Results for 'subjective probability'

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  1. Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity.Thomas Icard - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):863-903.
    Subjective probability plays an increasingly important role in many fields concerned with human cognition and behavior. Yet there have been significant criticisms of the idea that probabilities could actually be represented in the mind. This paper presents and elaborates a view of subjective probability as a kind of sampling propensity associated with internally represented generative models. The resulting view answers to some of the most well known criticisms of subjective probability, and is also supported (...)
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  2.  19
    Subjective Probability: The Real Thing.Richard C. Jeffrey - 2002 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book offers a concise survey of basic probability theory from a thoroughly subjective point of view whereby probability is a mode of judgment. Written by one of the greatest figures in the field of probability theory, the book is both a summation and synthesis of a lifetime of wrestling with these problems and issues. After an introduction to basic probability theory, there are chapters on scientific hypothesis-testing, on changing your mind in response to generally (...)
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  3.  60
    Subjective probability : criticisms, reflections and problems. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 157 - 180.
  4. Should subjective probabilities be sharp?Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):277-289.
    There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga (2010), that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed (...)
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  5. Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.
    Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities.
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  6. Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.
    It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be (...)
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  7. Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity.David Schmeidler - 1989 - Econometrica 57:571-589.
  8. Subjective probability and quantum certainty.Carlton M. Caves, Christopher A. Fuchs & Rüdiger Schack - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):255-274.
    In the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics, probabilities—and thus quantum states—represent an agent’s degrees of belief, rather than corresponding to objective properties of physical systems. In this paper we investigate the concept of certainty in quantum mechanics. Particularly, we show how the probability-1 predictions derived from pure quantum states highlight a fundamental difference between our Bayesian approach, on the one hand, and Copenhagen and similar interpretations on the other. We first review the main arguments for the general claim that (...)
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  9. Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by representation theorems, going back to Ramsey (1926), which tell us how to define or measure subjective probability by observable preferences. However, standard representation theorems make strong rationality assumptions, in particular expected utility maximization. How do we ascribe subjective probability to agents which do not satisfy these strong rationality assumptions? I present a representation theorem with weak rationality assumptions which can (...)
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  10. Updating Subjective Probability.Persi Diaconis & Sandy L. Zabell - 1982 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (380):822-830.
  11. Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), MIT Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press.
    This chapter is a philosophical survey of some leading approaches in formal epistemology in the so-called ‘Bayesian’ tradition. According to them, a rational agent’s degrees of belief—credences—at a time are representable with probability functions. We also canvas various further putative ‘synchronic’ rationality norms on credences. We then consider ‘diachronic’ norms that are thought to constrain how credences should respond to evidence. We discuss some of the main lines of recent debate, and conclude with some prospects for future research.
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  12. Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?Franz Huber - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
    Bayesianism is the position that scientific reasoning is probabilistic and that probabilities are adequately interpreted as an agent's actual subjective degrees of belief, measured by her betting behaviour. Confirmation is one important aspect of scientific reasoning. The thesis of this paper is the following: if scientific reasoning is at all probabilistic, the subjective interpretation has to be given up in order to get right confirmation—and thus scientific reasoning in general. The Bayesian approach to scientific reasoning Bayesian confirmation theory (...)
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  13.  85
    Subjective probability and the paradox of the gatecrasher.L. J. Cohen - 1981 - Arizona State Law Journal 2 (2).
  14.  82
    Subjective Probability and the Content/Attitude Distinction.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    On an attractive, naturalistically respectable theory of intentionality, mental contents are a form of measurement system for representing behavioral and psychological dispositions. This chapter argues that a consequence of this view is that the content/attitude distinction is measurement system relative. As a result, there is substantial arbitrariness in the content/attitude distinction. Whether some measurement of mental states counts as characterizing the content of mental states or the attitude is not a question of empirical discovery but of theoretical utility. If correct, (...)
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  15.  36
    The Measurement of Subjective Probability.Edward J. R. Elliott - 2024 - Cambridge University Press.
    Beliefs come in degrees, and we often represent those degrees with numbers. We might say, for example, that we are 90% confident in the truth of some scientific hypothesis, or only 30% confident in the success of some risky endeavour. But what do these numbers mean? What, in other words, is the underlying psychological reality to which the numbers correspond? And what constitutes a meaningful difference between numerically distinct representations of belief? In this Element, we discuss the main approaches to (...)
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  16.  57
    Subjective probability: Criticisms, reflections, and problems.H. Kyburg - 1978 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):157 - 180.
  17.  51
    Subjective Probability, Natural Predicates and Hempel's Ravens.Haim Gaifman - 1979 - Erkenntnis 14 (2):105 - 147.
  18.  78
    Subjective probability and acceptance.Mark Norris Lance - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):147 - 179.
  19.  61
    Subjective probabilities inferred from decisions.Ward Edwards - 1962 - Psychological Review 69 (2):109-135.
  20.  17
    Aggregating subjective probabilities: some limitative theorems.Carl Wagner - 1984 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 25 (3):233-240.
  21.  25
    Subjective probability revision and subsequent decisions.Lee R. Beach & James A. Wise - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 81 (3):561.
  22.  70
    Subjective Probability Weighting and the Discovered Preference Hypothesis.Gijs van de Kuilen - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (1):1-22.
    Numerous studies have convincingly shown that prospect theory can better describe risky choice behavior than the classical expected utility model because it makes the plausible assumption that risk aversion is driven not only by the degree of sensitivity toward outcomes, but also by the degree of sensitivity toward probabilities. This article presents the results of an experiment aimed at testing whether agents become more sensitive toward probabilities over time when they repeatedly face similar decisions, receive feedback on the consequences of (...)
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  23.  52
    Subjective probability assessments of the incidence of unethical behavior: the importance of scenario–respondent fit.Darlene Bay & Alexey Nikitkov - 2011 - Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility 20 (1):1-11.
    Largely due to the difficulty of observing behavior, empirical business ethics research relies heavily on the scenario methodology. While not disputing the usefulness of the technique, this paper highlights the importance of a careful assessment of the fit between the context of the situation described in the scenario and the knowledge and experience of the respondents. Based on a study of online auctions, we provide evidence that even respondents who have direct knowledge of the situation portrayed in the scenario may (...)
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  24.  23
    Subjective probability assessments of the incidence of unethical behavior: the importance of scenario-respondent fit.Darlene Bay & Alexey Nikitkov - 2011 - Business Ethics: A European Review 20 (1):1-11.
    Largely due to the difficulty of observing behavior, empirical business ethics research relies heavily on the scenario methodology. While not disputing the usefulness of the technique, this paper highlights the importance of a careful assessment of the fit between the context of the situation described in the scenario and the knowledge and experience of the respondents. Based on a study of online auctions, we provide evidence that even respondents who have direct knowledge of the situation portrayed in the scenario may (...)
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  25.  20
    Subjective probability estimates and confidence ratings.Lee R. Beach & James A. Wise - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (3p1):438.
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  26.  37
    The Axioms of Subjective Probability.Peter C. Fishburn - 1986 - Statistical Science 1 (3):335-358.
  27.  5
    Subjective Probability Weighting and the Discovered Preference Hypothesis.Gijs Kuilen - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (1):1-22.
    Numerous studies have convincingly shown that prospect theory can better describe risky choice behavior than the classical expected utility model because it makes the plausible assumption that risk aversion is driven not only by the degree of sensitivity toward outcomes, but also by the degree of sensitivity toward probabilities. This article presents the results of an experiment aimed at testing whether agents become more sensitive toward probabilities over time when they repeatedly face similar decisions, receive feedback on the consequences of (...)
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  28.  54
    On subjective probability and related problems.Günter Menges - 1970 - Theory and Decision 1 (1):40-60.
    Of late, probability subjectivism was resuscitated by the development of statistical decision theory. In the decision model, which is briefly described in the paper, the knowledge of a probability distribution over the states of nature plays a decisive role. What sources of probability knowledge are legitimate, or at all possible, is the main point at issue. Different definitions, evaluations, and foundations of probability are narrated, discussed, and weighed against each other. The typical research strategy of the (...)
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  29. Countable additivity and subjective probability.Jon Williamson - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
    While there are several arguments on either side, it is far from clear as to whether or not countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability. I focus here on de Finetti's central argument against countable additivity and provide a new Dutch book proof of the principle, To argue that if we accept the Dutch book foundations of subjective probability, countable additivity is an unavoidable constraint.
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  30. Subjective Probability and the Problem of Countable Additivity.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Bruno de Finetti's view that the axiom of countable additivity of the probability calculus cannot be justified in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability. After presenting the core of the subjective theory of probability and the main de Finetti's argument against the axiom of countable additivity (the so called de Finetti's infinite lottery) I argue against de Finetti's view. In particular, I claim that de (...)
     
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  31.  25
    Subjective probability and decision under uncertainty.N. T. Feather - 1959 - Psychological Review 66 (3):150-164.
  32.  31
    Subjective probability in a nutshell.Nick Chater, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Alan Yuille - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (7):287-291.
  33.  21
    Subjective probability and decision strategy.Lee R. Beach & James A. Wise - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (1p1):133.
  34.  42
    Axioms for Type-Free Subjective Probability.Cezary Cieśliński, Leon Horsten & Hannes Leitgeb - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-16.
    We formulate and explore two basic axiomatic systems of type-free subjective probability. One of them explicates a notion of finitely additive probability. The other explicates a concept of infinitely additive probability. It is argued that the first of these systems is a suitable background theory for formally investigating controversial principles about type-free subjective probability.
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  35. Subjective probability and realistic possible worlds.O. Majer - 2001 - Filosoficky Casopis 49 (3):495-505.
  36.  29
    Studies in subjective probability.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1964 - Huntington, N.Y.: Krieger. Edited by Howard Edward Smokler.
  37.  78
    Subjective probabilities and betting quotients.Colin Howson - 1989 - Synthese 81 (1):1 - 8.
    This paper addresses the problem of why the conditions under which standard proofs of the Dutch Book argument proceed should ever be met. In particular, the condition that there should be odds at which you would be willing to bet indifferently for or against are hardly plausible in practice, and relaxing it and applying Dutch book considerations gives only the theory of upper and lower probabilities. It is argued that there are nevertheless admittedly rather idealised circumstances in which the classic (...)
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  38.  18
    Subjective probabilities inferred from estimates and bets.Lee R. Beach & Lawrence D. Phillips - 1967 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 75 (3):354.
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  39.  38
    Objectifying Subjective Probabilities: Dutch Book Arguments for Principles of Direct Inference.Timothy Childers - 2012 - In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stöltzner & Marcel Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws, and Structures. Springer Verlag.
  40.  39
    Subjective probability, objective probability, and coherence.Richard Otte - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):373-380.
  41.  13
    Subjective Probability, Objective Probability, and Coherence.Richard Otte - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):373-380.
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  42.  69
    Subjective Probability and Indifference.Roy A. Sorensen - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):15 -.
  43.  69
    Objectively reliable subjective probabilities.Cory F. Juhl - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):293 - 309.
    Subjective Bayesians typically find the following objection difficult to answer: some joint probability measures lead to intuitively irrational inductive behavior, even in the long run. Yet well-motivated ways to restrict the set of reasonable prior joint measures have not been forthcoming. In this paper I propose a way to restrict the set of prior joint probability measures in particular inductive settings. My proposal is the following: where there exists some successful inductive method for getting to the truth (...)
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  44.  52
    On the subjective probability of compound events.Maya Bar-Hillel - 1973 - Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 9 (3):396-406.
    Subjects were requested to choose between gambles, where the outcome of one gamble depended on a single elementary event, and the other depended on an event compounded of a series of such elementary events. The data supported the hypothesis that the subjective probability of a compound event is systematically biased in the direction of the probability of its components resulting in overestimation of conjunctive events and underestimation of disjunctive events. Studies pertaining to this topic are discussed.
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  45.  26
    A primacy effect in subjective probability revision.Cameron R. Peterson & Wesley M. Ducharme - 1967 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 73 (1):61.
  46.  36
    Internal consistency of subjective probabilities.Cameron R. Peterson, Z. J. Ulehla, Alan J. Miller, Lyle E. Bourne & Donald W. Stilson - 1965 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (5):526.
  47.  11
    Sensitivity of subjective probability revision.Cameron R. Peterson & Alan J. Miller - 1965 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (1):117.
  48.  93
    Conceptual fallacies in subjective probability.Roger M. Cooke - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):21-27.
    Subjective probability considered as a logic of partial belief succumbs to three fundamental fallacies. These concern the representation of preference via expectation, the measurability of partial belief, and the normalization of belief.
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  49.  60
    Can reliabilists believe in subjective probability?Peter Baumann - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):199-200.
    According to reliabilist conceptions of knowledge, knowledge implies reliable true belief. Since reliability is an irreducibly probabilistic notion, one's view of knowledge also depends on one's view of probability. If one believes that all probability is subjective probability, knowledge becomes a relativized concept: knowledge is relative to a given body of beliefs of a given person at a given time. Since such a relativized conception of knowledge is extremely implausible and since reliabilism seems to capture at (...)
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  50.  21
    Training and conservatism in subjective probability revision.David M. Messick & Francis T. Campos - 1972 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 94 (3):335.
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