This paper is an essay in counterfactual epistemology. What if experience have high-level contents, to the effect that something is a lemon or that someone is sad? I survey the consequences for epistemology of such a scenario, and conclude that many of the striking consequences could be reached even if our experiences don't have high-level contents.

Frege's Puzzle is a founding problem in analytic philosophy. It lies at the intersection of central topics in the philosophy of language and mind: the theory of reference, the nature of propositional attitudes, the nature of semantic theorizing, the relation between semantics and pragmatics, etc. This chapter is an overview of the puzzle and of the space of contemporary approaches to it.

Meta-emotions are emotions about emotions, such as, for example, shame about anger. An important subset of meta-emotions constitutes a special case of co-experienced emotions, in which one emotion is directed at another emotion experienced by a subject at the same time. By making us reflectively aware of our own first-order emotions and suggesting an evaluation of them, meta-emotions enable reflection on our own emotional sensibility. In this paper, I explore the roles of meta-emotions in the context of affective empathy. I (...) show that, whereas meta-emotions on the side of the target person increase the complexity of empathy’s success conditions, meta-emotions on the side of the empathiser expand the role of meta-emotions for self-reflection and give rise to parallel phenomena of other-directed reflection. Exploring the roles of meta-emotions in the context of affective empathy allows us to better understand the significance of meta-emotions, as well as the functions of affective empathy. (shrink)

Our brains are us. But we are neither happy, fulfilled, nor all that we 'should' (or maybe could) be. We have everything previous generations could have dreamed of, but it seems it's never quite enough. What's going on? Has it anything to do with the way those brains have developed, by any chance? Gillian Bridge takes us on a journey through time, history and the mysterious labyrinth that is the brain, investigating strange happenings and unlikely people on the way. The (...) Significance Delusion is a challenging explanation of our species' peculiar vulnerability to disorders of both thinking and social cohesion. It is a power pack of research, ideas, facts and fascinating real life stories which explores our species' obsession with meaning and significance. What does it all mean for me? What do I mean to you? The Significance Delusion is humorous as well as deeply serious, and it is the must read compilation of lifestyle advice for tomorrow's well-adjusted people. It is a book about what it takes to thrive and survive as an individual human and as a society. From it you will learn the meaning of life, and your place in the world. For parents, educators, thinkers, psychologists, psychotherapists and policy makers. (shrink)

Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.

Excerpt from The Significance of Sociology for Ethics We must borrow further psychological commonplaces in order to establish a point of departure for our sociological argument. A. The judgment of good and bad is involuntary. The standard of good and bad is derived. This is the extent of the basis in fact for the intuitional philosophy. The act of judging a thing or an act good or bad is beyond Our control. So far as we know, the genus homo (...) sapiens has always performed this process spontaneously if the necessary stimuli were present. Neither the process of judging nor the result of the judgment is directly dependent upon the will. In this sense only is moral judgment intuitive. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The book's significance is two-fold: it argues for a new stage in the development of contemporary Confucian philosophy, and it demonstrates the value to Western ...

This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in cognitive and non-cognitive contents (...) between parties of deep ethical disagreement challenges both cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of disagreement itself. (shrink)

In Davidson's philosophy, one finds a wide variety of rich, provocative, and influential arguments concerning the nature of the mind—that mental states emerge only in the context of interpretation, that belief is "in its nature" veridical, that mental events are physical events, and so on. Most, if not all, of Davidson's conclusions about the mind have their source in discussions about the project of "radical interpretation." They rely upon arguments concerning the conditions on the successful interpretation of a speaker by (...) an interpreter who knows nothing initially about the speaker's language or mental states. But what is the relevance of this activity of radical interpretation? Why should the conditions on succeeding at it illuminate anything about the nature of the mind in general? In this paper, I explore these issues. In particular, I will argue that Davidson's confidence in the relevance of radical interpretation for understanding the mind ultimately depends upon a prior and quite substantive view of the mind. Moreover, it is a view of the mind for which Davidson provides little support. Indeed, the little support Davidson does provide appears to depend itself on the very relevance of radical interpretation. (shrink)

How was the hypothetical character of theories of experience thought about throughout the history of science? The essays cover periods from the middle ages to the 19th and 20th centuries. It is fascinating to see how natural scientists and philosophers were increasingly forced to realize that a natural science without hypotheses is not possible.

The Curry-Howard isomorphism is a proof-theoretic result that establishes a connection between derivations in natural deduction and terms in typed lambda calculus. It is an important proof-theoretic result, but also underlies the development of type systems for programming languages. This fact suggests a potential importance of the result for a philosophy of code.

This article appeals to Thomas Aquinas in order to offer a construal of the nature of reason arguably preferable to that prominent in the Enlightenment. Thomas’s account neither espouses the notion that reason is devoid of any appetitive influence nor so conflates reason and will as to suggest that thinking becomes essentially a form of willing. His view does respect that the activity of willing is of fundamental import for the life of reason. Since the ultimate object of the will (...) is union with God, it follows that the virtue that specifically promotes the attainment of this end—the virtue of religion—has particular import because it aims at rectifying the will and is the most excellent among the moral virtues. In brief, this virtue promotes the optimal intellectual and moral flourishing of individuals as well as the realization of justice in society. (shrink)

This paper considers clinical psychoanalysis together with developmental psychology (particularly attachment theory), evolution, and neuroscience in the context a Bayesian account of confirmation and disconfrimation. -/- In it I argue that these converging sources of support indicate that the combination of relatively low predictive power and broad explanatory scope that characterise the theories of both Freud and Darwin suggest that Freud's theory, like Darwin's, may strike deeply into natural phenomena. -/- The same argument, however, suggests that conclusive confirmation for Freudian (...) hypotheses, as in the case of Darwin's, will come from outside the original domain of explanation sketched out by Freud. As in Darwin's case conclusive confirmation came from understanding the physical mechanisms or reproduction, in Freud's case it will come from understanding the neural mechanisms that realise the phenomena described in psychoanalysis. (shrink)

This book offers a unique perspective on meaning in language, broadening the scope of existing understanding of meaning by introducing a comprehensive and cohesive account of meaning which draws on a wide range of linguistic approaches.

Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty.

Since Shelly Kagan pointed out the relative neglect of ill-being in philosophical discussions, several philosophers have contributed to an emerging literature on its constituents. In doing so, they have explored possible asymmetries between the constituents of ill-being and the constituents of positive well-being. This paper explores some possible asymmetries that may arise elsewhere in the philosophy of ill-being. In particular, it considers whether there is an asymmetry between the contribution made to prudential value by equal quantities of goods and bads. (...) It then considers a similar question about the contributions made to moral value by equal quantities of ill-being and positive well-being. The paper explores some of the difficulties involved in assessing these questions. It ends by considering broader differences, both practical and theoretical, between the significance of ill-being and of positive well-being. (shrink)

Discussions of sexual ethics often focus on the wrong of treating another as a mere object instead of as a person worthy of respect. On this view, the task of sexual ethics becomes putting the other’s subjectivity above their status as erotic object so as to avoid the harms of objectification. Ward and Anderson argue that such a view disregards the crucial, moral role that erotic objecthood plays in sexual encounters. Important moral features of intimacy are disclosed through the experience (...) of being an erotic object for another, as well as in perceiving another as an erotic object. Drawing on phenomenology, especially the insights of Simone de Beauvoir, Ward and Anderson argue that erotic encounters are shaped by the human condition of ambiguity, where being an object for others is intertwined with bodily agency. Because sexual agency is complex in this way, theories of sexual ethics and responsibility must widen their focus beyond transparent communication and authoritative expressions of will. (shrink)

The Significance Argument (SA) for the irreducibility of consciousness is based on a series of new puzzle-cases that I call multiple candidate cases. In these cases, there is a multiplicity of physical-functional properties or relations that are candidates to be identified with the sensible qualities and our consciousness of them, where those candidates are not significantly different. I will argue that these cases show that reductive materialists cannot accommodate the various ways in which consciousness is significant and must allow (...) massive vagueness in conscious experience. I also will argue that a nonreductive theory of the conscious-of relation can easily provide a very satisfying, unified explanation of the ways in which this relation is significant. (shrink)

Mark Wilson presents a highly original and broad-ranging investigation of the way we get to grips with the world conceptually, and the way that philosophical problems commonly arise from this. He combines traditional philosophical concerns about human conceptual thinking with illuminating data derived from a large variety of fields including physics and applied mathematics, cognitive psychology, and linguistics. Wandering Significance offers abundant new insights and perspectives for philosophers of language, mind, and science, and will also reward the interest of (...) psychologists, linguists, and anyone curious about the mysterious ways in which useful language obtains its practical applicability. (shrink)

What makes for a good life, or a beautiful one, or, perhaps most important, a meaningful one? Throughout history most of us have looked to our faith, our relationships, or our deeds for the answer. But in A Significant Life, philosopher Todd May offers an exhilarating new way of thinking about these questions, one deeply attuned to life as it actually is: a work in progress, a journey—and often a narrative. Offering moving accounts of his own life and memories alongside (...) rich engagements with philosophers from Aristotle to Heidegger, he shows us where to find the significance of our lives: in the way we live them. May starts by looking at the fundamental fact that life unfolds over time, and as it does so, it begins to develop certain qualities, certain themes. Our lives can be marked by intensity, curiosity, perseverance, or many other qualities that become guiding narrative values. These values lend meanings to our lives that are distinct from—but also interact with—the universal values we are taught to cultivate, such as goodness or happiness. Offering a fascinating examination of a broad range of figures—from music icon Jimi Hendrix to civil rights leader Fannie Lou Hamer, from cyclist Lance Armstrong to The Portrait of a Lady’s Ralph Touchett to Claus von Stauffenberg, a German officer who tried to assassinate Hitler—May shows that narrative values offer a rich variety of criteria by which to assess a life, specific to each of us and yet widely available. They offer us a way of reading ourselves, who we are, and who we might like to be. Clearly and eloquently written, A Significant Life is a recognition and a comfort, a celebration of the deeply human narrative impulse by which we make—even if we don’t realize it—meaning for ourselves. It offers a refreshing way to think of an age-old question, of quite simply, what makes a life worth living. (shrink)

Robert Kane provides a critical overview of debates about free will of the past half century, relating this recent inquiry to the broader history of the free will issue and to vital currents of twentieth century thought. Kane also defends a traditional libertarian or incompatibilist view of free will, employing arguments that are both new to philosophy and that respond to contemporary developments in physics and biology, neuro science, and the cognitive and behavioral sciences.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

분석철학이 중세 스콜라철학의 길을 답습하지는 않을까? 명제, 의미, 지시 등에 관해 집요하게 논의했던 중세의 문헌들처럼 분석철학의 전문적 작업들도 근친번식의 악순환에 빠져 결국 고립과 망각의 길을 자초하고 있는 것은 아닐까? 이 글은 이러한 우려를 낳는 분석철학의 학문지상주의적 경향과 ‘초형이상학화’에 대해 그 원천을 추적해보고자 한다. 내가 주목하는 것은 분석철학 특유의 문체와 논증 전개 방식, 그리고 그것의 뿌리가 되는 ‘분석’이라는 방법이다. 나는 그 병폐들이 ‘분석’이라는 방법과 긴밀하게 관련되어 있다고 생각한다. 이 글은 분석이 자신의 방법과 목적을 변화시키는 과정에서 어떻게 초형이 상학화가 일어났는지를 역사적으로 고찰할 (...) 것이다. 그리고 그 흐름을 되돌리고 분석철학의 지적 생산성과 현실 연관성을 높이기 위해 논증과 형이상학에 대해 새로운 시각을 가질 것을 제안하고자 한다. (shrink)

One challenge in developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame is to explain what differentiates epistemic blame from mere negative epistemic evaluation. The challenge is to explain the difference, without invoking practices or behaviors that seem out of place in the epistemic domain. In this paper, I examine whether the most sophisticated recent account of the nature of epistemic blame—due to Jessica Brown—is up for the challenge. I argue that the account ultimately falls short, but does so in (...) an instructive way. Drawing on the lessons learned, I put forward an alternative approach to the nature of epistemic blame. My account understands epistemic blame in terms of modifications to the intentions and expectations that comprise our “epistemic relationships” with one another. This approach has a number of attractions shared by Brown’s account, but it can also explain the significance of epistemic blame. (shrink)

One of the achievements of Hans Blumenberg’s historical anthropology is to have reflected on the way individuals can preserve themselves when they come up against points of significance (Bedeutsamkeiten). Goethe’s encounter with Napoleon, in which the poet succeeded in standing up to the emperor at eye level, was of such self-preserving significance. For Blumenberg himself, his sole encounter with Thomas Mann was of comparable significance, since the Nobel prize-winner asserted himself in the face of the ascendant Nazis (...) as the representative of Goethe and the defender of a humane world. Blumenberg likewise sought contact with Carl Schmitt in order to claim his own interpretative sovereignty over Goethe and thereby — following the model of Goethe and Thomas Mann — assert himself against a representative of the Third Reich. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Philosophers of language have tended to focus on examples that are not politically significant in any way. We spend a lot of time analyzing natural kind terms: We think hard about “water” and “pain” and “arthritis.” But we don’t think much about the far more politically significant kind terms (natural or social—it's a matter for dispute) like “race,” “sex,” “gender,” “woman,” “man,” “gay,” and “straight.” In this essay, I will try to show, using the example of “woman,” that it's worth (...) thinking about terms like these, for at least three reasons: (1) There are some interesting puzzles. (2) Politically significant terms matter to people's lives— and it's worth spending at least some of our energy thinking about things that matter in this way. (3) Most importantly, interesting methodological issues emerge at the intersection of philosophy of language and politics. (shrink)

뵈메의 시각으로 서포터즈의 퍼포먼스에 주목해서 프로 축구경기의 미학적 의미를 고찰하고, 이를 통해서 축구 미학은 물론 더 나아가서 스포츠 미학을 새로운 관점에서 접근하는 길을 환기시키는 것이 논문의 목적이다. 이러한 목적에 상응하는 연구의 내용은 다음과 같다. 먼저 ‘분위기’ 및 ‘분위기 머금은 현상’ 개념을 중심으로 뵈메의 ‘지각학으로서의 미학’의 핵심이 검토된다. 이는 축구경기의 미학적 의미를 전통미학의 틀에서 벗어나서 논구할 수 있는 기초를 다지는 것을 의미한다. 다음으로 축구경기에서 만들어지는 분위기, 즉 축구경기의 특정 상황에서 형성되는 경기장 전체의 분위기가 ‘극적인 골’ 사건에 초점을 맞춰 검토된 뒤, 그것이 (...) 어떻게 미학적 대상이 되는가 하는 점이 구명된다. 다시 말해서 극적인 골 직후 조성되는 경기장 분위기가 기본적으로 목적성취 혹은 욕구충족에 기인하는 것임에도 불구하고, 어째서 미학적 사건이라고 할 수 있는가 하는 점, 어째서 욕구충족과 무관한 지각경험의 대상이라 할 수 있는가 하는 점이 해명된다. 아울러 그 사건이 ‘분위기 머금은 현상’으로 표현되고 전달될 때, 그것은 이른바 직관 팬뿐만 아니라 모든 사람에게 미학적 대상이 되는데, 이것이 구체적으로 무엇을 의미하는 것인가 하는 점도 밝혀진다. 마지막으로 ‘축구경기의 미학적 의미’를 새로운 관점에서, 좀 더 정확히 말해서 뵈메의 관점에서 조망하고자 할 경우, 욕구대상으로서의 축구경기가 지각의 대상으로 전환될 때 일반 팬이 감지하게 되는 ‘성과사회의 그물코를 벗어나지 못한 삶에 처해있음’의 의미가 다각도로 논구되는 것이 무엇보다도 필요가 있다는 사실이 언급된다. 이러한 내용을 담고 있는 본 논문은 몇 가지 한계에도 불구하고 전통 미학의 틀에서 벗어나서 스포츠 미학 담론을 새로운 시각에서 새롭게 논의하는 것이 필요하고 또 충분히 가능하다는 사실을 환기시켜주는 데에는 기여할 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

듀이의 민주주의론에 의하면, 민주주의는 단순히 정치적 제도만이 아니라, 사람들이 함께 사는 “삶의 방식”인데, 이런 듀이의 민주주의가 실현되기 위해서는 시민의 도덕심뿐만 아니라 시민적 미덕이 요구된다. 그렇지만 듀이 윤리학은 통상적으로 과학주의적 윤리학이거나 일종의 공리주의로 이해되고 있다. 그런데 만일 듀이의 윤리학에 대한 이런 통상적인 이해가 맞다면 듀이 민주주의론의 기반은 취약할 것인데 민주주의와 과학주의, 그리고 민주주의와 공리주의의 관계는 그렇게 긴밀하지 않기 때문이다. 이 논문에서 필자는 듀이의 윤리학에 대한 이런 통상적인 이해가 잘못된 것이라고 비판하며 다음과 같이 논한다. 우선 메타윤리학적인 측면에서 보자면 듀이의 윤리학에 있어서 탐구란 (...) 사실 인간이성의 비판적 사용을 의미하는 것이지 과학주의적인 윤리학이 아니다. 규범윤리학적인 측면에서 보자면, 듀이에 의하면 도덕은 좋음, 옳음, 유덕함이라는 세 가지 독립적인 요소로 이루어져 있는데, 듀이는 좋음에 관해서는 목적론이, 옳음에 대해서는 의무론, 유덕함에 관해서는 ‘德공리주의’라고 불릴 수 있는 이론이 적절한 이론이라고 보며, 따라서 듀이의 전체적인 윤리이론은 이들 세이론이 통합된 이론이다. 듀이의 윤리이론이 이렇게 이해될 때, 듀이의 윤리이론은 삶의 방식으로서의 민주주의에서 시민들의 도덕성과 덕성을 담보할 수 있기 때문에 듀이 민주주의론은 굳건한 기초 위에 설 수 있으며, 이런 기초 위에서 그의 민주주의론의 현대적 의의를 평가하는 생산적인 본격적인 논의를 할 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

The shape of a life hypothesis holds, very roughly, that lives are better when they have an upward, rather than downward, slope in terms of momentary well-being. This hypothesis is plausible and has been thought to cause problems for traditional principles of prudential value/rationality. In this article, I conduct an inquiry into the shape of a life hypothesis that addresses two crucial questions. The first question is: what is the most plausible underlying explanation of the significance of a life’s (...) shape? The second question is: given its most plausible explanation, what does the shape of a life hypothesis teach us about the nature of prudential value? (shrink)

The possibility of seeding other planets with life poses a tricky dilemma. On the one hand, directed panspermia might be extremely good, while, on the other, it might be extremely bad depending on what factors are taken into consideration. Therefore, we need to understand better what is ethically at stake with planetary seeding. I map out possible conditions under which humanity should spread life to other solar systems. I identify two key variables that affect the desirability of propagating life throughout (...) the galaxy. The first is axiological and depends on which value theory in environmental ethics is correct. The second is empirical and depends on whether life is common or not in our region of the universe. I also consider two ethical objections to an interplanetary life-seeding mission: the risk of interfering with indigenous life and the risk of increasing suffering in our galaxy. (shrink)

On a standard interpretation, the aim of the formula of universal law is to provide a decision procedure for determining the deontic status of actions. By contrast, this chapter argues for the practical significance of the CI centering on Kant’s account of the dynamics of incentives. This approach avoids some widespread misconceptions about how the CI operates and false expectations about what it promises and delivers. In particular, it explains how it differs from deductive practical inferences. The CI is (...) the supreme form of morality, and yet not in the sense that particular categorical principles can be derived deductively from it, once the relevant details are supplied. The efficacy of practical reasoning primarily concerns agents, and consists in their reorientation toward the right end. Moral knowledge is knowledge about what we ought to do, but it is also a distinctive variety of self-knowledge, that is, knowledge of ourselves as rationally efficacious agents. (shrink)