This chapter contains sections titled: References and Further Reading.

Any adequate philosophy of technology needs to take a clear stance with regard to the limits of criticizability. While observing the canons of criticizability may appear to be simple, many philosophical approaches (whether towards technology or other topics) abandon comprehensive criticizability by adopting some forms of justificationist or essentialist epistemology. This paper aims to show that criticizability can only be upheld by subscribing to a non-justificationist epistemology and by acknowledging the propositions/standards dichotomy; failing to do so leads to undesirable epistemic (...) consequences. (shrink)

I will argue in this paper that Andrew Feenberg has erred in his claim on technological adaptability. Adapting to modern technology may not always be liberating. Drawing from his reflections on Heidegger and Marcuse, I will explain why Feenberg thinks that adaptability has a redemptive role in the midst of technological domination. I will also show why technological domination still characterizes human relations in the modern age. Advanced technologies including social media, have continued to manipulate people and (...) as such, diminish rather than deepen the authenticity of human life. For instance, two people in a café sometimes spend more time on their smartphones rather than valuing their face-to-face encounter; here, one can point out the lack of authenticity in human relations. This clearly manifests how consumer culture has taken over human life. In addition, it can be said that the notion of adaptability also fails to account for the hegemonic social relations created by modern technological innovations, since these gadgets remain beyond the reach of the masses, thus broadening the divide between classes of people in society. In order to address this, I propose that people should use technology in a socially sensitive way in order to truly give meaning to their lives and to effectively resist the totalitarian tendency of the modern age. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt, one of the most influential legal and political thinkers of the twentieth century, is known chiefly for his work on international law, sovereignty, and his doctrine of political exception. This book argues that greater prominence should be given to his early work in legal studies. Schmitt himself repeatedly identified as a jurist, and Hugo E. Herrera demonstrates how for Schmitt, law plays a key role as an intermediary between ideal, conceptual theory and the messiness and complexity of practical, (...) concrete situations. Law is concerned precisely with balancing the extremes of theory and reality, and in this respect, Schmitt associates it with philosophical thinking broadly as being able to understand and explain the tensions in human experience. Reviewing and analyzing prevailing interpretations of Schmitt by Jacques Derrida, Heinrich Meier, and others, Herrera argues that the importance of Schmitt's legal framework is both significant and overlooked. (shrink)

El presente texto corresponde a la presentación de la defensa de la tesis "La racionalidad científico-tecnológica. Aportes a la reflexión epistemológica en la obra de Herbert Marcuse", dirigida por la Dra. Delia Albarracín en la Maestría en Metodología de la Investigación Científica de la Universidad Nacional de Lanús, que dirige Esther Díaz, el 26 de agosto de 2011. En lo que sigue queremos sintetizar una lectura de la obra de Herbert Marcuse que pone el énfasis en un cruce posible entre (...) su visión antropológica y su visión epistemológica desde una metodología que denominamos dialéctica. La confluencia propuesta supone considerar a la categoría racionalidad tecnológica como una categoría central de su obra que permite estructurar una lectura de conceptos que, aventuramos, siguen vigentes para pensar y re-pensar nuestra condición humana. Esta categoría reúne reflexiones filosóficas y políticas en el intento por desnudar la principal ideología que permite cohesionar a los individuos en los modelos sociales centrales del siglo XX. This text is a part of the M.S. Dissertation, "Scientific-technological rationality. Contributions to an epistemological reflection on Herbert Marcuse's work", under the supervision of PhD Delia Albarracín for the Master in Methodology for Scientific Investigation, Lanús University, directed by Esther Díaz, held on August 26th, 2011. What follows is a summary of our approach to Herbert Marcuse's work, which focuses on the crossing between the anthropological and the epistemological vision, from a methodological view that we call dialectics. The proposed convergence implies that the technological rationality category is central in his work and permits a certain reading of concepts that are still in force to think over our human condition. This category joins philosophical and political reflections in an attempt to unveil the main ideology that unites individuals in the XXth century's principal social models. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between education and technological rationality from the perspective of the philosophy of education, and to show that while education is deeply related to technique, skills, or technology, it can never be reduced to technical knowledge, and that there are things in education that overflow technical knowledge. I will here ask why there is something in education that overflows technical knowledge — I will define it as knowledge of pathos (...) — and why it is necessary to redefine the meaning of education in terms of knowledge of pathos. In order to address this issue, I will first examine the relationship between technology and transcendence in the world of education in Kei Hachiya’s Education and Transcendence. Second, I will show that recent outstanding theoretical achievements of Japanese philosophers of education — Satoji Yano’s Education from the Perspectives of Gift and Exchange, Yasuo Imai’s Medial Perspective on Education, and Tsunemi Tanaka’s Clinical Theory of Human Becoming — are all located within the problematic area of ‘technology-pathos-education’. Finally, I would like to propose a ‘philosophy of education built on fragile parts’, with a view to redefining education through the knowledge of pathos, paying attention to the experience of pathei mathos and the opportunity of weakness in the philosophy of education. (shrink)

This paper argues, against technological and economic determinism, that the dominant model of industrial society is politically contingent. The idea that technical decisions are significantly constrained by ?rationality? ? either technical or economic ? is shown to be groundless. Constructivist and hermeneutic approaches to technology show that modern societies are inherently available for a different type of development in a different cultural framework. It is possible that, in the future, those who today are subordinated to technology's rhythms and (...) demands will be able to control it and to determine its evolution. I call the process of creating such a society ?subversive rationalization? because it requires technological advances that can only be made in opposition to the dominant hegemony. (shrink)

In this essay, we focus on Max Weber’s concept of rationalization to understand and make sense of the rise of bureaucratic, corporate governance and online learning in higher education. We reveal the distinct disconnect between human interaction and online platforms and how such disconnection is antithetical to higher learning. We also show how Weber’s analysis helps us recognize the uniquely crass commercialism embedded in the very rationalization that makes online learning in universities thinkable and actionable. Our use of online learning (...) is only one illustration of Weber’s concept of rationalization, but it provides an important understanding of the nefarious effects rationalization has on human interaction. The nexus of marketization, technology, and higher education represents, on our view, a juggernaut against faculty autonomy, academic freedom, and humane learning and should be directly challenged. One difficulty this challenge faces is the degree to which online learning has become ubiquitous and taken-for-granted. It has, as Weber clarifies, been rationalized. (shrink)

(1977). Technology and the crisis of rationality : Reflections on the death and rebirth of dialogue. World Futures: Vol. 15, Ethics and World Order, pp. 261-287.

Modern societies are shaped to a significant extent by socially rational institutions, arrangements, and technologies. A purely functional understanding of these rationalized structures eliminates the element of meaning from social life. Ellul, Heidegger and the Frankfurt School focused on this impoverishment and associate it with the spread of technology. But recent technology studies offer a different perspective which can be joined to the formulation of the social critique in the writings of Herbert Marcuse.

This paper explores the sense in which modern societies can be said to be rational. Social rationality cannot be understood on the model of an idealized image of scientific method. Neither science nor society conforms to this image. Nevertheless, critique is routinely silenced by neo-liberal and technocratic arguments that appeal to social simulacra of science. This paper develops a critical strategy for addressing the resistance of rationality to rational critique. Romantic rejection of reason has proven less effective than (...) strategies that conceptualize modern artefacts, systems, and organizations as rationally underdetermined. This approach first appears in Marx's analysis of capitalist economics. Although he lacks the concept of underdetermination, Marx gets around the silencing effect of social rationality with something very much like it in his discussion of the length of the working day. Frankfurt School Critical Theory later blended romantic elements with Marxian ones in a suggestive but ambiguous mixture. The concept of underdetermination reappears in contemporary science and technology studies, now clearly articulated and philosophically and sociologically elaborated. But somewhere along the way the critical thrust was diluted. Critical theory of technology attempts to recover that thrust. Here its approach is generalized to cover the three main forms of social rationality. (shrink)

Are computers on the way to acquiring “superintelligence”? Can human deliberation and decision-making be fully simulated by the mechanical execution of AI programmes? On close examination these expectations turn out not to be well-founded, since algorithms do, ultimately, have “heteronomous” characteristics. So-called AI-“autonomy” is a sensor-directed performance automatism, which — compared with the potential for ethical judgment in human “practical reason” — proves to be limited in significant ways. This is shown in some detail with reference to the idea of (...) a “digital humanism”, which was introduced by Julian Nida-Rümelin and Nathalie Weidenfeld, who argue that algorithms are useful “tools”, but emphasise — thus rejecting excessive “post-humanist” ideas about AI — that there exists a crucial difference between human action and its AI-simulation. While Nida-Rümelin/Weidenfeld´s “digital humanism” is, on the one hand, inspired by Kant’s conception of human autonomous self-determination, the concept of “structural rationality” that they advocate is, on the other hand, quite problematic. “Digital humanism”, however, can be improved as I argue — with reference to Barbara Herman’s analysis of “moral judgment” and to Allen Wood’s reflections on “human dignity”. (shrink)

Introduction to special issue of Synthese.

The paper analyses restructuring processes occuring with the introduction of information technologies into firms in Austria and assesses how far the evidence lends support to the thesis of a fundamental change in rationalization patterns as postulated by continental industrial sociologists claiming the emergence of a novel type of ‘systemic rationalization’. Based on a research perspective putting emphasis on several levels of social mediation of technological change the broad conclusion is the following: there are clear indications of a novel ‘systemic’ (...) approach to rationalization but the associated forms of work organization show substantial variation. The analysis of the influence of national-level institutions, industry- and firm-specific conditions, and their role in micro-political processes of system and work design, points towards an underutilization of work humanization potentials and suggests an increase in skill supply as one of the possible intervention strategies. (shrink)

Ingemar Nordin’s Using Knowledge: On the Rationality of Science, Technology, and Medicine is a critical rationalist examination of medicine as a social system, largely science-based, but including quackery. Thus rationality is limited, as befits the author’s fallibilism.

Hoy nos movemos en un mundo altamente cambiante y atestado de desarrollo científico, técnico y tecnológico. Un mundo condicionado por los intereses de una globalización económica, donde el imperativo es consumir, y donde aquellos que producen de manera individual y distinta son absorbidos, en el mejor de los casos, o anulados por el sistema capitalista. Ahora bien, ese estado de cosas ha puesto en riesgo de pérdida al sujeto racional heredado y caracterizado desde la modernidad y que es requerido hoy (...) día como sujeto de racionalidad tecnológica. El sujeto-persona-agente racional se encuentra en una encrucijada ante la sociedad de consumo y el sistema económico de producción. La encrucijada consiste en si sigue aceptando el ser considerado y utilizado como un objeto, cosa, instrumento, artefacto más dentro del sistema artefactual o recobrar la capacidad de racionalidad, heredada desde la Modernidad y refrendada como racionalidad tecnológica desde la Revolución Industrial. (shrink)

In this book, Ingemar Nordin analyzes how not only scientific but also non-scientific knowledge is to be used in practice when establishing a rational technological and medical development.

Andrew Feenberg, in his book Questioning Technology, offers his theory of “democratized rationalization” as a critical alternative to Jacques Ellul’s essentialist perspective. Feenberg argues that Ellul has confused the tendency toward efficiency in technological discourse with the essence of technology, thereby disallowing for a “positive program” of technological change. This article suggests that Feenberg’s “critical theory of technology” does not accurately portray Ellul’s ideas about technology, which were crafted over 40 books and hundreds of articles, and that a (...) reading of Feenberg from an Ellulian perspective reveals Questioning Technology to be: (a) a trend that Ellul predicted in technological scholarship, (b) an unfavorable trend that does not answer the problems posed by Ellul, and (c) an actual furthering of the “technological ideology” that Ellul carefully described in detail over several decades of research. This article concludes that the current trends toward praising democratization should be revisited in light of this Ellulian analysis. (shrink)

The article presents Henryk Skolimowski’s standpoint on the civilizational role of technology in the context of his eco-philosophy concept, it also reviews the changes underway in science and technology and the challenges posed on their rationality. Despite its evident historical anchoring, Skolimowski’s position appears to contain many currently important ideas and solutions.

“Reason,” said Lao Tze some twenty five hundred years ago, “is of all things the emptiest. Yet its use is inexhaustible.” With equal justice, he might have said the same of language. But Lao Tze, whose profound metaphysical probing appeared to carry him beyond the reach of linguistic aid, was led to insist that “Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not know.” Yet the “Old Philosopher,” as he is known to the Chinese, might be said to (...) admit, by the very implications of his insistence, that language can exercise the greatest influence on thought, if only, in his viewpoint, to nullify it. Today we acknowledge this influence by reversing the great metaphysician's statement, those without speech in some form or other cannot know. (shrink)

Thoroughly revised, this new edition of Critical Theory of Technology rethinks the relationships between technology, rationality, and democracy, arguing that the degradation of labor--as well as of many environmental, educational, and political systems--is rooted in the social values that preside over technological development. It contains materials on political theory, but the emphasis has shifted to reflect a growing interest in the fields of technology and cultural studies.

This paper investigates the compatibility of Hegel’s analyses of the mechanization of work in industrial society with Hegel’s notion of freedom as rational self-determination. Work as such is for Hegel a crucial moment on the way to a more complete realization of human freedom, but, as I maintain with Adorno, the technological developments of the last two centuries raise the question of whether the nature of work itself has changed since the industrial revolution. In his Jena lectures, Hegel recognized (...) significant problems that the mechanization of work poses for human freedom that—on my assessment—his later, mature thought does not sufficiently address. One finds, however, a more comprehensive depiction of the same worries that Hegel mentioned in his Jena lectures in Adorno’s critique of the dominant forms of labor in contemporary society and his understanding of technological rationality, which according to Adorno, dominates the contemporary world. I suggest, furthermore, that juxtaposing Hegel’s and Adorno’s thoughts on technology and the mechanization of work reveals Adorno’s philosophy of technology to be an extension, rather than a critique, of the spirit of Hegel’s own philosophical project as immanent critique of the necessary entailments of any given concept. (shrink)

This book is about the respective roles of intuition and reasoning in ethics. It responds to a number of well-known philosophers and psychologists, and proposes a new perspective – radical in its moderation. It examines in depth the work of the philosopher Joshua Greene and the psychologist Jonathan Haidt. With the so-called empirical turn in ethics, much work has been done to try to isolate the role of reason and intuition in forming our moral judgements, with Haidt and Greene leading (...) the research programmes and attracting much of the professional and public attention, and many others following. The current view – shared by both camps – is that intuition is largely the driver of our moral judgements – a view summed up in Haidt’s slogan ‘intuition first, strategic reasoning second’. Haidt believes we have to live with this and accept it. Greene does not: he contends that our intuitions, while suitable for the environments in which we evolved, are worthless in the modern, global, technological age, and to avoid ethical disaster we must learn to adopt reason as the arbiter of moral truth. This book steers a middle course between these two positions and is therefore of great interest to philosophers and psychologists alike. (shrink)

Socialist society is a society whose basic economic law and goal is the fullest possible satisfaction of human needs. Proceeding from this, the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU set a course for a more profound turn in the economy toward solution of the various tasks related to improving the well-being of Soviet people, not only for the five-year plan period but also as the general orientation of the economic development of the country for the long term.

Both developing and developed countries face an increasing mismatch between what patients expect to receive from healthcare and what the public healthcare systems can afford to provide. Where there has been a growing recognition of the entitlement to receive healthcare, the frustrated expectations with regards to the level of provision has led to lawsuits challenging the denial of funding for health treatments by public health systems. This book analyses the impact of courts and litigation on the way health systems set (...) priorities and make rationing decisions. In particular, it focuses on how the judicial protection of the right to healthcare can impact the institutionalization, functioning and centrality of Health Technology Assessment (HTA) for decisions about the funding of treatment. Based on the case study of three jurisdictions - Brazil, Colombia, and England - it shows that courts can be a key driver for the institutionalization of HTA. These case studies show the paradoxes of judicial control, which can promote accountability and impair it, demand administrative competence and undermine bureaucratic capacities. The case studies offer a nuanced and evidence-informed understanding of these paradoxes in the context of health care by showing how the judicial control of priority-setting decisions in health care can be used to require and control an explicit scheme for health technology assessment, but can also limit and circumvent it. (shrink)

I consider the intertextuality between Chinese and Western thought by exploring how images, metaphors, and ideas from the texts associated with Zhuangzi and Laozi were appropriated in early twentieth-century German philosophy. This interest in “Lao-Zhuang Daoism” encompasses a diverse range of thinkers including Buber and Heidegger. I examine how the problematization of utility, usefulness, and “purposiveness” in Zhuangzi and Laozi becomes a key point for their German philosophical reception; how it is the poetic character of the Zhuangzi that hints at (...) an appropriate response to the crisis and loss of meaning that characterizes technological modernity and its instrumental technological rationality; that is, how the “poetic” and “spiritual” world perceived in Lao-Zhuang thought became part of Buber's and Heidegger's critical encounter and confrontation with technological modernity; and how their concern with Zhuangzi does not signify a return to a dogmatic religiosity or otherworldly mysticism; it anticipates a this-worldly spiritual or poetic way of dwelling immanently within the world. (shrink)

Disputational models of argumentation have been criticized as introducing adversariality into argumentation by mistakenly conceiving of it as minimally adversarial, and, in doing so, structurally incentivizing ancillary adversariality. As an alternative, non-adversarial models of argumentation like inquiry have been recommended. In this article I defend disputational, minimally adversarial models of disagreement-based argumentation. First, I argue that the normative kernel of minimal adversariality is properly located in the normative fabric of disagreement, not our practices of disputation. Thus, argumentation’s minimal adversariality is (...) a hereditary, rather than an acquired, trait. Second, I show how attempts to model disagreement-based argumentation non-adversarially, as co-inquiry, misrepresent the normative commitments of disagreers. Indeed, such attempts backfire in their efforts to make argumentation less adversarial, by removing the normative, discursive mechanisms by which we may hold each other to rational account for our commitments. Finally, I show how regulative models of disputation, like the Pragma-Dialectical critical discussion, are designed to minimize ancillary adversariality thereby preventing its escalation. (shrink)