Results for 'shared action'

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  1.  45
    Shared action: An existential phenomenological account.Nicolai Knudsen - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Drawing on recent phenomenological discussions of collective intentionality and existential phenomenological accounts of agency, this article proposes a novel interpretation of shared action. First, I argue that we should understand action on the basis of how an environment pre-reflectively solicits agents to behave based on the affordances or goals inflected by their abilities and dispositions and their self-referential commitment to a project that is furthered by these affordances. Second, I show that this definition of action is (...)
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  2. The Emergence of a Shared Action Ontology: Building Blocks for a Theory.Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):549-571.
    To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions (...)
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  3.  79
    Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and Emotions.Giacomo Rizzolatti & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    When we witness a great actor, musician, or sportsperson performing, we share something of their experience. Only recently has it become clear just how this sharing of experience is realised within the human brain. 'Mirrors in the brain' provides an accessible overview of mirror neurons, written by the man who first discovered them.
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  4.  8
    Historical Meaningfulness in Shared Action.Steven G. Smith - 2009 - History and Theory 48 (1):1-19.
    Why should past occurrences matter to us as such? Are they in fact meaningful in a specifically historical way, or do they only become meaningful in being connected to other sorts of meaning—political or speculative, for example—as many notable theorists imply? Ranke and Oakeshott affirmed a purely historical meaningfulness but left its nature unclear. The purpose of this essay is to confirm historical meaningfulness by arguing that our commanding practical interest in how we share action with other actors is (...)
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  5.  38
    Subjective Agency and Awareness of Shared Actions.Lars Strother, Kristin A. House & Sukhvinder S. Obhi - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):12-20.
    Voluntary actions and their distal effects are intimately related in conscious awareness. When an expected effect follows a voluntary action, the experience of the interval between these events is compressed in time, a phenomenon known as ‘intentional binding’ . Current accounts of IB suggest that it serves to reinforce associations between our goals and our intention to attain these goals via action, and that IB only occurs for self-generated actions. We used a novel approach to study IB in (...)
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  6. Shared Emotions and Joint Action.John Michael - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):355-373.
    In recent years, several minimalist accounts of joint action have been offered (e.g. Tollefsen Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35:75–97, 2005; Sebanz et al. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31(6): 234–1246, 2006; Vesper et al. Neural Networks 23 (8/9): 998–1003, 2010), which seek to address some of the shortcomings of classical accounts. Minimalist accounts seek to reduce the cognitive complexity demanded by classical accounts either by leaving out shared intentions or by characterizing them in a (...)
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  7. Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and Emotions.Frances Anderson (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    When we witness a great actor, musician, or sportsperson performing, we share something of their experience. Only recently has it become clear just how this sharing of experience is realised within the human brain. 'Mirrors in the brain' provides an accessible overview of mirror neurons, written by the man who first discovered them.
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  8. Review of Steven G. Smith, Full History: On the Meaningfulness of Shared Action[REVIEW]David Weberman - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  9.  7
    Full History: On the Meaningfulness of Shared Action,Written by Steven G. Smith.João Rodolfo Munhoz Ohara - forthcoming - Journal of the Philosophy of History:1-4.
  10.  57
    Shared Being, Old Promises, and the Just Necessity of Affirmative Action.Peter McHugh - 2005 - Human Studies 28 (2):129-156.
    Although the residues of official segregation are widespread, affirmative action continues to meet resistance in both official and everyday life, even in such recent Supreme Court decisions as Grutter v Bollinger (539 U.S. 306). This is due in part to a governing ontology that draws the line between individual and collective. But there are other possibilities for conceiving the social, and I offer one here in a theory of affirmative action that is developed through close examination of sharing (...)
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  11.  4
    Steven G. Smith. Full History: On the Meaningfulness of Shared Action. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017. 264 Pp. [REVIEW]Alexandre Leskanich - 2019 - Critical Inquiry 46 (1):248-249.
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  12.  6
    Joint Action: Mental Representations, Shared Information and General Mechanisms for Coordinating with Others.Cordula Vesper, Ekaterina Abramova, Judith Bütepage, Francesca Ciardo, Benjamin Crossey, Alfred Effenberg, Dayana Hristova, April Karlinsky, Luke McEllin, Sari R. R. Nijssen, Laura Schmitz & Basil Wahn - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
  13. Action Observation and Execution: What is Shared?Frédérique De Vignemont - unknown
    Performing an action and observing it activate the same internal representations of action. The representations are therefore shared between self and other. But what exactly is shared? At what level within the hierarchical structure of the motor system do SRA occur? Understanding the content of SRA is important in order to decide what theoretical work SRA can perform. In this paper, we provide some conceptual clarification by raising three main questions: are SRA semantic or pragmatic representations (...)
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  14.  9
    Sharing a Task or Sharing Space? On the Effect of the Confederate in Action Coding in a Detection Task.Delia Guagnano, Elena Rusconi & Carlo Arrigo Umiltà - 2010 - Cognition 114 (3):348-355.
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  15.  38
    Joint Action of a Pair of Rowers in a Race: Shared Experiences of Effectiveness Are Shaped by Interpersonal Mechanical States.Mehdi R’Kiouak, Jacques Saury, Marc Durand & Jérôme Bourbousson - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  16.  79
    Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.
    Most theories of intentional action agree that if acting for a reason is a necessary condition for the action in question to be an intentional action, the reason need not genuinely justify it. The same should hold for shared intentional action, toward which philosophers of action have recently turned their attention. I argue that some of the necessary conditions proposed for shared intention turn out to require that we deny this claim. They entail (...)
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  17.  53
    Joint Action Without Shared Intention.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
  18.  84
    Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared[REVIEW]Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Natalie Sebanz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):137-146.
    Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared? Content Type Journal Article Pages 137-146 DOI 10.1007/s13164-011-0062-3 Authors Stephen A. Butterfill, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK Natalie Sebanz, Centre for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, & Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology Online ISSN 1878-5166 Print ISSN 1878-5158 Journal Volume Volume 2 Journal Issue Volume 2, Number 2.
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  19.  52
    What is Shared in Joint Action? Issues of Co-Representation, Response Conflict, and Agent Identification.Dorit Wenke, Silke Atmaca, Antje Holländer, Roman Liepelt, Pamela Baess & Wolfgang Prinz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):147-172.
    When sharing a task with another person that requires turn taking, as in doubles games of table tennis, performance on the shared task is similar to performing the whole task alone. This has been taken to indicate that humans co-represent their partner’s task share, as if it were their own. Task co-representation allows prediction of the other’s responses when it is the other’s turn, and leads to response conflict in joint interference tasks. However, data from our lab cast doubt (...)
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  20.  7
    Action-Effect Sharing Induces Task-Set Sharing in Joint Task Switching.Motonori Yamaguchi, Helen J. Wall & Bernhard Hommel - 2017 - Cognition 165:113-120.
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  21.  43
    Joint Action : Shared Intentions and Collective Goals.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  22.  13
    Joint Action and the Expression of Shared Intentions: An Expanded Taylorian Account.Sean Bowden - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    After having identified several shortcomings of the so-called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be (...)
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  23.  11
    Joint Action and the Expression of Shared Intentions: An Expanded Taylorian Account.Sean Bowden - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):440-462.
    After having identified several shortcomings of the so-called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be (...)
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  24. What Action Can Do: From Mirror Neurons to the “Shared Manifold “Hypothesis.V. Gallese - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  25.  36
    Social Cues to Joint Actions: The Role of Shared Goals.Lucia M. Sacheli, Salvatore M. Aglioti & Matteo Candidi - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  26. Active Perception and Perceiving Action: The Shared Circuits Model.Susan L. Hurley - 2006 - In Tamar Szab Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    Recently research on imitation and its role in social cognition has been flourishing across various disciplines. After briefly reviewing these developments under the headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation, I advance the _shared circuits_.
     
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  27.  18
    The Role of Shared Visual Information for Joint Action Coordination.Cordula Vesper, Laura Schmitz, Lou Safra, Natalie Sebanz & Günther Knoblich - 2016 - Cognition 153:118-123.
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  28.  6
    Joint Action Enhances Cohesion and Positive Affect, but Suppresses Aspects of Creativity When Combined With Shared Goals.Reneeta Mogan, Joseph Bulbulia & Ronald Fischer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  29.  19
    What's at the Top in the Top-Down Control of Action? Script-Sharing and 'Top-Top' Control of Action in Cognitive Experiments.Andreas Roepstorff & Chris Frith - 2004 - Psychological Research 68 (2-3):189--198.
    The distinction between bottom-up and top-down control of action has been central in cognitive psychology, and, subsequently, in functional neuroimaging. While the model has proven successful in describing central mechanisms in cognitive experiments, it has serious shortcomings in explaining how top-down control is established. In particular, questions as to what is at the top in top-down control lead us to a controlling homunculus located in a mythical brain region with outputs and no inputs. Based on a discussion of recent (...)
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  30. Shared Goals and Development.Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):94-101.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a part in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents (...)
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  31.  3
    The Structure of Unlimited Action Sharing.Steven G. Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Frontiers: A Journal of Emerging Thought 4 (2):57-71.
    An unrestricted conception of actors and their interdependence in action has now been deployed effectively in various fields of study, but the question remains how we can discriminate reasonably in our action sharing if there is more to consider than simply putting persons ahead of things. By what general practical realizations can a universal action sharer be guided? I identify four primary levels of action sharing—-coexistence, cooperation, collaboration, and communion—-showing a distinctive complex of factual and directive (...)
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  32.  13
    The Role of Action in Verbal Communication and Shared Reality.Gerald Echterhoff - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):354 - 355.
    In examining the utility of the action view advanced in the Pickering & Garrod (P&G) target article, I first consider its contribution to the analysis of language vis-à-vis earlier language-as-action approaches. Second, I assess the relation between coordinated joint action, which serves as a blueprint for dialogue coordination, and the experience of shared reality, a key concomitant and product of interpersonal communication.
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  33.  13
    Jointly Structuring Triadic Spaces of Meaning and Action: Book Sharing From 3 Months On.Nicole Rossmanith, Alan Costall, Andreas F. Reichelt, Beatriz López & Vasudevi Reddy - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  34. Joint Action and Development.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):23-47.
    Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman's, says it is. For on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different kind of joint (...)
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  35. The Shared Circuits Model. How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation and Mind Reading.Susan L. Hurley - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines; it is here surveyed under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring and simulation. It is cast at a (...)
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  36. Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency (...)
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  37. The 'Shared Manifold' Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy.Vittorio Gallese - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):33-50.
    My initial scope will be limited: starting from a neurobiological standpoint, I will analyse how actions are possibly represented and understood. The main aim of my arguments will be to show that, far from being exclusively dependent upon mentalistic/linguistic abilities, the capacity for understanding others as intentional agents is deeply grounded in the relational nature of action. Action is relational, and the relation holds both between the agent and the object target of the action , as between (...)
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  38. Essentially Shared Obligations.Gunnar Björnsson - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
    This paper lists a number of puzzles for shared obligations – puzzles about the role of individual influence, individual reasons to contribute towards fulfilling the obligation, about what makes someone a member of a group sharing an obligation, and the relation between agency and obligation – and proposes to solve them based on a general analysis of obligations. On the resulting view, shared obligations do not presuppose joint agency.
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  39. 'Social Identity'and 'Shared Worldview': Free Riders in Explanations of Collective Action.Helen Lauer - 2013 - Abstracta 7 (1).
    The notions 'worldview' and 'social identity' are examined to consider whether they contribute substantively to causal sequences or networks or thought clusters that result in group acts executed intentionally. ... Three proposed explanaitons of sectarian conflict or ethnic violence are analysed as examples of theories that causally link intenitonal group behaivour to the worldviews and social identities of the individual agents directly involved. But as will be shown, it is not a priori features of worldivews and identities as such, but (...)
     
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  40.  17
    Editorial: What's Shared in Sharing Tasks and Actions? Processes and Representations Underlying Joint Performance.Motonori Yamaguchi, Timothy N. Welsh, Karl Christoph Klauer & Kerstin Dittrich - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  41. Shared Epistemic Responsibility.Boyd Millar - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):493-506.
    It is widely acknowledged that individual moral obligations and responsibility entail shared moral obligations and responsibility. However, whether individual epistemic obligations and responsibility entail shared epistemic obligations and responsibility is rarely discussed. Instead, most discussions of doxastic responsibility focus on individuals considered in isolation. In contrast to this standard approach, I maintain that focusing exclusively on individuals in isolation leads to a profoundly incomplete picture of what we're epistemically obligated to do and when we deserve epistemic blame. First, (...)
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  42. Shared Agency.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sometimes individuals act together, and sometimes each acts on his or her own. It's a distinction that often matters to us. Undertaking a difficult task collectively can be comforting, even if only for the solidarity it may engender. Or, to take a very different case, the realization (or delusion) that the many bits of rudeness one has been suffering of late are part of a concerted effort can be of significance in identifying what one is up against: the accumulation of (...)
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  43.  34
    Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Intentional Action.Matti Heinonen - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2):168-188.
    I distinguish two kinds of contribution that have been made by recent minimalist accounts of joint action in philosophy and cognitive science relative to established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “complementarists” seek to analyze a functionally different kind of joint action from the kind of joint action that is analyzed by established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “constitutionalists” seek to expose mechanisms that make performing joint actions possible, without taking (...)
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  44.  5
    What's Shared in Movement Kinematics: Investigating Co-Representation of Actions Through Movement.Matilde Rocca & Andrea Cavallo - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  45. Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition.Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
    We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural (...)
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  46. The Shared Circuits Model (SCM): How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading.Susan Hurley - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines. Imitation is surveyed in this target article under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model (SCM) explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring, and simulation. It (...)
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  47.  12
    Sharing Responsibility.Larry May - 1996 - University of Chicago Press.
    Are individuals responsible for the consequences of actions taken by their community? What about their community's inaction or its attitudes? In this innovative book, Larry May departs from the traditional Western view that moral responsibility is limited to the consequences of overt individual action. Drawing on the insights of Arendt, Jaspers, and Sartre, he argues that even when individuals are not direct participants, they share responsibility for various harms perpetrated by their communities.
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  48. Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
    My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will (...)
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  49. Shared Agency Without Shared Intention.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):665-688.
    The leading reductive approaches to shared agency model that phenomenon in terms of complexes of individual intentions, understood as plan-laden commitments. Yet not all agents have such intentions, and non-planning agents such as small children and some non-human animals are clearly capable of sophisticated social interactions. But just how robust are their social capacities? Are non-planning agents capable of shared agency? Existing theories of shared agency have little to say about these important questions. I address this lacuna (...)
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  50. Shared Intentions, Loose Groups and Pooled Knowledge.Olivier Roy & Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2019 - Synthese (5):4523-4541.
    We study shared intentions in what we call “loose groups”. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know (...)
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