In this paper, I construe scientific understanding not only as understanding the phenomena by means of some theoretical material (theory, law or model), but more fundamentally as understanding the theoretical material itself that is supposed to explain the phenomena. De Regt and Dieks (2005) emphasise the contextual aspects of the intelligibility of theories, showing that it depends on their "virtues", on the historical standards of intelligibility, and on the particular "skills" of their users. My paper aims at continuing this (...) proposal, first by giving a more precise definition of one's understanding of a theory and then by emphasising the importance, for this issue, of the particular formats in which a theory is expressed and hence grasped by its users. To defend this, I take the example of the versions of classical mechanics (variational versus vectorial) and the various formats of representation of its main principles and models. What does "understanding a theory" mean? At first sight, we could say that it amounts to having a clear view of the logical relations between its core principles and theorems. This kind of understanding, though global, is quite abstract: one can understand the logical structure of a theory without being able to connect it to the phenomena. Moreover, this definition depends on how one 115 construes the structure of theories: it will vary according to whether one defines theories as logical sets of statements with interpretative rules (following the "syntactic conception" of theories) or as families of models ("semantic conception"). I thus suggest that there is another sense of "understanding a theory" that itself has two aspects. To understand a theory, one has to understand both what the theory says or means and how it works; in other words, one has to grasp the phenomena by means of its conceptual apparatus (representational aspect) and to be able to manipulate it and make it fit the phenomena (computational aspect). I claim that these are essentially contextual and practical matters, and that the particular format in which the theoretical content is displayed is crucial to them. Following Humphreys' proposal (2004), I claim that one never accesses to a theory as a whole. Be it a set of statements or a class of models, in practice, it is always displayed in some particular equations, statements, images, graphs, diagrams. Humphreys' proposal of the notion of "template" to complement the classical "units of analysis" of science, like theories and models, may be a good candidate to study the relationship between the representational and computational aspects of understanding: a template is a "concrete piece of syntax" (most of the time an equation, but I suggest that Humphreys' claim could be extended to other formats) that has both a representational and computational function. With the example of classical mechanics, I show how these two functions are interrelated and, as Humphreys suggests, sometimes in tension with each other. Adressing these issues by focusing on the particular formats that are dealt with in practice may enlight this problematic relationship. (shrink)

In this paper I expand Eric Scerri’s notion of Popper’s naturalised approach to reduction in chemistry and investigate what its consequences might be. I will argue that Popper’s naturalised approach to reduction has a number of interesting consequences when applied to the reduction of chemistry to physics. One of them is that it prompts us to look at a ‘bootstrap’ approach to quantum chemistry, which is based on specific quantum theoretical theorems and practical considerations that turn quantum ‘theory’ into (...) quantum ‘chemistry’ proper. This approach allows us to investigate some of the principles that drive theory formation in quantum chemistry. These ‘enabling theorems’ place certain limits on the explanatory latitude enjoyed by quantum chemists, and form a first step into establishing the relationship between chemistry and physics in more detail. (shrink)

The recent history of the domain of literary studies conjures up a Brueghelian picture of prolific growth and deep controversies. The variety of theoretical ...

The contributions in the first part Re-modelling logic of this volume take account of formal logic in the theory of rational argumentation.

Relativity Theory by Albert Einstein has been so far littleconsidered by cognitive scientists, notwithstanding its undisputedscientific and philosophical moment. Unfortunately, we don't have adiary or notebook as cognitively useful as Faraday's. But physicshistorians and philosophers have done a great job that is relevant bothfor the study of the scientist's reasoning and the philosophy ofscience. I will try here to highlight the fertility of a `triangulation'using cognitive psychology, history of science and philosophy of sciencein starting answering a clearly very complex (...) question:why did Einstein discover Relativity Theory? Here we arenot much concerned with the unending question of precisely whatEinstein discovered, that still remains unanswered, for we have noconsensus over the exact nature of the theory's foundations. We are mainly interested in starting to answer the`how question', and especially the following sub-question: what were his goals and strategies in hissearch? I will base my argument on fundamental publications ofEinstein, aiming at pointing out a theory-specific heuristic, settingboth a goal and a strategy: covariance/invariance.The result has significance in theory formation in science, especiallyin concept and model building. It also raises other questions that gobeyond the aim of this paper: why was he so confident in suchheuristic? Why didn't many other scientists use it? Where did he keep? such a heuristic? Do we have any other examples ofsimilar heuristic search in other scientific problemsolving? (shrink)

Thagard's theory of explanatory coherence (TEC) is a conceptual and computational framework that is used to show how new scientific theories can be judged to be superior to previous ones. In Structures in Science (SiS), Kuipers criticizes TEC as a model that does not faithfully reflect scientific practice. This article tries to explain the machinery behind TEC, and tries to indicate where TEC falls short (conceptually speaking) and where it can be improved. The main idea proposed in this article (...) is not to derive a coherence network from the input (à la TEC), but to construct a coherence network right from the input itself. (shrink)

The research on which the present paper makes a point in aimed at designing a cognitive model of Albert Einstein's discovery that is based on fundamental Einstein's publications and placed, ideally, at a meso-level, between macro-historical and micro-cognitive reconstructions (e.g. protocol analysis). As in a cognitive-historical analysis, we will trace some discovery heuristics in the construction of representations, that are on a continuum with those we employ in ordinary problem solving. Firstly, some theory-specific, reflexive heuristics—named orientative heuristics—are traced: inner (...) perfection, explain-or-assume, explanatory correspondence, and covariance/invariance. Then, other well-known abstractive heuristics as analogical and imagistic reasoning, thought experiment, limiting case analysis (e.g. Nersessian 1992) are shown occurring in Einstein's key-publications. A sketch of a socio-cognitive model for his discovery is then presented following two suggestions: (a) an idea of Van Fraassen about discovery phases, and (b) the Humean distinction between beliefs and ideas. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that sensitivity theory suffers from a fatal defect. Sensitivity theory is often glossed as: (1) S knows that p only if S would not believe that p if p were false. As Nozick showed in his pioneering work on sensitivity theory, this formulation needs to be supplemented by a further counterfactual condition: (2) S knows that p only if S would believe p if p were true. Nozick further showed that the (...) theory needs a qualification on the method used to form the belief. However, when these complications are spelled out in detail, it becomes clear that the two counterfactuals are in irresolvable tension. To jibe with the externalist intuitions that motivate sensitivity theory in the first place, (1) needs a fine-grained grouping of belief-formation methods, but (2) needs coarse-grained grouping. It is therefore suggested that sensitivity theory is in dire straits: either its proponents need to provide a workable principle of method individuation or they must retrench and give up their claims to providing sufficient conditions for knowledge. (shrink)

The paper addresses the formation of striking patterns within originally near-homogenous tissue, the process prototypical for embryology, and represented in particularly purist form by cut sections of hydra regenerating, by internal reorganisation of the pre-existing tissue, a complete animal with head and foot. The essential requirements are autocatalytic, self-enhancing activation, combined with inhibitory or depletion effects of wider range – “lateral inhibition”. Not only de-novo-pattern formation, but also well known, striking features of developmental regulation such as induction, inhibition, (...) and proportion regulation can be explained on this basis. The theory provides a mathematical recipe for the construction of molecular models with criteria for the necessary non-linear interactions. It has since been widely applied to different developmental processes. (shrink)

While the intersection between race and religion has been an important site for research for the sociology of religion and religious studies (in its descriptive dimensions) as well s theology (in its religiously normative dimensions), neither of these disciplines has incorporated recent work in the analytic philosophy of race. Analytic philosophy of race, for its part, has largely neglected the race/religion intersection, while analytic theologians by and large ignore the theological significance of race altogether. In this paper I am to (...) draw together these distinct disciplinary contributions—social-historical, philosophical and normative-theological—into a single integrated framework for a research program in analytic theology. I call that framework “religious racial formation theory,” and I claim that the work of specifying a determinate religious racial formation theory is not merely a (normatively driven) sociological and historical task but a necessarily philosophical one. I then detail what sorts of metaphysical determinations are required in order to yield an adequate explanation of the intersection uncovered by the socio-historical data summarized in the first section. (shrink)

The present article is an attempt to give - in the frame of the theory of the organism - environment system - a new interpretation to the role of efferent influences on receptor activity and to the functions of senses in the formation of knowledge. It is argued, on the basis of experimental evidence and theoretical considerations, that the senses are not transmitters of environmental information, but they create a direct connection between the organism and the environment, which (...) makes the development of a dynamic living system, the organism - environment system, possible. In this connection process the efferent influences on receptor activity are of particular significance, because with their help the receptors may be adjusted in relation to the parts of the environment which are most important in the achievement of behavioral results. Perception is the process of joining of new parts of the environment to the organism - environment system ; thus, the formation of knowledge by perception is based on reorganization of the organism - environment system, and not on transmission of information from the environment. With the help of the efferent influences on receptors each organism creates its own peculiar world which is simultaneously subjective and objective. The present considerations have far reaching influences as well on experimental work in neurophysiology and psychology of perception as on philosophical considerations of knowledge formation. (shrink)

Being formed through learning a practice is best understood within a constitutive theory of meaning as articulated by Charles Taylor. Disengaged views of the person cannot account for the formative changes in a person’s identity and capacities upon learning a professional practice. Representational or correspondence theories of meaning cannot account for formation. Formation occurs over time because students actively seek and take up new concerns and learn new knowledge and skills. Engaged situated reasoning about underdetermined practice situations (...) requires well-formed skillful clinicians caring for particular patients in particular situations. (shrink)

This book investigates the ubuntu theory-based conception of virtue and moral character formation in the northern, western, and eastern regions of Africa, suggesting a critical reconstruction of ubuntu by conceptualising the four different forms of practices in moral character formation. Arguing for the critical reconstruction of ubuntu virtue theory as more nuanced than simply the standard ubuntu normative virtue theories (which give priority to the community as the sole locus for understanding virtues and character formation (...) in Africa), the book builds a comprehensive model of virtue and moral character formation that draws insights from the reconstructed notion of ubuntu and other theories within and beyond the African thought. Chapters feature experience from across Africa including Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa, and centre on topics such as traditional cultural views and practices, political systems in various nations, neoliberalist thought, and primary, secondary and tertiary education systems in Africa and further afield. This is a valuable resource for scholars, academics, and postgraduate students, working in the fields of moral and values education, philosophy of education, and the theory of education more broadly. Those also interested in educational psychology may also find the volume of interest. (shrink)

Much of the scholarship on Kant’s theory of concept formation has focused on the question of whether his theory suffers from circularity, i. e., whether it presupposes the very concepts whose origin it should explain. In this article, I defend Kant against a well-known objection raised by Hannah Ginsborg. Ginsborg, I argue, overlooks the relatively narrow aim of Kant’s theory of concept formation. Kant explicitly frames it as an account of a concept’s inherent generality, or (...) form. However, Ginsborg’s objection is not about a concept’s form; it concerns the concept’s content. Moreover, Kant addresses the issue that she raises in his theory of definitions, which explains how a concept’s content can be revised and perfected. Kant considered all empirical concepts to be incomplete and imprecise. For this reason, he denied that they can be properly defined. Kant also did not regard the content of empirical concepts as fixed or permanent. Indeed, he expected that we would continually expand and revise their content on the basis of experience. I argue that these facts, along with the narrow scope of Kant’s theory of concept formation, effectively defuse Ginsborg’s objection. (shrink)

This paper presents a modified random network model to illustrate how groups can form in the absence of evolutionary forces, assuming groups are collections of entities at any level of organization. This model is inspired by the Zero Force Evolutionary Law, which states that there is always a tendency for diversity and complexity to increase in any evolutionary system containing variation and heredity. That is, in the absence of evolutionary forces, the expectation is a continual increase in diversity and complexity (...) at any level of biological hierarchy. I show that, when modeled, this expectation of increasing variation results not only in the formation of groups, but also in a higher probability of group formation than is found in a model that is purely random. (shrink)

In "A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Metaethics," Mark Alfano (2009) concludes that the response-dependence theory of Prinz and others and the fitting-attitudes theory first articulated by Brentano are false because they imply empirically false statements. He further concludes that these statements cannot be avoided by revising the definitions of the terms 'good' and 'bad' used in the two theories. I strengthen Alfano's first conclusion by arguing that the two theories are false even if they imply empirically (...) true but conceptually contingent statements, and show how, contrary to his second conclusion, the theories can avoid both empirically false and conceptually contingent implications. (shrink)

Johann Arnason and Shmuel Eisenstadt's social theories have remarkably different origins. Yet each has moved onto common ground with the other over a period of time. They meet in historical sociology in dialogue over theories of state formation and images of civilisation. Each is engaged in a project of revising civilisations sociology that reaches an apex with the comparative study of Japan.Their groundbreaking contributions can be read critically against a wider background of debates about postcolonialism, the reputation of the (...) notion of civilisation and the state of area studies in the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

In this article, we contribute to a conversation in global Christianity. Majority World pastors want access to training so they can more effectively care for their communities. But how? In this article, we create a context for spiritual formation rooted in virtue theory. We offer a humility-based, cross-cultural, relationally oriented model for training indigenous leaders while they are rooted within their locales, communities, and ministry contexts. We highlight a method that we believe to be culturally, educationally, and psychologically (...) hearty. We explore the non-formal training model and curriculum of Training Leaders International as a test case. TLI provides a structured program of training in spiritual growth and hermeneutical and communication skills to Christian leaders in the Majority World within their indigenous contexts. But it develops and delivers this training in a manner that causes two key factors to rise to prominence that are widely applicable in the cross-cultural development of Christian leaders: cultural humility and Christian-adapted virtue development, both relationally oriented. This article is meant to inspire and enable other ministries. (shrink)

In the early 1250’s, Albert the Great wrote the De mineralibus to establish a mineralogical science based on Aristotelian epistemology. In the first instance, the Dominican master undertakes to clarify the proximal material and efficient causes of minerals. In his analysis, the examination of material causes proceeds through the evaluation of the Peripatetic and Arabic mineralogy, while the study of the efficient causes leads Albert to align the formative process of the mineral substances with the processes of the generation of (...) animals and plants. Here the physiological role of heat acting upon moisture is crucial in the context of matter acquiring form. In contrast with the mineralogical tradition, Albert assigns the role of the efficient cause of stones and metals to heat, thus laying the foundation for a general theory of the process of generation. With respect to every degree of being, heat, on the one hand, is the active quality of matter, being able to act upon the elements; on the other hand, it conveys all the natural formative principles required for the formation of a substance. (shrink)

In the early 1250’s, Albert the Great wrote the De mineralibus to establish a mineralogical science based on Aristotelian epistemology. In the first instance, the Dominican master undertakes to clarify the proximal material and efficient causes of minerals. In his analysis, the examination of material causes proceeds through the evaluation of the Peripatetic and Arabic mineralogy, while the study of the efficient causes leads Albert to align the formative process of the mineral substances with the processes of the generation of (...) animals and plants. Here the physiological role of heat acting upon moisture is crucial in the context of matter acquiring form. In contrast with the mineralogical tradition, Albert assigns the role of the efficient cause of stones and metals to heat, thus laying the foundation for a general theory of the process of generation. With respect to every degree of being, heat, on the one hand, is the active quality of matter, being able to act upon the elements; on the other hand, it conveys all the natural formative principles required for the formation of a substance. (shrink)

Homology is among the most important comparative concepts in biology. Today, the evolutionary reinterpretation of homology is usually conceived of as the most important event in the development of the concept. This paradigmatic turning point, however important for the historical explanation of life, is not of crucial importance for the development of the concept of homology itself. In the broadest sense, homology can be understood as sameness in reference to the universal guarantor so that in this sense the different concepts (...) of homology show a certain kind of “metahomology”. This holds in the old morphological conception, as well as in the evolutionary usage of homology. Depending on what is (or was) taken as a guarantor, different types of homology may be distinguished (as idealistic, historical, developmental etc.). This study represents a historical overview of the development of the homology concept followed by some clues on how to navigate the pluralistic terminology of modern approaches to homology. (shrink)

This article explores the continuities and discontinuities of pre-Revolutionary intellectual traditions in 1920s Soviet culture and the Stalin-era cultural revolution. Through examination of the pre-revolutionary philosophical legacy underpinning Soviet musicological theory, I demonstrate that there are decisive features, such asSoviet Prometheanism, that characterize the musicology of the 1920s that both underline and differ from the pre-revolutionary philosophy of music and the musicology of the 1930s. I offer the basic outlines of aSoviet cultural theory of musicformulated by Russian music (...) critic, historian, composer and musicologist Boris Asafiev (1884–1949) in the 1920s. Explaining and describing what I mean by a particular cultural theory of music in the Soviet context forms the core issue of my article. (shrink)

Bearing Society in Mind disrupts the disciplinary boundaries of economic, political and cultural theory by exploring the theory and politics of the social formation.

Despite widespread recognition of an emergent politics of data in our midst, we strikingly lack a political theory of data. We readily acknowledge the presence of data across our political lives, but we often do not know how to conceptualize the politics of all those data points—the forms of power they constitute and the kinds of political subjects they implicate. Recent work in numerous academic disciplines is evidence of the first steps toward a political theory of data. This (...) article maps some limits of this emergent literature with an eye to enriching its theoretical range. The literature on data politics, both within political theory and elsewhere, has thus far focused almost exclusively on the algorithm. This article locates a further dimension of data politics in the work of formatting technology or, more simply, formats. Formats are simultaneously conceptual and technical in the ways they define what can even count as data, and by extension who can count as data and how they can count. A focus on formats is of theoretical value because it provides a bridge between work on the conceptual contours of categories and the technology-centric literature on algorithms that tends to ignore the more conceptual dimensions of data technology. The political insight enabled by format theory is shown in the context of an extended interrogation of the politics of racialized redlining. (shrink)