David Armstrong's book is a contribution to the philosophical discussion about possible worlds. Taking Wittgenstein's Tractatus as his point of departure, Professor Armstrong argues that nonactual possibilities and possible worlds are recombinations of actually existing elements, and as such are useful fictions. There is an extended criticism of the alternative-possible-worlds approach championed by the American philosopher David Lewis. This major work will be read with interest by a wide range of philosophers.

– The paper defends a naturalistic version of modal actualism according to which what is metaphysically possible is determined by dispositions found in the actual world. We argue that there is just one world—this one—and that all genuine possibilities are anchored by the dispositions exemplified in this world. This is the case regardless of whether or not those dispositions are manifested. As long as the possibility is one that would obtain were the relevant disposition manifested, it is a genuine (...) possibility. Furthermore, by starting from actual dispositional properties and branching out, we are able to include possibilities that are quite far removed from any state of affairs that happens to obtain, while still providing a natural and actual grounding of possibility. Stressing the importance of ontological considerations in any theory of possibility, it is argued that the account of possibility in terms of dispositional properties provides a more palatable ontology than those of its competitors. Coming at it from the other direction, the dispositional account of possibility also provides motivation for taking an ontology of dispositions more seriously. As well as the relevant dispositional notions required to lay out the view, the paper discusses the dispositional realism needed as the basis for the account of possibility. (shrink)

An original contribution to fundamental metaphysics. It offers a theory of possible individuals and possible worlds. It endeavors to show how its theory of possibility is adequate to various philosophical demands, such as those of modal logic. It employs its theory of possibility to clarify and resolve issues concerning such topics as disposition concepts and counterfactual conditionals. And it deals fruitfully with related metaphysical problems, such as essentialism, the doctrine of internal relations, and so on. (...) The theory of possibility, spelled out formally and with considerable detail, is a development of the approach to possibility suggested by Rescher in his earlier book, Conceptual Idealism. (shrink)

본 논문은 라이프니츠의 신학적-형이상학적 가능세계론을 내재적 가능세계론으로 변환시켜 나가기 위한 개념적 기초를 모색한다. 이를 위해 우선 라이프니츠의 가능세계론을 본 논문의 맥락에 맞추어, 특히 (불)공가능성, 특이성의 개념에 초점을 두고서 정리한다. 다음으로 들뢰즈의 타인론을 주축으로 삼아 내재적 가능세계론의 밑그림을 제시한다. 이 이론에서 왜 타인의 개념이 중요한가, 한 주체의 경험-선 개념으로부터 어떻게 상호-현실적인 세계의 구성으로 나아갈 수 있는가에 중점을 두어 서술한다. 마지막으로 내재적 가능세계론이 왜 필연적으로 윤리학적 맥락을 띨 수밖에 없는지, 그리고 내재적 가능세계론의 윤리학이 기존의 네 가지 유형의 윤리학들에 비해 어떤 점에서 근본적인가를 (...) 논증한다. 마지막으로 내재적 가능세계론이 지향하는 윤리학은 타자-되기의 윤리학임을 명시한다. (shrink)

The paper defends a naturalistic version of modal actualism according to which what is metaphysically possible is determined by dispositions found in the actual world. We argue that there is just one world – this one – and that all genuine possibilities are grounded in the dispositions exemplified in it. This is the case whether or not those dispositions are manifested. As long as the possibility is one that would obtain were the relevant disposition manifested, it is a genuine (...) possibility. Furthermore, by starting from actual dispositional properties and branching out, we are able to countenance possibilities quite far removed from any state of affairs that happens to obtain, while still providing a natural and actual grounding of possibility. Stressing the importance of ontological considerations in any theory of possibility, it is argued that the account of possibility in terms of dispositional properties provides a more palatable ontology than those of its competitors. Coming at it from the other direction, the dispositional account of possibility also provides motivation for taking an ontology of dispositions more seriously. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold. It attempts to introduce Arthur Collier to the contemporary reader of philosophy and to reveal some of the unique features of his thought. Part one is devoted to the first purpose and parts two and three to the second. Part three also contains a discussion on two impossibilities in Collier’s system: these are material substance and a centaur. Material substance turns out to be an ill-formed notion and the centaur, at the very least, (...) is not locatable in experience. (shrink)

Return from Exile: A Theory of Possibility challenges the modern understanding of possibility, which dates back to Leibniz and sees possibility as evasion, as irrelevant to the actual world. It offers an alternative account where reality is literally constituted of multiple possibilities.

It is difficult to wander far in contemporary metaphysics without bumping into talk of possible worlds. And, reference to possible worlds is not confined to metaphysics. It can be found in contemporary epistemology and ethics, and has even made its way into linguistics and decision theory. What are those possible worlds, the entities to which theorists in these disciplines all appeal? Some have hoped that a theory of possible worlds can be used to reduce modality to non-modal terms. (...) This paper sets reductive theories aside, and articulates and applies a framework for evaluating non-reductive theories of possible worlds. I argue that, if we abjure reduction, we should aim for a theory of possible worlds that is user-friendly. I then outline four leading contemporary theories and consider objections to each. My conclusions are negative: every theory we discuss fails to be user-friendly in some significant respect. (shrink)

최근 그 어떤 비결과주의 의무론도 결과주의로 변형시킬 수 있다는 주장이 논의된다. 비결과주의의 의무론적 속성들이 구현되는 사태 혹은 그것을 구현하는 행위 자체를 “좋은” 결과로 규정하면 이렇게 확장된 결과의 “좋음”을 통해 애초의 의무론과 동일한 행위 평가를 내리는 결과주의를 구성할 수 있다는 것이다. 논문은 단지 비결과주의 의무론을 결과의 좋음을 위주로 재기술하여 의무 술어의 귀속에서 외연적 동일성을 추구하는 유형과, 비결과주의 의무론적 평가들 중 수용해야 할 것을 선별하여 결과주의 틀 내로 포섭하는 두 유형의 결과주의화 전략을 구분하고 각각이 성공할 수 있는지 검토한다. 이 기획에서 행위자-상대적 의무를 (...) 결과주의화할 수 있는지가 관건이라고 보고 이를 집중적으로 논의한다. 논의 결과는, 만약 행위자-상대적 의무의 독특한 가치를 온전하게 보존하여 의무 술어의 귀속에서 동일성을 확보하면 그것을 종래의 결과주의적 가치와 조화롭게 포섭하고 결과주의의 장점을 유지하는 데 실패할 것이고, 조화로운 포섭을 위해 비결과주의 의무 수행의 가치를 특징적으로 결과주의적인 이익 관련 가치로 변형하면 행위자-상대적 의무의 우선성을 정당화하는 가치론을 제시하지 못하고 의무 술어 귀속의 동일성도 달성하지 못한다는 것이다. 결과주의화 전략은 결국 이론적, 실천적 측면에서 실질적 함의를 산출하는 데 실패한다. (shrink)

Great critical theorists from Marx and Engels to Adorno and Horkheimer not only came from the margins but also stayed faithful to the plight of the marginalized. They refused to compromise about the struggle for equality and tried to universalize its emancipatory essence. From Marx to Benjamin, critical philosophers who showed fidelity to the cause were denied a career in European universities and made impoverished, stateless, and homeless. Marginalization and critical theory are inseparable; yet, today, Marxism is institutionalized, and (...) the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory is gentrified. Critical Theory from the Margins, however, revives the Critical Theory that endorses criticism, aiming to negate dominant regimes of truth. It is unapologetic in its fidelity to the universalist struggles of the minoritized. In that spirit, Saladdin Ahmed shows that capitalism imposes a totalitarian social mode of existence and neoliberalism perpetuates fascism as a class of ideology across nationalist and religious movements. This book, then, is both a theorization and an argument in favor of the application of the episteme of the silenced as the essence of the critical education necessary for achieving universal emancipation. (shrink)

For centuries humans have considered just two main possibilities for what awaits us at death: a “nothingness” like that of our before-life or some type of supernatural afterlife. The theory of a natural afterlife defines a vastly different, real possibility. The natural afterlife embodies all of the sensory perceptions, thoughts, and emotions present in the final moment of a near-death, dreamlike experience. With death this moment becomes timeless and everlasting to the dying person—essentially, a never-ending experience. The relativeness (...) and timelessness of the natural afterlife must be clearly understood to appreciate why it’s not supernatural yet indeed an afterlife and potentially the optimal heaven. The theory of a natural afterlife is now only a hypothesis; however, science, human experience, and logical deduction suggest that it’s extremely plausible and advances in science and technology could someday make it a scientific theory. This paper states the theory, describes the unconventional afterlife it defines, extensively analyzes its validity, and briefly addresses how it can significantly impact how people view death. Analytical tools, typically used for system modeling and language definition, are applied here to present an abstract model of a lifetime within time eternal. The model is used to support and explain the theory. (shrink)

The famous Montesquieu’s catachresis wherein judges should be no more than the “mouth that pronounces the words of the law” is actually facing a crisis. I. e. Law has lost its unifying principle, its centre wherein its practices could search for foundation and legitimacy. Therefore, as a decentered reality, I believe Law should get a poststructuralist approach, appropriate for a decentered structure. That is why the aim of my research is to link Law to the poststructuralist theoretical reference of the (...) theory of discourse, as developed in the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Anyway, as Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical works are concentrated on the ontological level, I need to link their ontological reflections and Law manifestations on ontic level, the level of judicial practices. For that, I will use the support of the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. However, as dworkinian theory is situated in a very different philosophical background, when compared to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse, it will be necessary to rearrange some features of his jurisprudence to make it fits on a different comprehension of Law and its integrity. Especially considering integrity as hegemonic integrity, understanding the principles of justice as promises of justice and substituting judge Hercules for a new mythological character that, instead of searching one right answer in a seamless web, is herself who seams that web: Judge Penelope. (shrink)

In this paper I make some distinctions, which I hope are of help for Laura Valentini and others. Are the recommendations of a theory of what the government should do possible and are they feasible? Is the project of the theorist possibility-sensitive and is the project feasibility-sensitive?

"Wherever possible," said Bertrand Russell, "substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities." Metaphysics in this style is the activity of formulating and applying a calculus. We are to supply a list of primitive ideas, with a specification of the rules for combining them, and a sample of complexes created by combining these simples. Every obscure idea is to be reformulated as the complex deriving from these simples. The values impelling us include economy, clarity, decidability, and fruitfulness.

Armstrong's combinatorialism, in his own words, is the following project: "My central metaphysical hypothesis is that all there is is the world of space and time. It is this world which is to supply the actual elements for the totality of combinations. So what is proposed is a Naturalistic form of a combinatorial theory."2 Armstrong calls his central hypothesis "Naturalism." He intends his well−known theory of universals to satisfy this thesis. He now attempts to give a naturalistic (...) class='Hi'>theory of modality. (shrink)