Business ethics – both stockholder and stakeholder theories – makes the same mistake as the one made by the traditional ethics of medicine. The traditional ethics of medicine was a teleological ethics predicated on the assumption that the goal of medicine was to prolong life and promote better health. But, as bioethicists have made plain, these are not the only or even the overriding goals of most patients. Most of us have goals and values that limit our desire for (...) medical treatments. Similarly, the view of the stockholder in business ethics is that the stockholder has only one interest – profit. If stockholders have no other values or interests that would limit their desire for additional profit, their sole interest is in profit maximization. But investors are real people with interests and values that balance and limit their desire for profit. It would be an extremely odd individual who cared for nothing except more profit. And institutional investors are supposed to serve the interests of individual investors. Stockholders hold many stakes in the firms in which they invest. The conclusion that most stockholders have interests that would limit the pursuit of maximum profit has significant implications both for business ethics and for the management of for-profit corporations. Something like “informed consent for investors” is needed. Corporate managers, to the extent that they are to be agents of their stockholders, must not simply pursue profit maximization. They must ascertain the interests and values of their investors that limit the single-minded pursuit of profit. (shrink)

This paper analyses the arguments for two competing ethical models of business. On the one hand there are theorists like Milton Friedman who claim that the sole social responsibility of business leaders is to maximise stockholder profits. On the other, there are those who argue that a business has ethical responsibilities to many stakeholders: employees, stockholders, retailers, customers, and so on. I argue that a business has ethical responsibility over those functions and purposes over which it has the most (...) autonomous control. The production and selling of products and services for customers is the primary purpose of a business. The generation of profit is a contingent purpose dependent on the exchange between the business and the customer. I define excellent functioning businesses as those that synergise the purposes of stakeholders to provide products and services with ethical outcomes. When ethical considerations and business interests between stakeholders conflict, the responsibility of a business to its customers has primacy over those related to business input stakeholders such as employees, stockholders and suppliers. (shrink)

Stockholder and stakeholder perspectives have been positioned in the literature as being in tension, and thus a potential source of innovation and change. However, researchers have overlooked a systematic examination of this presumption in theory and in practice. This study explores the ways that stockholder and stakeholder assumptions are presented by theorists and compares these with expressions of stockholder and stakeholder perspectives used by firms in practice. We argue that theoretical entrenchment dichotomizing these perspectives has disrupted the (...) ability of researchers to leverage this tension. While scholarship remains trapped in a vicious cycle, we also argue that firms in practice express only the acceptance dimension of a virtuous cycle. Our empirical research demonstrates that firms accept and accommodate the paradoxical tension between managing for stockholders versus balancing the interests of stakeholders. This is evidenced by strategies we identify as book‐ending, cadence, continuous and simultaneous co‐mingling, and hybridization. We find that in practice these tensions are more integrated whereas in theory they are treated as more distinct and, often, in conflict. We suggest ways in which both scholarship and practice can better leverage tension as paradoxical opportunity. (shrink)

Here I synthesize certain ideas presented in two different articles that appeared in the same issue of Business Ethics Quarterly. One article (Hasnas) invokes the stockholder model as a valid normative theory of business ethics, the other article (Dunfee) invokes a marketplace of morality. Both articles imply that the accepted financial-economic view of the firm is a view that can accommodateethics. I offer empirical support for this view. I also identify the ethic of the stockholder model as a (...) variant on might-makes-right andconsider the social acceptance of this ethic as a postmodern phenomenon. (shrink)

In order to ensure that corporations act in socially responsible ways. R. Freeman says that firms should be legally required to act in accordance with the directives of a moral theory which he developed especially for business – a theory which has come to be called "normative stakeholder theory" (NST). I argue that NST fails as a moral theory and that this failure indicates: (1) that we should abandon the quest to develop a special moral theory for use in business, (...) and (2) that we should not attempt to impose the use of any moral theory upon business, but rather should allow corporations to determine their moral responsibilities in any way they see fit. (shrink)

This paper attempts to address the question of the ethical obligations of stockholders. Having presumed a rather narrow conception of the nature of property, and citing the limitations on stockholders rights and/or power, some have suggested that stockholders have no significant moral responsibilities. Others say that stockholders have moral responsibilities which they derive from the fact that the shareholders of a corporation are the legal owners of it. This article first of all, contests the view that stockholders have no responsibilities (...) regarding the moral or immoral activities of the corporation in which they invest. It will be maintained, however, that while stockholders have moral responsibilities to monitor corporate decisions and perhaps, to actively try to influence the corporation to act morally, such ethical obligations cannot be derived solely from the stockholders' legal ownership of the corporation. The true ground of the moral obligations of stockholders is a social/political one and one which embraces a broadened conception of the nature of property. (shrink)

The normative foundations of the investor centered model of corporate governance, represented in mainstream economics by the nexus-of-contracts view of the firm, have come under attack, mainly by proponents of normative stakeholder theory. We argue that the nexusof- contracts view is static and limited due to its assumption of price-output certainty. We attempt a synthesis of the nexus-of-contracts and the Knightian views, which provides novel insights into the normative adequacy of the investor-centered firm. Implications for scholarship and management practice follow (...) from our discussion. (shrink)

This essay responds to Hasnas’s recent article “The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed” in Business Ethics Quarterly. Hasnas claims that the stockholder theory is more plausible than commonly supposed and that the stakeholder theory is prone to significant difficulties. I argue that Hasnas’s reasons for favoring the stockholder over the stakeholder theory are not asstrong as he suggests. Following Hasnas, I examine both theories in light of two sets of normative considerations: utilitarian anddeontological. (...) First, I show that utilitarian considerations clearly favor the stakeholder theory. I then argue that though Hasnas rightly accents the basic deontological constraint at the core of the stockholder theory, he is wrong to think that acknowledging such a constraint necessarily counts against the stakeholder theory. Here, I develop Ross’s notion of prima facie obligations to show how a viable stakeholder theory might be developed within a deontological framework. (shrink)

Managers in Peru, South Africa, and the United States were classified into four groups along Singhapakdi et al. (J Bus Ethics 15:1131–1140, 1996) Perceived Role of Ethics and Social Responsibility (PRESOR) scale. In Peru and the United States, individuals in the ethics and social responsibility first category reported greater satisfaction with organizational performance than did those in the profits first category. Moral capitalists—individuals who report high emphases on both social responsibility and profits—reported the highest satisfaction with performance in the United (...) States. Managers in the United States are more likely than their counterparts in Peru and South Africa to reject the mutual exclusivity of prioritizing social responsibility and profits simultaneously. Directions for future research are outlined. (shrink)

In general it is found that the corporate managers and stockholders possess totally different view about good governance of a company. Managers strongly believe that governance of their companies is quite well but stockholders view that it is very poor. The study found that the groups differ in perception especially in terms of turnover, production, capital, leverage, debt service, credit policy, solvency, human resource, recruitment, technology, customer satisfaction, internal control, strength, opportunity, competition, industry position, collective bargaining agent (CBA) issues, and (...) economic remedies; whereas, they have similar view in terms of adequacy of research fund, company weaknesses and threats, contingency plans, presence of political influence. The managers think that the companies do not have enough retained earnings and these should not be distributed among stockholders, but the stockholders thinkotherwise. Managers always perceive that they are underpaid whereas stockholders express the opposite view. Each group believes that it is the other group that dominates the decision-making. Both the group wants to have mutual interaction but stockholders want to interact more than the mangers. The study noted that corporate managers’ tenure is more with the company than a stockholder’s holding of stock. The study also found that the managers are better educated than the stockholders. The study observed serious gender biasness both in management position and stockholding of the corporations. Though both the groups belong to same age level but their distribution shows stockholders enter into the share market at an early age. (shrink)

The narrative world of the Alien universe is shot through with self‐interested motivations, many of which focus on money. Employees do not have Full Moral Status (FMS), but from the point of view of managers they are valuable assets, i.e., have instrumental value for what they can do to maximize profits. The company, or its agents, repeatedly violates the stringent restrictions on harming beings normally considered to have FMS. There are indications that Carter Burke tried to impregnate Ripley in Aliens (...) by pushing a Facehugger onto her in the lab. This chapter questions what sort of protections would the crews of the Nostromo, Sulaco, and Prometheus have if stockholder theory were rejected. There are at least three different theories people can use to evaluate how each iteration of Weyland Industries treats its employees in the Alien films. These include stockholder theory, libertarian theories, and stakeholder theory. (shrink)

Following on from work on stakeholder identification, this paper constructs a typology of stakeholder theories based on the extent to which serving the interests of non-shareholders relative to those of shareholders is accepted as a responsibility of companies. A typology based on the division of stakeholder theories into normative, descriptive, and instrumental is rejected on the grounds that the latter two designations refer to second order theories rather than divisions within stakeholder theory and the first is a designation which, for (...) the purposes of business ethics, applies to all stakeholder theories. The crucial distinction between stockholder and stakeholder theory is argued to be their respective rejection and acceptance of role-specific responsibilities toward non-shareholders that are `ultimate objective fulfilling''. From this starting point, a typology is constructed using a division of stakeholder theories into those which do and do not give priority to the interests of shareholders over those of non-shareholders, do and do not posit perfect duties towards non-shareholders as well as shareholders, do and do not accept accountability to non-shareholders as well as shareholders. (shrink)

At least since the publication of the monumental Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984), the “stakeholder theory” originated by R. E. Freeman has engrossed much of the business ethics literature. Subsequently, some advocates have moved a bit too quickly and without proper definition or argument. They have exceeded Freeman’s intentions which are more libertarian and free-market than is often thought. This essay focuses on the versions of stakeholder theory directly authored or coauthored by Freeman in an effort to recover (1) (...) Freeman’s intentions and (2) the argumentative justification of stakeholder theory. It then argues that Freeman’s appeal to legal, economic, and ethical constraints ultimately produce arguments that are invalid. One can thoroughly support legislation constraining corporations or seeking to prevent age discrimination, market monopolies, and externalities and regret the extent that capitalism is heir to such shortcomings without it following that (1) business beneficiaries should be changed from stockholders to stakeholders and (2) the latter should be given serious decision-making power. Further, stakeholder theory neither defines nor battles any obvious opposition. Hence, it is difficult to see what it changes about business management. In short, stakeholder theory either changes too much about business, or nothing important at all (depending on one’s interpretation). Efforts to supplant or improve the reigning theory of capitalism will have to do better. (shrink)

This paper is the third in a series of four that is directed at understanding and assessing stakeholder theory for the purposes of business ethics. It addresses the suitability and viability of the theory, rejecting objections of a moral and efficiency sort based (respectively) on claims about property rights and the economic superiority of the alternative stockholder approach, but accepting that implementation problems require limiting both the number of groupings admitted to stakeholder status and the degree of responsibility towards (...) them. The conclusion looks forward to the construction of a suitably limited version of the stakeholder approach in a fourth paper drawing upon this one and the previous two. (shrink)

The Business Roundtable's “Purpose of a Corporation” letter announced a shift from stockholder primacy to stakeholder primacy. Interestingly, we contend the letter's language employed a technical efficiency emphasis, suggesting a firm's executives chose to make this shift because they believed doing so would improve the firm's financial performance, via improved corporate governance. We examine whether investors actually accepted the technical efficiency arguments at face value, or in contrast believed the announcements were merely a “rational myth,” what management thought investors (...) would want to hear. We employ a 2-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) event study for 140 publicly-held firms. Overall, we find investor support for the announcement. In addition, we found how returns to firms with prior similar announcements were negative at the time of the announcement. Also, the returns for firms having multiple signatories were positive and significant. (shrink)

Traditional corporate finance endorses the principle of stockholder wealth maximization as the purpose of business. In light of recent scandals and legislation, businesses are increasingly expected to use financial resources in a manner which benefits society and not just the owners of the firm. This imputation of a corporate soul will necessarily reduce investor returns, which has at least two major financial implications for the firm and the economy. The first is that it may cause investors to change their (...) required rates of return and thereby change the amount of capital available to firms, and the economy. The second is that it may implicitly replace equity with debt in the capital structure of firms, with all that implies for financing and corporate governance. The purpose of this article is to examine these implications and evaluate their sometimes counterintuitive consequences. (shrink)

When making an assessment of animal welfare, it is important to take environmental (housing) or animal-based parameters into account. An alternative approach is to focus on the behavior and appearance of the animal, without making actual measurements or quantifying this. None of these tell the whole story. In this paper, we suggest that it is possible to find common ground between these (seemingly) diametrically opposed positions and argue that this may be the way to deal with the complexity of animal (...) welfare. The model will have to be acceptable for the different parties that will be affected by it and real benefits for the animal should result from it. This will be the basis of a practical ethical approach. All this can be condensed into a model that essentially is made up out of three basic elements: the classical welfare analysis with an existing welfare assessment tool, an assessment of the stockholder, and an implementation of the Free Choice Profiling technique. This new framework does not pretend to be a different or better animal welfare matrix; it is intended to integrate existing knowledge and to provide a practical tool to improve animal welfare. It identifies whether there are welfare problems on a farm, if present whether these problems are caused by the housing system or the stockholder, and what can be done to improve the situation. (shrink)

Although stockholders may benefit from information regarding the frequently substantial charitable and political contributions of the corporations they own, US corporations are typically not required to disclose any information about such payments in annual financial statements or information submitted periodically to regulatory agencies. This lack of transparency is confounded by disclosure requirements of private foundations, which a corporation may choose to establish for the purposes of administering charitable giving for the corporation. The resulting disclosure fog engendered by extant regulations may (...) be confusing to those corporation owners who would like to know what corporation contributions are being made to charities and politicians. This article enumerates the magnitude of the charitable and political gifts of 40 of the most generous public corporations in the USA, the current disclosure requirements for public companies, the role of foundations, rationales for withholding relevant information from owners, and ethically questionable strategies that corporations may use to manage those disclosures for their benefit. (shrink)

Although stockholders may benefit from information regarding the frequently substantial charitable and political contributions of the corporations they own, US corporations are typically not required to disclose any information about such payments in annual financial statements or information submitted periodically to regulatory agencies. This lack of transparency is confounded by disclosure requirements of private foundations, which a corporation may choose to establish for the purposes of administering charitable giving for the corporation. The resulting disclosure fog engendered by extant regulations may (...) be confusing to those corporation owners who would like to know what corporation contributions are being made to charities and politicians. This article enumerates the magnitude of the charitable and political gifts of 40 of the most generous public corporations in the USA, the current disclosure requirements for public companies, the role of foundations, rationales for withholding relevant information from owners, and ethically questionable strategies that corporations may use to manage those disclosures for their benefit. (shrink)

Contrary to stockholder theories that place the interests of profit-seeking owners above all else, stakeholder theorists argue that corporate executives have moral and ethical obligations to consider equally the interests of a wide range of stakeholders affected by the actions of a corporation. This paper argues that the stakeholder approach is particularly appropriate for the governance of news media companies and outlines an ethical framework to guide news company executives.

This study examines the effect of a business ethics course on undergraduates’ attitudes toward the importance of corporate ethics and social responsibility, as measured by the PRESOR scale. It employs a survey approach, adopting a pretest/posttest methodology in the data collection. A total of 132 undergraduate students were surveyed over a period of four semesters during 2006 and 2007. To test the effects of individual personality characteristics and examine their potential interaction with ethical education, participants’ personal values and degree of (...) Machiavellianism were also assessed. The business ethics course resulted in significantly less support for the traditional “stockholder view” of business, providing backing for the inclusion of a stand-alone business ethics course in the business studies curriculum. In addition, among nonbusiness majors, the course resulted in significantly greater support for the “stakeholder view,” suggesting that it would be especially beneficial to open such a course to nonbusiness students. (shrink)

This paper discusses the normative ethical theory of the business firm advanced principally by William E. Evan and R. Edward Freeman. According to their stakeholder theory, the firm should be managed for the benefit of its stakeholders: indeed, management has a fiduciary obligation to stakeholders to act as their agent. In this paper I seek to clarify the theory by discussing the concept of a stakeholder and by distinguishing stakeholder theory from two varieties of stockholder theory-I call them ‘pure’ (...) and ‘tinged.’ I argue that the distinctive claims of stakeholder theory, as contrasted with tinged stockholder theories, have been inadequately supported by argument. (shrink)

Using measures developed by Singhapakdi et al. (1996, Journal of Business ethics 15, 1131–1140) the perceived importance of ethics and social responsibility (PRESOR) is measured among MBA students in the United States, Malaysia and Ukraine revealing a stockholder view and two stakeholder views. Relativism and Idealism are also measured. The scores of MBA students are compared among each other and with those of the U.S. managers who were part of the original study. Managers'' scores tend to be significantly higher (...) on the Stockholder and Stakeholder II views, and much lower on Relativism than the MBA students. The Malaysian MBA students scored higher than did the American MBA students on Relativism, Idealism and the Stockholder view. The Ukrainian MBA students'' scores on the three PRESOR factors are generally similar to those of the American MBAs, while they had the highest scores of any group on the Relativism scale. Overall, the patterns of responses, as much as the significant differences on specific scales, support the notion that culture, however defined, affects both values and ethics. Several directions for future research are identified.''. (shrink)

Social and environmental ratings provided by social rating agencies are multidimensional. The first goal of our paper is to identify a small number of independent and relevant socially responsible (SR) dimensions reflecting a firms’ coherent posture toward social issues. We put forward that these dimensions are not exactly the same as the ESG ones (Environment, Social, and Governance). Using the six sub-ratings provided by the Vigeo rating agency, we perform a principal component analysis and we highlight three main independent SR (...) dimensions related to (1) business stakeholders (employees, customers, and suppliers), (2) societal stakeholders (environment and society), and (3) financial stakeholders (stockholders and debt holders). The second objective of our paper is to explore the link between stock returns and these three SR dimensions. Our most notable finding is that for each SR dimension, investors ask for an additional risk premium when they accept to hold non-socially responsible stocks. The cost of equity is thus lower for SR firms. The average premium over the period 2003–2010 is larger for the components “business stakeholders” and “financial stakeholders” than for the component “societal stakeholders.” The premium for this last component has only existed since the end of 2008. Since that time, environment and community involvement have become important risk factors strongly considered by investors. For the three dimensions, investors notably penalize large non-social firms and reward small social firms. (shrink)

This study adds to the empirical evidence supporting a significant connection between ethics and profitability by examining the connection between published reports of unethical behaviour by publicly traded U.S. and multinational firms and the performance of their stock. Using reports of unethical behaviour published in the Wall Street Journal from 1989 to 1993, the analysis shows that the actual stock performance for those companies was lower than the expected market adjusted returns. Unethical conduct by firms which is discovered and publicized (...) does impact on the shareholders by lowering the value of their stock for an appreciable period of time. Whatever their views on whether ethical behaviour is profitable, managers should be able to see a definite connection between unethical behaviour and the worth of their firm's stock. Stockholders, the press and regulators should find this information important in pressing for greater corporate and managerial accountability. (shrink)

The three leading normative theories of business ethics are the stockholder theory, the stakeholder theory, and the social contracttheory. Currently, the stockholder theory is somewhat out of favor with many members of the business ethics community. Thestakeholder theory, in contrast, is widely accepted, and the social contract theory appears to be gaining increasing adherents. In thisarticle, I undertake a critical review of the supporting arguments for each of the theories, and argue that the stockholder theory is neitheras (...) outdated nor as flawed as it is sometimes made to seem and that there are significant problems with the grounding of both thestakeholder and social contract theory. I conclude by suggesting that a truly adequate normative theory of business ethics must ultimately be grounded in individual consent. (shrink)

The stakeholder approach offers the opportunity to consider corporate responsibility in a wider sense than that afforded by the stockholder or shareholder approaches. Having said that, this article aims to show that this theory does not offer a normative corporate responsibility concept that can be our response to two basic questions. On the one hand, for what is the company morally responsible and, on the other hand, why is the corporation morally responsible in terms of conventional and post-conventional perspectives? (...) The reason why the stakeholder approach does not offer such a definition, as we shall see, is because the normative stakeholder approaches tend to confuse the social validity with the moral validity or legitimacy. It leads us to a conventional definition of corporate moral responsibility (CMR) that is not relevant to the pluralistic and global framework of our societies and economies. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate this intuition. (shrink)

Argues that many corporate executives have destroyed the value of their companies, cheated stockholders, employees, and the public, and compromised the integrity of financial markets and accountants while enriching themselves.

The three leading normative theories of business ethics are the stockholder theory, the stakeholder theory, and the social contracttheory. Currently, the stockholder theory is somewhat out of favor with many members of the business ethics community. Thestakeholder theory, in contrast, is widely accepted, and the social contract theory appears to be gaining increasing adherents. In thisarticle, I undertake a critical review of the supporting arguments for each of the theories, and argue that the stockholder theory is neitheras (...) outdated nor as flawed as it is sometimes made to seem and that there are significant problems with the grounding of both thestakeholder and social contract theory. I conclude by suggesting that a truly adequate normative theory of business ethics must ultimately be grounded in individual consent. (shrink)

Stakeholder theorists have generally misunderstood the nature and ramifications of the fiduciary responsibilities that corporate directors owe their stockholders. This fiduciary duty requires the exercise of care, loyalty, and honesty with regard to the financial interests of stockholders. Such obligations do not conflict with the normative goals of stakeholder theory, nor, after a century of case law that includes Dodge Bros. v. Ford, do fiduciary responsibilities owed shareholders prevent managerial policies that are generous orsensitive to other corporate stakeholders. The common (...) law recognizes a multitude of legal relationships between various corporateconstituents, and fiduciary duties are only a subset of the obligations that arise from these relationships. This article argues that statuteand case law can bring comparable legal protection to constituents other than stockholders, and suggests ways that these protectionsmight be further strengthened. Implications for management education are also discussed. (shrink)

Andrew Carnegie popularized the principles of charity and stewardship in 1899 when he published The Gospel of Wealth. At the time, Carnegie''s ideas were the exception rather than the rule. He believed that businesses and wealthy individuals were the caretakers or stewards of their property holding it in trust for the benefit of society as a whole.One of the most visible ways a business can help a community is through corporate philanthropy. While the courts have ruled that charitable contributions fall (...) within the legal and fiduciary powers of the corporation''s policymakers, some critics have argued that corporate managers have no right to give away company money that does not belong to them and any income earned by the company should be either reinvested in the company or distributed to the stockholders. (shrink)

Peter Frankental, Head of Business Networks, Amnesty International, explores the role of The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a corporate code of conduct. Frankental observes a changing business context, which overall increases the risk to business of dealing with other parties, including countries, subcontractors, joint venture partners and their stockholders. The paper proceeds to examine the barriers to integration of human rights, and identifies dilemmas that firms need to resolve. While in the author’s view ethical behaviour does not (...) confer competitive advantages in the short run, companies that base their codes of conduct on the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights are likely to find themselves in the stronger position to protect their reputation, brands and assets in the longer term. (shrink)

The results of an exploratory study examining the role of trust in stakeholder satisfaction are reported. Customers, stockholders, and employees of financial institutions were surveyed to identify management behaviors that lead to stakeholder satisfaction. The factors critical to satisfaction across stakeholder groups are the timeliness of communication, the honesty and completeness of the information and the empathy and equity of treatment by management.

Corporate management is torn between either focusing solely on the interests of stockholders or taking into account the interests of a wide spectrum of stakeholders. Of course, there need be no conflict where taking the wider view is also consistent with maximising stockholder wealth. In this paper, we examine the extent to which a conflict actually exists by examining the relationship between a company's positive and negative corporate social responsibility activities and equity performance. In general, we find little evidence (...) to suggest that managers taking a wider stakeholder perspective will jeopardise the interest of its stockholders. However, our findings do suggest that the market is not only influenced by the independent CSR activities, but also the totality of these activities and that the facets that they value do vary over time. It seems that most recently, the market has valued most firms that satisfied minimum requirements in the areas of diversity and environmental protection but were most proactive in the area of employee-relations. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that a theory of the firm that takes profit maximizing to be the essential activity and purpose of the firm is seriously inadequate. I argue that firms in the actual economy neither are nor should be maximizers of profit. I argue instead that firms are and must be satisficers, that they must make enough profit to satisfy the various demands which they encounter in their operation. Yet it should be clear that the notion of satisficing, (...) while it escapes the major problems encountered by maximization, itself lacks much of any very clear content. In the end I claim that the notion of satisficing can best be understood if we abandon the traditional characterization of profits and replace it with a notion of extended profits, which I define as that part of corporate revenue which is available for distribution among stockholders, management, and labor, and for reinvestment in the corporation's business operation. (shrink)

This paper presents the results of a national study of the beliefs and perceptions of small business professionals concerning ethics within their company and business in general. The study examined their views on the relationship between success and ethical conduct as well as the extent and nature of ethical conflicts experienced by the respondents. Some comparisons are made with similar studies that have been conducted in the past. Respondents have the most ethical conflicts with customers and employees, and with regard (...) to honesty in contracts/agreements. Most also believe that ethical standards are lower than they were 10 and 20 years ago, primarily because society's moral standards are lower. Additionally, they believe that the behavior of top management has the most influence on decisions in ethical situations. Finally, consistent with prior studies, they believe that they have the most responsibility to customers, ahead of employees and stockholders. (shrink)

The requirement of the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business to include business ethics in the curriculum has prompted business programs to teach ethics either integrated across the curriculum or in standalone classes. The question addressed here is how to engage students in thinking deeply and empathetically about ethical issues impacting corporate social responsibility. This research focused on using a thought experiment developed by John Rawls in which students examined CSR issues from the perspective of six stakeholder groups. A (...) pre-test/post-test design measured the effectiveness of an instruction module on CSR coupled with an active exercise using Rawls’ veil of ignorance and original position. Results indicate that students placed greater responsibility on the stockholders and board of directors after taking this module. The implication of the Rawlsian technique to use stakeholder empathy is discussed as a tool for engaging business ethics students. (shrink)

Peter Frankental, Head of Business Networks, Amnesty International, explores the role of The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a corporate code of conduct. Frankental observes a changing business context, which overall increases the risk to business of dealing with other parties, including countries, subcontractors, joint venture partners and their stockholders. The paper proceeds to examine the barriers to integration of human rights, and identifies dilemmas that firms need to resolve. While in the author’s view ethical behaviour does not (...) confer competitive advantages in the short run, companies that base their codes of conduct on the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights are likely to find themselves in the stronger position to protect their reputation, brands and assets in the longer term. (shrink)

In this article, we use ideas from stakeholder capital maintenance theory to address tensions in allocating firm profits between stockholders and other stakeholders. We utilize a mediative thought experiment to conceptualize how multiple stakeholder interests might better be served, such that genuine firm profits (from new value creation) versus artificial firm profits (from non-wealth-producing transfers) may be identified and incentivized. We thereby examine how such accounting transfers can be envisioned as stakeholder capital to be maintained for the benefit of both (...) the firm and the economy. We present examples to illustrate the hypothetical model proposed and its implications. (shrink)

My station and its duties : the function of being a manager -- Stockholder management or stakeholder management -- The ethical treatment of employees -- The ethical treatment of customers -- Supply chain management and other issues -- Corporate social responsibility -- Moral imagination, stakeholder theory and systems thinking : one approach to management decision-making -- Leadership.

Given the increasing importance attached to both corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate governance, this study investigates the association between these two complimentary mechanisms used by companies to enhance relations with stakeholders. Consistent with both legitimacy and stakeholder theory and controlling for industry profile, firm size, stockholder power/dispersion, creditor power/leverage, and economic performance, our analysis of the annual reports for a sample of 222 listed companies suggests that firms providing more CSR information: have better corporate governance ratings; are larger; (...) belong to higher profile industries; and are more highly leveraged. Our findings support the limited prior research suggesting a link between corporate governance quality and CSR disclosure in company annual reports and suggest that, rather than mandating specific disclosures, regulators might be better served focussing on corporate governance quality as a way of increasing CSR disclosures. (shrink)