This chapter contains sections titled: Truth and Unconcealment Unconcealment in General The Planks of the Platform Propositioned truth Unconcealment of the essence (being) of beings The revealing‐concealing of the clearing.

This book includes ten essays that trace the notion of unconcealment as it develops from Heidegger's early writings to his later work, shaping his philosophy of truth, language and history. 'Unconcealment' is the idea that what entities are depends on the conditions that allow them to manifest themselves. This concept, central to Heidegger's work, also applies to worlds in a dual sense: first, a condition of entities manifesting themselves is the existence of a world; and second, worlds themselves (...) are disclosed. The unconcealment or disclosure of a world is the most important historical event, and Heidegger believes there have been a number of quite distinct worlds that have emerged and disappeared in history. Heidegger's thought as a whole can profitably be seen as working out the implications of the original understanding of unconcealment. (shrink)

Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, like Goethe’s Faust, begins in Faustus’ study. Faustus, renowned for his learning, is reading, going through the entire range of medieval disciplines — Aristotelian logic, Galenic medicine, Justinian law, Jerome’s Vulgate. His rapid deductions, after quoting to himself snatches from the concerned texts, read like a pastiche of the vanity of all human knowledge one encounters in De vanitate scientiarum by Cornelius Agrippa, a rumored alchemist and master of the occult.1 Faustus rejects logic as sterile, and (...) medicine and law as “mercenary,” unfit for the gentleman-scholar, who, according to the contemporary code,2 did not study or work for gain — these are.. (shrink)

Table of Formal and Descriptivists Ontologists (PDF - from Bernard Bolzano to present time) Ontologists of the 19th and 20th Centuries (a selection of critical judgments about some of the greatest philosophers of the recent past) Living Ontologists (a list of authors with an interest in ontology, with synthetic bibliographies).

This paper discusses Heidegger's 1931-32 lecture course on The Essence of Truth. It argues that Heidegger read Platonic ideas, not only as stage-setting for the western philosophical tradition's privileging of conceptualization over practice, and its correlative treatment of truth as correctness, but also as an early attempt to work through truth as the fundamental experience of unhiddenness. Wrathall shows how several of Heidegger's more-famous claims about truth, e.g. that propositional truth is grounded in truth as world-disclosure, and including Heidegger's critique (...) of the self-evidence of truth as correspondence, are first revealed in a powerful (if iconoclastic) reading of Plato. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Higher Yearning 101 Lesson 1: Socrates and Alcibiades on Stalking, Seduction, and Giving Birth Lesson 2: Peter Abelard and Heloise on Fondling and Losing “Tenure” Lesson 3: Heidegger and Arendt on Concealed Unconcealment “So I'll see you after class …”.

: Two major philosophers of the twentieth century, the German existential phenomenologist Martin Heidegger and the seminal Japanese Kyoto School philosopher Nishida Kitarō are examined here in an attempt to discern to what extent their ideas may converge. Both are viewed as expressing, each through the lens of his own tradition, a world in transition with the rise of modernity in the West and its subsequent globalization. The popularity of Heidegger's thought among Japanese philosophers, despite its own admitted limitation to (...) the Western "history of being," is connected to Nishida's opening of a uniquely Japanese path in its confrontation with Western philosophy. The focus is primarily on their later works (the post-Kehre Heidegger and the works of Nishida that have been designated "Nishida philosophy"), in which each in his own way attempts to overcome the subject-object dichotomy inherited from the tradition of Western metaphysics by looking to a deeper structure from out of which both subjectivity and objectivity are derived and which embraces both. For Heidegger, the answer lies in being as the opening of unconcealment, from out of which beings emerge, and for Nishida, it is the place of nothingness within which beings are co-determined in their oppositions and relations. Concepts such as Nishida's "discontinuous continuity," "absolutely self-contradictory identity" (between one and many, whole and part, world and things), the mutual interdependence of individuals, and the self-determination of the world through the co-relative self-determination of individuals, and Heidegger's "simultaneity" (zugleich) and "within one another" (ineinander) (of unconcealment and concealment, presencing and absencing), and their "between" (Zwischen) and "jointure" (Fuge) are examined. Through a discussion of these ideas, the suggestion is made of a possible "transition" (Übergang) of both Western and Eastern thinking, in their mutual encounter, both in relation to each other and each in relation to its own past history, leading to both a self-discovery in the other and to a simultaneous self-reconstitution. (shrink)

This article reflects on the received view of the rupture which constitutes the beginning of a critical, ethical, political and legal opening, the understanding of which inhabits the cry of, and response to, injustice. It takes the very critique that feeds into, and is distorted by, practical reasoning, as its point of departure. Grasping this rupture as the complementary relation between deconstruction and radical alterity, would entail unreflectively accepting a certain kind of truthfulness—truthfulness as [in]correctness, manifesting in a relationship that (...) involves rootless and controlling movement of making and unmaking of world. In closely reading Wittgenstein and Heidegger on the level of seeing, showing and saying, truthfulness is shown to contain an essential tension between, on the one hand, the Socratic, metaphysically-bound notion of beingness, correctness and meaning-steering and, on the other hand, the pre-Socratic notion of unconcealment (a-lethia), which, pointing even earlier than pre-Socratics into aboriginality, involves attentive letting of gliding in the inexpressible saying of language. While steering is about generating new possibilities of expressibility, gliding is about poetic dwelling, or enduring inexpressibility as a constitutive part of saying. Although aletheia is taken to be the key influence on rootless post-foundational thinking, it is argued that unconcealment involves letting and enduring the presencing inexpressibility of place and home-coming, that is, worlding-rootedness; thus showing Heidegger’s originary politics as the district of the uncanny to be about worlding that attentively lets the presencing inexpressibility of earth be as place. In reading Heidegger’s views on humanism, beginning and language, the argument links inexpressibility—essentially and historically—to the grasping of the belongingness together of world, earth and place, viewing this belongingness as key to both the saying of art and of mortals dwelling together temporally, spatially, materially in a manner always strange to, and nearer than, the steering/controlling of beingness, time, space and place that the very gesture and emergence of critique is captive of and is not capable of attuning to and capturing. Art always estranges the metaphysical cycle of correctness which preserves pain and suffering—a cycle that inhabits a double bind of responding to violence and injustice generated by the violence of metaphysics with metaphysical violence and justice. In showing essential strife within truthfulness itself, Heidegger points to even greater and earlier problematic than the pre-Socratics—to the painful core of inexpressibility between the ontology of steering time, spaces and material—steering places—and the gliding temporality, spatiality and materiality of ontology of place. (shrink)

Heidegger’s lecture course on “Parmenides” lays strong emphasis on the dimension of lethe in truth . Such a withdrawal belonging to unconcealment should not be confused with a dissembling or hiding . A concealment pertaining to the presence of a thing can be illustrated by means of a phenomenological description of oblivion, anamnesis, the rare, the gift and the secret. Especially Heidegger’s account of an “open secret” lends itself to a philosophical interpretation of Poe’s “The Purloined Letter”. Dupin recurrently (...) meditates on the right way of keeping a secret and mocks the police for confusing lethe with pseudos. Incidentally, stealing is shown to be no less a form of unconcealment than the gift. Poe’s description of how and where The Purloined Letter is openly present in the minister’s study sheds light on how a thing can remain secret by giving way to other things. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the Black Notebooks, Heidegger ascribes in 1938/9 to the Jewish race an “empty rationality and calculative ability,” in his view the cause of its “worldlessness.” To assess this characterisation, I present Heidegger’s theories of history as a decline in Being and Time and in his later history of Being. For this purpose, I discuss his notions of Rechnen, Machenschaft, and Geviert, several existentialia from Being and Time, and Heidegger’s identification of modern machination and modern technology. Furthermore, I examine Heidegger’s (...) attitude toward the Jews and the Holocaust. I present his alignment of the unconcealment of modernity and the Jewish race, and compare his theory of machination with the texts “Positionality” and “The Question concerning Technology”. Heidegger’s notes about the Jews in the Black Notebooks after 1944 confirm that he tried “to silence Auschwitz silently,” as I already argued in a paper from 1995. (shrink)

On the theme of “the elemental,” this paper delves into the element of water. Specifically, the paper interprets the statement inaugurating philosophy, Thales’ claim that everything is water. This is seen not as any sort of atomism and not as opposed to mythology. Instead, it is a claim expressing what the myths themselves are trying to say: there is a mystery to the presence of things, their unconcealment is bestowed on them from a hidden source. This paper shows that (...) Socrates and Heidegger make a similar claim, and so, by generalizing from these three preeminent philosophers, the basic outlook of philosophy as such crystallizes in the view that everything is water. (shrink)

A phenomenological account of the forms of life characteristic of late capitalism--including television, celebrity culture, and personal electronics--culminating in an ontology of the gadget-commodity that brings together Marxist theories of commodity fetishism and ideology with Heidegger's attempt to think truth as unconcealment.

In human lives, technology holds sway in mundane and extraordinary ways, such as in the ways we work, entertain, transport, and feed ourselves, and importantly in the ways we encounter and manage health, disease, illness, and death. A significant area of Heidegger's later work is questioning technology. Unlike many current inquiries that centre on contemporary technology's function, utility, and positive transformations, Heidegger offers a radical way of thinking about technology through developing an inquiry that uncovers technology's essence of revealing. In (...) this article, Heidegger's thinking about technological modes of revealing in regard to bodies, health, and illness is explored. In Heidegger's view, the ordered revealing of modern technology has overshadowed other modes of revealing. This article highlights how remembering concealment and unconcealment in its many modes can be relevant to nurses and others involved in health care. Through tracing Heidegger's thinking about technology, a more critical approach to the effects and outcomes of modern technologies within health care systems can be generated. (shrink)

When it comes to understanding the genesis and development of Heidegger’s thought, it would be rather difficult to overestimate the importance of the “Aristotle-Introduction” of 1922, Heidegger’s “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle.” This text is both a manifesto which describes the young Heidegger’s philosophical commitments, as well as a promissory note which outlines his projected future work. This Aristotle-Introduction not only enunciates Heidegger’s broad project of a philosophy which is both systematic and historical; it also indicates, in particular, why (...) a principal (or fundamental) ontology can be actualized only through a destruction of the history of ontology. This text anticipates several central themes of Being and Time (e.g., facticity, death, falling), and also foreshadows some of the issues which were to occupy the later Heidegger (e.g., “truth” as a heterogenous process of unconcealment). There is no doubt that much can – and will – be written on the meaning and implications of this important text. But instead of making my own, early contribution to such a secondary literature, I have decided to limit myself in this “Preface” to a few brief remarks concerning the historical background to Heidegger’s “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle.”. (shrink)

The third chapter of Brentano's dissertation "On the Manifold Meaning of Being According to Aristotle" (1862) analyzes "Being in the sense of the True." Because Heidegger has always related the Question of Being to the Question of Truth, and because he calls Brentano's work the "chief help and guide" of his first venture into philosophy, the question arises: does Brentano's account of "Being in the sense of the True" have significant bearing on Heidegger's response to the principal matter of his (...) thought, i.e., Aletheia as the Unconcealment of Beings in Presence? This article traces the parallels and divergencies in Brentano's and Heidegger's accounts of the relation between Being and Truth. (shrink)

It has long been theorized that Heidegger’s idea for Dasein was highly influenced by the Chinese notion of the Dao. This is due to a misinterpretation on behalf of Heideggerian scholars and others of what the Dao represents. In fact, Heidegger, in explicating what he thought to be “the most extreme inversion of φύσης-ουσία [phusis-ousia],” made this equal to “Chinese-like ‘constancy,’” which is the basis of the Dao. Taking what Heidegger interpreted phusis to be (derived from Aristotelian metaphysics and an (...) assumption of pre-Socratic thought) as a process of unconcealment from continuing re-concealment which signals a kind of “truth” of being [phusis], that which calls for constant presence is inauthentic Dasein, rather than authentic Dasein. In other words, Heidegger’s idea of what inauthentic Dasein calls for could be explained within Aristotle’s system as equal to aiming to replace phusis with the know-how of τέχνη [techne]. The Dao, as rightfully understood and utilized by the master craftsman and the Sage, is accessible, constant, and knowable. This could not be in more opposition to Heidegger’s notion of phusis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:On Inception by Martin HeideggerDaniel NeumannHEIDEGGER, Martin. On Inception. Translated by Peter Hanley. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2023. xi + 171 pp. Cloth, $40.00This translation [End Page 548] of Heidegger's On Inception (written in 1941 and published in German in 2005 as Über den Anfang) is an important addition to the translated corpus of texts on the themes of Ereignis (event) and the history of beyng (Seynsgeschichte) that (...) occupied Heidegger's thinking from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s, and that resulted in a series of writings that remained unpublished during his lifetime. Similar to those other volumes, On Inception does not follow a linear train of thought but offers short and often fragmentary notes and musings that, nonetheless, build on one another. There is a considerable thematic overlap with the other writings on the event. Many of the themes found here, such as the role of technology in exposing contemporary understanding of being, Hölderlin as the poet of the saying of beyng, or the notion of another beginning of the unconcealment of beyng, can be found in Contributions to Philosophy, Mindfulness, and The Event as well.What sets On Inception apart from these other volumes is the focus on the inceptual aspect of the thinking of beyng. In this regard, the first and longest of the six sections comprising the book (entitled "The Incipience of Inception") offers the most extended original contribution Heidegger makes here. It concerns the question of how one can think from out of the unconcealment of beyng. Exploring this topic throws more light on many of the questions that the reading of the other volumes raises, such as whether the event should be thought of as a one-time historical occurrence; how one can think from out of the event, that is, how it constitutes the possibility of thinking it; and the relationship between beings, being (referring to the truth of the presence of beings), and beyng (referring to the truth of the presencing of being). All of these issues concern the inceptual character of the event, whose understanding affords a better sense of paradigmatic change in thinking and dwelling associated with it. To understand the inceptual character of the event gives the reader a clue as to where to begin thinking (about) it. This does not remove the considerable and intentional obscurity surrounding these ideas, but it shows Heidegger as constantly altering and refining how to think of the history of the concealment and unconcealment of beyng. One of the biggest disagreements among interpreters has been whether to read this in transcendental or realist terms, that is, whether we should take the unconcealment of beyng as the proffering of a real, mind-independent totality or as a cipher for our transcendental ability to understand and make sense of the appearance of being. In this regard, the question of incipience goes toward elucidating who or what is thought to begin this unconcealment.What, then, does an inceptive thinking of beyng amount to? Put negatively, it can concern neither beyng as some sort of cause of beings, nor beings themselves as what appear as a consequence of beyng's unconcealment: "[I]nception is not the inception of something other than what it itself is; equally, inception is not the inception of itself, as if what were being thought of were a producing and causing." To think beyng as inception puts emphasis on the emergent nature of the opening of the clearing in which beings can come to presence for someone. That is, the [End Page 549] word "inception" names the very opening up of the possibility to consider the truth of beyng, that is, to think the event. What is at stake is therefore the incipient nature of inception—the fact that grasping what the term means cannot be based on any one incipient thing, but on incipience (Anfängnis). There is a processual (or, to use Daniela Vallega-Neu's more Heideggerian term, poietic) aspect to the way Heidegger thinks the event, and incipience in many ways expresses this poietic nature because it both suggests that there is something that begins and unfolds, but also conceals what... (shrink)

With what right and with what meaning does Heidegger use the term 'truth' to characterize Dasein's disclosedness? This is the question at the focal point of Ernst Tugendhat's long-standing critique of Heidegger's understanding of truth, one to which he finds no answer in Heidegger's treatment of truth in §44 of Being and Time or his later work. To put the question differently: insofar as unconcealment or disclosedness is normally understood as the condition for the possibility of propositional truth rather (...) than truth itself, what does it mean to say - as Heidegger does - that disclosedness is the "primordial phenomenon of truth" and what justifies that claim? The central aim of this paper is to show that Tugendhat's critique remains unanswered. Recent Heidegger scholarship, though it confronts Tugendhat, has not produced a viable answer to his criticism, in part because it overlooks his basic question and therefore misconstrues the thrust of his objections. Ultimately, the paper suggests that what is needed is a re-evaluation of Heidegger's analysis of truth in light of a more accurate understanding of Tugendhat's critique. The paper concludes by sketching the profile of a more satisfactory reply to Tugendhat's critical question, advocating a return to Heidegger's 'existential' analyses in Being and Time in order to locate the normative resources Tugendhat finds lacking in Heidegger's concept of truth. (shrink)

The seemingly "inextricable" mutual entanglement of history and the play of power dissolves itself when thinking, under the sway of technique, moves beyond the horizon of metaphysic, and turns to question the unconcealment of being, that is, when man lets time become the law of his essence. Only so would a history, i.e. freedom, happen again, and rescue modern man from his otherwise destinyless age.

Martin Heidegger has made uncovering the truth of being his life’s work. He ultimately came to locate this truth at the site of the clearing (lichtung), which allowed him to sweep away the traditional formulation of the question of being and begin anew with beyng. This second beginning, as Heidegger called it, stood apart from the original in that he saw fit to cloak beyng in nothingness. This paper explores Heidegger’s use of nothingness and his claim that in order to (...) overcome the divide between the two beginnings, we must leap into the abyss of the clearing. Given Heidegger’s interest in East Asian philosophy, his use of nothingness appears to resemble that of Daoism. Despite this outward similarity, however, this paper will argue that Heidegger’s doctrine of nothingness failed to grasp the cosmological significance of the clearing for he saw it only in terms of symbolizing the existential play of being. Thus while Heidegger argues that the clearing marks the unconcealement of beyng, Daoism uses the clearing to point us to the root of being in nothingness. (shrink)

Heidegger develops his reading of a-lētheia as privative un-concealment (Unverborgenheit) in tandem with his early phenomenological theory of truth. He is not simply reinterpreting a word, but rather reading Greek philosophy as having a primordial understanding of truth which has itself been concealed in interpretation. After shedding medieval and modern presuppositions of truth as correspondence, the existential truth-experience shows itself, no longer left puzzlingly implicit in unsatisfactory conventional readings of Greek philosophy. In Sein und Zeit §44, Heidegger resolves interpretive difficulties (...) in Parmenides through his interpretation of alētheia and philologically grounds this reading in Heraclitus’s description of the unconcealing logos. Although this primordial sense of the word has already been obscured in Plato and Aristotle, the structural gradation of their theories of truth conserves the primordial pre-Socratic sense of truth as the experience of unconcealment. (shrink)

"Heidegger's way of understanding the originary phenomenon of truth is to "make clear the mode of being of the cognition itself." His starting point is a proposition that is not based on intuition. Someone says with his or her back to the wall: this picture hangs askew. The proposition embodies the claim to have discovered the picture (as a being) in the "how" (the mode) of its being. The proposition displays this "how" of being in language. In the attempt to (...) verify the proposition by sensuous experience, the recognition, according to Heidegger, is directed only to the intended being (the picture) and not to the proposition. It is directed to the being itself (which is to be verified by perception) in its mode of uncoveredness (Entdeckt-heir), i.e., in its showing-itself. Confirmation (Bewährung) means this showing-itself of the being in the same way in which it is intended in the proposition. A true proposition shows the being in its mode of uncoveredness. The phenomenon of "originary truth" does not have the character of correspondence. It is the ground of the concept of truth in the sense of correspondence and propositional truth. By unfolding the meaning of alétheia Heidegger shows us a more originary sense of truth as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit). He wants to show that this concept coincides with the first and originary concept of truth in Greek thinking. In this primary sense only the discovering human Dasein can be "true" while it is Being-discovering (Entdeckend-Sein). On the other hand, beings (Seiendes) that we can find in the world can only "be" in a secondary mode, i.e., as being-discovered (Entdecktsein). They can only make a claim to uncoveredness. Their fundament is the Being-discovering of the human Dasein. The being-true of a discovered being is only possible as being discovered by human Dasein as being-in-the-world. The authentic Being of Dasein, the being-in-the truth, presupposes disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of the world in states-of-mind (Befindlichkeiten), understanding, and discourse, i.e., the constitution of the being (Seinsverfassung) of human Dasein as thrownness (Geworfenheit) and project (Entwurf).. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article is written in the field of the philosophy of science. The aim is to express how painting and drawing can be used as part of a phenomenological research method. The painter or drawer is a visual researcher in the process of capturing a holistic and truthful experience of a cultural phenomenon. We will highlight the visual researcher process and how the experience of truth is known throughout this process. The paining and sketches, which we present in this (...) article, are part of a book, together with written narratives and pedagogical theory – on teaching as a phenomenon – called Lærerpraksis og Pedagogisk teori. The paintings and drawings present teaching in a way that complements and expands the written text. The sketches and painting of teaching attempt to establish the truth as unconcealment of a phenomenon. Our argumentation is based on the theories of Gadamer, Cassirer, Panofsky and Heidegger. Gadamer connects humanistic research with artistry and the experience of truth. Cassirer argues that the perception of a cultural phenomenon begins as a holistic understanding to bring forth the symbolic form or essence of the phenomenon. Panofsky transfers the theory of Cassirer into the field of painting. The concept of synthetic intuition is the intrinsic knowing of a painting, which corresponds to Cassirer’s concept of symbolic forms. Heidegger’s theory explores how art unfolds and preserves the truth. We will argue that the connection between art and truth could bring forth important perspectives on phenomenological science and turn the research activity closer to an artistic form. (shrink)

This work considers Heidegger's treatment of Aristotle's doctrine of logos apophantikos. Through a singular interpretation of Aristotle's De Interpretatione, Heidegger rejects the traditional notion of truth as "adaequatio" that takes place in judgement to offer an alternative comprehension in terms of unconcealment.

The paths and the ways: an insight into transdisciplinarity: This is a short study of how the notion of thinking that Heidegger developed in his writing, in the Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking, can be read through a consideration of a Chinese Taoist text Tao Te Ching and the Confucian, though a Taoist inspired text, by Zisi, the Zhongyong, to illuminate the essential nature of openness in transdisciplinarity and the restrictions of disciplinarity of knowing taken as the ritual (...) and rules of methodology. This approach offers a way to understand unconcealment in the onto-cosmology of the harmony of all Being and of personal cultivation which is essential to the ontology of Heidegger. I then suggest how this might be offered in what could be called a transdisciplinary pedagogy. Key words: Heidegger. Confucianism. Taoism. Transdisciplinarity. Harmony. Os caminhos e os meios: uma visão da transdisciplinaridade Resumo: Este é um breve estudo sobre como a noção de pensamento que Heidegger desenvolveu em seus escritos, em Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking [Uma Conversa no Caminho do Campo sobre o Pensar], pode ser lida através da consideração de um texto taoísta chinês Tao Te Ching e de um texto confucionista, embora inspirado por taoístas, de Zisi, o Zhongyong [A Doutrina do Meio], para iluminar a natureza essencial da abertura na transdisciplinaridade e as restrições da disciplinaridade do conhecimento a serem tomadas como ritual e regras da metodologia. Essa abordagem oferece uma maneira de entender a desocultação na ontocosmologia da harmonia de todo o Ser e do cultivo pessoal, essencial à ontologia de Heidegger. Sugiro então como isso pode ser oferecido no que poderia ser chamado de pedagogia transdisciplinar. Palavras-chave: Heidegger. Confucionismo. Taoísmo. Transdisciplinaridade. Harmonia. Los caminos y los medios: una visión de la transdisciplinariedad Resumen: Este es un breve estudio de cómo la noción de pensamiento que desarrolló Heidegger en sus escritos, Conversación sobre un camino rural sobre el pensamiento, puede leerse mediante la consideración de un texto chino taoísta Tao Te Ching y un texto confuciano, aunque inspirado por los taoístas de Zisi, el Zhongyong [La Doctrina del Medio], para iluminar la naturaleza esencial de la apertura en la transdisciplinariedad y las limitaciones de la disciplina del conocimiento a tomado como ritual y reglas de metodología. Este enfoque ofrece una forma de entender la falta de cultivación de la ontocosmología de la armonía de todo Ser y el cultivo personal, esencial para la ontología de Heidegger. Luego sugiero cómo se podría ofrecer esto en lo que podría llamarse pedagogía transdisciplinaria. Palabras clave: Heidegger. Confuciano. Taoísmo. Transdisciplinariedad. Armonía. Data de registro: 30/07/2020 Data de aceite: 21/10/2020. (shrink)

Plato provocatively characterizes truth $$ in terms of harmony $$ at various points throughout his dialogues. While limited attention has been directed toward the role of musical concepts in Plato's general cosmology, not any attention has been directed toward how musical concepts function in relation to Plato's characterization of truth. In fact, this issue has had little occasion for consideration. Almost every contemporary translator empties terms such as $\grave\alpha\rho\mu o\nu\acute\iota\alpha,$ when co-incidental with $\acute\alpha\lambda\acute\eta\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha,$ of their musical content. As a consequence, (...) I argue, Plato's characterization of truth is made readily amenable to contemporary conceptions of truth-not necessarily a good thing since it robs us of the original richness of Plato's thought. The dissertation explores how retaining the aural meaning latent within $\grave\alpha\rho\mu o\nu\acute\iota\alpha$ and other terms of musical import serves to elucidate the rich complexion of Plato's notion of $\acute\alpha\lambda\acute\eta\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha.$ Ultimately, I show how Plato's use of musical terminology to characterize truth informs other features of his philosophical outlook, illustrate the cohesiveness and consistency of key texts believed problematic by other commentators, and underscore significant differences between Plato's $\acute\alpha\lambda\acute\eta\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha$ and ideas of truth prevalent today. ;For Plato, I argue $\acute\alpha\lambda\acute\eta\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha$ bears a meaning different from its primitive sense of oracular unconcealment and its later sense of correctness $,$ and a meaning also different from other terminological alternatives $.$ Truth, accordingly, turns out for Plato to be neither mysterious and groundless nor a matter of simple correspondence to an objective reality. The value of Plato's conception of truth as harmony consists in its ability to avoid the polarity of contemporary conceptions of truth as either objectively determinate or subjectively determinate . Truth is neither arbitrarily imposed upon the world by us, nor artificially imposed upon us by an antecedently structured and independent reality. The dissertation concludes by articulating reasons for favoring Plato's theory of truth, while noting a few underlying assumptions likely problematic for some contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Unverborgenheit is truth in Heidegger's Greek-inspired view that happens in Entbergen, or bringing forth. Technology is a way of bringing forth and the truths brought forth in ancient and contemporary science-based technologies are essentially different, the latter being destined by enframing or Gestell that is the essence of contemporary science and technology. Here I give an etymological-ecological-feminist interpretation to the essences of ancient and contemporary technologies as ontogeneses and their unconcealments. A turning point is also identified, on the basis (...) of Carolyn Merchant's eco-feminist account of the mental-spiritual change due to technical change of earth-bound practices, specifically mining, during the commercial revolution and the rise of contemporary science. As Heidegger's wording strongly hints to mountains as salvaging the not-yet-concealed, and human relation to mountains as finding the concealed, Merchant's account of the female nature, or Mother Earth, and male science as penetrating her dark plots for secrets to be exploited by humans, and its connection to mining practices, seems in some respects to clarify Heidegger's somewhat dark notions of unconcealment and truth. RESUMEN Unverborgenheit es la verdad en el pensamiento heideggeriano de inspiración griega, esto ocurre en el Entbergen, o desocultamiento. La tecnología es una forma de desocultar, y las verdades desocultadas por las tecnologías de base científica en la antigüedad y en la época contemporánea son esencialmente diferentes; la última estaría determinada por lo dispuesto, o Gestell, que sería la esencia de la ciencia y tecnología contemporáneas. En este texto presento una interpretación etimológico-ecológico-feminista de las esencias de la tecnología antigua y contemporánea como ontogénesis y sus desvelamientos. También se puede apreciar un punto crucial en la aproximación eco-feminista de Carolyn Merchant al cambio mental-espiritual debido al cambio tecnológico de las prácticas ligadas a la tierra, en especial la minería, durante la revolución comercial y el surgir de la ciencia contemporánea. Como la terminología de Heidegger sugiere fuertemente a las montañas como salvando lo todavía no oculto, y a las relaciones humanas con las montañas como encontrar lo oculto, el enfoque de Merchant sobre la naturaleza mujer, o Madre Tierra, y la ciencia masculina que penetra en sus oscuras parcelas en busca de secretos para ser explotados por la humanidad, y su conexión con las prácticas mineras, parece clarificar en ciertos aspectos las oscuras nociones heideggerianas de desvelamiento y verdad. (shrink)

One of Heidegger’s main interests in Heraclitus’ concept of Λόγοζ regards the phenomenon of corresponding (Entsprechen). While λέγειν is interpreted as an obedient joining (Fügen), harvesting (Lesen), gathering (Sammeln, Versammeln) and lying-before (Vorliegen lassen), the movement of essential thinking picks up the idea of corresponding (όμολογεἴν) to a subtle ‘claim’ (Anspruch) of being throughout appearance (εἴδοζ Anblick) which addresses i. e. calls for being put into words. The λέγειν of human Λόγοζ can thus become (at times) the same with the (...) one Aôyoç of being while the act o f corresponding holds being and thinking together. “Truth” can lie before in λέγειν, but only for the one listening attentively to what is spoken and so by hearing (Vernehmen) what is not spoken (out loud) in the spoken word. It is to this dimension of concealment (Verborgenheit), that speech still belongs to, even as result of an essential thinking that gathers and brings into presence: The brightness of essential thinking seems to owe itself to this darkness crossed by the fire of lightning. άλήθεια can thus be conceived in the Greek context of a special concept of ‘emerging into the light of φύσιζ‘, which also corresponds to the revealing movement of inceptually unfolding Λόγοζ in the gathering true human Xôyoç. Far from being able to dispose of being as knowledge remains a movement between the concealed toward unconcealment, essential thinking stays indepted to something “never-submerging” as (φύσιζ and the salvaging event of gathering into one Λόγοζ. To be freed from metaphysical for the inceptual thinking means learning to listen to how the essence of φύσιζ and άλήθεια address as the one Λόγοζ and to correspond to it, insofar as clearing is always carried by it i. e. can never remain permanently concealed from it. The present contribution follows the train of thought summarized here in brief through Heidegger’s confrontation with Heraclitus. (shrink)

The heart of Aristotelian Logic is the square of opposition. This study engaged on further [re]investigation and meta-logical analysis of the validity of the square of opposition. Further, in this paper, it has been modestly established, with greater clarity, the exposition of the strengths, more than the presentation of the defects, loopholes and weaknesses, of the Aristotelian Logic in a descriptive and speculative manner. The unconcealment of the breakdown of the square of opposition marked a rupture and the opening (...) of avenues of alternative reasoning. The critical and analytical exposition of the loopholes of the square of opposition led to a realization that things around us could have been and still be different; and there could have been better alternative reasoning than what we have called, adopted, and worshipped [Greek] logic. Results show that the downfall of the oppositional relationships in the square of opposition provided a proof of the logical illusion of Aristotle or the loophole of Traditional Logic. The laws of opposition, that have been considered the measures of logically deductive inferences, are practically almost totally logical deceptions. By implication, if the laws of subcontrariety, contrariety, and subalternation [and may be contradiction] have collapsed, the square of opposition has also collapsed; hence, Aristotle‟s square of opposition is a fallacy. This means that the square of opposition has errors and in itself an error. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that Heidegger, contrary to the view of many scholars, in fact endorsed a view of truth as a sort of correspondence. I first show how it is a mistake to take Heidegger's notion of 'unconcealment' as a definition of propositional truth. It is thus not only possible but also essential to disambiguate Heidegger's use of the word 'truth', which he occasionally used to refer to both truth as it is ordinarily understood and unconcealment (...) understood as the condition of the possibility of truth. I then show how Heidegger accepted that propositional truth, or 'correctness', as he sometimes called it, consists in our utterances or beliefs corresponding to the way things are. Heidegger's objection to correspondence theories of truth was not directed at the notion of correspondence as such, but rather at the way in which correspondence is typically taken to consist in an agreement between representations and objects. Indeed, Heidegger took his account of unconcealment as explaining how it is possible for propositions to correspond to the world, thus making unconcealment the ground of propositional truth. I conclude by discussing briefly some of the consequences for Heidegger interpretation which follow from a correct understanding of Heidegger's notion of propositional truth. (shrink)

The realist belief in the primacy of the world and its underlying structure answers the question ‘why is there something rather than nothing.’ The world, and all things contained in it exists because of God’s creative act. Personal death in Christian philosophy continues the gift of human existence by shifting that temporal existence into eternal life. The death and resurrection of Christ lays the foundation for the possibility of eternal life, while the will of God provides an answer to the (...) why of human existence. The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of the death and resurrection of Christ on the metaphysical strings of human existence. The phenomenon of human death takes place on the arms of consciousness and being’s unconcealment. The subjective correlate of human death is the irreversible loss of consciousness, while the objective correlate of human death presents as the infolding of the gift of existence, namely, of being’s unconcealment from consciousness. These correlates function as a dynamic unit to explain human death and resurrection. The attempt to justify a belief in the existence of life after death from the point of view of consciousness alone is dualistic and leads to several absurdities and confusions about the nature of the afterlife state. The explanation of the resurrection of Christ as a continuation of the dialogue between being and consciousness begun on earth avoids those absurdities while maintaining personal identity. (shrink)

RESUMEN Los zapatos nos sirven y nos acompañan, testimonian diferentes verdades, dependiendo de su utilidad y su dueño. Pueden ser de vagabundos o de prisioneros, de militares, artistas o campesinos, de adultos o de niños, de asesinos o de asesinados. Muchos guardan un misterio, todos tienen una historia. El arte los ha acogido desde sus comienzos, vinculándolos a diferentes sucesos, como en las obras de Vincent Van Gogh, Can Togay y Gyula Pauer. A partir del trabajo de estos artistas se (...) busca vincular el vacío y el horror en el arte con el tema de la verdad, entendida como alétheia o desocultación, rememoración y acontecimiento, e indagar por la historia que se oculta tras ciertas obras artísticas. ABSTRACT Shoes are not only useful; they are also our constant companions, and, as such, they attest to different truths, depending on their utility and their owner. They can belong to vagabonds or prisoners, to soldiers, artists, or peasants, to adults or children, to murderers or victims Many conceal a mystery, and they all have a history. Since its beginnings, art has included them and linked them to diverse events, as is the case in the works of Vincent Van Gogh, Can Togay, and Gyula Pauer. On the basis of the work of these artists, the article connects emptiness and horror in art with truth, understood as alétheia or unconcealment, remembrance, and event, and inquires into the hidden story of certain artworks. (shrink)

This paper suggests that one of the reasons for the lack of understanding of what is happening in the Gaza Strip is our current understanding of truth. This understanding of truth, which has prevailed for 2500 years, holds that truth is the accordance of a statement with facts. Together with our recording some of the abuses of human rights in the Gaza Strip, which have all but been ignored, the paper suggests that Martin Heidegger’s understanding of truth as “aletheia,” as (...) unconcealment, may lead to a better knowledge of what is truly occurring in the Gaza Strip. (shrink)

ArgumentHeidegger's philosophy of science is notable for the prominence it gives to visuals and visualization. This is because for Heidegger, truth – including scientific truth – is the consequence of unconcealment, the lifting of a veil. But as scientific truth is a special kind, its visualization is also special: scientific truth reveals itself to us as, in Heidegger's words, “a calculable nexus of forces.” This nexus unconceals itself largely by means of instrumentation: it is this process of revelation that (...) turns objects into objects of science. Despite its focus on visualization, however, Heidegger's philosophy of science cannot be applied directly to scientific visuals. His categories are not designed with visual exegesis in mind. For that purpose, semiotics, the science of meaning as defined by Charles Peirce, is a necessary intermediary between the abstract and the concrete, a taxonomy of icon, index, and symbol that can be employed as a set of hermeneutic probes that permit the exploration of scientific visuals as embodiments and carriers of scientific meaning. But not their sole embodiments and carriers. In achieving scientific semiosis, the verbal and visual must combine their particular strengths. This is also in accord with a Heideggerian view: science moves methodically from the visual to the propositional, though it never leaves the visual behind. (shrink)

The first part of the text poses the question whether for Heidegger?s aesthetically relevant thought it is better to use older terms, such as?Heidegger?s Doctrine of Art? or?Heidegger?s Philosophy of Art?, or a more recent term?Heidegger aesthetics?? Does the term?Heidegger?s aesthetics? represent an?oxymoron? contrary to the intentions of Heidegger?s own philosophy, or does it signify a relevant aesthetic conception that has its own place in contemporary philosophical aesthetics? In order to answer these questions, the text considers Heidegger?s understanding of aesthetics (...) as a philosophical discipline and also the problems arising in connection with this designation. It argues that Heidegger?s concept of?overcoming aesthetics? represents the interpretation of his own philosophy of art developed in the essay The Origin of the Work of Art. The second part of the text follows the thesis that the Heidegger?s aesthetics contains the definitions of art and work of art, based on Heidegger?s analyses of freedom, basic moods, and emotions. This part of text follows a broader thesis, in which Heidegger?s philosophy as a whole can be understood as the phenomenology of freedom. Also, it discusses a special thesis that the concept of strife of Earth and world in The Origin of the Work of Art should be understood only on the background of the primordial struggle between concealment and unconcealment in the truth as the unconcealedness of beings. Further, the concept of strife is linked on a deeper level with the determination of finite human freedom and basic human moods. In light of that, Heidegger?s aesthetics is not only the heteronomous aesthetics of the work of art, but also the autonomous aesthetics of aesthetic experience articulated with respect to finite human freedom. The conclusion is that Heidegger?s aesthetics of truth understood as the philosophy of freedom, basic moods, and emotions, according to their inner intentions, is closer to the tradition of the aesthetics of sublime than the aesthetics of the beautiful. (shrink)

What will philosophy of technology be as its practitioners depart from the cross- roads of the ideas of Don Ihde and Bernard Stiegler? Their two lines of thought confront and cross each other, giving rise to different ways of understanding technologies. Rather than following one or the other of these directions, I propose an Erörterung of such crossroads. As Heidegger’s commentary on Georg Trakl’s poetry insists, Erörterung means, first, “to point out the proper place or site of something to situate (...) it,” and, second, “to heed that place or site ”. This Erörterung has to be conducted at multiple times, on multiple levels, as each of them hermeneutically identifies its own site. I proceed first through an Erörterung of the crossroads of the thinking of technology after Ihde and Stiegler, and second through an Erörterung of the Ort or the site of the first Erörterung, where the Ort for Heidegger is the land of the evening, the Occident [Abendland], in the throes of globalization, or more precisely Americanisation, a form of disorientation, that obscures the unconcealment of the essence of the human-technology relationship central to Heidegger. In the third part, I propose that the way to integrate and extend Heidegger, Ihde, and Stiegler is to acknowledge the importance of historical, cultural, and geopolitical difference in the interrelationship between the cosmos, morality, and technical activities, what I call cosmotechnics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Other Side of Nothingness: Toward a Theology of Radical OpennessPaul O. IngramThe Other Side of Nothingness: Toward a Theology of Radical Openness. By Beverly J. Lanzetta. Albany: State University of New York, 2001. 182 pp.The central thesis of The Other Side of Nothingness is that apophatic mystical experience offers Christians a theology of humility sensitive to religious pluralism, which in turn is a means of overcoming the (...) "pains of spiritual oppression" caused by religious intolerance and doctrinal imperialism. The book's argument is that "mystical consciousness" overturns the dogmatic truth claims of "conventional theology" by preparing the self for the experience of radical openness to "divinity," however "divinity" is theologically named in the "conventional theology" of humanity's religious traditions. The book's author, Beverly J.Lanzetta, draws on a variety of Christian mystical texts to support her claims: Meister Eckhart, Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius, Teresa of Avila, Bonaventure, and the anonymous author of the Cloud of Unknowing. She also makes comparative references to Hindu, Buddhist, and Sufi traditions, along with contemporary writers such as Abraham Joshua Heschel, Mahatma Gandhi, Thomas Merton, Howard Thurman, and Dorothy Day to illustrate her claim that apophatic mystical experience—the experience of the utter [End Page 306] annihilation of the self—draws the mystic to a place beyond a tradition's historical and normative self-understanding to new dimensions of the Sacred and, sometimes, to new "revelatory paradigms." The revelatory paradigm Lanzetta believes she has discovered in the evidence she cites is that "the divine nature itself is pluralistic, non-absolute, and is continually the source of new religious traditions," by which she means something similar to what John Cobb calls "creative transformation." For her, this is the antidote to religious imperialism and the exclusivism of conventional theology, meaning "non-mystical theology," which she argues is the source of religions fanaticism in all religions traditions, particularly in Christianity.There is much to admire about Lanzetta's take on mysticism and its importance for undercutting theological absolutism of the sort one encounters in the Christian Right or in certain radical movements within contemporary Islam. Her analyses of the mystical texts she cites to support her arguments are carefully crafted and accurately express the theologies of the Christian mystics who are the foci of her own theological reflection. Her writing style is elegant and clearly expresses the passion with which she embraces her views. I especially liked her focus on kenotic Christology in her description of the "Apophatic Christ" who "bears the generosity of speech and teaches an ethic of radical openness," which Lanzetta claims is also an openness to truths found outside Christian tradition. "All are called not to his name, his ministry, or even to his person, but are called to sustain the tension between the saying and the unsaying, and between the living and the dying, in which God's nonviolent heart yearns for unconcealment" (p. 90). Indeed, this is the heart of Christian mystical experience of Christ, particularly attested to in the writings of Maguerite Porete and Hildegard von Bingen. Yet kenotic Christologies are also found in nonmystical theology, which Lanzetta tends to lump together pejoratively under her category "conventional theology." Consequently, as much as I admire this book and agree with its essential conclusions—but for different reasons—my trouble with this work originates in Lanzetta's assertion of a hard dualism between mystical theology and "ordinary theology," a dualism that undermines her arguments and conclusions. My concern is threefold.First, mystical experience is primarily a matter of consciousness in the sense that something previously unknown and unexperienced is suddenly "there." This unanticipated presence is as real to the mystic's perspective as everyday experiences are, which is why mystics so often speak of being empowered to "see" or "touch" or "taste" what has been up to now imperceptible. If the experience is apophatic in structure—a usually brief moment of awareness in which all subject-object duality is overcome so that the mystic isn't aware of a self separated from what the self experiences or even that there is an "experience happening"—the mystic is neither thinking, feeling, or interpreting. That is... (shrink)

This research tried to make a contribution to the discussion around the conditions, under which the ontological shift of the philosophical hermeneutics can be done. It began with an analysis of Gadamer's well-known formula: " Being that can be understood is language. (Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache.)". Scholars interpret it differently. By means of the grammatical analysis, I showed on the one hand an interpretation of the formula from the perspective of pan‐lingualism as absurd, because they regard Being (...) and language as identical. On the other hand, an interpretation from the perspective of the linguistic ontology should be eliminated, according to which the being possesses a linguistic character, so that its unconcealment can complete itself without the effort ofunderstanding. The two interpretations come from a misunderstanding that they regard the subordinate clause of that formula as descriptive relative clause. There is still another interpretive problem, if we regard the subordinate clause as restrictive relative clause and thus interpret Gadamer's theory as linguistic idealism. However Gadamer indicates that such an interpretation remains on the level of German idealism, because it limits understanding to an intellectual grasping. Another reading of the subordinate clause as restrictive relative clause is appropriate, because it takes understanding as a practical ability (Können) into its consideration and at the same time emphasizes the non-identity between Being and language despite their ontological inseparableness. Gadamer finds out a linguistic theory, in order to support such kind of reading. He extends his principle of aesthetic non-differentiation to the range of language. By means of thislinguistic non-differentiation, the ontological shift of the hermeneutics can complete itself. (shrink)

The Chiasm of the Visible and the Imaginary.Sketches for a Phenomenological Approach to PhotographyIn the digital age today, photographic images appear more and more through a virtual space; their appearance takes place more and more throughan “immaterial medium”. This renders the status of a photographic image more ambiguous, if not more enigmatic. Is a photograph merely a journalistic tool?Is photographic activity primarily mimetic which is meant to fulfill the function of unconcealment of the truth of the given state of (...) things in the world? Or thistruth function can only be fulfilled by the assistance of the viewer’s gaze and the viewing subject’s narrative which is deployed not only according to whatis visible and present, but also according to what is invisible and absent on the surface of the photograph itself? If such is the case, doesn’t a photographalso comprise a hermeneutical and even deconstructive dimension? On the other hand, photography is more and more considered as a kind of artwork inits own right as it can awaken pleasure, imagination and emotion: in short, a photograph is a work which exhibits an affective intentionality. What is therelation between the representational, artistic, affective and critical functions of a photograph? Is there any tension between these functions? This articleattempts to answer some of these problems from a phenomenological approach.Il chiasma del visibile e dell’immaginario.Lineamenti di un approccio fenomenologico alla fotografiaOggi, nell’era digitale, le immagini fotografiche ci vengono incontro sempre più spesso attraverso un medium immateriale. Lo statuto ontologico diun’immagine fotografica diviene così sempre più ambiguo, se non propriamente enigmatico. Una foto è un semplice strumento d’informazione ? L’attivitàfotografi ca è prioritariamente mimetica? La sua funzione principale è quella di rivelare la verità di un certo stato di cose nel mondo? Oppure questa funzionedi veridizione ha bisogno, per realizzarsi, del contributo dello sguardo del soggetto che contempla la fotografia, dell’apporto di un discorso che investe non solo ciò che è visibile e presente, ma anche ciò che è invisibile e assente dalla superficie fotografica? La fotografia, in altri termini, non comporta sempre una dimensione ermeneutica o decostruttiva ? D’altra parte, la fotografia viene sempre più considerata come un’opera d’arte in senso pieno, come un’opera che si fa portatrice di un’intenzionalità affettiva, capace di risvegliare la nostra immaginazione e le nostre emozioni. Quale rapporto sussiste tra le diverse funzioni che una fotografia può svolgere, ad esempio quella rappresentativa, quella artistica, quella affettiva, quella critica? L’articolo cerca di rispondere ad alcuni di questi problemi a partire dall’approccio fenomenologico di Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

The formal indication is a key concept in Heidegger’s thought. But Heidegger’s discussion of the formal indication in the period after the “Kehre” has always received little attention, with the result that Heidegger’s late self-reflection on this method has not been brought into scholarly focus. Recent publications – especially volume 91 of the Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe, Ergänzungen und Denksplitter (published in 2022) and volume 102, Vorläufiges I-IV – now provide relatively accurate testimony to this self-reflection. For the first time, they (...) help resolve the long-standing dilemma: Why did Heidegger renounce the concept of the formal indication in his later thought, and what does this renunciation mean? With the appearance of these newer texts, it becomes possible to take a full look at Heidegger’s conception of formally indicating concepts and to reconsider the most important elements of this conception – the ontological difference and the relation of Being to human – in the light of the key-texts of the early and late Heidegger. Heidegger’s final position on the formal indication is thus revealed: The formal indication is the anticipation of the “truth of Being” in which concealment and unconcealment become one. This position strongly indicates a continuity and identity of the early and late Heidegger. In this sense, the disappearance of the concept of formal indication in the late Heidegger does not mean that its core ideas are abandoned, but that they are transformed into a more original form: from the “ontological difference” to the “origin of difference” (Unterschied – Austrag); from the “relation of Being to human” (qua Seinsverständnis), which is not yet freed from the entanglement with elements of transcendental philosophy, to a more original relation that contains the concealment and unconcealment within itself (Seinsgeschichte – Ereignis – Geviert). (shrink)

Quantum mechanics was reformulated as an information theory involving a generalized kind of information, namely quantum information, in the end of the last century. Quantum mechanics is the most fundamental physical theory referring to all claiming to be physical. Any physical entity turns out to be quantum information in the final analysis. A quantum bit is the unit of quantum information, and it is a generalization of the unit of classical information, a bit, as well as the quantum information itself (...) is a generalization of classical information. Classical information refers to finite series or sets while quantum information, to infinite ones. Quantum information as well as classical information is a dimensionless quantity. Quantum information can be considered as a “bridge” between the mathematical and physical. The standard and common scientific epistemology grants the gap between the mathematical models and physical reality. The conception of truth as adequacy is what is able to transfer “over” that gap. One should explain how quantum information being a continuous transition between the physical and mathematical may refer to truth as adequacy and thus to the usual scientific epistemology and methodology. If it is the overall substance of anything claiming to be physical, one can question how different and dimensional physical quantities appear. Quantum information can be discussed as the counterpart of action. Quantum information is what is conserved, action is what is changed in virtue of the fundamental theorems of Emmy Noether (1918). The gap between mathematical models and physical reality, needing truth as adequacy to be overcome, is substituted by the openness of choice. That openness in turn can be interpreted as the openness of the present as a different concept of truth recollecting Heidegger’s one as “unconcealment” (ἀλήθεια). Quantum information as what is conserved can be thought as the conservation of that openness. (shrink)