Consequentialism is an agent-neutral teleological theory, and deontology is an agent-relative non-teleological theory. I argue that a certain hybrid of the two—namely, non-egoistic agent-relative teleological ethics (NATE)—is quite promising. This hybrid takes what is best from both consequentialism and deontology while leaving behind the problems associated with each. Like consequentialism and unlike deontology, NATE can accommodate the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs. Yet unlike consequentialism and (...) like deontology, NATE accords well with our commonsense moral intuitions. (shrink)

Introduction -- Al-Rāzī's theory of action -- Al-Rāzī on the ethics of action -- Al-Rāzī's perfectionist theory of virture -- Al-Rāzī's later pessimism: commentary on Risālat Dhamm al-ladhdhāt -- Appendix: Risālat Dhamm ladhdhāt al-dunyā.

This research seeks to extend the literature of trust by examining whether the amount of trust that employees have in their supervisors is contingent upon the ethical system of belief utilized by their immediate supervisors. To help answer this question, it is hypothesized that employees have a greater degree of trust in immediate supervisors practicing the deontological ethical system of belief than in those practicing the teleological ethical system of belief. This study begins the search for the moral frameworks (...) that are the antecedents of trust in immediate supervisors. The results indicate that practicing a deontological approach to ethics may stimulate a greater degree of employee trust in immediate supervisors than a teleological approach; therefore, the ethical system of belief held by immediate supervisors affects his or her employees. (shrink)

In this article, a teleological model for analysis of everyday ethical situations in dementia care is used to analyse and clarify perennial ethical problems in nursing home care for persons with dementia. This is done with the aim of describing how such a model could be useful in a concrete care context. The model was developed by Sandman and is based on four aspects: the goal; ethical side-constraints to what can be done to realize such a goal; structural constraints; (...) and nurses’ ethical competency. The model contains the following main steps: identifying and describing the normative situation; identifying and describing the different possible alternatives; assessing and evaluating the different alternatives; and deciding on, implementing and evaluating the chosen alternative. Three ethically difficult situations from dementia care were used for the application of the model. The model proved useful for the analysis of nurses’ everyday ethical dilemmas and will be further explored to evaluate how well it can serve as a tool to identify and handle problems that arise in nursing care. (shrink)

In his widely read book, Five Types of Ethical Theory (1930), C.D. Broad introduced the distinction between two approaches to ethics: teleology and deontology. In the second half of the twentieth century, these terms found their way into Christian ethics, giving rise to a problem. Christian ethics seems to be straightforwardly teleological, but it also seems to be straightforwardly deontological. In this article, I argue that the problem is largely a product of the way teleology is (...) construed: the ends in teleological ethics are implicitly assumed to be outcomes or states of affairs. I demonstrate the point through a reading of both the early philosophical sources and the more recent works of Charles Camosy and John Perry. I then argue that major sources in the Christian tradition, including those used by Camosy and Perry, are better understood as offering a more expansive picture of teleology in which ends are not always outcomes or states of affairs. I conclude by arguing that this more expansive picture of teleology resolves some important problems that have plagued debates about teleology and deontology in Christian ethics. (shrink)

Kant’s dualism in anthropology and morality is said to be bridged only by means of a teleology that seems to betray the historical constitution of its subjectivity. And yet the Kantianarticulation of problems of theoretical and practical reason can be explored only insofar as they help us understand the correlated issues of the unity of reason, the relation of aesthetics and ethics in the light of the three Critiques, and the teleological conception of history. In this paper, I (...) argue for a teleological reading of the systematic architectonic so as to make sense of the concept of purposiveness as the a priori principle of judgment in its logical, aesthetic, and teleological reflection and of the unifying, a priori principles of each faculty–namely, conformity to law, final purpose, and conformity to purpose or purposiveness – respectively dealt with in the three Critiques. (shrink)

The paper entitled ‘Anthropocentric teleological environmental ethics’ is quite suggestive. I have tried to pinpoint that environmental ethics is both anthropocentric and teleological. I contend that man is the sole bearer of values. Environment serves human purpose. Man gives values to environment or Mother Earth. Indians with their reverence for sacred rivers have always been close to nature. I propose integral teleological environmental ethical theory which integrates man and nature, deontological and teleological theories. It (...) reconciles between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric views of environment. (shrink)

This article provides a methodology for the interpretation of AI ethics principles to specify ethical criteria for the development and deployment of AI systems in high-risk domains. The methodology consists of a three-step process deployed by an independent, multi-stakeholder ethics board to: (1) identify the appropriate level of abstraction for modelling the AI lifecycle; (2) interpret prescribed principles to extract specific requirements to be met at each step of the AI lifecycle; and (3) define the criteria to inform (...) purpose- and context-specific balancing of the principles. The methodology presented in this article is designed to be agile, adaptable, and replicable, and when used as part of a pro-ethical institutional culture, will help to foster the ethical design, development, and deployment of AI systems. The application of the methodology is illustrated through reference to the UK Ministry of Defence AI ethics principles. (shrink)

God demands that Abraham sacrifice his son Isaac. Why? Kierkegaard tells us that God requires of Abraham a "teleological suspension of the ethical." In this essay I explore the meanings of the Ethical, God, and Faith in an effort to make sense of this phrase, and, more broadly, of the biblical story itself.

Extensive and growing use of electronic performance monitoring in organizations has resulted in considerable debate. Advocates of electronic monitoring approach the debate in teleological terms arguing that monitoring benefits organizations, customers, and society. Its critics approach the issue in deontological terms countering that monitoring is dehumanizing, invades worker privacy, increases stress and worsens health, and decreases work-life quality. In contrast to this win-lose approach, this paper argues that an approach which emphasizes communication in the design and implementation of monitoring (...) systems offers a win-win solution that should satisfy both deontological and teleological ethicists. (shrink)

Functional contexts have long been recognized to support evaluative judgments of a certain kind, even where there is no element of design: we speak, for example, of such things as good roots or defective hearts in connection with judgments about proper functions; an animal might even be judged defective for failing to possess a certain species-typical, functional behavioral disposition. These are obviously not moral judgments, but it is interesting to wonder whether the latter might be understood in a similar way. (...) Can moral virtues, for example, be understood as dispositions to function properly in certain spheres of human life involving the will, so that someone lacking them might be said to have a defective character? ;One possibly tempting way of pursuing this broadly Aristotelian line, which has been proposed in recent work by Philippa Foot, would be to argue that there is a single type of functional framework within which to understand both function-related evaluations in biology generally, and function-related evaluations pertaining to ethics and practical rationality; in both cases, it might be thought, talk of species-typical functions and proper functioning is to be understood in relation to the flourishing of the organisms in question, the difference being that the functions relevant to ethics would involve the will. ;I argue that this way of fleshing out a neo-Aristotelian approach to ethics and practical rationality is misguided. Much of the dissertation is devoted to showing this by developing a positive account of functional teleology in biology which makes clear that the flourishing or welfare-promotion of organisms is neither a general nor an ultimate end within the biological functional framework. The view I defend recognizes the crucial role played by natural selection history in shaping facts about present functional teleology, but it is importantly different from what are generally known as "etiological" views. In particular, it does not involve any direct reduction of facts about function to facts about causal history, and it suggests a non-reductionist view of functional teleological explanation, which I also defend. The rejection of etiological views of function in general leaves open the possibility that there is some kind of functional framework, distinct from the biological one, that might be relevant to ethics; I explore this in the last chapter. (shrink)

“Modern ethics,” so-called, has only in the most recent years come under some very sharp and telling, not to say even devastating, criticism. And what is it that one should understand by this term, “modern ethics”? Well, it is a term used largely by very recent critics to designate that whole tradition in ethics, in part utilitarian and in part Kantian in character, that has quite dominated the study of ethics, at least in Anglo-American philosophy, for (...) upwards of three-quarters of a century and more now. (shrink)

Kant’s dualism in anthropology and morality is said to be bridged only by means of a teleologywhich seems to betray the historical constitution of its subjectivity. And yet the Kantianarticulation of problems of theoretical and practical reason can be explored only insofar asthey help us understand the correlated problems of the unity of reason, the relation of aestheticsand ethics in the light of the three Critiques, and the teleological conception of history.In this paper, I argue for a (...) class='Hi'>teleological reading of the systematic architectonic so as tomake sense of the concept of purposiveness as the a priori principle of judgment in its logical,aesthetic, and teleological reflection and of the unifying, a priori principles of each faculty–namely, conformity to law, final purpose, and conformity to purpose or purposiveness(Gesetzmäßigkeit, Endzweck, Zweckmäßigkeit) – respectively dealt with in the three Critiques. (shrink)

Gilbert Meilaender has been an important contributor to the field of bioethics for decades. His insistence that there is a natural teleology of the body that should constrain ambitions of the will in bioethics deserves careful attention. This article examines the idea of a natural teleology of the body as it applies to human oocytes. It argues that approaching human eggs in terms of their telos rather than their moral status is useful. The article examines how Meilaender deploys the idea (...) of a natural teleology to reject John Robertson’s work on assisted reproduction, particularly his preoccupation with procreative liberty. Finally, the article raises questions about the sharp contrast Meilaender draws between teleology and intentionality. (shrink)

Aristotle has interpreted research done by empirical methods using metaphysical concepts extensively. According to some authors, his metaphysically intoned philosophy of biology is compatible with the modern theory of evolution and with some of the essential topics of ecological ethics. We will try to show how the interpretation of the substantial whole, under the aspect of the notion of potentiality, is Aristotle’s contribution to the debates of eco-ethical holism. Furthermore, we will show how Hans Jonas also finds the possibility (...) of valuing the individual organic substance in Aristotle’s works, which are not only representatives of the human species. Hans Jonas pleads for a revision of the modern theory of evolution, which, combined with some of Aristotle’s metaphysical elements, could avoid the reductionism to which it was exposed after Descartes. (shrink)

The most common corporate reaction to public concern over the ethics of their business practices and the sensitivity of their organization to social expectations is to promote policies and rules designed to bring about a set of socially responsive behaviours and actions. The result of this corporate deontological approach is to create a teleopathic culture that relieves decision makers from the personal responsibil ity for the consequences of their actions and widens the gap between how society expects business to (...) behave and their actual behaviour. The corporate use of a deontological approach effectively allows the substitution of corporate conscience for the moral values of individual decision makers and thus weakens the linkage between individual personal values and behaviour. The creation of teleopathological behaviour in an organization is explored through a juxtaposition of the parables of the Sadhu and the Good Samaritan. The consequences of teleopathic behaviour are then illustrated through an examination of Dow Corning's silicon gel product liability case. (shrink)

This book develops a unified theory of moral progress. The author argues that there are mechanisms in place that consistently drive societies towards moral improvement and that a sophisticated, naturalistically respectable form of teleology can be defended. The book's main aim is to flesh out the process of moral progress in more detail, and to show how, when the right mechanisms and institutions of moral progress are matched together, they create pressure for the desired types of moral gains to manifest. (...) The first part of the book deals with two issues: the conceptual one about what moral progress is, and the broadly empirical one whether it is possible. It shows that cultural evolution successfully explains the origins of modern forms of morally welcome change. The second part argues that there is logical space for a moderate, scientifically credible form of teleology, and that the converse case for moral decline is weak. It addresses the types, drivers and institutions of moral progress that allow for the storage, transmission and cumulative improvement of our normative infrastructure over time. Finally, the third part demonstrates why moral progress cannot be accounted for in metaethically realist terms. Moral Teleology will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in ethics, moral epistemology and moral psychology. (shrink)

A study involving purchasing managers was conducted to test specific Hunt-Vitell theoretical propositions concerning the determinants of managers' teleological evaluations. We extended the Hunt-Vitell model by developing a new integrative construct, namely the desirability of consequences to self versus others. We hypothesized that desirability of consequences affects teleological evaluations in that the more desirable the consequences of a particular action, the more likely managers evaluate that action positively. The results of the present study provided support for this hypothesis. (...) Furthermore, we extended the Hunt-Vitell model by developing a new integrative construct, namely the desirability of consequences of self versus others. We hypothesized that cognitive moral development moderates the relationship between the desirability of consequences of self versus others and teleological evaluation. The results failed to support this hypothesis. We explained the lack of support in terms of the level of aggregation of the data, the possibility of the confounding effect of respondents' sensitivity to ethical issues, and the possibility that deontological evaluations confounded the respondents' teleological judgments. Future research and managerial implications of the findings were also discussed. (shrink)

This article investigates how the Kantian moral law is employed by Fichte in the System of Ethics of 1798 as a cosmic principle in order to deliver a deduction of its applicability in the world of sense. It considers how Kant’s conception of a moral teleology in the 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment inspires Fichte to harness the concept of the original, determinate end of a natural thing in the deduction as a means of mediating the Kantian (...) “supersensible idea of the morally good” by sensible intuitions. He goes beyond Kant by taking the law to be “actually operative” in ordinary consciousness and consequently “a theoretical principle for the determination of the world.”. (shrink)

One of the most controversial issues to emerge in recent studies of Fichte concerns the status of his normative ethics, i.e., his theory of what makes actions morally good or bad. Scholars are divided over Fichte’s view regarding the ‘final end’ of moral striving, since it appears this end can be either a specific goal permitting maximizing calculations (the consequentialist reading defended by Kosch 2015), or an indeterminate goal permitting only duty-based decisions (the deontological reading defended by Wood 2016). (...) While I think each interpretive position contains an element of truth, my aim in this paper is to defend a third alternative, according to which Fichte’s normative ethics presents us with a unique form of social perfectionism. (shrink)

To approach the issue of teleology, I will focus on what I regard as the fundamental form of teleological causation: goal-directed action. What is “goal-directed action,” and what kinds of entities act goal-directedly? Consider some representative processes.

According to one influential narrative, a significant root of our ecological crisis is to be found in the Christian appropriation of teleology, undergirding the anthropocentrism endemic to Western thought. This article challenges this argument in three steps. First, I present the Aristotelian understanding of teleology, which is intrinsic to living organisms, and which has been suggested as a resource for ecological ethics. Second, I argue that the rejection of intrinsic teleology in favour of an extrinsic teleology first occurs with (...) modern philosophy, in tandem with a new pragmatic conception of knowledge. Third, I provide an alternative construal of the early Christian understanding of teleology, through the figure of Maximus the Confessor, arguing that his understanding of the contemplation of nature is a key resource to be recovered for ecological ethics. I end with a sketch of such a recovery, as articulated by Thomas Merton. (shrink)

This article discusses the claim made by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling that the story of Abraham involves a ?teleological suspension of the ethical?. It tries to show that this claim is intelligible and plausible when considered within the context of a philosophical position which views morality as a system of duties.

I focus here on the teleological suspension of the ethical as it appears in Fear and Trembling. A common reading of Fear and Trembling is that it explores whether there are religious reasons for action that settle that one must do an action even when all the moral reasons for action tell against doing it. This interpretation has been contested. But I defend it by showing how the explicit teleological suspension of the ethical mirrors implicit teleological suspensions (...) of the epistemological and prudential, and by articulating how it might be necessary for God to suspend the ethical in order to forgive us for our wrongdoings to others. I also discuss whether God’s commands are implicitly conditional, whether religious reasons to act, believe, and forgive are in each case grounded in divine commands, and what role love plays in each type of teleological suspension. (shrink)