The idea of inclusive collective decision-making is important in establishing democratic legitimacy, but it fails when citizens are excluded. Stated-preference methods of valuation, which are commonly used in economics, have been criticised because the principle of willingness to pay may exclude low-income earners who do not have the capacity to pay. Deliberative valuation has been advocated as a way to overcome this problem, but deliberation may also be exclusive. In this review, two deliberative valuation frameworks are (...) compared. The first is grounded on the idea of rational discourse that emphasises argument at the expense of other communicative strategies. It seeks to secure inclusion through procedural rules and prerequisites, but fails to address the underlying democratic limitation of argumentation. The second does not rely on the distinction between rational and rhetorical speech, and therefore admits alternative forms of communication. This approach recognises differences in the communicative capacities and practices of those who take part in deliberation, and so is better equipped to improve, though not to guarantee, inclusion. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the criterion of valuation in neoclassical economics is flawed because it is not an invariant measure of value. It is invariant only when unrealistically restrictive conditions are imposed on the class of admissible utility functions, which in fact makes it a special case. The only sensible alternative is to turn to classical value theory based on real sacrifices or opportunity costs.

Scholars belong to multiple communities of credit simultaneously. When these communities disagree about a scholarly achievement’s credit assignment, this raises a puzzle for decision and game theor...

‘Contingent Valuation ’ is a method often used to make decisions about environmental issues. It is used to elicit citizens’ preferences at the location of a specific facility, new road and the like. I argue that even if we could elicit a truly informed and ‘free’ choice, the method would remain flawed, as 1) all ‘local’ activity also has far-reaching environmental consequences; 2) majority decisions may support chices that adversely affect minorities; 3) even with full information, consenting to harms (...) like significant alterations of our normal functioning or health, or genetic mutations, may not be morally acceptable. (shrink)

Values, Valuations, and Axiological Norms in Richard Rorty's Neopragmatism sympathetically discusses Richard Rorty's neopragmatist philosophy. This book brings together a range of interpretations and possibilities on a variety of humanistic topics, including philosophy, literature, culture, film, economics, social issues, politics, and more. Skowroński involves the work of philosophers such as Kant, Dewey, Santayana, and Kołakowski as he delves into various philosophical problems using the lens of Rorty’s neopragmatist thought.

In the philosophy of perception, olfaction is the perennial problem child, presenting a range of difficulties to those seeking to define its proper referents, and its phenomenological content. Here, we argue that many of these difficulties can be resolved by recognizing the object-like representation of odors in the brain, and by postulating that the basic objects of olfaction are best defined by their biological value to the organism, rather than physico-chemical dimensions of stimuli. Building on this organism-centered account, we (...) speculate that the phenomenological space of olfaction is organized into a number of coarse affective dimensions that apply categorically. This organization may be especially useful for coupling sensation to decision-making and instrumental action in a sensory modality where the stimulus space is especially complex and high-dimensional. (shrink)

The origins of both economic and philosophical value theory are examined and shown to be closely related. The status of neo-classical value theory is that it is internally flawed in any attempt to describe the real world. Cost-benefit analysis as it applies to the valuation of environmental agents relies upon the claim that this neo-classical theory has a particular status in optimal welfare maximisation and, therefore, suffers the same problems of internal consistency. Economic valuation of the environment is (...) not a scientific process derived from external law but a social process relying upon social agreement. Alternatives to economic valuation are considered and may possess a more plausible social base. However, all environmental valuation is at odds with beliefs based upon the existence of objective and intrinsic values. (shrink)

The paper examines Nietzsche's claim that valuations born out of a psychological condition he calls "ressentiment" are objectionable. It argues for a philosophically sound construal of this type of criticism, according to which the criticism is directed at the agent who holds values out of ressentiment, rather than at those values themselves. After presenting an analysis of ressentiment, the paper examines its impact on valuation and concludes with an inquiry into Nietzsche's reasons for claiming that ressentiment valuation is (...) "corrupt." Specifically, the paper proposes that ressentiment valuation involves a form of self-deception, that such self-deception is objectionable because it undermines the integrity of the self, and that the lack of such integrity ensnares the agent in a peculiar kind of practical inconsistency. The paper ends with a brief review of the problems and prospects of this interpretation. (shrink)

In this paper, I will discuss some aspects of the Swedish policy to reduce pesticide use by 50%, a decision that has attracted great interest and may sometimes have been over-advertised. It has also been followed by similar programmes in other countries such as Denmark, Holland and Canada, What are the cultural and political backgrounds? What is general and what is specifically swedish? Why did the demand for this decision first occur in Sweden, where the problems concerning pesticide use are (...) much less pronounced than in many other countries and agricultural areas? Does the Swedish policy imply a new approach with completely different conditions for pesticide use, or should it preferably be described as an adaptation to what modern pesticide and agricultural technology can achieve? (shrink)

The paper examines Nietzsche’s claim that valuations born out of a psychological condition he calls “ressentiment” are objectionable. It argues for a philosophically sound construal of this type of criticism, according to which the criticism is directed at the agent who holds values out of ressentiment, rather than at those values themselves. After presenting an analysis of ressentiment, the paper examines its impact on valuation and concludes with an inquiry into Nietzsche’s reasons for claiming that ressentiment valuation is (...) “corrupt.” Specifically, the paper proposes that ressentiment valuation involves a form of self-deception, that such self-deception is objectionable because it undermines the integrity of the self, and that the lack of such integrity ensnares the agent in a peculiar kind of practical inconsistency. The paper ends with a brief review of the problems and prospects of this interpretation. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest analiza problemu autointerpretacji w odniesieniu do formuły „mocnego wartościowania” oraz zagadnienia osoby ludzkiej. Przedmiotem analiz jest koncepcja wartości Charlesa Taylora ujęta w kontekście jego filozoficznych inspiracji oraz krytyki niektórych jego rozwiązań. Poznanie własnego „ja” dokonuje się w kontekście odkrywania i realizacji takich wartości jak wolność, godność, autentyczność, sprawczość i odpowiedzialność, itp. Można wskazać na relację, jaka zachodzi między strukturą aksjologiczną a osobą, która pozwala jej na autointerpretację. Z jednej strony dzięki wartościom podmiot określa własną tożsamość, z drugiej (...) strony stanowią one element „wspólnoty znaczeń” – umożliwiający zrozumienie „sytuacji ludzkiej” i dialog między osobami. Świat wartości odkrywamy w trakcie artykulacji i interpretacji własnych uczuć oraz rozumienia uczuć innych ludzi. Wartości umożliwiają rozmowę na temat tego, co nas łączy lub dzieli, umożliwiają porozumienie, a także na artykułowanie przyczyn nieporozumienia. Rozwój osoby jest zapośredniczony w kulturowych formach ekspresji oraz w dialogu z innymi podmiotami. Koncepcja Taylora stanowi ciekawą i ważną próbę połączenia refleksji z zakresu filozofii człowieka, teorii wartości i filozofii kultury ekspresji. (shrink)

Study of the social determinants of consciousness is one of the more timely problems of contemporary philosophy. It requires a complex study of various factors determining the social nature of human consciousness and the cultural-historical mediation of humankind's reflection of the world. Esthetics, which studies the phenomenon of esthetic consciousness, has a place among these scientific disciplines.

Contemporary discussions of egalitarian justice have often focused on the issue of expensive taste. G.A. Cohen has recently abandoned the view that all chosen disadvantages are non-compensable, now maintaining that chosen expensive judgmental tastes—those endorsed by valuational judgment—are compensable as it is unreasonable to expect persons not to develop them. But chosen expensive brute taste—the main type of non-compensable expensive taste on the new scheme—cannot be described in such a way that there is a normative difference between it and chosen (...) expensive judgmental taste. As there are related problems with denying compensation for the other kind of expensive taste that might remain non-compensable, Cohen's position on taste appears to be either implausible or virtually indistinguishable from that of equality of welfare. However, compensation for valuational judgment-based expensive taste might be justified on grounds of responsibility. (shrink)

The paper discusses some of the criticisms of contingent valuation (CV) and allied techniques for estimating the intensity of peoples' preferences for the environment. The weakness of orthodox utilitarian assumptions in economics concerning the commensurability of all items entering into peoples' choices is discussed. The concept of commensurability is explored as is the problem of rational choice between incommensurate alternatives. While the frequent claim that the environment has some unique moral intrinsic value is unsustainable, its preservation often raises (...) ethical and other motivations that are not commensurate with the values that people place on ordinary marketable goods. Nevertheless, CV is also claimed to have some advantages and it is concluded that little progress will be made in this area until both sides in the debate recognise what is valid in their opponents' arguments. (shrink)

Philosophical investigation in synthetic biology has focused on the knowledge-seeking questions pursued, the kind of engineering techniques used, and on the ethical impact of the products produced. However, little work has been done to investigate the processes by which these epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical forms of inquiry arise in the course of synthetic biology research. An attempt at this work relying on a particular area of synthetic biology will be the aim of this chapter. I focus on the reengineering of (...) metabolic pathways through the manipulation and construction of small DNA-based devices and systems synthetic biology. Rather than focusing on the engineered products or ethical principles that result, I will investigate the processes by which these arise. As such, the attention will be directed to the activities of practitioners, their manipulation of tools, and the use they make of techniques to construct new metabolic devices. Using a science-in-practice approach, I investigate problems at the intersection of science, philosophy of science, and sociology of science. I consider how practitioners within this area of synthetic biology reconfigure biological understanding and ethical categories through active modelling and manipulation of known functional parts, biological pathways for use in the design of microbial machines to solve problems in medicine, technology, and the environment. We might describe this kind of problem-solving as relying on what Helen Longino referred to as “social cognition” or the type of scientific work done within what Hasok Chang calls “systems of practice”. My aim in this chapter will be to investigate the relationship that holds between systems of practice within metabolic engineering research and social cognition. I will attempt to show how knowledge and normative valuation are generated from this particular network of practitioners. In doing so, I suggest that the social nature of scientific inquiry is ineliminable to both knowledge acquisition and ethical evaluations. (shrink)

Contingent valuation surveys have tended to yield results that seem to go contrary to what is standardly seen as 'rational choice'. We argue that some of the inconsistencies arise because bids for public environmental goods in contingent valuation surveys are often motivated by moral considerations and ethical beliefs. We analyse the expected results of CV surveys given the existence of such ethical motivations, including the valuation of actions as well as states. It is found that we cannot (...) expect bids made on this basis to reveal preferences which obey the rules commonly assumed in the theory of consumer choice. The two standard reactions to these anomalies have been to attack the validity of the method, or to urge greater rigour in survey design and application. By contrast, we conclude that the usefulness of the method for evaluating options concerning environmental public goods depends critically on the problem definition. The method should be used for the direct evaluation of realistic policy packages, rather than to try to extract abstract values for invaluable goods. The conclusion accords with current trends, including the move towards the use of deliberative methodologies. (shrink)

The book is written by members of the R.S. Hartman Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology to explain the significant advances which Hartman made in theoretical and applied axiology, to forge ahead where he left problems unsolved, and to develop applications of his theory of value in business, investments, psychology, education, ethics, cross cultural studies, and theology. Contents: Part I. Axiological Theory; Part II Applications of Axiology.

Establishing that nature has intrinsic value has been the primary goal of environmental philosophers. This goal has generated tremendous confusion. Part of the confusion stems from a conflation of two quite distinct concerns. The first concern is with establishing the moral considerability of the natural world which is captured by what I call "intrinsic value p ." The second concern attempts to address a perceived problem with the way nature has traditionally been valued, or as many environmentalists would suggest, (...) undervalued, what I call "intrinsic value v ." In this paper I argue against further development of both types of theories of the intrinsic value of nature. There are, I believe, intermediate valuations that have been almost entirely overlooked in discussions of value. Much of the confusion currently plaguing environmental ethics can be avoided by abandoning intrinsic value and refocusing environmental ethics. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new categorical approach which attempts to provide an original understanding of QM. Our logos categorical approach attempts to consider the main features of the quantum formalism as the standpoint to develop a conceptual representation that explains what the theory is really talking about —rather than as problems that need to be bypassed in order to allow a restoration of a classical “common sense” understanding of what there is. In particular, we discuss a solution to (...) Kochen-Specker contextuality through the generalization of the meaning of global valuation. This idea has been already addressed by the so called topos approach to QM —originally proposed by Isham, Butterfiled and D ̈oring— in terms of sieve-valued valuations. The logos approach to QM presents a different solution in terms of the notion of intensive valuation. This new solution stresses an ontological reading of the quantum formalism and the need to restore an objective conceptual representation and understanding of quantum physical reality. (shrink)

Maintaining plural values is important when there is no conclusive principle by which the relative priority of normative positions can be determined. Value-articulating institutions predicated upon such principles have a low pluralistic potential. In response to the failures of stated-preference approaches to economic valuation, new perspectives have been developed to capture plural values. Three broad approaches are identified. The first, functional diversification, seeks to encompass the multiple qualities of the object of valuation, whereas positional modification enforces a particular (...) mode of thinking on the subject. Both entail a prior judgement of values and benefit from a reduction in the range of values. Eventually, therefore, both approaches collapse pluralism to a problem that can be tackled. The third approach, structural reconstruction, has greater pluralistic potential, recognising that the more diverse and uncertain the object of valuation, the more compelling it is. (shrink)

In this paper, we want to analyze conceptually whether and when merely using economic discourse – talking money – can crowd out people's positive attitudes towards environmental goods and their reasons to protect them. We concentrate on the specific case of market-based or monetary valuation as an instance of ‘commodification in discourse’ and argue that it can have the same moral problems as real commodification. We aim to bring together insights from philosophy, ethics, economics and psychology to argue that (...) there are good reasons to think about how and when to apply MV in environmental cases. On the basis of this interdisciplinary analysis and in order to promote further empirical research, we develop four empirically falsifiable hypotheses. Commodification in discourse can bring about real commodification. MV can have framing and crowding effects on those who come into contact with it. Intrinsic motivation is more robust than extrinsic motivation and leads less to freeriding. MV's framing and crowding effects can decrease environmental protection. (shrink)

Naive mereology studies ordinary, common-sense beliefs about part and whole. Some of the speculations in this article on naive mereology do not bear directly on Peter van Inwagen's "Material Beings". The other topics, (1) and (2), both do. (1) Here is an example of Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many". How can a table be a collection of atoms when many collections of atoms have equally strong claims to be that table? Van Inwagen invokes fuzzy sets to solve this (...) problem. I claim that an alternative treatment of vagueness, supervaluations over many-value valuations, provides a better solution. (2) The Special Composition Question asks how parts compose a whole. One who rejects van Inwagen's answer in terms of constituting a life need not provide some alternative answer. Even if all answers to the Special Question fail, there are a multitude of less general composition questions that are not so difficult. (shrink)

This paper presents the contribution of the pragmatic sociology of critical capacities to the understanding of environmental conflicts. In the field of 'environmental valuation', nowadays colonised by economics, the approach of plural modes (or 'regimes') of engagement provides a sociological understanding of the unequal power of conflicting 'languages of valuation'. This frame entails a shift from 'values' to 'modes of valuation', and links modes of valuation to modes of practical engagement and coordination with the surrounding environment. (...) Different social sources of incommensurability are thus detected and reframed as critical tension within and among modes of human coordination with the environment. (shrink)

Le présent article examine la façon dont John Dewey a entrepris de poser le problème de la valuation et de ses conséquences au sein de sa théorie de l’éducation. Plus spécifiquement, nous voudrions montrer que son effort pour repenser l’articulation des moyens et des fins du processus de valuation contribue à repenser l’enquête morale. Celle-ci, si elle fait alors l’objet d’une pédagogie qui met au centre l’expérience vécue du sujet, nous oblige à concevoir à nouveaux frais les valeurs (...) que nous accordons aux connaissances apprises. Notre analyse entend démontrer que : 1) de même que dans le domaine éthique, rien n’a de valeur en soi pour le sujet agissant. Mais que 2) la valuation de tout acte est déterminée en situation, alors, 3) dans le domaine de la pédagogie, aucune connaissance n’a de valeur en soi pour l’élève. 4) Ainsi la première tâche de l’enseignant.e est de former l’élève à des processus de valuation efficaces. Cela dans le but que celui-ci puisse à son tour, clairement, déterminer pour lui-même les connaissances qui auront de la valeur. Si notre hypothèse est juste alors cette tâche devient à la fois un point de départ important de la pédagogie pragmatiste et un impératif incontournable de l’éthique enseignante. -/- The present article examines how Dewey addressed the problem of value, as well as the consequences that this solution had for his educational theory. More specifically, I aim to show that Dewey’s effort to rethink means and ends within the process of valuation contributes to a recasting of moral inquiry. If moral inquiry becomes part of a pedagogy that focuses upon the lived experience of the subject, this compels us to rethink the value we attribute to acquired knowledge. My analysis will demonstrate 1) that even within the ethical domain, nothing has value in itself for the acting subject, but that 2) the value of all acts must be determined within specific situations, and therefore 3) within the domain of pedagogy, no knowledge has value in and of itself for the student. 4) Thus the first task of the teacher is to teach students how to evaluate questions of value, which will push them to determine for themselves what knowledge has value. If my hypothesis is correct, this task becomes simultaneously an important starting place for pragmatist pedagogy and a cornerstone of a new ethic of teaching. (shrink)

The automated valuation of benchmark land price plays an essential role in regulating land demand in Chinese real-estate market as the big data are currently accumulated rapidly. However, this problem becomes highly challenging due to the multidimension, large volume, and nonlinearity of the land price-influencing factors. In this paper, an effective data-driven automated valuation framework is proposed for valuing real estate assets by combining a GIS and neural network technologies. This framework can automatically obtain the values of (...) spatial factors affecting land price from GIS and generate training set data for training the neural network to identify the complex relationship between all kinds of factors and benchmark land prices. The effectiveness and universality of the framework is verified via the data of benchmark land prices in Wuhan. The framework can be applied for automated benchmark land price valuation in other cities. (shrink)

We show that a solution to Hilbert's Tenth Problem in the rings of algebraic integers and bigger subrings of number fields where it is currently not known, is equivalent to a problem of bounding archimedean valuations over non-real number fields.

Problem of Axiological Legitimization of the Universal System of the Protection of Human Rights Summary In this paper it is argued that legitimization of the universal system of the protection of human rights depends primary not from the content of values recognised as fundamental but rather from metaaxiological solutions related to the way of existence and to the possibility of cognition of these values. Legitimisation is based on the recognition of an objective nature and of cognoscibility of basic values. (...) Realisation of the primary aim of this paper is linked to the problem of different meanings of the notion of universality, used in the context of the universal system of the protection of human rights. First, descriptive and normative meanings have to be distinguished. In the case of normative sense, there are moral and legal meanings of “universality”. An axiological justification of the universality of human rights in the legal sense leads to the legitimisation of the universal system. It is shown that modifications of – broadly accepted in the Polish theory of law – definitions of an axiological justification of legal norms are needed. These definitions base such a justification on the valuations made by particular groups of subjects. It is argued that it is much more convenient to refer to valuations understood as meanings of sentences of certain kind. -/- Streszczenie W artykule zmierza się do uzasadnienia tezy, że legitymizacja uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka jest oparta nie tyle na treści wartości uznawanych w tym systemie, ale na uznanych w nich rozstrzygnięciach metaaksjologicznych, dotyczących tego, jak istnieją wartości podstawowe dla tego systemu i czy są one poznawalne. Walor legitymizacyjny posiada przede wszystkim uznanie obiektywnego charakteru tych wartości i ich poznawalności. Realizacja zasadniczego celu zakłada uporządkowanie podstawowych pojęć dotyczących problematyki powszechności praw człowieka – termin „powszechność” stosowany w odniesieniu do praw człowieka w kontekście uniwersalnego systemu ochrony ma wiele znaczeń. Przede wszystkim odróżnić trzeba powszechność w aspekcie opisowym i w aspekcie normatywnym. W przypadku powszechności w aspekcie normatywnym w grę może wchodzić powszechność w sensie ideowym i powszechność w sensie pozytywnoprawnym. Uzasadnienie tej ostatniej jest też uzasadnieniem poszukiwanej tu legitymizacji uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka. Prowadzone analizy prowadza także do sformułowania postulatów dotyczących sposobu definiowania uzasadnienia aksjologicznego norm prawnych. Modyfikacji wymagają powszechnie przyjmowane w polskiej teorii prawa definicje relatywizujące takie uzasadnienie do ocen przyjmowanych przez konkretne podmioty oceniające lub ich grupy. (shrink)

Problem of Axiological Legitimization of the Universal System of the Protection of Human Rights Summary In this paper it is argued that legitimization of the universal system (UN-system) of the protection of human rights depends primary not from the content of values recognised as fundamental but rather from metaaxiological solutions related to the way of existence and to the possibility of cognition of these values. Legitimisation is based on the recognition of an objective nature and of cognoscibility of basic (...) values. Realisation of the primary aim of this paper is linked to the problem of different meanings of the notion of universality, used in the context of the universal system of the protection of human rights. First, descriptive and normative (prescriptive) meanings have to be distinguished. In the case of normative sense, there are moral and legal meanings of “universality”. An axiological justification of the universality of human rights in the legal sense leads to the legitimisation of the universal system. It is shown that modifications of – broadly accepted in the Polish theory of law – definitions of an axiological justification of legal norms are needed. These definitions base such a justification on the valuations made by particular groups of subjects. It is argued that it is much more convenient to refer to valuations understood as meanings of sentences of certain kind. -/- Streszczenie W artykule zmierza się do uzasadnienia tezy, że legitymizacja uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka jest oparta nie tyle na treści wartości uznawanych w tym systemie, ale na uznanych w nich rozstrzygnięciach metaaksjologicznych, dotyczących tego, jak istnieją wartości podstawowe dla tego systemu i czy są one poznawalne. Walor legitymizacyjny posiada przede wszystkim uznanie obiektywnego charakteru tych wartości i ich poznawalności (uznanie kognitywizmu aksjologicznego). Realizacja zasadniczego celu zakłada uporządkowanie podstawowych pojęć dotyczących problematyki powszechności praw człowieka – termin „powszechność” stosowany w odniesieniu do praw człowieka w kontekście uniwersalnego systemu ochrony ma wiele znaczeń. Przede wszystkim odróżnić trzeba powszechność w aspekcie opisowym i w aspekcie normatywnym. W przypadku powszechności w aspekcie normatywnym w grę może wchodzić powszechność w sensie ideowym (moralnym) i powszechność w sensie pozytywnoprawnym. Uzasadnienie tej ostatniej jest też uzasadnieniem poszukiwanej tu legitymizacji uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka. Prowadzone analizy prowadza także do sformułowania postulatów dotyczących sposobu definiowania uzasadnienia aksjologicznego norm prawnych. Modyfikacji wymagają powszechnie przyjmowane w polskiej teorii prawa definicje relatywizujące takie uzasadnienie do ocen przyjmowanych przez konkretne podmioty oceniające lub ich grupy. (shrink)

We shall in this paper try to present "a solution" of this problem and state with precision both the sense in which natural predicates "describe," while value predicates do not, and the sense in which value predicates "follow from" descriptive ones. We shall reach an unexpected result: not only are the value predicates "a different kind of predicates" from what the descriptive predicates are thought to be, but the descriptive predicates themselves are a different kind of predicates from what (...) they have been thought to be. They are one particular, and the most significant, set of value predicates. And it is precisely this special significance for valuation that makes them both "descriptive" and "factual"! (shrink)

ResumeMeans-centered approach to science is contrasted with a problem-centered orientation. Overstress on and too exclusive concern with method, instrument, technique or procedure fosters the following mistakes:1) Emphasis on polish and elegance rather than on vitality, significance and creativeness.2) Giving the commanding positions in science to technicians rather than discoverers.3) Over-valuation of quantification for its own sake.4) Fitting problems to techniques rather than vice-versa.5) Creation of a false and pernicious hierarchical system among the sciences.6) Overstrong compartmentalization between the sciences.7) (...) Emphasis on the difference rather than the similarities between scientists and other truth-seekers.8) Creation of a scientific orthodoxy, which in turn a) tends to block the development of new methods, b) tends to exclude many problems from the jurisdiction of science and c) tends to make scientists “safe” rather than daring and unconventional.9) Neglect of the problems of values, with a consequent blurring of the criteria for judging the worth or importance of an experiment. (shrink)

When it reaches its absolute limit, namely, when it comes to the question of good and evil, politics must seek ethics for help, for I do not wish to consider political power as an ultimate end in itself though it is an intermediary end. There is not only the reality of power but also an ethic of power as well. For “the concept of the ‘good life’ mutually implicates politics and ethics.” As a relationship between man and man, the exercise (...) of power is not ethically neutral but is moral; and ethical questions arise only when man is not alone, that is, he exists in relation to others. Because the possibility of evil is inherent in every move of power, the problem of power is an ethical problem: “the problematic of evil is intertwined with the problematic of power.”The idea of human dignity is what underlies an existentialist ethics. Gabriel Marcel has this in mind when he speaks of “the existential background of human dignity.” A preponderance of the existentialist critique of the dehumanizing, alienating and depersonalizing tendency of modern man and society accentuates this singular, self-same idea of human dignity. Human dignity is not just an idea of equality, political or otherwise. It infuses all such principles of politics as freedom, justice, equality and responsibility one wishes to defend, and it underlies such problems of politics as war and peace, racism, human rights and colonialism. All these principles and problems of politics make direct or indirect, and explicit or implicit reference to human dignity.By human dignity is meant an affirmation of the moral respect for the absolute worthiness of each and every individual as a human person. To appeal to and call upon human dignity is to affirm the very humanity of man, both the quality of being truly human and a collectivity of men. The idea of human dignity is never a testimonial to atomic individualism, the allegation of which is often made by many critics of existentialism and should properly be reserved for the “possessive individualism” of the Hobbesian and Lockeian political tradition. Rather, it is an appeal to solidify and strengthen the sense of a human community. For to be authentically human (to be “personal”) means to be social or intersubjective. The ethical accent on human dignity is not a move away from politics for the sake of the romanticism of political defeat much less of “an escape for the bewildered” and of harboring the idea of the absurd. But rather it is to bring politics close to ethics or to close the gap between politics and ethics, a two-faced Janus. I wish to defend the ethical triumph of political man, the consummation of politics.By widening the gap between ethics and politics in the name of the logic of science and value neutrality, the political behavioralist as a theorist (not as an individual actor) is totally oblivious to the ethical foundation of politics. It should be said that one cannot make a commitment noncommittally, the behavioralist's commitment to value neutrality notwith-standing.The cardinal malaise of the methodological credo of value neutrality is the indifference to or insensibility of political behavioralism to the living dialectic of truth and action when its declared aim is merely to acquire knowledge whose subject matter is the anonymous object inhumanly called “man.” It is the conspiracy of political epistemology narrowly conceived rather than political silence or depoliticization which is on trial in a phenomenological critique of political behavioralism. To summon the credo of relevance to remove the barriers of political silence or to solicit the politicization of the political science profession alone is, though a leap forward, far short of resolving the predicament endemic to political behavioralism as an adequate theory of politics. (shrink)

A decision problem in which the values of the decision variables must sum to a fixed positive real number s is called an "allocation problem," and the problem of aggregating the allocations of n experts the "allocation aggregation problem." Under two simple axiomatic restrictions on aggregation, the only acceptable allocation aggregation method is based on weighted arithmetic averaging (Lehrer and Wagner, Rational Consensus in Science and Society, 1981). In this note it is demonstrated that when the (...) values assigned to the variables are restricted to a finite set (as is always the case in practice), the aforementioned axioms allow only dictatorial aggregation. (shrink)

In this essay I criticize the contigent valuation method in resource economics and the concepts of utility and efficiency upon which it is based. I consider an example of this method and argue that it cannot-as it pretends-substitute for public education and political deliberation.

In this essay I criticize the contigent valuation method in resource economics and the concepts of utility and efficiency upon which it is based. I consider an example of this method and argue that it cannot-as it pretends-substitute for public education and political deliberation.

A chain-closed field is defined as a chainable field (i.e. a real field such that, for all n ∈ N, Σ K2n+1 ≠ Σ K2n) which does not admit any "faithful" algebraic extension, and can also be seen as a field having a Henselian valuation ν such that the residue field K/ν is real closed and the value group ν K is odd divisible with |ν K/2ν K| = 2. If K admits only one such valuation, we show (...) that f ∈ K(X) is in $\mathbf{\Sigma} K(X)^{2n} \operatorname{iff}$ for any real algebraic extension L of $K, "f(L) \subseteq \mathbf{\Sigma}L^{2n}"$ holds. The conclusion is also true for K = R((t)) (a chainable but not chain-closed field), and in the case n = 1 it holds for several variables and any real field K. (shrink)

A chain-closed field is defined as a chainable field which does not admit any "faithful" algebraic extension, and can also be seen as a field having a Henselian valuation $\nu$ such that the residue field $K/\nu$ is real closed and the value group $\nu K$ is odd divisible with $|\nu K/2\nu K| = 2$. If $K$ admits only one such valuation, we show that $f \in K$ is in $\mathbf{\Sigma} K^{2n} \operatorname{iff}$ for any real algebraic extension $L$ of (...) $K, "f \subseteq \mathbf{\Sigma}L^{2n}"$ holds. The conclusion is also true for $K = \mathbf{R})$, and in the case $n = 1$ it holds for several variables and any real field $K$. (shrink)

The center of this investigation is the hard problem of phenomenal perception. To be clear, hereby it is thought of higher animals; accordingly the problem of Human consciousness will explicitly not be treated. The so-called explanatory gap (Levine), i.e. missing a neural explanation of experiences, here is emergence-theoretically countered: It is argued that systems own properties and laws different from those of their components. Applied to the brain the phenomenal character of perception is explained as an emergence effect (...) from the systemic cooperation of perception, valuation and behavior, whereby also an interpretation is opened to Davidson’s anomal monism. As is further shown, feelings are to be understood as a necessary completion of perception when, as in the case of higher animals, the behavior is primarily controlled by phenomenal perception. (shrink)

Holiness is an important but problematic concept for religious discourse. It is unclear what it means, both in classical texts and in contemporary usage. Holiness seems to signify a property in some cases and a relation in others. The Bible itself preserves a range of usages. Some of these are ontological: holiness as a would-be property inheres in objects, places, persons, or times. Other uses are imputed: holiness connotes a status that human beings ascribe to things. The range of use (...) can be explicated by the concept of a social or institutional reality developed by Searle. Social facts entail valuations, intentions, and practices; they presuppose a basis of brute fact. A plausible contemporary view of holiness will link ontological and axiological commitments in such a way as to express the underlying goodness of being. (shrink)

The adoption of the Collateral Directive 2002/47/EC represents an important progress towards the implementation of a truly harmonized single financial market. The Lithuanian Financial Collateral Arrangements Act (the Law) has implemented the Directive 2002/47/EC in time. The Law establishes special regulation for financial securities given in transactions between „professional market participants“, between market participants and other companies, inclusive small and medium-sized enterprises. The Law applies to certain transactions on the financial markets and aims at stabilizing the financial markets. Essentially, the (...) Directive and the national implementing law ensure the enforceability of financial collateral arrangements and provide for rapid and non-formalistic enforcement of financial collateral procedures in insolvency cases. The realization of financial collaterals is made easier and cheaper. (shrink)

We recall the characterisation of positive definite polynomial functions over a real closed ring due to Dickmann, and give a new proof of this result, based upon ideas of Abraham Robinson. In addition we isolate the class of convexly ordered valuation rings for which this characterisation holds.

Works of culinary expertise are not typically regarded as works of "fine" art, in the way that, say, paintings, etchings, symphonies and sculptures are. I argue, however, that any form of creativity embodied in a perceptible work reflecting it is a subject about which we might exercise "aesthetic judgments" that do not differ fundamentally from the sorts typical with regard to the usual "fine" arts. To reserve a special notion for marking off the latter simply disguises the fact that it (...) is properly a value judgment that one is making. Otherwise it might seem a simple matter of fact that certain works are not works of fine art. I deal with this issue in Chapters Three and Four, in connection with traditional attempts to distinguish art from mere "craft" and more recent efforts to account for a certain "openness" in the concept of art. In Chapter One I consider the work of art as an "aesthetic object" combining sensory qualities into a complex whole, and specific objections against the possibility of composing or constructing, according to artistic principles, complexes of tastes . In Chapter Two the notion of "function" is introduced, since it might be thought that food is too obviously functional, in the face of the apparent irrelevance of functional considerations in artistic appraisal. ;Throughout, the emphasis is on food as specifically edible. In Chapter Two I argue, however, that other aspects of food besides its taste and smell might also be considered as part of that specific emphasis. Even to consider the visual qualities of a dish, for example, does not necessarily reduce it to a case of sculpture or visual design. Rather, I argue, cooking is an art which, in some of its forms, simply happens also to be an art of sculpting or visual design. I make a related point in Chapter Five about works in which food is at most one ingredient, e.g., performances, services or ceremonies. In cases where the whole work actually utilizes potentialities of food in an essential way, I argue that it is at least not clear why we should not regard the work as one of the culinary art that also happens to take the form, say, of dramatic or pictorial art. ;The first two chapters primarily aim to remove objections to regarding food works as art. This of course does not show that any particular food creation ever does in fact reach the level demanded for proper inclusion as "art." However, my more general discussion in Chapters Three and Four are aimed at generating some sympathy for an approach that would simply undercut the feeling that there is any such "level" to be reached in the first place. At best we are dealing with degrees of artistic value. Why not simply grant, then, that creatively produced taste complexes are works of art, and reserve whatever valuations we might come to make for the judgements we make concerning how good any particular work of food art is? In Chapter Five I emphasize the extent to which food works may in fact embody artistic dimensions, specifically with respect to the creative combination of expressive and symbolic elements. This allows for a kind of "composition" involving those elements, over and above the potentialities inherent in taste and smell as such. As for whether such compositions then ever reach a level of excellence sufficiently high for genuine "art"--I try to argue that this is a question that we simply should not ask. (shrink)

Over the past few decades, scholars have reassessed the role of amour-propre in Rousseau’s thought. While it was once believed that he had an entirely negative valuation of the emotion, it is now widely held that he finds it useful and employs it to strengthen moral attachments, conjugal love, civic virtue and moral heroism. At the same time, scholars are divided as to whether this positive amour-propre is an antidote to the negative or dangerous form. Some scholars are confident (...) that ‘inflamed’ amour-propre can be overcome while others adopt a more fatalistic view. While mindful of Rousseau’s pessimism in his most famous works, this essay seeks to identify a middle position. By contending Rousseau’s discussion of amour-propre is largely concerned with the problems surrounding identity construction in commercial, urban societies, it will be argued that amour-propre can be lessened to manageable levels in more rural societies, that is, agrarian provincial life. (shrink)

In this article, I consider the implications arising from the commonplace premise that the nature of being admits in ontological kinds. That is, there are actual, fundamentally different genera of being in the world, namely human and non-human beings. That for entities to be considered suitable for valuation under the same ethical rubric, it must be assumed that the general character of their mental states is commensurate. However, if we accent that it is indeterminable what kind of being an (...) entity is without access to the phenomenological character of its experiences, then it may be argued that the ethical standards for non-human animals which follow from our inductive descriptions will always remain a matter of opinion, expressed from a particular point of view delimited within the metaphysical commitments derived from a human ontology of being. (shrink)

Jens Beckert’s 2009 article on the constitution and dynamics of markets is a bold attempt to define a novel research agenda. Deeming uncertainty and coordination essential for the constitution of social action in markets, Beckert proposes a framework centered on the resolution of three coordination problems: valuation, cooperation, and competition. The empirical study of these three coordination problems has the potential to contribute considerably to the sociological analysis of markets. However, the assertion that such a theoretical vantage point can (...) explain the constitution and dynamics of markets is not compelling because it (1) conflates social interaction with social structures, (2) fails to address power relations, institutions, and macro-level structures, and (3) neglects the historically contingent and socially contested nature of markets themselves. The present article shows that these three pitfalls are the result of starting from the problem of order and building upon uncertainty as the basis of action in markets, lending the suggested framework a methodologically individualist bent. Therefore, Beckert’s suggested framework is in danger of mystifying the very power relations, institutions, and macro-level structures that are at the heart of the constitution and dynamics of markets. (shrink)

How are “interesting” research problems identified and made durable by academic researchers, particularly in situations defined by multiple evaluation principles? Building on two case studies of research groups working on rare diseases in academic biomedicine, we explore how group leaders arrange their groups to encompass research problems that latch onto distinct evaluation principles by dividing and combining work into “basic-oriented” and “clinical-oriented” spheres of inquiry. Following recent developments in the sociology of valuation comparing academics to capitalist entrepreneurs in pursuit (...) of varying kinds of worth, we argue that the metaphor of the portfolio is helpful in analyzing how group leaders manage these different research lines as “alternative investment options” from which they were variously hoping to capitalize. We argue portfolio development is a useful concept for exploring how group leaders fashion “entrepreneurial” practices to manage and exploit tensions between multiple matrices of valuation and conclude with suggestions for how this vocabulary can further extend analysis of epistemic capitalism within science and technology studies. (shrink)

Moral philosophy and education, by H. D. Aiken.--The moral sense and contributory values, by C. I. Lewis.--Realms of value, by P. W. Taylor.--The role of value theory in education, by J. D. Butler.--Does ethics make a difference? By K. Price.--Educational value statements, by C. Beck.--Educational values and goals, by W. K. Frankena.--Conflicts in values, by H. S. Broudy.--Levels of valuational discourse in education, by J. F. Perry and P. G. Smith.--Education and some moves toward a value methodology, by A. S. (...) Clayton.--You can't pray a lie, by M. Twain.--Men, machines, and morality, by J. F. Soltis.--Teaching and telling, by I. Scheffler.--Reason and habit, by R. S. Peters.--The two moralists of the child, by J. Piaget.--Causes and morality, by R. S. Peters.--On education and morals, by R. W. Sleeper.--Moral autonomy and reasonableness, by T. D. Perry. (shrink)