Unlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of consciousness of the stimuli in their blind field. What is the nature of that consciousness? Is it visual experience? I address these questions by considering whether we can establish the existence of any structural—necessary—features of visual experience. I argue that it is very difficult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I investigate whether it is possible to visually, or (...) more generally perceptually, experience form or movement at a distance from our body, without experiencing colour. The traditional answer, advocated by Aristotle, and some other philosophers, up to and including the present day, is that it is not and hence colour is a structural feature of visual experience. I argue that there is no good reason to think that this is impossible, and provide evidence from four cases—sensory substitution, achomatopsia, phantom contours and amodal completion—in favour of the idea that it is possible. If it is possible then one important reason for rejecting the idea that people with type 2 blindsight do not have visual experiences is undermined. I suggest further experiments that could be done to help settle the matter. (shrink)

Several promising approaches have been developed to represent conscious experience in terms of mathematical spaces and structures. What is missing, however, is an explicit definition of what a ‘mathematical structure of conscious experience’ is. Here, we propose such a definition. This definition provides a link between the abstract formal entities of mathematics and the concreta of conscious experience; it complements recent approaches that study quality spaces, qualia spaces, or phenomenal spaces; and it provides a general method (...) to identify and investigate structures of conscious experience. We hope that ultimately this work provides a basis for developing a common formal language to study consciousness. (shrink)

Gordon Nagel’s Kant differs sharply form Berkeley. More importantly, he offers a powerful and systematic account of perception and understanding which can be argued to be a serious contender in contemporary discussions of epistemology and cognitive psychology. Readers tempted to think that Kant may be dismissed because of his commitments to the myths of the given and the analytic/empirical distinction are forced to think again. Here we have a Kant for whom the given is analyzable and who is a species (...) of holist—and yet who also defends a detailed account of a priori structures of experiences. Nagel offers us all this and more including illuminating discussions of Kant’s departures from the Modern tradition, a suggestive discussion of analogies between twentieth-century accounts of language and Kant’s account of cognitive synthesis, and a distinction between interpretation and understanding that helps demystify the phenomena/noumena distinction. (shrink)

For the first time this volume makes Jean-Pierre Meunier's influential thoughts on the film experience available for an English-speaking readership. Introduced and commented by specialists in film studies and philosophy, Meunier's intricate phenomenological descriptions of the spectator's engagement with fiction films, documentaries and home movies can reach the wide audience they have deserved ever since their publication in French in 1969.

The as-structure provided by language, even in the sciences, is always constitutive of experience and never merely designative. “From Saying…it comes to pass that the World is made to appear” (Heidegger 1971 [1957]: 101).

The transformation of the relations between reflection and reality and between concepts and their correspondent objects into themes represents even in the present a field for most heated discussions. The joining of conceptual schemes corresponding to the intellect and reality represents a problem which is still to be solved. A solution to this problem was proposed by R. Carnap in his extremely ambitious project from Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928). Overlooked for a long time, this work has returned to (...) the philosophical spotlight in recent years, because philosophers finally realized that Carnap’s project comprises almost allthe major themes of contemporary epistemology, such as the relation between theory and reality, between concepts and experience, the major lines of a phenomenology and of a “logic of experience” or the status of language and of the concepts of science. Situated at the confluence of some philosophical traditions such as neo-kantian philosophy, the logical analysis of Russell and Wittgenstein, but also phenomenology, Carnap’s program in Aufbau starts from some premises such: the need to control experience (= major stake of any scientific knowledge); the orientation towards form of the modern concept of scientific knowledge (under Kant’s direct influence); the assertion of a concept of knowledge mostly relational or structural (issue resulted in the orientation towards form of modern knowledge); the need for a methodology engaged in a constructive way and modelled on mathematical thinking; our reporting to the instance of sensitivity in the formation of experience (under E. Mach’s influence). (shrink)

Visual experience is often characterised as being essentially spatial, and auditory experience essentially temporal. But this contrast, which is based upon the temporal structure of the objects of sensory experience rather than the experiences to which they give rise, is somewhat superficial. By carefully examining the various sources of temporal variation in the chemical senses we can more clearly identify the temporal profile of the resulting smell and taste (aka flavour) experiences. This in turn suggests that (...) at least some of the objects of olfactory experience have significant temporal structure, including interactions between odorants and the body’s own sensory systems. This can help to inform our understanding not only of the metaphysics of olfaction, but the temporal structure of sensory processing and experience in other sense-modalities, including vision and audition. (shrink)

In many contemporary philosophical writings, what is most surprising to me is not the things asserted, nor those denied, but those not even mentioned . Several of these slighted topics are summed up in the title of this essay. At the age of twenty, when I was not reading any technical philosophers, nor any author who held an essentially social view of experience, I attempted to persuade myself of the adequacy of a non-social view, expressed partly in a self-interest (...) theory of motivation, and partly in an idea of perception as experience of things not themselves constituted by any sort of experiences. So far from succeeding in this attempt, I began to find reasons for regarding both motivation and perception as manifestations of a single principle, that of the overlapping or inter-individual unity of minds, not simply of human minds, but of mind on various levels of, nature, including inorganic nature. This overlapping I thought I found in experience itself, and not merely through speculation or postulation. Subsequent reading in philosophy has not shown me a basic error in Hhis early philosophizing, but only a vagueness and blurring of dis; Jinctions which, when taken into account, strengthen rather than weaken the case. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is the comparison of the conceptions of Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Blanchot, which should serve as a basis of the further contemplation of the relationship between the thinking and experience. The shared critical view of the phenomenological interpretation of experience leads both philosophers to an alter- native conception, in which experience transcends thinking and in face of such an experience the reality is an alterity. However, the experience of alterity, which (...) under- lines the wholeness and temporal unity of all human thinking, is conceived differently, resulting in different conceptions of subjectivity: With Levinas the domi- nating role is played by humankind as the opposite of the nonhuman, while with Blanchot the dichotomy is dissolved. His conception is thus a challenge to conceive the experience, thinking and reality beyond the human/nonhuman dichotomy. (shrink)

Faced by the issue of co-education in his book Opinions, the English philosopher C E M Joad once tried to draw up an intuitive list of the differences between little boys and girls. His list was an intelligent man’s summary of the salient distinguishing features characterised by the non-scientist’s reluctance to invoke behaviouristic factors. He thus opined that boys were more abstract, girls more empirical, boys more inquisitive, girls more obedient, and so on. An analogous account of the relations holding (...) between literature and philosophy will have occurred to people who read widely and credit themselves with a cultured receptivity: their commonest formula is that literature portrays real life while philosophy explains it. At this level of insight come those readers who state as a grave paradox that Dostoievski is ‘really more of a philosopher’ and Plato ‘a creative writer’. Others perceive that though philosophy may achieve the artistic effects of poetry or the novel, it is normally governed by rigour of method; that written philosophy tends to follow Occam’s razor, whereas literature approaches the sublime almost in inverse proportion to the noted rule, since a considerable part of its aesthetic relies on repetition, digression or what the Russian formalist critic Sklovskij termed ‘postponement of the effect’. Perhaps indeed there are some lateral factors, symptoms rather than causes, which do throw light on the parting of company between literary and philosophical writing: there is, for example, no such thing as a child prodigy in philosophy, though such a phenomenon exists in all the arts. Wittgenstein was making his first jottings at the same age when Rimbaud had given up writing poetry. No philosopher has developed a system by the age when most great novelists have formed their style. If personal maturity is a sine qua non of philosophy, it is marginal, even deleterious, to literature, for it may close off and ossify the inspiration, as is thought to be the case with the Wordsworth of 1840 onwards. The writer must in a sense never grow up, not only for the oft-cited reason that he has to remain in touch with the material provided by memory, but also because the disponibilité to experience of youth and early adulthood seems to be the essential initiatory stage of the literary hero. Jacopo Ortis, Julien Sorel, Raskolnikov, Felix Krull and Amory Blaine constitute a perennial type for all of whom adventure, travel, temptation and conflict are items of implicit acceptance. (shrink)

I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed (...) into more sharply defined views, and then argue that these views are inconsistent with certain empirical facts about how time is represented in the brain. These facts instead support a kind of atomic view, on which temporal experiences are temporally unstructured atoms. (shrink)

The Promethean background As the scientific rationality of Western civilization began to bear its full fruit, it became increasingly conscious of its ...

John J. McDermott's anthology, _The Philosophy of John Dewey_, provides the best general selection available of the writings of America's most distinguished philosopher and social critic. This comprehensive collection, ideal for use in the classroom and indispensable for anyone interested in the wide scope of Dewey's thought and works, affords great insight into his role in the history of ideas and the basic integrity of his philosophy. This edition combines in one book the two volumes previously published separately. Volume 1, (...) "The Structure of Experience," contains essays on metaphysics, the logic of inquiry, the problem of knowledge, and value theory. In volume 2, "The Lived Experience," Dewey's writings on pedagogy, ethics, the aesthetics of the "live creature," politics, and the philosophy of culture are presented. McDermott has prefaced each essay with a helpful explanatory note and has written an excellent general introduction to the anthology. (shrink)

According to the Matching Thesis (MT), the temporal structure of experience in time matches the apparent temporal structure of the objects and events represented in the content of perceptual experience. In this paper I critically address attempts to show the MT on the grounds that perceptual experience is transparent: that experiences themselves possess no introspectively discernible temporal structure apart from that of the apparent objects perceived. Pace such a Transparency Argument for the MT, I (...) argue that considerations of perceptual transparency can in fact ground no view about the relationship between the temporal structure of perceptual experiences and the apparent temporal structure of objects and events that experience represents. I defend this outcome against a line of objection having to do with self-knowledge. (shrink)

It is common to characterize pain with touch-related terms, like ‘cutting’, ‘pressing’, ‘sharp’, and ‘pulsing’, or temperature-related terms, like ‘hot’ or ‘burning’. This suggests that many pains are phenomenally multimodal because they are experienced as having some tactile-like or thermal-like character. The goal of this chapter is to investigate the structure of phenomenally multimodal pain experiences. It is argued that the usual accounts of multimodal structure proposed in investigations regarding exteroceptive experiences cannot be plausibly applied to multimodal experiences (...) of pain. Instead, an alternative framework is proposed which characterizes the structure of tactile-like and thermal-like pains by referring to the notion of crossmodal correspondences. (shrink)

Color experience is structured. Some ?unique? colors (red, green, yellow, and blue) appear as ?pure,? or containing no trace of any other color. Others can be considered as a mixture of these colors, or as ?binary colors.? According to a widespread assumption, this unique/binary structure of color experience is to be explained in terms of neurophysiological structuring (e.g., by opponent processes) and has no genuine explanatory basis in the physical stimulus. The argument from structure builds on (...) these assumptions to argue that colors are not properties of surfaces and that color experiences are neural processes without environmental counterparts. We reconsider the argument both in terms of its logic and in the light of recent models in vision science which point at environment-involving patterns that may be at the basis of the unique/binary structure of color experience. We conclude that, in the light of internal and external problems which arise for it, the argument from structure fails. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: The generative method outlined in the target article produces some interesting results, demonstrating the value of cardio-phenomenology. The proposed division of categories reflecting the structure of experience into sub-categories suggests that prior theoretical commitments may have influenced the process of analysis in ways the authors might not (...) have foreseen or intended. This commentary discusses potential areas for future work, proposing that some modifications to the methodology might lessen possibly unforeseen influences on the central process of classification. (shrink)

In the philosophy of perception, representationalism is the view that all phenomenological differences among mental states are representational differences, in other words, differences in content. In this paper I defend an alternative view which I call external sortalism, inspired by traditional adverbialism, and according to which experiences are not essentially representational. The central idea is that the external world serves as a model for sorting, conceptualizing, and reasoning surrogatively about perceptual experience. On external sortalism, contents are construed as a (...) kind of gloss on experiences themselves. We can retain what is attractive about representationalism, namely, that perceptual experiences can be evaluated for accuracy, without problematic commitment to the idea that they bear a substantive, representational relation to external objects and properties and that this relation determines the phenomenal character of experience. (shrink)

This paper describes a method for analyzing a corpus of descriptions collected through micro-phenomenological interviews. This analysis aims at identifying the structure of the singular experiences which have been described, and in particular their diachronic structure, while unfolding generic experiential structures through an iterative approach. After summarizing the principles of the micro-phenomenological interview, and then describing the process of preparation of the verbatim, the article presents on the one hand, the principles and conceptual devices of the analysis method (...) and on the other hand several dimensions of the analysis process: the modes of structural unfolding of generic structures, the mutual guidance of the processes of structural and experiential unfolding, the tracking of analysis processes, and finally the assessment of analysis results. (shrink)

This innovative new collection features six original essays exploring the spatial, temporal, and other structures that shape conscious perception. Includes cutting-edge research on an increasingly influential topic in the philosophy of the mind Explores structural differences between the senses and between different theories of perceptual experience Offers innovative new arguments on the philosophy of perception written by leading scholars in the field.

In this expository article one of the contributions of Jean Cavailles to the philosophy of mathematics is presented: the analysis of ‘mathematical experience’. The place of Cavailles on the logico-philosophical scene of the 30s and 40s is sketched. I propose a partial interpretation of Cavailles's epistemological program of so-called ‘conceptual dialectics’: mathematical holism, duality principles, the notion of formal contents, and the specific temporal structure of conceptual dynamics. The structure of mathematical abstraction is analysed in terms of (...) its complementary dimensions: paradigmatic generalization (domain extension, descriptive definitions, creative role of the symbolism...) and thematic reflexivity of concepts (promotion of operations to objects of a higher type). (shrink)

John Macmurray, one of the most brilliant of the younger English philosophers, sets forth his conception of a religion which he believes can save the world from chaos. He regards religion as having its springs in the relations between human individuals, and thinks that a religion that is not concerned with inherent social questions is no religion at all, or rather, it is a religion that has been falsified and that has lost the clue to its own meaning. According to (...) his view, every aspect of progress, every scientific advance, the achievement of every artist and every mystic is to be tested not against a supernatural world but in the practical world of human society. It is only in this way that the efficacy of religion and its high usefulness to mankind will be able to continue in its historical importance and perhaps even create a world of peace and well-being. (shrink)