The eminent Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu confronts the paradox that while Western cultures recoil from claims of universality, previously colonized peoples, seeking to redefine their identities, insist on cultural particularities.

Universals: Loux, M. J. The existence of universals. Russell, B. The world of universals. Quine, W. V. O. On what there is. Pears, D. F. Universals. Strawson, P. F. Particular and general. Wolterstorff, N. Qualities. Bambrough, R. Universals and family resemblances. Donagan, A. Universals and metaphysical realism. Sellars, W. Abstract entities. Wolterstorff, N. On the nature of universals.--Particulars: Loux, M. J. Particulars and their individuation. Black. M. The identity of indiscernibles. Ayer, (...) A. J. The identity of indiscernibles. O'Connor, D. J. The identity of indiscernibles. Allaire, E. B. Bare particulars. Chappell, V. C. Particulars re-clothed. Allaire, E. B. Another look at bare particulars. Meiland, J. W. Do relations individuate? Long, D. C. Particulars and their qualities. Copi, I. Essence and accident. Chandler, H. S. Essence and accident. Plantinga, A. World and essence. (shrink)

It is said that when Socrates is made to ask questions like "What is the pious and what the impious?", "What is courage?", or "What is the beautiful?", he is asking for the definition of a universal. For the "average" Greek of his time, however, this is a radically new question about a radically new sort of object, and Socrates’ interlocutors do not understand it. They usually answer it as if it were a different, if related, question: they tend to (...) provide concrete instances of the universal in question rather than a definition, however inadequate, of the universal itself. Socrates always tries, but does not always succeed, to make himself clear: Meno, for example, is supposed never to get the point. (shrink)

Armstrong holds that a law of nature is a certain sort of structural universal which, in turn, fixes causal relations between particular states of affairs. His claim that these nomic structural universals explain causal relations commits him to saying that such universals are irreducible, not supervenient upon the particular causal relations they fix. However, Armstrong also wants to avoid Plato’s view that a universal can exist without being instantiated, a view which he regards as incompatible with naturalism. This (...) construal of naturalism forces Armstrong to say that universals are abstractions from a certain class of particulars; they are abstractions from first-order states of affairs, to be more precise. It is here argued that these two tendencies in Armstrong cannot be reconciled: To say that universals are abstractions from first-order states of affairs is not compatible with saying that universals fix causal relations between particulars. Causal relations are themselves states of affairs of a sort, and Armstrong’s claim that a law is a kind of structural universal is best understood as the view that any given law logically supervenes on its corresponding causal relations. The result is an inconsistency, Armstrong having to say that laws do not supervene on particular causal relations while also being committed to the view that they do so supervene. The inconsistency is perhaps best resolved by denying that universals are abstractions from states of affairs. (shrink)

This paper seeks to advance the horizon of Kwasi Wiredu’s philosophical defense of the compatibility of cultural universals and particulars. Wiredu reflects on language, biological identity, inter/intra cultural communication, as well as epistemic and moral fundamentals as cultural universals. In pursuing further Wiredu’s thesis on cultural universals, the present paper critically examines some of the inconsistencies implicit in Wiredu’s position. As a consequence, the paper extends the frontiers of the realm of universals by establishing the (...) plausibility of causality as another instance of a conceptual universal, transcending all cultural particularities. (shrink)

The purpose of the following, paper is to consider whether there is a fundamenital division of the objects with which metaphysics is concerned into two classes, universals and particulars, or whetlher there is any method of overcoming this dualism. My own opinion is that the dualism is ultimate; on the other hand, many men with whom, in the main, I am in close agreement, hold that it is not ultimate. I do not feel the grounds in favour of (...) its ultimate nature to be very conclusive, and in what follows I should lay stress rather on the distinctions and considerations introduced during the argument than on the conclusion at which the argument arrives. (shrink)

A phenomenalist philosophy which employs the Principle of Acquaintance (PA) plus the Principle that what exists are the referents of certain meaningful terms, defined by PA, cannot include either universals or particulars in its ontology, but is limited to instances of universals as constituting the range of ontological existents. Universals must be omitted since they are repeatable and, hence, never wholly presented or contained, whereas the objects of direct acquaintance are wholly and exhaustively presented. Furthermore, no (...) entities beyond characters (qualities and relations) are given in direct acquaintance; hence, particulars, too, must be omitted for the phenomenalist who relies on PA. (shrink)

The medieval version of the problem of universals centres around propositions such as ?man is a species? and ?animalis a genus?. One of C. Lejewski's analyses of such propositions shows the semantic status of their terms by means of Ajdukiewicz-style categorical indices having participial or infinitive forms as their natural-language counterparts. Some medievals certainly used such forms in their corresponding analyses, thus avoiding the alleged referential demands generated by nominally-termed propositions. Boethius the Consul exemplifies the confusion which may still (...) arise from the traditional definition of universal in terms of predication of many. Unnecessary adherence to nominally-termed analyses not only grounded a tendency towards nominalism and Platonism, but also towards the moderns? ?way of ideas? (shrink)

Preconference version of paper for the 17th International Congress of Linguists in Prague, July, 2003.

L'analisi dell'aristotelismo «platonizzante» nell'ambito della filosofia araba prima della sistemazione della Shifa di Avicenna, secondo cui Dio non avrebbe conoscenza dei particolari, consente all'A. di dimostrare come ci siano stati anche approcci platonici ad Aristotele , che non sono passati attraverso il filtro dei neoplatonici greci. L'altra cosa significativa è il fatto che all'interno della scuola di Baghdad vi sono modi diversi di intendere lo stato ontologico degli universali. L'A. tenta anche di ridimensionare la figura di al-Farabi all'interno della scuola (...) di Baghdad. I filosofi considerati sono al-Farabi, Yahya b. Adi e Ibn al-Tayyib. (shrink)

This excellent collection of essays is aimed at what the editor feels is a gap in the subjects of the present proliferation of anthologies: ontology. Specifically, the essays are aimed at the problems raised by universals, mainly whether they exist and if so what is their status, and the nature of particulars. There are, correspondingly, two sections in the book; the first, on universals, arranged chronologically because the essays form a continuous stream of philosophical dialogue, contains articles (...) by Russell, Quine, Pears, Strawson, Wolterstorff, Bambrough and others. The sequential arrangement is very pleasing, for it gives the reader a chance to get the feel of real philosophical dialogue. To both sections, Loux provides clear introductory essays setting forth both the problems and possible solutions. The second section, on particulars, is arranged topically, although within each topic the sequential form is preserved. The first section is on the identity of indiscernibles principle, with essays by Max Black, Ayer, and O’Conner. [[sic]] The second is on the theme of bare particulars, including articles by Allaire, Chappell, and Meiland. The final section is on characterized particulars and essentialism, with essays by Long, Copi, and Chandler. An essay by David Wiggins rounds out this part of the book. This book can serve both as an introduction to the problem of ontology and a source for on-going inquiry. A large bibliography is included for those who wish to pursue the question.—W. de V. (shrink)

in Intellectual Property Rights in a Networked World, eds. H. Tavani and R. Spinello, 2004.

In his 1911 paper, “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars,” Bertrand Russell supposes the question whether universals are spatial or non spatial turns on the question of the existence of particulars. If particulars could be shown to exist, then since, according to Russell, they obviously are spatial, the non-spatiality of universals would be established. On the other hand, the denial of the existence of particulars would entail the spatiality of universals.In this (...) paper, I argue that Russell’s claim is plausible only if particulars are construed either as quality instances or as ordinary objects. If, however, particulars are either substrata or collections of qualities, nothing follows in regard to the spatiality or the non-spatiality of universals. Since the alternative interpretations of particularity are, I contend, at least as attractive as Russell’s, his failure to consider them makes his position less interesting than it might otherwise have been. (shrink)

In his 1911 paper, “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars,” Bertrand Russell supposes the question whether universals are spatial or non spatial turns on the question of the existence of particulars. If particulars could be shown to exist, then since, according to Russell, they obviously are spatial, the non-spatiality of universals would be established. On the other hand, the denial of the existence of particulars would entail the spatiality of universals.In this (...) paper, I argue that Russell’s claim is plausible only if particulars are construed either as quality instances or as ordinary objects. If, however, particulars are either substrata or collections of qualities, nothing follows in regard to the spatiality or the non-spatiality of universals. Since the alternative interpretations of particularity are, I contend, at least as attractive as Russell’s, his failure to consider them makes his position less interesting than it might otherwise have been. (shrink)

If the truth of a given sentence, ‘P’ depends upon a certain non-linguistic fact, P then, how is the P without inverted commas involved in the statement, “ ‘P’ is true when P“? How is ‘P’ related to P? My answer suggests that any discussion of these questions leads inevitably to the ancient problem of particulars and universals.

Russell’s late ontology sought to avoid “wholly colourless particulars” (substrata, points of space, bare instants of time) by appealing to complexes of compresent qualities in place of particulars that exemplify qualitieso Yet he insisted on (i) calling qualities like redness “discontinuous,” “repeatable” particulars, and (ii) claiming that such qualities were not universals, since they were not exemplified but were ultimate subjects that exemplified universal relations and universal qualities. It is argued that his choice of terminology is (...) not only misleading, but is ironically not consistent with the concept of universality implicit in his well known “proof” of the existence of universals, a proof he retained in his later (1940-48) ontology. It is also argued that there are substantive grounds for rejecting his classification that clarify the concept of a universal. (shrink)

Russell’s late ontology sought to avoid “wholly colourless particulars” (substrata, points of space, bare instants of time) by appealing to complexes of compresent qualities in place of particulars that exemplify qualitieso Yet he insisted on (i) calling qualities like redness “discontinuous,” “repeatable” particulars, and (ii) claiming that such qualities were not universals, since they were not exemplified but were ultimate subjects that exemplified universal relations and universal qualities. It is argued that his choice of terminology is (...) not only misleading, but is ironically not consistent with the concept of universality implicit in his well known “proof” of the existence of universals, a proof he retained in his later (1940-48) ontology. It is also argued that there are substantive grounds for rejecting his classification that clarify the concept of a universal. (shrink)

A connection between things and properties is required to hold things and properties together. Exemplification is such a connection. Exemplification is usually considered primitive, and therefore analysis of exemplification is nearly absent from the literature. I maintain that exemplification might not be primitive; and in giving a description of exemplification, I point out a new problem having to do with the issue of how things are tied to properties.

To address, as Miller does, the text of Catcher particularly, we would argue that Holden's experiences of old age, physical repulsiveness, sex, aloneness and isolation, and even death are embedded in his full experience of society, and that his responses, moment by moment, bear the imprint of his total response to the competitive, dehumanizing world he is in the process of rebelling against and rejecting. He finds old Spencer pathetic not just because he is elderly and arthritic and snuffy with (...) flu, but because he is relatively powerless, not very well off, and naïve in urging upon Holden his teacherly prescriptions for life: be sensible, do your lessons, take care for your future—as if with one's own efforts alone could guarantee one's worldly future. This essay is a reply to disagreements raised by James E. Miller, Jr. to the Ohmanns' “Reviewers, Critics, and The Catcher in the Rye” . Carol Ohmann has also contributed "Virginia Woolf's Criticism: A Polemical Preface" with Barbara Currier Bell. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, contra Fraser MacBride, that conceptual analysis, and in particular the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity, can solve the Problem of Universals, whether understood as the One over Many or the as the Many over One. In this paper I show why the solutions needed to solve either version of the problem must be in terms of truthmakers, and that the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity is not sufficient to solve them.

This paper aims to describe the Cartesian conception on the universals, as well as the way in which this conception could be related to the position developed by Locke in the Essay. Firstly, some considerations about the role of sensorial knowledge in Cartesian philosophy are analyzed. Secondly, some considerations about Locke’s conception of idea are reviewed. Then, the Cartesian concept of universal is reviewed considering his position in the Principia. Finally, Descartes’ and Locke’s view about universals are compared (...) highlighting the role that both thinkers assign to the sensory experience in their theory of knowledge. (shrink)

A reanalysis of Atran's data is presented in which the comparison between Itzaj and Michigan animal names is represented in spatial rather than taxonomic form. Similarity among all subjects is also represented in spatial terms. Finally, culturally shared knowledge between the two cultures is shown to be about ten times larger than the culture-specific component unique to each culture.

In this volume, John Bacon argues that it is difficult to deny the existence of particularized properties and relations, which in modern philosophy are sometimes called `tropes'. In so doing, he advances a powerful and sophisticated metaphysical theory according to which both ordinary particulars and properties and relations are bundles of tropes.

This essay in the "anthropology of science" is about how cognition constrains culture in producing science. The example is folk biology, whose cultural recurrence issues from the very same domain-specific cognitive universals that provide the historical backbone of systematic biology. Humans everywhere think about plants and animals in highly structured ways. People have similar folk-biological taxonomies composed of essence-based species-like groups and the ranking of species into lower- and higher-order groups. Such taxonomies are not as arbitrary in structure and (...) content, nor as variable across cultures, as the assembly of entities into cosmologies, materials or social groups. (shrink)

There is no single problem of universals but a family of difficulties that treat of a variety of interwoven metaphysical, epistemological, logical and semantic themes. This makes the problem of universals resistant to canonical reduction (to a ‘once-and-for-all’ concern). In particular, the problem of universals cannot be reduced to the problem of supplying truth-makers for sentences that express sameness of type. This is (in part) because the conceptual distinction between numerical and qualitative identity must first be drawn (...) before a sentence is eligible to be supplied with truth-makers. The case is made through a consideration of a recent argument by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. (shrink)

I will consider Armstrong's problems in trying to account for structural universals, i.e., a kind of complex universal whose instantiation by particulars involves different parts of those particulars instantiating several basic properties and relations, such as the property of being a molecule of methane. I present and criticise Armstrong's most recent attempt to explain structural properties by means of the identification of universals with types of states of affairs and I state my own solution to the (...) problem by appealing to formal relations holding between particulars. (shrink)

Summary Based on Max Weber's concept of Kulturnation and Hans Blumenberg's project of metaphorology, this essay argues that modern nations follow distinct cultural programmes that are inherent to their national ideas. Each national idea is propagated by a particular biopolitical metaphor, which performs a transfer from practical or scientific ideas about how nature structures and organises life to cultural ideas about how human lives should be socially and politically organised. The essay examines the emergence of the principal metaphors of grafting (...) in England (Great Britain), of regeneration and elective affinities in France, and of organic self-generation in Prussia (Germany). The fact that each nation claims for its particular national idea the status of a universal principle constitutes the intrinsic paradox of nationalism. (shrink)

Wittgenstein expounds his notion of a family resemblance in two important passages. The first is from The Blue Book:This craving for generality is the resultant of a number of tendencies connected with particular philosophical confusions. There is— The tendency to look for something common to entities which we commonly subsume under a general term. We are inclined to think that there must be something common to all games, say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general (...) term “game” to the various games; whereas the games form a family the members of which have family likenesses …. There is a tendency rooted in our usual forms of expression, to think that a man who has learnt to understand a general term, say, the term “leaf,” has thereby come to possess a kind of general picture of a leaf, as opposed to pictures of particular leaves …. This again is connected with the idea that the meaning of a word is an image, or a thing correlated with the word. (shrink)

I reassess the famous arguments of Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1925) against the tenability of the distinction between particulars and universals and discuss their recent elaboration by Fraser MacBride. I argue that Ramsey’s argument is ambiguous between kinds and properties and that his sceptical worries can be resolved once this distinction is taken into account. A crucial role in this dissolution is a notion of what is essential to a property. I close by some epistemological considerations.