - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (1):183-199.
    Instrumental values are often considered to be inferior to intrinsic values. One reason for this is that instrumental values are extrinsic and rely on two factors: (a) a means–end relationship that is (b) conducive to something of final or intrinsic value. In this paper, I will investigate the conditions under which bearers of instrumental value are given different value or owed different levels of respect. Such conditions include the number of means that are conducive to something of (...)
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  26.  51
    Tropic of value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 213-228.
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value, which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention (...)
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  27. Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):111-130.
    Recent literature on intrinsic value contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsic value (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value about which (...)
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  28.  80
    Holism about value: some help for invariabilists.Daniel Halliday - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1033-1046.
    G.E. Moore’s principle of organic unity holds that the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. Moore combined this principle with invariabilism about intrinsic value: An item’s intrinsic value depends solely on its bearer’s intrinsic properties, not on which wholes it has membership of. It is often said that invariabilism ought to be rejected in favour of what might be called ‘conditionalism’ about intrinsic value. This (...)
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  29.  20
    Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances.Graham Oddie - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11.
    According to Fitting Attitude theorists, for something to possess a certain value it is necessary and sufficient that it be fitting to take a certain attitude to the bearer of that value. This seems obvious for thick evaluative attributes, but less obvious for thin evaluative attributes. This chapter argues that the fitting response to the thin evaluative attributes of states is desire. The good is what it is fitting to desire, the bad what it is fitting to (...)
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  30. Source and Bearer: Metz on the Pure Part-Life View of Meaning.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy of Life 5 (3):1-18.
    According to the pure part-life view the meaning in our lives is always borne by particular parts of our lives. The aim of this paper is to show that Thaddeus Metz’s rejection of this view is too quick. Given that meaning is a value that often depends on relational rather than intrinsic properties a pure part-life view can accommodate many of the intuitions that move Metz towards a mixed view. According to this mixed view some meaning is borne by (...)
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  31.  42
    Confucian Values and Human Rights.May Sim - 2013 - Review of Metaphysics 67 (1):3-27.
    Rather than attempt to adjudicate between these rivals in the “Asian values”/”Confucian values” debates, I wish to explore if Confucian values can contribute to the promotion of human rights. Instead of relying on prioritizing the communal over the individual which some defenders of ‘Asian values’ have done, which communal values are not that distinct from the more conservative Western communitarians’ emphasis, I inquire into the distinctive characteristics of Confucianism which can be used to justify the kind of human rights proclaimed (...)
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  32.  5
    Research on the Status of Intangible Cultural Heritage Bearers in the Human Capital Perspective.Jing Zhao, Zhong Wang, Chenyu Wang, Liming Han, Yaohui Ruan, Zhounan Huangfu, Shuai Zhou & Lei Zhou - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Culture is the bloodline of the nation and the spiritual home of the people. Intangible cultural heritage belongs to the field of culture, and the transmission of ICH is a kind of human-based cultural transmission, which is the shaping of people’s morality, character, sentiment, will, ideals and beliefs, value orientation, humanistic cultivation, artistic taste, way of thinking, wisdom, and ability in the practice of production and life of various ethnic groups. Based on the status acquisition model, this study analyzed (...)
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  33. The Fact/Value Entanglement as a Linguistic Illusion.Óscar L. González-Castán - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95 (1):287-305.
    This paper addresses four different, albeit related, issues concerning Hilary Putnam's fact/value entanglement theory. It is organized around a series of questions. First, what set of problems does the theory attempt to resolve? The revision of the empiricists and the positivist traditions will be the main concern of this first section. Secondly, how does the notion of "fact/value entanglement" solves these problems? I argue that while Putnam has persuasively defended the possibility of an entanglement between descriptive functions and (...)
     
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  34. Inherent Value and Moral Rights.Paul W. Taylor - 1987 - The Monist 70 (1):15-30.
    In Chapter Seven of The Case for Animal Rights’ Tom Regan propounds and analyzes a concept of inherent value. He then argues that all humans and animals that satisfy what he calls the “subject-of-a-life criterion” have this kind of value and have it equally. In Chapter Eight of the book Regan draws a close connection between an individual’s having inherent value and its being a bearer of moral rights. I shall examine each of these points in (...)
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  35. Fitting attitudes, finkish goods, and value appearances.Graham Oddie - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 74-101.
    According to Fitting Attitude theorists, for something to possess a certain value it is necessary and sufficient that it be fitting (appropriate, or good, or obligatory, or something) to take a certain attitude to the bearer of that value. The idea seems obvious for thick evaluative attributes, but less obvious for the thin evaluative attributes—like goodness, betterness, and degrees of value. This paper is an extended argument for the thesis that the fitting response to the thin (...)
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  36.  24
    Ethical Validity and Its Ontological Bearer in Heinrich Rickert’s Metaethics.Andrea Sebastiano Staiti - 2017 - Quaestio 17:623-635.
    In this paper I present Heinrich Rickert’s account of the difference between theoretical and ethical values as an insightful strategy to accommodate constructivist and realistic intuitions in metae...
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  37. Pain and value.Adam Swenson - 2006 - Dissertation, Rutgers University, New Brunswick
    All existing explanations of why pain is intrinsically bad are false. They all rest upon a mistaken conception of what pains are. On this false view, pain is merely a kind of sensation or feeling. The nature of a stubbed toe is exhausted by the way it stings and throbs. However, on the correct view, pains are much richer and much more complex. For example, a pain’s intrinsic properties also include its sufferer’s beliefs about the causes and implications of her (...)
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  38.  8
    On Culture, Values, and Peace.Nicholas Roerich - 2018 - Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics 20 (2):171-194.
    1. The Banner of Peace2. The Sacred Sign of Peace3. The Heart of Culture4. The Red Cross of Culture5. The Mission of Womanhood6. Glory to Women, Bearers of Culture7. Roots of Culture8. In spite of difficulties 9. Re-evaluation10. Defense of Values.
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  39. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA.
    Section 2.1 identifies three notions of intrinsic value: the finality sense understands it as value for its own sake, the supervenience sense identifies it with value that depends exclusively on the bearer’s internal properties, and the nonderivative sense describes intrinsic value as value that provides justification for other values and is not justified by any other value. A distinction between final intrinsic and final extrinsic value in terms of supervenience is subsequently introduced. (...)
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  40.  31
    The Aesthetic Value of Performing Music.Gilead Bar-Elli - 2017 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 51 (1):84-97.
    And indeed we think it not manly to perform music, except when drunk or for fun.Composing, performing, and listening are three familiar musical practices, each having various forms and manifestations. Aesthetic value is usually ascribed to objects—whether artistic or natural. But “object” needs to be understood here in a very wide sense, including, for example, a theatrical production or a ballet. In dealing with music, I assume that complete works are the primary bearers of such value, but we (...)
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  41. Reflections on Law and Its Inner Morality.Csaba Varga - 1985 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 62 (3):439-451.
    1. Law and morals as two systems of norms, and the inner morality of law 2. Law as a value bearer and as a mere external indicator 3. The inner and external moral credit of legislator 4. The inner morality of law. As to the last paragraph, the most striking feature of the inner morality of law is that it is such a possible characteristic, surplus quality which is not a sine qua non, which law is conceivable without. (...)
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  42. Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Relation Between Final and Intrinsic Value.Antoine C. Dussault - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):166-189.
    This paper examines the debate as to whether something can have final value in virtue of its relational (i.e., non-intrinsic) properties, or, more briefly put, whether final value must be intrinsic. The paper adopts the perspective of the fitting-attitude analysis (FA analysis) of value, and argues that from this perspective, there is no ground for the requirement that things may have final value only in virtue of their intrinsic properties, but that there might be some grounds (...)
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  43.  44
    Review: Emotion and Value. Edited by Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd. [REVIEW]Hichem Naar & Christine Tappolet - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):675-678.
    © The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] is widely accepted that emotions have something to do with values. The major task of contemporary philosophy of emotion is to say precisely what that something is. How exactly are emotions related to evaluative properties? Unsurprisingly, there are various ways they may be related. First, emotions might themselves be bearers of value. It might be a good (...)
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  44.  56
    Martinus Dacus and Boethius Dacus on the Signification of Terms and the Truth-Value of Assertions.Ana María Mora-Márquez - 2014 - Vivarium 52 (1-2):23-48.
    The article intends to show: a) that the modist Martin of Dacia sides with the traditional reading of the first chapter of Aristotle’s De interpretatione that we find in masters of arts from the first half of the thirteenth century; and b) that the modist Boethius of Dacia is one of the first thirteenth-century scholars to depart from this reading. In fact, Boethius presents us with an account of propositional verification where the terms’ signification is not operational and where the (...)
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  45.  71
    Propping Up the Collapsing Principle.Henrik Andersson - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):475-486.
    According to a standard account of incomparability, two value bearers are incomparable if it is false that there holds a positive value relation between them. Due to the vagueness of the comparative predicates it may also be indeterminate as to which relation that holds - for each relation it is neither true nor false that it holds. John Broome has argued that indeterminacy cannot coexist with incomparability and since there seems to exist indeterminacy there cannot exist incomparability. At (...)
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  46.  35
    A Wholesome Anthropocentrism: Reconceptualizing the Value of Nature Within the Framework of An Enlightened Self-Interest.Bartlomiej A. Lenart - 2020 - Ethics and the Environment 25 (2):97.
    Abstract:Non-anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics face problems that cannot be resolved within a holistic framework of natural value since such frameworks posit abstract and general properties as the bearers of intrinsic value and thus ignore the moral claims of individual organisms. Two paradigm examples of such approaches, Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic and Arne Neass' Deep Ecology suffer from this problem. Christine Korsgaard's argument for the conceptual separation of intrinsic and instrumental valuing, however, serves as a strong theoretical grounding (...)
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  47.  95
    Bivalence and the challenge of truth-value gaps.Teresa Marques - 2004 - Dissertation, Stirling
    This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot be neither true (...)
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  48. The Disjunctive Hybrid Theory of Prudential Value: An Inclusive Approach to the Good Life.Joseph Van Weelden - 2018 - Dissertation, Mcgill University
    In this dissertation, I argue that all extant theories of prudential value are either a) enumeratively deficient, in that they are unable to accommodate everything that, intuitively, is a basic constituent of prudential value, b) explanatorily deficient, in that they are at least sometimes unable to offer a plausible story about what makes a given thing prudentially valuable, or c) both. In response to the unsatisfactory state of the literature, I present my own account, the Disjunctive Hybrid Theory (...)
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  49. Choices, Interests, and Potentiality: What Distinguishes Bearers of Rights? [REVIEW]Anna-Karin Margareta Andersson - 2013 - Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (3):175-190.
  50. Leibniz, Acosmism, and Incompossibility.Thomas Feeney - 2016 - In Brown Gregory & Yual Chiek (eds.), Leibniz on Compossibility and Possible Worlds. Cham: Springer. pp. 145-174.
    Leibniz claims that God acts in the best possible way, and that this includes creating exactly one world. But worlds are aggregates, and aggregates have a low degree of reality or metaphysical perfection, perhaps none at all. This is Leibniz’s tendency toward acosmism, or the view that there this no such thing as creation-as-a-whole. Many interpreters reconcile Leibniz’s acosmist tendency with the high value of worlds by proposing that God sums the value of each substance created, so that (...)
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