Results for 'truth by convention'

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  1. Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention.Jared Warren - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):119-139.
    In “Truth by Convention” W.V. Quine gave an influential argument against logical conventionalism. Even today his argument is often taken to decisively refute logical conventionalism. Here I break Quine’s arguments into two— the super-task argument and the regress argument—and argue that while these arguments together refute implausible explicit versions of conventionalism, they cannot be successfully mounted against a more plausible implicit version of conventionalism. Unlike some of his modern followers, Quine himself recognized this, but argued that implicit conventionalism (...)
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  2. Truth by Convention.W. V. Quine - 1936 - In Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead. London: Longmans, Green & Co.. pp. 90–124.
  3. The Possibility of Truth by Convention.Jared Warren - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):84-93.
    An influential argument against the possibility of truth by linguistic convention holds that while conventions can determine which proposition a given sentence expresses, they (conventions) are powerless to make propositions true or false. This argument has been offered in the literature by Lewy, Yablo, Boghossian, Sider and others. But despite its influence and prima facie plausibility, the argument: (i) equivocates between different senses of “making true”; (ii) mistakenly assumes hyperintensional contexts are intensional; and (iii) relies upon an implausible (...)
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  4. Truth by Convention: A Symposium by A. J. Ayer, C. H. Whiteley, M. Black.A. J. Ayer, C. H. Whiteley & M. Black - 1936 - Analysis 4 (2/3):17 - 32.
  5. Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention.Gary Ebbs - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):193-237.
    According to the standard story W. V. Quine ’s criticisms of the idea that logic is true by convention are directed against, and completely undermine, Rudolf Carnap’s idea that the logical truths of a language L are the sentences of L that are true-in- L solely in virtue of the linguistic conventions for L, and Quine himself had no interest in or use for any notion of truth by convention. This paper argues that and are both false. (...)
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  6.  7
    On Truth by Convention.Richard E. Olson - 1975 - Philosophy Research Archives 1:109-123.
    In his early essay, "Truth by Convention," W.V.O. Quine scraps a programme for a conventionalistic account of logic on finding that the very logic which he wishes to stipulate by conventional truth assignments is presupposed in the stipulation of his conventions. Recently, however, Carlo Giannoni has offered us a variant of the Quine programme which, he maintains, avoids Quine's initial pitfall by shifting the emphasis from truth assignment to the conventional stipulation of inference rules. In the (...)
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  7. Truth by Convention: See Ayer, A. J.M. Black - 1936 - Analysis 4:28.
  8. Eternal Truth by Convention.Eric J. Loomis - unknown
    Within the epistemology of the sciences, conventionalism has been the subject of regular criticism for over six decades. Critics such as W. V. Quine and Morton White, and more recently Nathan Salmon (1992), and Paul Boghossian (1996), have attacked even the most basic tenet of conventionalism, namely its claim that the truth of certain statements is fixed not by stipulation-independent facts, but by the conventions governing the meaning of those statements and their constituents.
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  9.  3
    Truth by Convention: A Symposium.A. J. Ayer, C. H. Whiteley & M. Black - 1938 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 3 (2):92-93.
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  10. Truth by Convention: See Ayer, A. J.C. H. Whiteley - 1936 - Analysis 4:22.
     
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  11. Vagueness and truth by convention.Dharmendra Kumar - 1969 - Analysis 29 (4):129.
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  12.  17
    Quine W. V.. Truth by Convention. Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead, Longmans, Green and Co., New York 1936, Pp. 90–124. [REVIEW]Barkley Rosser - 1936 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):42-42.
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  13.  39
    Quine Against Lewis (and Carnap) on Truth by Convention.Sean Morris - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):366-391.
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  14.  27
    Vagueness and Truth by Convention.Dharmendra Kumar - 1969 - Analysis 29 (4):129 - 130.
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    Review: W. V. Quine, Truth by Convention[REVIEW]Barkley Rosser - 1936 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):42-42.
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  16.  41
    Vacuous Variants and Truth by Convention.Erik Götlind - 1955 - Theoria 21 (1):1-24.
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  17.  11
    Some Implications of Empirical Truth by Convention.Donald A. Wells - 1951 - Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):185-192.
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  18.  16
    Protocols, Truth and Convention.Thomas Oberdan (ed.) - 1993 - Rodopi.
    The continuing philosophical interest in the famous 'Protocol Sentence Debate' in the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists is, to a large measure, due to the focus on the epistemological issues in the dispute, and the neglect of differences among the leading players in their philosophical views of logic and language. In Protocols, Truth and Convention, the current understanding of the debate is advanced by developing the contemporaneous views of logic and language held by the principal disputants. Rudolf Carnap (...)
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  19. Truth and Convention: On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Relativism.Hilary Putnam - 1987 - Dialectica 41 (1-2):69--77.
    SummaryI discuss a simple case in which theories with different ontologies appear equally adequate in every way. . I contend that the appearance of equal adequacy is correct, and that what this shows is that the notion of “existence” has a variety of different but legitimate uses. I also argue that this provides a counterexample to the claim advanced by Davidson, that conceptual relativity is incoherent.RésuméJe discute un cas simple où des théories comportant des ontologies différentes apparaissent également adéquates à (...)
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  20.  41
    Ayer A. J., Whiteley C. H., Black M.. Truth by Convention: A Symposium. Analysis, Vol. 4 , Pp. 17–22, 22 28, 28–32.C. H. Langford - 1938 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 3 (2):92-93.
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  21. Truth and Conventional Implicature.Stephen Barker - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):1-34.
    Are all instances of the T-schema assertable? I argue that they are not. The reason is the presence of conventional implicature in a language. Conventional implicature is meant to be a component of the rule-based content that a sentence can have, but it makes no contribution to the sentence's truth-conditions. One might think that a conventional implicature is like a force operator. But it is not, since it can enter into the scope of logical operators. It follows that the (...)
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  22.  35
    Review: A. J. Ayer, C. H. Whiteley, M. Black, Truth by Convention: A Symposium. [REVIEW]C. H. Langford - 1938 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 3 (2):92-93.
  23.  8
    Götlind Erik. Vacuous Variants and Truth by Convention. Theoria , Vol. 21 No. 1 , Pp. 1–24.Jonathan Bennett - 1956 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 21 (4):395-395.
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  24.  22
    Truth and Convention: On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Relativism.Hilary Putnam - 1987 - Dialectica 41 (1-2):69-77.
    SummaryI discuss a simple case in which theories with different ontologies appear equally adequate in every way.. I contend that the appearance of equal adequacy is correct, and that what this shows is that the notion of “existence” has a variety of different but legitimate uses. I also argue that this provides a counterexample to the claim advanced by Davidson, that conceptual relativity is incoherent.RésuméJe discute un cas simple où des théories comportant des ontologies différentes apparaissent également adéquates à tout (...)
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  25.  33
    Truth(Making) by Convention.Jamin Asay - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):117-128.
    A common account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths is that while the former are true solely in virtue of meaning, the latter are true also in virtue of the way of the world. Quine famously disputed this characterization, and his skepticism over the analytic/synthetic distinction has cast a long shadow. Against this skepticism, I argue that the common account comes close to the truth, and that truthmaker theory in particular offers the resources for providing a compelling (...)
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  26.  26
    Are Necessary Truths True by Convention?K. Britton, J. O. Urmson & W. C. Kneale - 1947 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 21 (1):78-133.
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  27.  6
    Are Necessary Truths True by Convention?Karl Britton, J. O. Urmson & W. Kneale - 1949 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):201-202.
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  28. Words by Convention.Gail Leckie & Robert Williams - 2019 - In David Sosa & Ernie Lepore (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language Volume 1. Oxford, UK: OUP.
    Existing metasemantic projects presuppose that word- (or sentence-) types are part of the non-semantic base. We propose a new strategy: an endogenous account of word types, that is, one where word types are fixed as part of the metasemantics. On this view, it is the conventions of truthfulness and trust that ground not only the meaning of the words (meaning by convention) but also what the word type is of each particular token utterance (words by convention). The same (...)
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  29.  85
    Theories of Truth and Convention T.Douglas Patterson - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-16.
    Partly due to the influence of Tarski's work, it is commonly assumed that any good theory of truth implies biconditionals of the sort mentioned in Convention T: instances of the T-Schema "s is true in L if and only if p" where the sentence substituted for "p" is equivalent in meaning to s. I argue that we must take care to distinguish the claim that implying such instances is sufficient for adequacy in an account of truth from (...)
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  30. Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy.Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    The doctrine of the two truths - a conventional truth and an ultimate truth - is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools; it is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. One theory is articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd ct CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another and yet (...)
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  31.  17
    Book Review: Protocols, Truth and Convention[REVIEW]Gila Sher - 1997 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (1):153-155.
    The continuing philosophical interest in the famous 'Protocol Sentence Debate' in the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists is, to a large measure, due to the focus on the epistemological issues in the dispute, and the neglect of differences among the leading players in their philosophical views of logic and language. In Protocols, Truth and Convention , the current understanding of the debate is advanced by developing the contemporaneous views of logic and language held by the principal disputants. Rudolf (...)
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  32. Symposium: Are Necessary Truths True by Convention?K. Britton, J. O. Urmson & W. C. Kneale - 1947 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 21:78-133.
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  33.  13
    Review: Karl Britton, J. O. Urmson, W. Kneale, Are Necessary Truths True by Convention[REVIEW]Charles A. Baylis - 1949 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):201-202.
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  34.  6
    Britton Karl, Urmson J. O., and Kneale W.. Are Necessary Truths True by Convention? Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XXI , Pp. 78–133. [REVIEW]Charles A. Baylis - 1949 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):201-202.
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  35. Linguistic Convention and Worldly Fact: Prospects for a Naturalist Theory of the a Priori.Brett Topey - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1725-1752.
    Truth by convention, once thought to be the foundation of a uniquely promising approach to explaining our access to the truth in nonempirical domains, is nowadays widely considered an absurdity. Its fall from grace has been due largely to the influence of an argument that can be sketched as follows: our linguistic conventions have the power to make it the case that a sentence expresses a particular proposition, but they can’t by themselves generate truth; whether a (...)
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  36.  41
    Soames on the Logical Empiricists on Truth, Meaning, Convention, and Logical Truth.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1357-1365.
    In the first part of this paper, I express doubts that Tarski and Carnap were guilty of some confusions about the relations between truth and meaning, attributed to them by Soames. In the second part, I consider Quine's Carrollian argument against conventionalism about logical truth, discussed only briefly and approvingly by Soames, and I explore the question whether some not obviously incorrect forms of conventionalism about logical truth, such as what I call "finitary conventionalism", are immune to (...)
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  37.  1
    Truth and Consequences: Intentions, Conventions, and the New Thematics.Reed Way Dasenbrock - 2000 - Pennsylvania State University Press.
    Contemporary literary theory takes truth and meaning to be dependent on shared conventions in a community of discourse and views authors’ intentions as irrelevant to interpretation. This view, argues Reed Way Dasenbrock, owes much to Anglo-American analytic philosophy as developed in the 1950s and 1960s by such thinkers as Austin and Kuhn, but it ignores more recent work by philosophers like Davidson and Putnam, who have mounted a counterattack on this earlier conventionalism. This book draws on current analytic philosophy (...)
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  38.  12
    Conventional and Ultimate Truth: A Key for Fundamental Theology by Joseph Stephen O'Leary, [Thresholds in Philosophy and Theology], University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2015, Pp. XVII + 404, £47.95, Pbk. [REVIEW]Vivian Boland - 2019 - New Blackfriars 100 (1087):362-364.
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  39.  3
    Conventional and Ultimate Truth: A Key for Fundamental Theology by Joseph O'Leary.Thomas Cattoi - 2019 - Buddhist-Christian Studies 39 (1):327-331.
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  40. Truth-Makers and Convention T.Jan Woleński - 2011 - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.
    This papers discuss the place, if any, of Convention T (the condition of material adequacy of the proper definition of truth formulated by Tarski) in the truth-makers account offered by Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith. It is argued that although Tarski’s requirement seems entirely acceptable in the frameworks of truth-makers theories for the first-sight, several doubts arise under a closer inspection. In particular, T-biconditionals have no clear meaning as sentences about truth-makers. Thus, (...)-makers theory cannot be considered as the semantic theory of truth enriched by metaphysical (ontological) data. The problem of truth-makers for sentences about future events is discussed at the end of the paper. (shrink)
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  41.  21
    Status of Conventional Truth in Tsong Khapa's Mādhyamika Philosophy.Sonam Thakchoe - 2007 - Contemporary Buddhism 8 (1):31-47.
    This paper examines how and why conventional truth is, in Tsong khapa’s view, false and deceptive yet indeed truth that stands shoulder to shoulder with ultimate truth. The first part of the paper establishes the complementary nature of the two truths by responding to the question ‘Why is conventional truthtruth” at all?’ The discussion in the second part examines the uses of conventional discourse within the Maādhyamika philosophical framework—partly by discussing Tsong khapa’s response to (...)
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  42. Against Conventional Wisdom.Alexander W. Kocurek, Ethan Jerzak & Rachel Etta Rudolph - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (22):1-27.
    Conventional wisdom has it that truth is always evaluated using our actual linguistic conventions, even when considering counterfactual scenarios in which different conventions are adopted. This principle has been invoked in a number of philosophical arguments, including Kripke’s defense of the necessity of identity and Lewy’s objection to modal conventionalism. But it is false. It fails in the presence of what Einheuser (2006) calls c-monsters, or convention-shifting expressions (on analogy with Kaplan’s monsters, or context-shifting expressions). We show that (...)
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  43. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.François Recanati - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    This book argues against the traditional understanding of the semantics/pragmatics divide and puts forward a radical alternative. Through half a dozen case studies, it shows that what an utterance says cannot be neatly separated from what the speaker means. In particular, the speaker's meaning endows words with senses that are tailored to the situation of utterance and depart from the conventional meanings carried by the words in isolation. This phenomenon of ‘pragmatic modulation’ must be taken into account in theorizing about (...)
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  44. The Conventional and the Analytic.Manuel García-Carpintero & Manuel Pérez Otero - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):239-274.
    Empiricist philosophers like Carnap invoked analyticity in order to explain a priori knowledge and necessary truth. Analyticity was “truth purely in virtue of meaning”. The view had a deflationary motivation: in Carnap’s proposal, linguistic conventions alone determine the truth of analytic sentences, and thus there is no mystery in our knowing their truth a priori, or in their necessary truth; for they are, as it were, truths of our own making. Let us call this “Carnapian (...)
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  45.  31
    Donald Davidson. In Defense of Convention T. Truth, Syntax and Modality, Proceedings of the Temple University Conference on Alternative Semantics, Edited by Hugues Leblanc, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, Vol. 68, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and London1973, Pp. 76–86. [REVIEW]Melvin Fitting - 1977 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 42 (2):314.
  46.  46
    Lauri Karttunen and Stanley Peters. Conventional Implicature. Syntax and Semantics, Volume 11, Presupposition, Edited by Choon-Kyu Oh and David A. Dinneen, Academic Press, New York, San Francisco, and London, 1979, Pp. 1–56. - Gerald Gazdar. A Solution to the Projection Problem. Syntax and Semantics, Volume 11, Presupposition, Edited by Choon-Kyu Oh and David A. Dinneen, Academic Press, New York, San Francisco, and London, 1979, Pp. 57–89. - Janet Dean Fodor. In Defense of the Truth Value Gap. Syntax and Semantics, Volume 11, Presupposition, Edited by Choon-Kyu Oh and David A. Dinneen, Academic Press, New York, San Francisco, and London, 1979, Pp. 199–224. - Ruth M. Kempson. Presupposition, Opacity, and Ambiguity. Syntax and Semantics, Volume 11, Presupposition, Edited by Choon-Kyu Oh and David A. Dinneen, Academic Press, New York, San Francisco, and London, 1979, Pp. 283–297. - S. K. Thomason. Truth-Value Gaps, Many Truth Values, and Possible Worlds. Syntax and Semantics, Volume 11, P. [REVIEW]Tyler Burge - 1981 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 46 (2):412-415.
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    Exploding a Myth: Conventional Wisdom or Scientific Truth?J. Dunning-Davies - 2007 - Horwood.
    In this book Jeremy Dunning-Davies deals with the influence that "conventional wisdom" has on science, scientific research and development. He sets out to explode' the mythical conception that all scientific topics are open for free discussion and argues that no-one can openly raise questions about relativity, dispute the 'Big Bang' theory, or the existence of black holes, which all seem to be accepted facts of science rather than science fiction. In today's modern climate with "Britain's radioactive refuse heap already big (...)
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  48.  6
    Overlooking Conventions: The Trouble with Linguistic Pragmatism.Michael Devitt - 2021 - Springer Verlag.
    This book criticizes the methodology of the recent semantics-pragmatics debate in the theory of language and proposes an alternative. It applies this methodology to argue for a traditional view against a group of “contextualists” and “pragmatists”, including Sperber and Wilson, Bach, Carston, Recanati, Neale, and many others. The author disagrees with these theorists who hold that the meaning of the sentence in an utterance never, or hardly ever, yields its literal truth-conditional content, even after disambiguation and reference fixing; it (...)
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  49.  34
    Gorampa on the Objects of Negation: Arguments for Negating Conventional Truths.Sonam Thakchoe - 2008 - Contemporary Buddhism 9 (2):265-280.
    In this paper I explore Gorampa’s conception of the objects of negation. My primary aim is to show that, in Gorampa’s conception of the objects of negation, negating the extreme existent (bha ̄va/yod pa)—the first of the tetralemma (catuskoti/mtha’ bzhi)— __ entails negating the conventional realities qua truths themselves. The paper first identifies Gorampa’s notions of the objects of negation soteriogically and epistemically, and second it considers Gorampa’s arguments defending his treatment of truths (bden pa) as the objects of negation. (...)
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  50.  22
    For the Cowherds: Coloniality and Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy.Amy Donahue - 2016 - Philosophy East and West 66 (2):597-617.
    Comparative philosophers have noted that some comparative methods perpetuate colonial legacies. What follows employs aspects of the scholarship of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Anîbal Quijano, and María Lugones to identify one colonially problematic methodology that some well-regarded contemporary comparative representations of “Buddhist Philosophy” arguably adopt. In 1995, Lin Tongqi, Henry Rosemont, Jr., and Roger Ames identified “the most fundamental methodological issue facing all comparativists” by raising and responding to the question: “Does the imposition of modern Western conceptual categories on non-Western patterns (...)
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