There are strong moral reasons to acknowledge that third parties can have the standing to forgive. Third-party refusals to forgive can reinforce the moral agency and value of women and disrupt the gendering of forgiveness. Third-party forgiveness can also be crucial for restorative justice aims, like recognizing the value of wrongdoers. Lastly, many victim-only accounts of forgiveness are problematic and utilize an individualistic conception of the self that reinforces the logic of misogyny. (...) Victim-only accounts of forgiveness can also restrict focus to the victim's suffering, thereby neglecting the importance of healing and the relevance of third-party forgiveness for facilitating healing. (shrink)

This paper challenges a common dogma of the literature on forgiveness: that only victims have the standing to forgive. Attacks on third-party forgiveness generally come in two forms. One form of attack suggests that it follows from the nature of forgiveness that third-party forgiveness is impossible. Another form of attack suggests that although third-party forgiveness is possible, it is always improper or morally inappropriate for third parties to forgive. (...) I argue against both of these claims; third-party forgiveness is possible, and in some cases it is morally appropriate for third parties to forgive (or refuse to forgive) wrongdoers for wrongs done to victims. I also propose an explanation of third parties’ standing to forgive: third parties have the standing to forgive when it is appropriate for them to take wrongs done to victims ‘personally’. While appropriately ‘taking a wrong personally’ does not require seeing oneself as a victim, it typically does require being in some form of personal relationship with victims. Thus, while the standing to forgive is not grounded exclusively in having been wronged, the prerogative to forgive is normally limited to victims and their loved ones. And once we recognize the importance of third-party forgiveness in our moral lives and the norms that govern it, we can more easily adjudicate between competing accounts of the nature of forgiveness.​. (shrink)

In this paper, I take issue with the widespread philosophical consensus that only victims of wrongdoing are in a position to forgive it. I offer both a defense and a philosophical account of third-party forgiveness. I argue that when we deny this possibility, we misconstrue the complex, relational nature of wrongdoing and its harms. We also risk over-moralizing the victim's position and overlooking the roles played by secondary participants. I develop an account of third-party (...) class='Hi'>forgiveness that both demonstrates how successful, morally legitimate, acts of third-party forgiveness are possible and simultaneously highlights the particular moral risks that would-be third-party forgivers face. I conclude insofar as they are appropriately grounded and cautiously bestowed, at least some acts of third-party forgiveness contribute significantly to post-conflict repair. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third-party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third-party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb (...) severe and inescapable costs of distinctive kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive. (shrink)

When A wrongs B while C observes, or when B tells C afterward, C might apologize. This could seem to be an imprecise or merely metaphorical use of the word ‘apology’ to refer to an expression of sympathy. But this short paper explains how third-party apologies function as apologies (they restore respect to B, the victim, that was undermined by the wrongdoer A); it explains why such an apology could be morally necessary on C's part; and it provides (...) a preliminary account of the components of a third-party apology. (shrink)

The categorical denial of third-party forgiveness represents an overly individualistic approach to moral repair. Such an approach fails to acknowledge the important roles played by witnesses, bystanders, beneficiaries, and others who stand in solidarity to the primary victim and perpetrator. In this paper, I argue that the prerogative to forgive or withhold forgiveness is not universal, but neither is it restricted to victims alone. Not only can we make moral sense of some third-party acts (...) and utterances of the form, “I can or cannot forgive…” but also, we ought to recognize them as legitimate instances of third party forgiveness. Concern for the primary victim’s autonomy tends to exaggerate a need for moral deference, while ignoring how others are called upon to support and mediate for victims of violence and oppression. I advocate a cautious extension of the victim’s prerogative to forgive, one that grounds forgiveness in a double relation of sympathetic identification and attentive care. Following Jean Harvey’s recent work, I call this relationship moral solidarity. Furthermore, I argue, there are important moral and political reasons to acknowledge third party forgiveness; these reasons are particularly evident in contexts of oppression. In fact, third party refusals to forgive may have particular moral significance. In situations of abuse, oppression and damaged self-respect, third party refusals may protect the agency of victims who too easily forgive. (shrink)

In this monograph, I offer feminist reasons to develop a multidimensional account of forgiveness as a moral, and therefore at least partially deliberative, action or set of actions, which functions as a remedy in responding to blame or condemnation, releasing offenders from the fullness of their blameworthiness, in relational contexts which therefore require considerations of power between relata. I rely on feminist philosophical account of the relational self in order to contextualise these power relations. I provide accounts of (...) class='Hi'>forgiveness as a performative utterance, third-party forgiveness, and self-forgiveness based upon this feminist and multidimensional model of forgiveness. (shrink)

This chapter reviews and evaluates the most common strategies for defending the view that, whatever other reasons might support forgiving in a particular case, forgiveness is defective when the person purporting to forgive lacks standing. Various arguments in favor of limiting standing are used in order to clarify what standing might be. In the end, I endorse an interpretation of standing as the possession of a normative power, which allows for the possibility of third-party forgiveness in (...) some circumstances. (shrink)

Forgiveness has traditionally been characterized an affective response to a wrongdoing, i.e. a psychological process that involves ridding oneself of resentment or other negative reactive attitudes. In contrast to the prevailing model, this paper advocates for the emerging position that forgiveness should be understood as a normative power akin to a promise. In particular, I argue that forgiveness involves surrendering the right to discount the interests of a perpetrator (a special permission the victim acquires in virtue of (...) having been wronged). I argue that this model fits and/or explains important features of forgiveness, such as the idea that forgiveness is a personal response to a blameworthy wrong, that forgiveness re-establishes a relation of equality, and that forgiveness is ‘normatively significant’. I further develop the position by showing how it can provide a unified case of paradigmatic forgiveness, self-forgiveness, and third-party forgiveness—this explanatory power distinguishes the view from previous articulations of the idea that forgiveness is a normative power. The final section further explores these distinctions by delimiting the scope of forgiveness to exclude powers related to apologies, compensation, or ‘redemption’. (shrink)

This dissertation is a philosophical investigation of forgiveness, in both interpersonal and political contexts. The aim of the dissertation is to demonstrate the merits of a broad, multidimensional account that remains faithful to the moral phenomenology of forgiving and being forgiven. Previous philosophical work has tended to see forgiveness primarily in terms of reactive attitudes: specifically, the struggle to overcome resentment. Yet defining forgiveness along these lines fails to do justice to common intuitions that, for example, (...) class='Hi'>forgiveness may be a gift offered to another, that it may be the remission of a debt or burden, or that it may 'wipe clean' a stain. Against standard philosophical models that limit its nature to a single dimension, the multidimensional model acknowledges its affective, cognitive and socially performative aspects. -/- My investigation begins by considering characteristic features of forgiveness, the reasons we have to forgive, and its potential moral value. In my preliminary chapters, I present my case against narrow theories of forgiveness, particularly those that define it in terms of attitude alone. In Chapter Three, I situate forgiveness in the context of moral considerations, by analyzing its relationship to other important moral values (trust, compassion, and moral sensitivity) and by defending an account of elective forgiveness. My fourth chapter turns from the act of forgiving to the limits of forgiveness. I discuss forgiveness of hostile or absent wrongdoers, forgiveness of injuries to other people ('third party forgiveness'), and the 'unforgivable.' Some philosophical discussions of the unforgivable have confused what is conceptually unforgivable with what is morally or even empirically unforgivable. By disentangling these threads, I argue that there are, in principle at least, no moral limits on what we may forgive. My concluding chapter applies the multidimensional model of forgiveness to recent discussions of the topic in political philosophy. I argue that the multidimensional model can meaningfully connect a range of forgiving practices in a political context, from transitional justice to interpersonal reconciliation. (shrink)

Philosophical discussion of forgiveness has mainly focused on cases in which victims and offenders are known to each other. But it commonly happens that a victim brings an offender under a definite description but does not know to which individual this applies. I explore some of the conceptual and moral issues raised by the phenomenon of forgiveness in circumstances in which identification is incomplete, tentative or even mistaken. Among the conclusions reached are that correct and precise identification of (...) the offending individual is not essential for forgiveness to take place; that an offender can, under certain strict conditions, be said to be forgiven by proxy where the victim has misidentified the offender and ‘forgiven’ the wrong person; and that proxy forgiveness of this sort is not subject to the objections commonly levelled against ‘proxy’ or ‘third-party forgiveness.’. (shrink)

In the philosophical literature on forgiveness it is almost universally assumed that only the victim of a wrong has the standing to forgive. This paper challenges that assumption and argues for the possibility of meaningful second- and third-party forgiveness.

The chapter explores the symmetry thesis, which holds that departures from or variations on the paradigms of forgiveness and gratitude are conceptually and evaluatively symmetrical or parallel: where one makes sense and is praiseworthy, the other should be too. So if third-party forgiveness makes sense, so too should third-party gratitude; if propositional gratitude makes sense, so too should propositional forgiveness; if self-gratitude makes sense, so too should self-forgiveness. The symmetry thesis fares reasonably (...) well, initially; both third- party forgiveness and third-party gratitude turn on the quasi-legal notion of standing, and thus rise or fall together; though propositional forgiveness seems at first not even coherent, I argue that it is as coherent and appropriate as its counterpart, propositional gratitude. The symmetry thesis falters, however, at self-forgiveness and self-gratitude, since the former but not the latter is conceptually problematic because of doubts that one can wrong oneself, strictly speaking. (shrink)

When a wrongdoing occurs, victims, barring special circumstance, can aptly forgive their wrongdoers, receive apologies, and be paid reparations. It is also uncontroversial, in the usual circumstances, that wronged parties can aptly blame their wrongdoer. But controversy arises when we consider blame from third-parties after the victim has forgiven. At times it seems that wronged parties can make blame inapt through forgiveness. If third parties blame anyway, it often appears the victim is justified in protesting. “But I (...) forgave him!” In other cases, however, forgiveness seems irrelevant: B can forgive A, but it can still seem that third parties can aptly blame A for the wrong against B. This perplexity adds a dimension to ongoing discussion regarding criteria for apt blame and the related issues of standing and fittingness. This paper explores the status of third party blame after forgiveness. I argue that while post forgiveness blame is often inapt, in many other cases forgiveness is irrelevant. This difference is explained by appeal to the various relationships third parties might have to wronged parties, and how these differences affect the ways we blame and thereby blame’s aptness. (shrink)

This essay argues that the theory of forgiveness that Jean Hampton presents in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY has been misunderstood and undervalued. By placing the impersonal reactive attitudes at the center of her account of forgiveness, Hampton offers a valuable alternative to the standard view.

This volume considers challenges to forgiveness in the most difficult circumstances, such as in criminal justice contexts, when the victim is dead or when bystanders disagree, and when anger and resentment seem preferable and important. Contributing philosophers include Myisha Cherry, Jonathan Jacobs, Barrett Emerick, Alice MacLachlan, David McNaughton and Eve Garrard. Contributing psychologists include Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Robert D. Enright and Mary Jacqueline Song, C. Ward Struthers, Joshua Guilfoyle, Careen Khoury, Elizabeth van Monsjou, Joni Sasaki, Curtis Phills, Rebecca Young, and (...) Zdravko Marjanovic. (shrink)

Volume II of Vernon Press’s series on the Philosophy of Forgiveness offers several challenging and provocative chapters that seek to push the conversation in new directions and dimensions. Volume I, Explorations of Forgiveness: Personal, Relational, and Religious, began the task of creating a consistent multi-dimensional account of forgiveness, and Volume II’s New Dimensions of Forgiveness continues this goal by presenting a set of chapters that delve into several deep conceptual and metaphysical features of forgiveness. New (...) Dimensions of Forgiveness creates a theoretical framework for understanding the many nuanced features of forgiveness, namely, third-party forgiveness, forgiveness as an aesthetic process, the role of resentment in warranting forgiveness, the moral status of self-forgiveness, epistemic trust, forgiveness’s influence on the moral status of persons, forgiveness in time, the status of Substance and Subject within a Hegelian framework, Jacques Derrida’s “impossible” forgiveness, and the use of imaginative “magic” to become a maximal forgiver. Readers will be challenged to question and come to terms with many oft-overlooked, yet important philosophical dimensions of forgiveness. (shrink)

According to standard philosophical analyses, only victims can forgive. There are good reasons to reject this view. After all, people who are neither direct nor indirect victims of a wrong frequently feel moral anger over injustice. The choice to foreswear or overcome such moral anger is subject to most of the same sorts of considerations as victims’ choices to forgive. Furthermore, bystanders’ reactions to their experiences of moral anger often reflect either virtues or vices that are of a piece with (...) what we normally describe as a forgiving or unforgiving disposition. In this paper, I reject the view that only victims can forgive by comparing the experience and regulation of moral anger by victims and bystanders. The virtues of victims and bystanders with regard to moral anger are so similar that there is no good reason to apply different labels. However, the recognition of forgiveness in bystanders offers us more than simple consistency. It also leads us to think about the role moral bystanders play in the maintenance of the moral community, as well as the ways in which this role can be abused or overstepped. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that a feminist and multidimensional account of forgiveness must take seriously our everyday experience with forgiving, and the nature of the power relationship in which forgiver and forgiven stand. According to my model, forgiveness is a moral act with at least two dimensions, namely the choice to take up, or take seriously, a new attitude toward one's wrongdoer for moral reasons and the performative utterance to the wrongdoer of one's making this choice. It (...) is my position that and are distinct, that either can be discussed as a discreet occasion of forgiveness separately from the other, and the ethical recommendations regarding one of these dimensions can be discussed apart from ethical recommendations regarding the other. ;Mainstream accounts of forgiveness inadequately consider that forgiveness inevitably involves one's relationship with another, and that women and men have disparate experience with forgiveness in their often unequal relations. I argue for a feminist framework which holds we are constituted by our relations , and attends to women's experience with this traditionally feminine virtue. I argue that the statement, "I forgive you," is itself an instance of forgiveness; it is what J. L. Austin calls a performative utterance because more than reporting, truly or falsely, how one feels, saying "I forgive you" performs an act that sets something new in motion, and changes the relation between wrongdoer and victim. I argue for the logical possibility of third-party forgiveness , by which I mean the act of forgiving a wrongdoer for wrongs done to someone other than the forgiving agent. Although 3PF is not a substitute for the forgiveness of victims, it plays an important role in our relationships with the wrongdoers of those with whom we identify. I conclude that both third-party and group forgiveness, like the forgiveness of victims, can be ethically problematic but powerful moral acts. (shrink)

We are often pressed to forgive or in need of forgiveness: Wrongdoing is common. Even after a perpetrator has been taken to court and punished, forgiveness still has a role to play. How should a victim and a perpetrator relate to each other outside the courtroom, and how should others relate to them? Communicating about forgiveness is particularly urgent in cases of civil war and crimes against humanity inside a community where, if there were no forgiveness, (...) the community would fall apart. Forgiveness is governed by social and, in particular, by moral norms. Do those who ask to be forgiven have to fulfil certain conditions for being granted forgiveness? And what does the granting of forgiveness consist in? We may feel like refusing to forgive those perpetrators who have committed the most horrendous crimes. But is such a refusal justified even if they repent their crimes? Could there be a duty for the victim to forgive? Can forgiveness be granted by a third party? Under which conditions may we forgive ourselves? The papers collected in the present volume address all these questions, exploring the practice of forgiveness and its normative constraints. Topics include the ancient Chinese and the Christian traditions of forgiveness, the impact of forgiveness on the moral dignity and self-respect of the victim, self-forgiveness, the narrative of forgiveness as well as the limits of forgiveness. Such limits may arise from the personal, historical, or political conditions of wrongdoing or from the emotional constraints of the victims. (shrink)

Using forgiveness theory, we investigated the effects of organizational apology and restitution on eliciting forgiveness of a transgressing organization after transactional psychological contract breach. Forgiveness theory proposes that victims are more likely to forgive offenders when victims’ positive offender-oriented emotions replace negative ones. Three pre-post laboratory experiments, using vignettes about a broken promise of financial aid, found that while apology-alone and restitution-alone each increased likelihood of forgiving, restitution-alone was the more effective of the two responses. When combined (...) with an apology, restitution boosted the effect of apology-alone. However, restitution was unnecessary if positive emotions replaced negative ones; third-party blame accomplished this negative-to-positive emotion replacement. Consistent with forgiveness theory, offender-oriented negative-to-positive emotion replacement partially mediated all effects, and negative emotion reductions were strongly correlated with positive emotion gains. We discuss implications for the repair of damaged norms and relationships within an organizational community. These include reparative effects of apology and restitution, dual-process conceptions of violation and repair, repair after psychological contract breach, and emotion replacement models of forgiveness. (shrink)

Forgiveness and mercy are both generous responses to wrongdoing. Forgiveness is a personal reaction to wrongful harm. It can be expressed in emotional, verbal, or relational terms, and it can potentially express a number of important moral values. Controversial topics with regard to forgiveness include the possibility of unforgivable actions and of third-party, self, and group forgiveness. Recent political developments have invited philosophical reflection on public forgiveness. Mercy is usually theorized in relation to (...) punishment, and it is understood to provide the basis for more lenient treatment than that demanded by justice, interpreted strictly. It remains controversial as to whether mercy should be understood apart from justice or incorporated within it. (shrink)

The philosophical literature on the standing to forgive is divided. The majority view holds that only victims have the standing to forgive (Murphy and Hampton 1988, Owens 2012, Zaragoza 2012, Walker 2013), while recent contributions challenge the majority view and argue that third parties also have the standing to forgive (MacLachlan 2008, Norlock 2009, Pettigrove 2009, Chaplin 2019). This chapter defends the victim’s unique standing to forgive by way of a specific account of the nature of forgiveness. The (...) standard account of forgiveness says that forgiveness is the overcoming of resentment for the right reasons. The standard account can explain how forgiveness differs from similar responses, like excusing and condoning, but falls short of explaining how forgiveness can be a voluntary action. A satisfactory account of forgiveness should be able to explain how forgiveness can be separate from excusing and condoning, as well as how forgiveness can be voluntary. To account for all the desiderata, this chapter suggests an account of forgiveness that depends on the wrongdoer’s repentance and the victim’s decision to absorb the cost of the wrongdoing. On this account, forgiveness is necessarily the prerogative of the victim. (shrink)

Using forgiveness theory, we investigated the effects of organizational apology and restitution on eliciting forgiveness of a transgressing organization after transactional psychological contract breach. Forgiveness theory proposes that victims are more likely to forgive offenders when victims’ positive offender-oriented emotions replace negative ones. Three pre-post laboratory experiments, using vignettes about a broken promise of financial aid, found that while apology-alone and restitution-alone each increased likelihood of forgiving, restitution-alone was the more effective of the two responses. When combined (...) with an apology, restitution boosted the effect of apology-alone. However, restitution was unnecessary if positive emotions replaced negative ones; third-party blame accomplished this negative-to-positive emotion replacement. Consistent with forgiveness theory, offender-oriented negative-to-positive emotion replacement partially mediated all effects, and negative emotion reductions were strongly correlated with positive emotion gains. We discuss implications for the repair of damaged norms and relationships within an organizational community. These include reparative effects of apology and restitution, dual-process conceptions of violation and repair, repair after psychological contract breach, and emotion replacement models of forgiveness. (shrink)

We are often encouraged to forgive those who have wronged us. Before we can decide whether this is what we ought to do, we had better figure out what forgiveness amounts to. This article surveys recent philosophical disagreements over the nature of forgiveness. Is it only victims who can forgive the wrongs that were done to them, or can third parties also forgive? Is it possible to forgive yourself? When you forgive, what is that you are forgiving? (...) Do you forgive morally wrong actions, or do you forgive wrongdoers? Can you forgive things that were not actually morally wrong? How do you forgive? Do you forgive by having a change of heart towards the perpetrator, by losing your anger and resentment? Or do you forgive by changing the way you treat the wrongdoer, by withholding punishment, or by achieving reconciliation? Or do you forgive by declaring “I forgive you” to the wrongdoer? (shrink)

After a transgression has occurred within an organization, a primary concern is the reintegration of the affected parties back into the organizational community. However, beyond offenders and victims, reintegration depends on the views of organizational peers and their desire to interact with these parties. In two studies, we demonstrated that offender amends and victim forgiveness interact to predict peer reintegrative outcomes. We found evidence of backlash against unforgiving victims: Peers wanted to work the least with victims who rejected appropriate (...) amends, thus penalizing them for their failure to contribute to the restoration process. This backlash effect was due to decreased liking of the victim and the perceived failure to repair the offender-victim relationship. These findings demonstrate that peers expect both offenders and victims to do their part to achieve reconciliation following transgression, and both may suffer the consequences of failing to meet peer expectations. Implications for reintegration within organizations are discussed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:After a transgression has occurred within an organization, a primary concern is the reintegration of the affected parties (namely offenders and victims) back into the organizational community. However, beyond offenders and victims, reintegration depends on the views of organizational peers and their desire to interact with these parties. In two studies, we demonstrated that offender amends and victim forgiveness interact to predict peer reintegrative outcomes. We found evidence of backlash against unforgiving victims: Peers wanted to work the least with (...) victims who rejected appropriate amends, thus penalizing them for their failure to contribute to the restoration process. This backlash effect was due to decreased liking of the victim and the perceived failure to repair the offender-victim relationship. These findings demonstrate that peers expect both offenders and victims to do their part to achieve reconciliation following transgression, and both may suffer the consequences of failing to meet peer expectations. Implications for reintegration within organizations are discussed. (shrink)

This chapter reflects on public apologies as means of moral repair by considering the various roles the public might play in these moral dramas. Audiences to public apologies include people who are related to the transgression in different ways. This chapter focuses on those parties in front of whom public apologies are intentionally performed but who are neither victims nor wrongdoers. Do such third parties add something of value to the apology? If so, how? How might they play their (...) role well? Under what circumstances might they forgive? How might things go poorly? This chapter argues that public apologies face a problem of “mission creep.”. (shrink)

While prior ecolabel research suggests that consumers’ trust of ecolabel sponsors is associated with their purchase of ecolabeled products, we know little about how third-party certification might relate to consumer purchases when trust varies. Drawing on cognitive theory and a stratified random sample of more than 1200 consumers, we assess how third-party certification relates to consumers’ use of ecolabels across different program sponsors. We find that consumers’ trust of government and environmental NGOs to provide credible environmental (...) information encourages consumers’ use of ecolabels sponsored by these entities, and consumers do not differentiate between certified versus uncertified ecolabels in the presence of trust. By contrast, consumers’ distrust of private business to provide credible environmental information discourages their use of business association-sponsored ecolabels. However, these ecolabels may be able to overcome consumer distrust if their sponsors certify the ecolabels using third-party auditors. These findings are important to sponsors who wish develop ecolabels that are more credible to consumers, and thus encourage more widespread ecolabel use. (shrink)

This paper explores the theoretical basis of the third party’s duty of justice as to grave human rights violations, presenting role obligations as the best complement to the literature. It begins with discussions on agents of justice in duty-based theories, notably O’Neill’s account on global justice, and rights-based theories, which are both included in the institution-centred perspective. I claim that these studies have failed to consider an individual duty bearer’s motive, autonomous reasoning and integrity in relation to justice, (...) all of which constitute serious lacunae for the effective accomplishment of responsibility. To supplement, I introduce the distinction between responsibility and commitment, and acknowledge that combining the two is the desirable condition for recognising the duty of justice. Finally, I argue that the role obligations undertaken through personal acceptance of an institution-based role or a commitment-based role related to human rights norms adequately explain third parties’ duty to protect others from serious harm. (shrink)

The challenges of dealing with disclosure of HIV status cause frustration to health care providers and counselors. This frustration follows from the already known high risk to the third party on one hand and our ethical obligation to “respect persons” in terms of privacy and confidentiality on the other side. Given the stubbornly low rates of voluntary disclosure (partner notification) among couples, however, it is quite tempting to suggest a paradigm of routine third party disclosure to (...) identifiable sexual partners by health care providers. This might be the lesser of the two evils and might give better public health outcomes in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa. (shrink)

The risks to groups posed by research involving human beings—including genetics research—should be conceived of as a species of third-party risks. The important task of protecting third parties from the risks posed by the conduct and the findings of research should not be assigned to IRBs because they are not designed or equipped to handle such a broad responsibility. The serious problems raised by third-party risks require an integration of policy-making and regulation that is beyond (...) the scope and competence of IRBs. (shrink)

In their report in this supplement on research regulatory systems, Barbara Bierer and Mark Barnes note that, when research misconduct has been detected but not yet proven, the individual with institutional responsibility for oversight of research misconduct investigations “may determine that notification of relevant journals or professional societies and correction or full retraction of implicated papers or presentations is appropriate. In those cases, even when a finding of research misconduct per se has not been made or has not been explicitly (...) stated, the journal, professional society, and their readers or members may draw their own conclusions as to what led to the retraction or correction.” This statement highlights an aspect of the reviewed regulatory schemes that creates vulnerability for institutions of higher education subject to the regulations: while, as the authors suggest, it may be “appropriate” to notify third parties (that is, journals, professional societies, and other academic institutions) of suspected research misconduct, there is no regulatory obligation to provide such a notification, and, in fact, providing early (or any) notification is contrary to the confidentiality provisions of the research misconduct regulations. Moreover, the institution—and individuals acting on behalf of the institution—may face legal exposure for notifying outside entities. (shrink)

Utility of third party funding is an undeniable fact, especially where a party is under financial strain, yet its increased usage in private arbitration has given rise to a number of substantive and procedural issues. In view of this, the present paper attempts to map the growing utility or otherwise of the mechanism of third party funding, and analyses its various nuances and legal sustainability within the framework of international arbitration. Further, an attempt is made (...) to analyse the ways and means of ameliorating the utility of third party funding and for enhancing its acceptance in the global arbitration community. (shrink)

Third-party fairness maintenance could win some reputational benefits, and it includes two methods: punishment and compensation. We predicted that the third parties' preference between punishment and compensation are affected by whether they are free to choose between the two methods, and the affection could be interpreted through reputational benefits. The present study includes two sections. In Study 1, the participants acted as fourth parties who were asked to rate the reputations of the third parties who had (...) chosen different response methods to an unfair result of the dictator game. The results showed that there was no reputational difference between the two methods when third parties were not free to choose, but the reputation of compensation was better when third parties were free to choose. In Study 2, the participants acted as third parties. The participants were asked to choose a method to respond to an unfair result of the dictator game. There were two reputational contexts: secret and open. The results showed that when third parties were not free to choose, they had no preference between the two methods under the two reputational contexts, but when third parties were free to choose freely, they prefer punishment under the secret context but prefer compensation under the open context. This study systematically reveals a reputational interaction between fourth and third parties, and verifies the affection of reputational benefits on the third parties' preference between punishment and compensation. (shrink)

We present a vignette study conducted with a quota sample of the German population (n = 400). Subjects had to redistribute a good between two hypothetical persons who contributed equally to the available amount but differed in quantity needed and the reason for their neediness. On a within-subjects level, we tested for the effects of need, accountability, and resource availability on their third-party distribution decisions. Between subjects, we further varied the kinds of needs: The persons either needed the (...) good as a means to survive, to live a decent life, to participate in society, or to be autonomous. Despite equal productivity, the mean share allocated to the needier person was significantly higher than an equal share. However, this share turned out significantly smaller when the needier person was accountable for needing more than the other. Nonetheless, even if accountable, the needier person still got a share larger than their contribution would suggest. When there was a surplus of resources, the needier person got an even higher share than when resources were scarce. (shrink)

This paper discusses the relation between communication and preservation of social norms guarded by third-party sanctions. In 2001 Jonathan Bendor and Piotr Swistak derived deductively the existence of such norms from a simple boundedly rational choice model. Their analysis was based on a perfect public information case. We take into account communication and analyse at the micro level the process of production and interpretation of information on which decisions are based. We show that when information is fully private (...) and we allow for communication a state of anomie can result. If some social control mechanisms are available, social stability can be maintained. The less efficient the social control mechanisms however, the more restrictive rules will be needed to sustain the social norms. Furthermore not all cognitive strategies for interpreting received messages are equally effective. Strategies based on reputation are better than strategies based on profit analysis. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on how third parties impact the course of acts of revenge based on their world views, such as belief in a just world. Assuming this belief to be true, the following questions could be asked: (a) What are the consequences of a third party's worldview in terms of secondary victimization? (b) Are bystanders actually aware of these consequences? (c) If so, then why do they let it happens?

The lead article in the Hastings Center Report's November‐December 2020 issue reconsiders the rationale for requiring that patients have a prescription from a physician to obtain a drug. Madison Kilbride, Steve Joffe, and Holly Fernandez Lynch conclude that growing respect for patient autonomy should lead to a new default for drug access: drugs should be available over the counter unless there are special concerns about harms to third parties or about patients' ability to make decisions for themselves. This conclusion (...) would be a substantial reorientation of drug policy in the United States. Bioethics at a societal level is a theme in the second article, “The Social Risks of Science,” and throughout the issue. (shrink)

: Four principal arguments have been offered in support of requiring public and private third-party payers to help fund medical research: (1) many of the costs associated with clinical trial participation are for routine care that would be reimbursed if delivered outside of a trial; (2) there is a need to promote scientific research and medical progress and lack of coverage is an impediment to enrollment; (3) to cover the costs of trials expands health care and treatment options (...) for the sick; and (4) it is beneficial for private insurers to cover the costs associated with cancer clinical trials because doing so makes such companies more attractive to consumers. Although many see third-party-payer coverage as a victory for patients and for the future of research, requiring coverage of services provided in a trial beyond those that would be provided to a comparable patient outside the research context raises a number of concerns. (shrink)

The scene takes place in O'Higgins Park, in Santiago, Chile, on 1 October 1995. Some women have just taken their place on the stage and the enthusiastic audience is applauding, the women have started singing accompanied by a guitar, but they cannot be heard, for the audience is still applauding. One of the women gets up. Like the others, she is wearing a white blouse and a long black skirt, she is old and her hair is grey. She moves to (...) the front of the stage, chooses her place and stops, her eyes search the horizon but do not wander aimlessly, her eyes are fixed somewhere between the here and the hereafter. When she finds what she is looking for, she raises her right hand to wave a white handkerchief, and the dance begins. The audience, suddenly attentive, watches. And what do they see? Not the woman alone on the stage, but the empty space which she traces. The empty space disturbs us, as Chilean spectators, because the cueca, the national folklore dance, is danced by two people, or it is not danced at all. The invisible other is invoked by this woman's every gesture and we do not smile when faced with the absence of her man because we have a premonition that she is not pretending, we have a premonition that she can see him. The image of women dancing alone has become one of the symbols of the struggle of the families of the disappeared under the dictatorship of General Pinochet. The families are commemorating, on 1 October 1995, the twentieth anniversary of their organization into an association in 1975. The term “the disappeared” has progressively become accepted to indicate the victims of a novel, coercive practice in Chile, since the coup d’état on 11 September 1973. The forced disappearance of people differs from political assassination, as Amnesty International never ceases to indicate in the various reports which it commissions on them. In the Chilean case, this speciality is in part due to the security system which has taken on the responsibility of destroying all organized opposition to the military dictatorship: the DINA, the intelligence service created by the military junta, which is only answerable for its actions to the junta. More fundamentally, the special character of disappearance is due to the invisibility of the victim's body and to the doubt that this invisibility arouses within the victim's family circle: the disappeared is not identified as dead because his death is never certified, on the other hand his sudden and unexplained absence indicates that he is a person in danger and that this danger extends to all those who notice his absence. (shrink)

The present studies investigate how the intentions of third parties influence judgments of moral responsibility for other agents who commit immoral acts. Using cases in which an agent acts under some situational constraint brought about by a third party, we ask whether the agent is blamed less for the immoral act when the third party intended for that act to occur. Study 1 demonstrates that third-party intentions do influence judgments of blame. Study 2 (...) finds that third-party intentions only influence moral judgments when the agent's actions precisely match the third party's intention. Study 3 shows that this effect arises from changes in participants' causal perception that the third party was controlling the agent. Studies 4 and 5, respectively, show that the effect cannot be explained by changes in the distribution of blame or perceived differences in situational constraint faced by the agent. (shrink)

Third-party punishment (TPP) occurs when the perpetrator of a transgression is punished by an individual who is not the victim of the transgression and, therefore, not directly affected by it. As F...

The central importance of reproduction in all human cultures has given rise to many methods and techniques of assisting reproduction or overcoming infertility. Such methods and techniques have achieved spectacular successes in the Western world, where processes like in vitro fertilization (IVF) constitute a remarkable breakthrough. In this paper, the author attempts to reflect critically on assisted reproduction technologies (ART) from the background and perspective of African culture, a culture within which human reproduction is given the highest priority but which (...) also exhibits a highly ambivalent attitude to modern technology-assisted methods of reproduction. The author considers the ethical crux of reproductive technologies to be linked to the issue of the moral status of the human embryo and argues that a morally significant line of demarcation cannot be drawn between embryos and other categories of humans. (shrink)