The article deals with a specific type of contract that an heir is entitled to conclude—the transfer (or sale) of the rights of succession. As a starting point, the author of the article analyses the formation and further development of the transfer of succession as a whole (hereditas) in the Roman law. Two major proceedings used by Roman lawyers for the purposes of the alienation of hereditas are analysed, one being in iure cessio hereditatis and the second taking the (...) form of emptio venditi hereditatis. The interrelations between this kind of transfer and the recognition of the possibility of the assignment of rights (cessio) under the Roman law are pointed out. The author traces the impact of the principles developed by the Roman law on the legal regulation of the contract in question in modern codification by drawing attention to the French Civil Code and the Civil Code of Quebec. The author states that the legal rules on the sale of the rights of succession contained in the new Lithuanian Civil Code adopted in 2000 have been transposed, to a large extent, from the two abovementioned codes. After analysing the object of this contract, the author concludes that it is the sale of a certain incorporeal property (res incorporales) that is meant by the terms ‘succession’ (hereditas) or the ‘rights of succession’. This feature distinguishes the analysed contract from the ordinary contracts that an heir may conclude for the purposes of the alienation of specific objects making part of the succession. (shrink)

A number of authors from Grotius onwards have proposed that a binding promise transfers a right from promisor to promisee. The promisee now has the right, previously possessed by the promisor, to determine whether the promisor performs the act mentioned in their promise. This proposal runs into problems of detail. The chapter first reformulates the theory so as to avoid these problems. It then considers a more fundamental difficulty raised by Hume and argues that the reformulated theory succumbs to Hume’s (...) critique. The point is illustrated by way of a detailed discussion of the difference between consent and choice. Finally, a new theory of promising based on the idea of an authority interest is proposed. (shrink)

The United Nations Scientific, Education and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) expresses in its title and substance a controversial linkage of two normative systems: international human rights law and bioethics. The UDBHR has the status of what is known as a ‘non-binding’ declaration under public international law. The UDBHR’s normative foundation within bioethics (and association, for example, with virtue-based or principlist bioethical theories) is more problematic. Nonetheless, the UDBHR contains socially important principles (...) of technology transfer and transnational benefit (articles 14, 15 and 21). This paper is one of the first to explore how the disciplines of bioethics and international human rights law may interact in the UDBHR to advance the policy relevance and health impact of technology transfer and transnational benefit principles. It investigates their normative ancestry in the UDBHR, as well as relevant conceptual differences between bioethics and public international law in this respect and how these may be relevant to their conceptual evolution and application. (shrink)

This paper examines the Transference Theory of causation, developed originally by Aronson (1971) and Fair (1979). Three difficulties for that theory are presented: firstly, problems associated with the direction of transference and causal asymmetry; secondly, the case of persistence as causation, for example where a body's own inertia is the cause of its motion; and thirdly the problematic notion of identity through time of physical quantities such as energy or momentum. Finally, the theory is compared with the Conserved Quantity Theory (...) (Dowe 1992c), and it is shown that that account embodies the modifications that the transference theory needs to adopt. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 18 There are two ways to transfer a bodily right. One might transfer a bodily right in a detaching way – that is, without transferring jurisdiction over one’s future bodily choices. Alternately, one might transfer a bodily right in an attaching way – that is, in a way that transfers such jurisdiction. For instance, A might sell his kidney to B for money paid at the time of the transplant. Alternately, A might accept money now, agreeing (...) to give up his kidney some time down the road. In the latter case and not the former, B acquires normative jurisdiction over A’s future bodily choices. In this paper I will argue that the distinction between attaching and detaching transfers of bodily rights has implications regarding whether certain contracts and agreements should be legally enforced – and whether problems arise when the moral and legal transferability of these rights comes apart. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 18 There are two ways to transfer a bodily right. One might transfer a bodily right in a detaching way – that is, without transferring jurisdiction over one’s future bodily choices. Alternately, one might transfer a bodily right in an attaching way – that is, in a way that transfers such jurisdiction. For instance, A might sell his kidney to B for money paid at the time of the transplant. Alternately, A might accept money now, agreeing (...) to give up his kidney some time down the road. In the latter case and not the former, B acquires normative jurisdiction over A’s future bodily choices. In this paper I will argue that the distinction between attaching and detaching transfers of bodily rights has implications regarding whether certain contracts and agreements should be legally enforced – and whether problems arise when the moral and legal transferability of these rights comes apart. (shrink)

Libertarians famously contend that the minimal state is the most just social arrangement because it secures individual freedoms and basic political rights. They also oppose wealth transfer taxation, i.e. taxation of inheritances, bequests, and inter vivos gifts, arguing that it violates people's right to use their wealth freely. However, as I argue, libertarian opposition to wealth transfer taxation causes practical problems for their commitment to a minimal state, as there is strong empirical evidence demonstrating that wealth transfer taxation is (...) required to secure the political rights necessary for a free and stable society. In other words, I contend that without an effective wealth transfer tax, it will be difficult to ensure political rights and basic freedoms, thus leaving the libertarian minimal state in peril of collapse. (shrink)

Grotius is now widely acknowledged as an important figure in early modern contractual and consensual theories of political authority and legitimacy. However, as his thoughts on these debates are disseminated throughout his works rather than systematically ordained, it remains difficult to assess what, if anything, constitutes his distinctive mark. In the present paper, I will argue that his works contain a combination of two conceptual elements that have come to constitute a salient characteristic of early modern contract and consent theories: (...) first, a strong obligation to keep one’s promises, and second, an account of perfect promises as transferrals of rights. In the political sphere, this means that citizens who have promised their obedience to the authorities are obligated to keep faith, which provides a solid foundation for political obligations. In addition, their promise implies that authorities receive the right to rule over them, which accounts for the legitimacy of these authorities’ power. (shrink)

Addresses the issue of transference from a Lacanian perspective and discusses the implications which transference has in working with criminal clients. The article begins by briefly discussing the constitution of Lacanian subjectivity which includes a discussion of J. Lacan's concepts of the imaginary and symbolic orders. The idea of transference is then situated between the play of the imaginary and symbolic orders which constantly asks the question, what does the Other want. This question is especially important in the therapeutic work (...) with criminal Ss, and reveals certain countertransference possibilities which when left unexplored, can greatly threaten the success of the treatment. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Hegel, in his work _Philosophy of Right_, defines ownership through three elements: acquisition by occupation, use, and transfer. To own something involves mere acquisition and encompasses its appropriate use and potential transfer to others. Subsequently, the final aspect mentioned was the concept of infinite judgement. The acts of owning and transferring to others are diametrically opposed, and Hegel’s unique logic forcibly connects these opposing concepts. This form of infinite judgement was advocated by the young Hegel during the era of _Phenomenology (...) of Spirit_. There, he stated, “Spirit is a bone”. However, when he later wrote _Science of Logic_ or _Encyclopedia_, the formulation of infinite judgement changed to “Spirit is not something that is bone”. This shift was influenced by Kant. In _Logic_, the discourse advances into syllogism, inferential theory, leading to “Spirit is a bone for such-and-such reasons”. In essence, Hegel binarily connected spirit and bone in his youth and introduced a mediating term in this connection later in his life, establishing inferential links. However, the notion of forcibly connecting opposing concepts remains. Therefore, the statement “Ownership is transfer” represents an infinite judgement while simultaneously signifying syllogism that “I truly own this object if I can transfer it to others”. This contributes to the reasoning that “I and objects can be connected through the intermediary of others”, progressing to the inference that “I and others can be connected through objects”, thereby laying the foundation for society. (shrink)

With biobank research on the increase and the history of exploitation in Africa, it has become necessary to manage the transfer of human tissues across national boundaries. There are many accepted templates of Material Transfer Agreements that currently exist internationally. However, these templates do not address the specific concerns of South Africa and even of Africa as a continent. This article will examine three significantly important ethico-legal concepts that were deliberated and carefully adapted by a South African Institution to suit (...) the transfer of Human Biological Materials and associated data for biobank research, namely: informed consent; benefit sharing arrangements; and ownership together with intellectual property rights in human tissues. The discussion includes an analysis of current practice; the ethico-legal challenges in the South African/African context; the decisions made with regard to how the related ethico-legal challenges were addressed in the MTA; and justifications for implementing these decisions. The processes considered could be of benefit to other developing world countries who consider it necessary to manage the transfer of HBMs across national boundaries. (shrink)

A multitude of legislation impacts the use of samples and data for research in South Africa. With the coming into effect of the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013 in July 2021, recent attention has been given to safeguarding research participants’ personal information. The protection of participants’ privacy in research is essential, but it is not the only risk at stake in the use and sharing of personal information. Other rights and interests that must also be (...) considered and safeguarded include the right to non-discrimination, the right to dignity, and the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. This can be achieved by ensuring that the ethical values and universal principles that underpin the research landscape, namely equity, reciprocity, justice and solidarity, are embedded in the regulatory framework for the management and use of personal information. This paper advocates an integrated bioethics approach to the use of personal information for research in SA. A key feature in embedding such an approach is a Data Transfer Agreement that appropriately integrates the safeguards and protections set out by our regulatory framework with bioethical rules and procedures when personal information is used and shared for research purposes. This paper thus calls for the development of a national DTA that is guided by key ethical principles when data are shared for research purposes. This paper will be followed by a webinar on 23 June 2022 hosted by the Department of Science and Innovation and the SA Medical Research Council, where the recommendations and suggestions set out herein will be unpacked, discussed and debated by relevant stakeholders. (shrink)

In the present paper we argue that the theory of contracts embraced by many libertarian scholars and relied upon by them in sundry important debates (e.g. over morality of the fractional reserve banking or loan maturity mismatching etc.), that is, the title transfer theory of contracts (TTT) should be rejected as not being able to account for the binding force of future-oriented contracts, including contracts deemed enforceable by those scholars themselves. The TTT claims that the only contracts that should be (...) legally binding are these where the debtor’s failure to abide by them constitutes a violation of the creditor’s private property rights. However, as we argue, no default of the debtor in a future-oriented contract can in itself amount to such a violation. (shrink)

Research ethics regulation in parts of the Global North has sometimes been initiated in the face of biomedical scandal. More recently, developing and recently developed countries have had additional reasons to regulate, doing so to attract international clinical trials and American research funding, publish in international journals, or to respond to broader social changes. In Taiwan, biomedical research ethics policy based on ‘principlism’ and committee- based review were imported from the United States. Professionalisation of research ethics displaced other longer-standing ways (...) of conceiving ethics connected with Taiwanese cultural traditions. Subsequently, the model and its discursive practices were extended to other disciplines. Regulation was also shaped by decolonizing dis- courses associated with asserting Indigenous peoples’ rights. Locating research ethics regulation within the language and practices of public policy formation and transfer as well as decolonization, allows analysis to move be- yond the self-referential and attend to the social, economic and political context within which regulation operates. 研究倫理規範甚至法制化的濫觴,過去在有些北美國家是為了回應其國內發生的醫學研究倫 理醜聞。但近年來,無論是發展中或已開發國家,往往是為了爭取國際醫學臨床試驗計畫能在 其國內執行、爭取美國相關研究經費、能在英語的國際期刊發表文章、或是因應國內相關社會變化。 以台灣來說,基於「原則主義」的醫學領域之研究倫理政策及規範,以及在研究機構內成立 委員會專責倫理審查的運作模式,可說完全移植自美國。這種運作模式及研究倫理的專業化, 不但逐漸取代過去已融合台灣文化的研究倫理觀쳀,且在這種運作模式下的倫理論述及實作, 更從醫學領域擴展至其他研究領域。在此同時,台灣的研究倫理規範之發展,也受到台灣原住 民族的去殖民化及群體權主張等影響。. (shrink)

This article examines John Stuart Mill’s influential proposal of how to tax wealth transfers. According to Mill, every person should be free to bequeath but not to receive bequest. Mill proposed an upper limit on how much each person could receive from wealth transfers. We discuss three objections against this proposal. The nonseparability objection holds that it is not possible to separate the freedom to give from the freedom to receive. The objection from private property holds that private property includes (...) an unlimited right to dispose of one’s assets and that this right is violated under Mill’s scheme. The objection from incentives holds that Mill’s scheme would have negative effects on people’s willingness to work and save. We argue that these objections can be met and that taxing bequeathed wealth according to Mill’s scheme is more just and more efficient compared to systems that rely less on wealth transfer taxation. (shrink)

In Section I, the purely conceptual issue as to whether animals other than human beings, all or some, may possess rights is examined. This is approached via a consideration of the concept of a moral right, and by way of examining the claims of sentience, consciousness, capacities for pleasure and pain, having desires, possessing interests, self-consciousness, rationality in various senses. It is argued that only beings possessed actually or potentially of the capacity to be morally self-determining can be possessors (...) of rights. In Section II, normative questions concerning the rights animals might possess if they were to be capable of possessing rights are discussed. The approach followed is that of considering the kinds of argument advanced in support of human rights, and whether these arguments, and the rights they are claimed to establish, are transferable to animals, and whether there are or might be specifically animal rights. In Section III the question of what is or could be the goal of one who recognizes and seeks to respect all rights, animal and human, is raised. In particular, the issue as to whether a goal of maximizing the satisfaction of rights could remain a coherent one if animal rights are acknowledged, is explored. (shrink)

The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model is a financing model used especially in the financing of infrastructure projects in developing countries. It is one of the most common methods used by the countries to provide non-budgetary financing. The fact that becoming popular in the world as of the 20th Century, this model started to be implemented in the Islamic countries created the need for examining the model in terms of Islamic law. No substantive studies have been conducted on this matter in Turkey. (...) In the Arab world, the first significant development in this regard was the 23rd Term meeting of Al Baraka Group organized in Mecca in November 2002. Next, the Islamic Fiqh Community, which operates under the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, organized a meeting about the BOT model in 2009. At this meeting, ten experts from different countries presented papers on the BOT model, and a final declaration was announced at the end of the meeting. After this meeting, some independent studies were carried out on the BOT model. However, it was observed that these efforts did not reach a sufficient level, and generally remained within the framework of the papers presented at the meeting. The BOT model is a model that takes place in the form of the transfer of the facility to the relevant public institution or organization free of charge at the end of the period after the depreciation and profit of the invested capital are realized. All expenses are covered by the private enterprise. The public service or activity is operated for a certain period of time by the private enterprise. It was observed that the studies on the BOT model in Turkey mainly dated back to the last quarter of the Twentieth Century. In this context, the Law No. 3996 about the BOT model was enacted on 08 June 1994 in Turkey. Today, the BOT model is actively used in many areas, and the delivery of the service begins after the projects are completed. The BOT model has three main successive stages. In the first stage, the project is completed with the financing of OGS. In the second stage, the operating right of this project would be awarded to the investor in accordance with the contract. In the third stage, the ownership of the facility would be transferred to the relevant public institution. The BOT model was discussed in terms of Islamic law, firstly in general and then in terms of the interests and convictions. The BOT model contains many interests in terms of both the state and the society. In addition, it has certain disadvantages. There are many reasons and aims in selecting the BOT model. The most important of these reasons is the continuation of the projects and the required work without imposing a burden on the public budget. Islamic law has a structure that prioritizes public interest. In this context, the state must observe the public interest in its operations. In the BOT model, the existence of public interest is particularly notable with the projects implemented in the fields of hospitals, roads, bridges, airports and etc. Islamic jurists have different opinions regarding the contracts administered in the BOT model. Some of them consider this model as a new contract that does not exist in the tradition, while others compare it to a traditional contract. The analogies of the traditional contract have been compared to leasing, payment, foundation, fief, corporate (with partnership) and exception contracts. Others, on the other hand, considered the BOT model as an atramentous contract combining several different contracts. It seems difficult to argue that the BOT model is completely similar to any of the classical fiqh contracts. However, as a result of the BOT model, it is considered an agreement with a company to conclude a contract; therefore there is a more prominent similarity to an exception contract. Nonetheless, it is not possible to say that the BOT model fully complies with the traditional exception contract. As a matter of fact, while there is no time determination in the exception contract, the time is determined in the BOT model. In the exception contract, while the material must be completely covered by the private sector, in the BOT model, issues such as the right to land and building construction are covered by the employer. In addition, the classical exception contract does not contain many contracts as in the BOT model; and it is an agreement in which the fee is presented and terminated after the order is placed. Nonetheless, the BOT contract includes three basic contracts (construction-operation-transfer) as well as many contracts related to these contracts. Finally, considering that the BOT model was a contract, the issues in the context of the basic elements that should be included in a contract were discussed in this study. In addition, situations such as ignorance, gharar and interest in terms of affecting the validity of the contract were discussed and dealt with in terms of the BOT contract. (shrink)

Psychoanalysis provides a complex discursive matrix for making sense of, or unraveling the existing sense of, textual material in social research. However, the relationship between psychoanalytic work in the clinic and psychoanalytic social research poses a series of questions for those working in each domain. The relationship opened up new fields of enquiry, of empirical and theoretical research, but it also now gives rise to empirical and theoretical problems. This paper is concerned with the elaboration of clinical concepts in the (...) emerging field of psychosocial research, with a particular focus on the use of transference. The paper distinguishes 3 versions of transference in the psychoanalytic tradition, drawing attention to the importance of an “intersubjective” conception of transference in psychosocial research as an alternative to “attachment” models that appeal to mainstream empiricist approaches to psychological inquiry. The third version of transference elaborated in Lacanian psychoanalysis, one concerned with signification, is used to ground an analysis of the clinic as specific space in which the phenomenon manifests itself. Analysis of the clinic as “transferential space” enables us to conceptualize the place of psychoanalysis in the clinic and to question the extrapolation of transference to social research. The paper concludes with a consideration of generalized transference outside the clinic. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The Politics of Feminist Knowledge Transfer draws together analytical work on gender training and gender expertise. Its chapters critically reflect on the politics of feminist knowledge transfer, understood as an inherently political, dynamic and contested process, the overall aim of which is to transform gendered power relations in pursuit of more equal societies, workplaces, and policies. At its core, the work explores the relationship between gender expertise, gender training, and broader processes of feminist transformation arising from knowledge transfer activities. Examining (...) these in a reflective way, the book brings a primarily practice-based debate into the academic arena. With contributions from authors of diverse backgrounds, including academics, practitioners and representatives of gender training institutions, the editors combine a focus on gender expertise and gender training, with more theory-focused chapters. (shrink)

How do professionals working in pre-implantation genetic diagnosis reflect upon their decision making with regard to ethical challenges arising in everyday practice? Two focus group discussions were held with staff of reproductive genetic clinics: one in Utrecht with PGD-professionals from Dutch PGD-centres and one in Prague with PGD-professionals working in centres in different European countries. Both meetings consisted of two parts, exploring participants’ views regarding treatment requests for conditions that may not fulfill traditional indications criteria for PGD, and treatment and (...) transfer requests involving welfare-of-the-child considerations. There was general support for the view that people who come for PGD will have their own good reasons to consider the condition they wish to avoid as serious. But whereas PGD-professionals in the international group tended to stress the applicants’ legal right to eventually have the treatment they want, participants in the Dutch group sketched a picture of shared decision-making, where professionals would go ahead with treatment in cases where they are able to understand the reasonableness of the request in the light of the couple’s reproductive history or family experience. In the international focus group there was little support for guidance stating that welfare-of-the child considerations should be taken into account. This was different in the Dutch focus group, where shared decision-making also had the role of reassuring professionals that applicants had adequately considered possible implications for the welfare of the child. (shrink)

This article discusses two issues of majority-minority relations in deeply divided societies. The first is the legitimacy of the transfer of a homeland minority — along with the territory it inhabits — to a neighboring kin-state against the will of the minority or most of its members. The second is the constitutional validity of legislation that renders citizenship or the right to vote contingent upon an oath of allegiance to the state or to its fundamental attributes. These two interrelated steps, (...) advanced by a central partner in the current government coalition in Israel, are aimed at the Arab-Palestinian minority. This article’s main focus is the examination of Israeli constitutional law safeguards that may prevent the implementation of these initiatives, which I find to be very dangerous. (shrink)

The study is designed to examine the perceptions of Chinese executives of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and to explore possible strategies by which well-established foreign multinational enterprises can carry out their CSR in China. The interviewees’ interpretation of CSR is found to be oriented toward internal operations of the Chinese subsidiaries and economic responsibility. Many interviewees have the classical view of CSR, while headquarters has the modern view. The main problems of implementing CSR are: specific Chinese business culture, intellectual property (...) rights, internal due process, and insufficient Chinese government support. It is recommended that socialization of Chinese executives about CSR be accomplished through personnel transfer among various functional areas in the corporate system, the development of a just organizational culture in the Chinese subsidiaries, and collaboration with external partnersthat advocate CSR. (shrink)

This article suggests enacting an accession tax instead of the estate duty – which was repealed in Israel in 1981. This suggestion evolves from historical and normative explorations of the tension between perceptions of familial intergenerational property rights and justifications for the “death tax,” as termed by its opponents, i.e., estate and inheritance tax. First, the Article explores this tension as expressed in the history of the Israeli Estate Duty Law. This chronological survey reveals a move from the State’s (...) taken-for-granted interest in revenue justifying the Law’s enactment in 1949; moving on to the “needy widow” and “poor orphan” in whose name the tax was attacked during the years 1959–1964, continuing to the abolition of the tax in 1981 in the name of efficiency and the right of the testator to transfer his wealth to his family, and finally cumulating with the targeting of tycoon dynasties that characterizes the recent calls for reintroducing the tax. Next, based on the rich literature on the subject, the Article maps the arguments for and against intergenerational wealth transfer taxation, placing the Israeli case in larger philosophical, political, and pragmatic contexts. Lastly, it associates the ideas of accession tax and “social inheritance” with inspirational sources for rethinking a realistic wealth transfer taxation to bridge the gap between notions of intergenerational familial rights and intergenerational social justice. (shrink)

This article argues that the dominant “nonconventionalist” theories of promising cannot account for the moral impact of two basic commercial practices: the transfer of contractual rights and the discharge of contractual debt in bankruptcy. In particular, nonconventionalism’s insensitivity to certain features of social context precludes it from registering the moral significance of these social phenomena. As prelude, I demonstrate that Seana Shiffrin’s influential position concerning the divergence between promise and contract commits her to impugning these features of the modern (...) economy. Finally, I examine the importance of promising for friendship and why we resist the commodification of promissory rights in this domain. (shrink)

The objective of this works in to analyze the conditions of transference of sovereignty and the concept of natural liberty in William of Ockham. Firstly, I briefly explain some antecedents of the conflict of ‘investidures’. Secondly, I will show that Ockham advanced the existence of a set of natural rights hold by the community. This permitted to argue against the Papal interference in the secular sphere, but also to set limits to the emperor himself and grant the individual with (...) natural rights. Thirdly, I explain the differences between ius fori and ius poli and I suggest that Ockham did not provide point of contact between these laws, excepting in the case of liberty. Finally, I revise briefly Ockham’s term translation imperii. (shrink)

Many of the major self-determination movements of the 20th and early 21st Centuries did not go smoothly, but resulted in forced or semi-forced transfers of groups of people from one country to another. Forced population transfers are not, of course, supported by major theorists of self-determination and secession. However, the problems that make population transfers extremely common in actual cases of self-determination and secession, are not squarely faced in many theories of self-determination. And, I shall argue, certain leading theories of (...) self-determination and secession would make population transfers almost inevitable in practice, even if not called for or sanctioned in theory. This is a major stumbling block for any attempt to move from an abstract account of self-determination towards a working theory. In this paper I take a first step towards addressing this problem. I shall show how any approach to dealing with secession, including “primary rights” accounts, “remedial rights only” accounts, and even “consensual” accounts, must be able to deal with the inevitable problem of population transfers, if it is to be a complete and plausible theory. I shall also show how population transfers, to the extent that we can always expect them to take place, can be made as just as possible, in light of any approach to the problem of secession. I will not here attempt to adjudicate between different approaches to secession and self-determination. To that extent, my argument may be seen as a friendly addition to all of the above approaches, showing how they may try to meet an objection which they have not yet faced. (shrink)

The received view in Thomas Hobbes scholarship is that theindividual rights described by Hobbes in his political writings andspecifically in Leviathan are simple freedoms or libertyrights, that is, rights that are not correlated with duties orobligations on the part of others. In other words, it is usually arguedthat there are no claim rights for individuals in Hobbes''s politicaltheory. This paper argues, against that view, that Hobbes does describeclaim rights, that they come into being when individuals conform (...) to thesecond law of nature and that they are genuine moral claim rights, thatis, rights that are the ground of the obligations of others to forebearfrom interfering with their exercise. This argument is defended againstboth Jean Hampton''s and Howard Warrender''s interpretations of rights inHobbes''s theory. The paper concludes that the theory of rightsunderlying Hobbes''s writing is not taken from Natural Law but isprobably closer to a modern interest theory of rights. (shrink)

Universities have long been involved in knowledge transfer activities. Yet the last 30 years have seen major changes in the governance of university–industry interactions. Knowledge transfer has become a strategic issue: as a source of funding for university research and (rightly or wrongly) as a policy tool for economic development. Universities vary enormously in the extent to which they promote and succeed in commercializing academic research. The identification of clear-cut models of governance for university–industry interactions and knowledge transfer processes is (...) not straightforward. The purpose of this article is to critically discuss university knowledge transfer models and review the recent developments in the literature on research collaborations, intellectual property rights and spin-offs, those forms of knowledge transfer that are more formalized and have been institutionalized in recent years. The article also addresses the role played by university knowledge transfer organizations in promoting commercialization of research results. (shrink)

This article argues that there is no human right to cross borders without impediment. Receiving states, however, must recognize the procedural rights of those unable to protect their human rights in the place where they currently reside. Asylum claims must be properly investigated, and in the event that the state declines to admit them as refugees, it must ensure that the third country to which they are transferred can protect their rights. Both procedural and substantive (...) class='Hi'>rights apply while refugees are physically present in the state’s territory and their immigration status is being investigated. The state’s obligation to protect these rights arises from the power it exercises over them. In contrast, the state does not exercise equivalent power over those it declines to admit in the first place, even though its immigration criteria – if discriminatory in the negative sense – can be faulted on other grounds. Beneath these arguments lie two basic assumptions: one is the need to separate human rights claims from other claims of justice, especially those deriving from citizenship; the other is the need to determine who bears the obligations that correspond to these rights. Attention to the different relations in which prospective immigrants may stand toward the state they hope to enter can help us understand how border regimes may comply with, or violate, human rights. (shrink)

In this article, the logical implications of a right to life are examined. It is first argued that the prohibition of Termination of life on request confers an inalienable right to life. A right is inalienable if it cannot legitimately be waived or transferred. Since voluntary euthanasia entails waiver of the right to life, the inalienability yields that it cannot be justified. Therefore, any ethical position that is in favor of voluntary euthanasia has to argue that the right to (...) life is an inalienable right and accept the conclusion that killing on request is justified. (shrink)

This article offers an understanding of the normative basis of unjust enrichment. It begins by considering whether the right at stake in cases of unjust enrichment fits within a Kantian conception of right that treats free agency as the sole aspect of the person commanding respect. It argues that it does not because, in cases of unjust enrichment, recovery does not depend on finding a violation of the plaintiff's bare freedom to choose. The article then argues that unjust enrichment vindicates (...) the plaintiff's right of self-determination—the realization of the capacity to live from self-chosen ends—when the laws of property and contract threaten to undermine it. This resolves the puzzles of unjust enrichment law that remain mysterious on other accounts, such as how the plaintiff can have a right to recovery even though property has been effectively transferred to the defendant, why the plaintiff may recover even though the defendant has been purely passive and has committed no wrong, and why unjust enrichment fails to exhibit the structure of corrective justice. (shrink)

Even in the absence of complete scientific consensus on the magnitude, timing, and regional distribution of the effects of global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions, it is worthwhile to examine potential policy responses to the prospect of climate change. An internalization of the greenhouse externality based on property rights in carbon emissions offers the potential to promote rather than retard worldwide economic development. As the world economy moves in a market?oriented direction, the arbitrary wealth transfers associated with a (...) carbon?rights distribution plan would dissipate within the time span required for planetary climate management. Thus, the present world situation may provide a new opportunity to reconcile the imperatives of global environmental protection and the promotion of sustained economic growth. (shrink)

Some rights are so important for human autonomy and well-being that many scholars insist they should not be waived, traded, or abandoned. Privacy is a recent addition to this list. At the other end of the spectrum is the belief that privacy is a mere unimportant interest or preference. This paper defends a middle path between viewing privacy as an inalienable, non-waivable, non-transferrable right and the view of privacy as a mere subjective interest. First, an account of privacy is (...) offered that clarifies the concept and demonstrates how privacy is directly related to human health and well-being. Second, along with considering and rejecting several accounts for why privacy might be considered an inalienable right, an argument is offered for why it is morally permissible to waive, transfer, abandon, or alienate privacy. (shrink)

Is territorial jurisdiction over natural resources justified? This paper argues that a freedom-based account of self-determination coupled with ‘functionalist’ justifications of territorial right support territorial jurisdiction over natural resources. This justification simultaneously gives rise to limits on the permissible exercise of the right: the principles of reciprocity and generality, and of equal freedom. This ‘reciprocal’ view on territorial jurisdiction over natural resources, defended here, differs from two alternatives: the traditional sovereignty view on the one hand and the transnational jurisdiction view—which (...) favours the transfer of sovereignty over natural resources from states to transnational institutions—on the other hand. (shrink)

In March of 2014 Nature Publishing Group, responsible for the publication of journals such as Nature and ScientificAmerican, was subject to criticism for its requirement that contributing authors waive their moral rights in relation to their published articles. Some of the rights included under the umbrella term ‘moral rights’ are the right to have any copies of one’s work reproduced accurately and without alteration; the right to the accurate attribution of one’s work under one’s own name; and (...) the right not to have the work of others falsely attributed to oneself. The Nature Publishing case, from the criticism it sparked to the group’s own response, highlights a category error that occurs when moral rights are conceived of as property rights. Rather, moral rights are natural, non-proprietary rights. In correcting this category error it becomes evident that moral rights offences are not property offences, such as theft, but fraud offences—like plagiarism and forgery. Subsequently, whereas property rights, by definition, are able to be transferred or waived, it can be shown that no justification can be made for treating moral rights as transferrable or able to be waived. (shrink)

Western attempts to obtain Chinese compliance with intellectual property rights have a long history of failure. Most discussions of the problem focus on either legal comparisons or explanations arising from levels of economic development (based primarily on the example of U.S. disregard for such rights during the 18th and 19th centuries). After decades of heated negotiation, intellectual property rights is still one of the major issues of misunderstanding between the West and the various Chinese political entities. This (...) paper examines the sources of this problem from the standpoint of traditional Chinese social and political philosophy (specifically Neo-Confucianism). It points out that the basic assumptions about the nature of intellectual property, which arose during the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe, are fundamentally at odds with the traditional Chinese view of the role of intellectuals in society. It suggests that policies which do not take these differences into account, but which attempt to transfer Western legal concepts without the underlying social constructs are responsible for much of the lack of success in the area of intellectual property rights. (shrink)

Conditional cash transfers represent an innovation in social assistance policy by conditioning welfare benefits on recipients’ behaviors associated with human capital development. Although social assistance has expanded throughout the developing world in the 21st century, the political logic guiding CCT adoption differs sharply from that of unconditional cash transfers, and from the politics of social insurance development. Striking spatial and temporal correlations in their adoption also raise the specter of policy interdependence. A dynamic logit analysis of social assistance reforms in (...) developing nations from 1990 to 2011 reveals that although CCTs have been impelled by democratization in developing countries, the model is not embraced systematically by the left or the right of the political spectrum. Rather, CCTs are more likely to be adopted in contexts of divided government and where regional neighbors, and more democratic countries in the region, have previously adopted them. (shrink)

The current statist order assumes that states have a right to make rules involving the transfer and/or extraction of natural resources within the territory. Cosmopolitan theories of global justice have questioned whether the state is justified in its control over natural resources, typically by pointing out that having resources is a matter of good luck, and this unfairness should be addressed. This paper argues that self-determination does generate a right over resources, which others should not interfere with. It does not (...) entail, however, that there is no obligation on rich countries to redistribute to poor countries. Indeed, in some rare instances, it might be necessary for a particular political community to use its resources, but the presumption is that the collectively self-determining group should have the right to decide that. (shrink)

Most treatments of territorial rights include a discussion (and rejection) of Locke. There is a remarkable consensus about what Locke’s views were. For him, states obtain territorial rights as the result of partial transfers of people’s property rights. In this article, I reject this reading. I argue that (a) for Locke, transfers of property rights were neither necessary nor sufficient for territorial rights and that (b) Locke in fact held a two-part theory of territorial (...) class='Hi'>rights. I support this reading by appealing to textual and contextual evidence. I conclude by drawing a lesson from Locke’s views for current debates on territorial rights. (shrink)

Translator's Abstract: The right to have rights was never a right to be had. Hannah Arendt's famous formulation of the most elementary right of all, the right to participate in the definition of rights, is not a description of a given right that belongs to one or the other form of law, but an indictment of a deficit in the construction of legality on the basis of the right to withdraw legal protection from members of a community, and (...) therefore to refuse rights. The one and only human right thus turns out to be ungrounded in anything but the idea of its being had: a " property right " that traces back to the legal, philosophical and linguistic definitions of " one's own " since antiquity. Only the gift of the incalculable and of that which cannot possibly be legitimated can ground the autarchic self-relation of having: ungrounded in the rationally organized nature of any given, possessing the right to membership in a political community turns out to be permission to freely transfer this possession to another, without expectation of a return. (shrink)

Giulia Cavaliere and César Palacios-González argue that lesbian couples should have access to human nuclear genome transfer so that both members of the couple can have a genetic link to the child they intend to parent. Their argument is grounded in an appeal to reproductive freedom. In this Response, I address a number of concerns with their argument. These concerns relate to nomenclature, treating like cases alike, genetic-relatedness and the limits of reproductive rights. On this last point, I insist (...) that we should not mistake ‘wants’ for ‘needs’ or ‘rights’. I maintain that there is no right to biological parenthood, there is no compelling need for human nuclear genome transfer to satisfy a so-called need for genetically-related children, and we ought not to pander to an acquired desire for genetic filiation. (shrink)