An introduction to ancient Chinese ideas on how to live a good life.

This inquiry aims to advance curricular discourses on equity and social transformation by reviewing Korea’s indigenous philosophy and religion, Donghak [東學 Eastern Learning]. I explicate the ways in which the democratic ideals of equity and justice were implemented in nineteenth- and twentieth-Korean society, founded upon the “my mind is your mind” [吾心卽汝心] ontology. Three major philosophical-theological concepts are investigated, including serving God in the subject [侍天主 Shi-chun-ju], keeping a pure mind and correcting the energy [守心正氣 Sushim-jungqi], and creating a new (...) cosmic world [開闢 Gae-byeok]. These concepts extend curricular discourses on equity, social transformation, and community in the crisis of market-oriented curriculum practices. Garnered from Donghak’s teaching, suggestions for curriculum theorists encompass: challenging the self–other dichotomy, including self-cultivation as an important curricular goal, and supporting an eco-centered life and its curriculum in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Interpretations of Nietzsche as a virtue theorist have proliferated in recent years as commentators have sought to read him as a modern eudaimonistic philosopher while also attempting to show what makes his contribution to this tradition valuable and distinctive.1While some commentators still contend that interpreting Nietzsche as a eudaimonist is antithetical to his overtly-stated philosophical aims,2 over the last decade there has been a upsurge of support for such readings, especially from commentators who emphasise what they claim is the pervasive (...) influence of the Hellenistic tradition on his work. Keith Ansell-Pearson has argued that Epicurus was a key influence on Nietzsche’s middle period, for example; whereas Michael Ure has claimed that the Stoic thought of Seneca and Epictetus was also highly influential.3 Nevertheless, even those commentators who agree that Nietzsche can be informatively situated, or is even best situated, within the Hellenistic tradition cannot agree on two seemingly-intractable puzzles which any virtue-theoretical reading must solve in order to give a full account of his moral philosophy. The puzzles can be stated as follows: Puzzle 1: Which character traits does Nietzsche endorse as virtues? Puzzle 2: What is Nietzsche’s ethical ideal? This article offers an exegetical strategy to shed light on both puzzles, especially the first one regarding which character traits Nietzsche endorses as virtues which, as we shall see, is tougher to answer by a straightforward appeal to his texts. To elucidate this puzzle, I will propose that his approving comments regarding excellence-based moral philosophy indicate that his own ethics is also structured in terms of an ethical ideal with a requisite set of virtues which, following his ancient philosophical influences, he views as fundamentally connected. As Julia Annas notes, one the most distinctive ‘assumptions which ancient theories make [is] the relationship of [our] virtues to our final end’,4 and given Nietzsche’s interest in, and apparent endorsement of, ancient eudaimonism – especially compared to his invariably scathing remarks on the modern deontological and utilitarian traditions – we have reason to think that he shares this view.5 What is significant for this article, however, is that Nietzsche’s commitment to a kind of eudaimonism modelled on the ancient world offers a potential way to solve both puzzles. If his virtues and ethical ideal are connected in a similar way to ancient eudaimonistic theories, then understanding his ethical ideal allows us to infer which character traits he endorses as virtues, and vice versa. Although it might be objected that a method tackling both puzzles in tandem would be unworkable if their solutions were contained in each other, in what follows I will show that Nietzsche’s extensive comments on his ethical ideal of ‘becoming what one is’ positions us in a strong position to infer which character traits he prizes most highly. I will call these character traits ‘virtues of self-cultivation’. (shrink)

The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation (Bil dung) and its Historical Meaning. This article aims at analysing the historical meaning of the German ideal of self-cultivation (Bildung), considering its different uses and interpretations over time. Based on the historical semantics of Reinhart Koselleck and the bibliography on the subject, it reconstructs the core transformations in its semantic structure from the beginnings in the late Middle Ages to its institutionalization in the German school system in the nineteenth century. The development of the (...) ideal of Bildung in Germany is characterised by the tension between its function as means of integration through education and its function as instrument of social distinction. The reflexion on this educational ideal is presented as a counterpoint to some of the contemporary educational practices, based on the imperatives of the market and the neoliberal management of human capital. (shrink)

The author reflects on the anthropological role of the “self-cultivation” category in the philosophical system of Immanuel Kant, for whom self-cultivation stood as the central idea of the Enlightenment. Kant believed that it was man alone who created himself to a rational being, that his rationality was not a granted good but something he had to mature to by way of multiple disciplinary, civilizing and moralizing measures. An interesting avenue in Gernot Böhme’s approach is his assumption that this conceptual perspective (...) applied to all three Kantian Critiques, e.g., that Critique of Pure Reason propounds the disciplining of human cognition under the banner of subordinating the sphere of intuition to the categories of intellect. These categories are not inborn in the human mind, but are built by the willful disciplining of the perceptual elements of cognition anchored in the animal fundaments of the humanum. Towards the close of his essay Böhme attempts a critique of Kant’s philosophy, accusing it of reductionism and depreciating many anthropological powers. (shrink)

We don’t know ourselves, we knowledgeable people – we are personally ignorant about ourselves. And there’s good reason for that. We’ve never tried to find out who we are – how could it happen that...

A revival of Confucianism in post-Mao China helped the government legitimate its power in the face of a new socio-political and economic situation. This paper specifically explores the role of Confucian self-cultivation in China’s governance. Drawing on Beetham’s theory of legitimation of power and Weber’s tri-typology of authority, we argue that self-cultivation, appealing to ingrained cultural values and traditions, fulfils the criteria of legitimation of power through two principles, namely, differentiation and community interest. In the context of suzhi education and (...) China’s national university entrance exam, we interrogate tensions and paradoxes between the need for a presentation of modern and liberal authority and the CCP’s one-party rule. The paper illustrates the complexity of China’s authoritarianism and the intricacies and intrinsic relevance of self-cultivation in current practice. (shrink)

It is often observed that there is little or no moral philosophy in classical Indian Buddhist thought. This is sometimes believed to be surprising since obviously there is an ethical teaching in Buddhism and clearly there are other forms of Buddhist philosophy. In my view, there is something that can plausibly be called moral philosophy in Indian Buddhism, but it is not quite what many people have expected because they have approached the issue from a specific understanding of philosophy that (...) is too limited. I propose to defend this interpretation by reshaping Mark Siderits’ concept of fusion philosophy. The fusion I will propose reveals a form of moral philosophy that may be called self-cultivation philosophy. I will argue that this was a common activity in ancient Chinese, Greek and Indian cultures—including especially early Buddhist thought and practice. (shrink)

"The book defends the thesis that the concept of self-cultivation philosophy is an informative interpretive framework for comprehending and reflecting on several philosophical outlooks in India, the Greco-Roman world and China. On the basis of an understanding of human nature and the place of human beings in the world, self-cultivation philosophies maintain that our lives can and should be substantially transformed from what is judged to be a problematic, untutored condition of human beings, our existential starting-point, into what is put (...) forward as an ideal state of being. We are to do this by undertaking a set of therapeutic or spiritual exercises guided by some philosophical analysis. The self-cultivation philosophies in India are expressed in: the Bhagavad Gītā; the Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophies of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Patañjali; and teaching of the Buddha and his followers Buddhaghosa and Śāntideva. The philosophies originating in Greece, with subsequent development in the Roman period, are the most prominent Hellenistic approaches: the Epicureanism of Epicurus, Lucretius and Philodemus; the Stoicism of Chrysippus, Epictetus and Seneca; and Pyrrho and the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus. The self-cultivation philosophies from China are the early Confucian outlooks of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi; the classical Daoist perspectives of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi; and the Chan tradition of Bodhidharma, Huineng and Linji"--. (shrink)

This essay discusses Korean Neo-Confucian conceptions of the self and the important practice of self-cultivation in Neo-Confucian culture. Although approaching the question and practice from different perspectives, these conceptions reflect a foundation in reverence for knowledge, righteousness, propriety, and benevolence. Basic comparisons are then drawn between Neo-Confucian and Western conceptions of the self and self-cultivation. In particular, Michel Foucault's work on self-cultivation as embedded in social discourses or practices suggests that Neo-Confucian self-cultivation also can be described through a microphysics of (...) reverence. Two examples from modern Korean culture are considered in order to demonstrate how a microphysics of reverence reveals replication and reinforcement of existing social practices in the guise of self-cultivation. (shrink)

This essay discusses Korean Neo-Confucian conceptions of the self and the important practice of self-cultivation in Neo-Confucian culture. Although approaching the question and practice from different perspectives, these conceptions reflect a foundation in reverence for knowledge, righteousness, propriety, and benevolence. Basic comparisons are then drawn between Neo-Confucian and Western conceptions of the self and self-cultivation. In particular, Michel Foucault’s work on self-cultivation as embedded in social discourses or practices suggests that Neo-Confucian self-cultivation also can be described through a microphysics of (...) reverence. Two examples from modern Korean culture are considered in order to demonstrate how a microphysics of reverence reveals replication and reinforcement of existing social practices in the guise of self-cultivation. (shrink)

A concise and accessible introduction to the evolution of the concept of moral self-cultivation in the Chinese Confucian tradition, this volume begins with an explanation of the pre-philosophical development of ideas central to this concept, followed by an examination of the specific treatment of self cultivation in the philosophy of Kongzi ("Confucius"), Mengzi ("Mencius"), Xunzi, Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming, Yan Yuan and Dai Zhen. In addition to providing a survey of the views of some of the most influential Confucian thinkers (...) on an issue of fundamental importance to the tradition, Ivanhoe also relates their concern with moral self-cultivation to a number of topics in the Western ethical tradition. Bibliography and index are included. (shrink)

The primary purpose of Confucian education is character-building, and the starting point and source of inspiration for character-building is self-cultivation. This deceptively simple assertion is predicated on the vision of the human as a learner, who is endowed with the authentic possibility of transforming given structural constraints into dynamic processes of self-realization. The true function of education as characterbuilding is learning to be human. Paideia or humanitas is, in its core concern, educating the art of embodiment. Through embodiment we realize (...) ourselves (body, mind-heart, soul, and spirit) in community, nature, and Heaven. (shrink)

Educational philosophies of self-cultivation as the foundation and cultural ethos for education have a strong and historically effective tradition stretching back to antiquity in the classical ‘cra...

Philosophical luminaries including Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill have all theorized that our human capacity of reason calls us to become the best that we can be by developing our “natural abilities.” This article explores the thesis that the development of our talents is not a moral duty to oneself and suggests that it may be avoided for other reasons than failures of rationality. In the face of the opportunity-costs associated with different life-goals, resistance to developing (...) our powers may spring from an informed and perfectly rational choice in favor of an equally valuable alternative to talent development as a way of life. Thus, the arguments in this essay suggest that the predominant, rationalistic view in defense of a duty to develop one’s talents ignores a distinctively human capacity, namely, the capacity for reasoned moral choice. The paper argues, however, that we do well in viewing the development of one’s talents as worthwhile. In other words, it is correct to sustain that the individual would be acting in a morally deficient manner if she declined to develop her abilities for the wrong reasons even if no duty to self to avoid that course of action exists. (shrink)

Self-care apps are booming. Early iterations of this technology focused on tracking health and fitness routines, but recently some developers have turned their attention to the cultivation of character, basing their conceptual resources on the Hellenistic tradition (Stoic Meditations™, Stoa™, Stoic Mental Health Tracker™). Those familiar with the final writings of Michel Foucault will notice an intriguing coincidence between the development of these products and his claims that the Hellenistic tradition of self-cultivation has much to offer contemporary life. In this (...) article, I explore Foucault’s cryptic remarks on this topic, and argue that today’s self-care developers can improve future products by paying attention to the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation he identifies as especially important. (shrink)

이 글은 『장자』 포정해우(庖丁解牛) 이야기의 ‘신(神)’ 개념을 인지적으로 분석하여 장자 수양론에 내재한 인지적 특질을 밝히는 것이다. 최고의 정신상태(mentality)인 ‘신’은 인간의 인지 체계인 뜨거운 인지(hot cognition)와 차가운 인지(cold cognition)가 혼성하여 창발 되는 ‘인지적 자발성(cognitive spontaneity)’로 뇌의 인지 작용과 몸의 행동 양식이 가장 명징한 수준이다. 즉 이 연구는 ‘신’의 상태가 선험적·생득적인 것이 아니라 수양의 경험에서 만들어지는 것임을 인지적으로 해명하는 것이다.BR 수양 이전의 포정은 오직 감각 기관(hot cognition)으로만 소를 보는데, 3년 간의 도축 수양(cold cognition)을 통해 도축 기술을 완전히 신체화(embodiment) 한다. 그 결과 더 (...) 이상 감각 기관에 얽매이지 않고 소를 ‘정신(神)’으로 대한다. 두 가지 인지 체계의 상호작용으로 최고의 자발적 상태인 ‘인공적인 뜨거운 인지(artificial hot cognition)’을 획득하는데, 장자는 이를 ‘신욕(神欲)’이라 했다. 새롭게 만들어진 뜨거운 인지가 몸과 감정으로 대표되는 기존의 뜨거운 인지와 다른 점은 고도의 분별 작용을 담당하는 차가운 인지를 경험하고 체화한 인지라는 것이다.BR 신욕을 따라 19년 동안 도축한 포정의 칼은 숫돌에 새로 간 칼과 같다. 인공적인 뜨거운 인지는 수많은 소의 개별 자연성을 인식하게 하고, 나의 자연성과 소의 자연성을 하나로 간주하게 한다. 그래서 포정은 자신의 자연성도 소의 자연성도 해치지 않는다. 포정은 인공적인 뜨거운 인지를 완전히 따르면서도, 여전히 뼈가 엉긴 곳이면 다시 분별하고 판단하는 차가운 인지에 의존한다. 도축의 수양을 통해 획득한 최고의 인지이자 제2의 본성인 ‘인공적인 뜨거운 인지’는 두 가지 인지 체계가 변화하는 상황에 가장 절묘하게 작동하는 것으로, 상황의 복잡성에 적절하게 대응하여 또 다른 균형점을 찾아가는 끊임없는 인지 작용의 과정이다. 즉 ‘인공적인 뜨거운 인지’의 작용이 곧 “緣督以爲經”의 중도(中道)이다. (shrink)

Nietzsche's Therapy explores the ethics of self-cultivation that Nietzsche forged in his middle works.

Self-cultivation—taking pedagogical action to educate oneself—is an integral part of non-formal adult education. Ever since Greek antiquity, it has been a central ingredient in the western philosophical and educational tradition. However, we argue that the global challenges that have emerged in the present era of the ecological crisis call for a new kind of understanding of this basic educational phenomenon. Based in particular on recent work in dark ecology and its central concept of the ‘uncanny’, we outline a few key (...) features of our time in relation to the contemporary challenge of self-cultivation. We then review extant literature on self-cultivation to ascertain whether the theoretical resources that have been used to conceptualise it in the past are capable of addressing these new aspects of self-cultivation. We conclude that each of the theoretical resources analysed here offer valuable insights into the novel challenges facing self-cultivation, though not all important questions can be answered. By specifying the contributions and limitations of these theoretical resources, we pave the way for future work on conceptualising self-cultivation for our times. (shrink)

I propose that Confucianism incorporates a latent commitment to the closely related epistemic virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness. Confucian praise of certain people, practices, and dispositions is only fully intelligible if these are seen as exercises and expressions of epistemic virtues, of which curiosity and inquisitiveness are the obvious candidates. My strategy is to take two core components of Confucian ethical and educational practice and argue that each presupposes a specific virtue. To have and to express a ‘love of learning’ (...) requires the virtue of curiosity, while the normative practice of good questioning requires exercise of the virtue of inquisitiveness. Taken together, people engaging in the foundational Confucian project of moral self-cultivation must desire and acquire a range of epistemic goods, a set of dispositions that manifest in the virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness, possession of which is admirable and excellent. Such, at least, is the claim defend in this chapter, which is an exercise in cross-cultural virtue epistemology. (shrink)

In this article, I show how resources for an education for non-dichotomous thinking can be drawn from the two Daoist texts, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. Dichotomous thinking can be defined as thinking that considers things in terms of strict and even irreconcilable dichotomous oppositions. The authors of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi are known for their criticism of such dichotomous thinking. At the same time however, these authors seem to fall into this very kind of thinking which they criticize. (...) That is to say, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi often promote adherence to conventionally ‘lower’ values over ‘higher’ ones. I believe though that this tension can be resolved if viewed through a pedagogical framework. Specifically, the adherence to ‘lower values’ can be seen as the initial step in the process of Daoist self-cultivation where one reduces the artificial distinctions one adheres to in order to prepare one’s disposition for union with Dao, which in turn entails non-dichotomous thinking. (shrink)

This book is an inquiry into ki-energy, its role within Eastern mind-body theory, and its implications for our contemporary Western understanding of the body. Yuasa examines the concept of ki-energy as it has been used in such areas as acupuncture, Buddhist and Taoist meditation, and the martial arts. To explain the achievement of mind-body oneness in these traditions he offers an innovative schematization of the lived body. His approach is interdisciplinary and cross-cultural, offering insights into Western philosophy, religion, medical science, (...) depth psychology, parapsychology, theater, and physical education. To substantiate the relationship that ki-energy forms between the human body and its environment, Yuasa introduces contemporary scientific research on ki-energy in China and Japan, as well as evidence from acupuncture medicine and from the experience of meditators and martial arts practitioners. This evidence requires not only a rethinking of the living human body and of the mind-body and mind-matter relation, but also calls into question the adequacy of the existing scientific paradigm. Yuasa calls for an epistemological critique of modern science and explores the issue of the relation of teleology to science. (shrink)

Confucius and Aristotle both put a primacy on the task of ethical self-cultivation. Unlike Aristotle, who emphasizes the instrumental value of legal punishment for cultivation’s sake, Confucius raises worries about the practice of punishment. Punishment, and the threat of punishment, Confucius suggests, actually threatens to warp human motivation and impede our ethical development. In this paper, I examine Confucius’ worries about legal punishment, and consider how a dialogue on punishment between Confucius and Aristotle might proceed. I explore how far apart (...) these thinkers actually stand, and examine the possibilities for a rapprochement between them. Doing so brings to light the self-cultivation perspective’s range of resources for thinking about punishment’s justification. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper aims to offer a new perspective on role modelling by examining adolescents’ own efforts to lead a morally virtuous life. While traditional approaches to moral education emphasize the importance of teachers as role models, this study proposes a shift in focus towards adolescents’ own role models. Drawing on the philosophical concept of moral self-cultivation and psychological insights on identity development and social cognitive learning, it is argued that adolescents have the ability to cultivate their moral character by (...) emulating others. However, empirical evidence suggests that adolescents often do not perceive teachers as their role models. Consequently, moral educational theories are advised to demand less of teachers as role models. Teachers could invest more time in understanding students’ personal role models and encourage them to compare these role models with their own behavior. By acknowledging and addressing students’ role models, teachers can facilitate the moral self-cultivation of adolescents. (shrink)

A concise and accessible introduction to the moral philosophy of Kongzi (Confucius), Mengzi (Mencius), Xunzi, Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming, Yan Yuan and Dai Zhen.

This thesis offers an original theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments based on the Francophone interpretation of the Hellenistic conception of self-cultivation. Recently Harry Frankfurt, Bernard Williams, and Susan Wolf have argued that practical philosophers must direct more attention to how our passionate attachments radically affect our resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’. By neglecting this topic, these thinkers argue, we overlook some of the strongest and most distinctively human motivations that guide our practical (...) lives, ones that have a powerful effect on our capacity to flourish. Not only should philosophers explain how our moral obligations and prudential concerns guide our conduct, they should also explain how and why we are guided by deep-seated passionate attachments, considerations that Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf argue provide the conditions for leading a life with a sense of meaning and purpose. Despite viewing passionate attachments as being vitally important, Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf offer separate accounts of either why we cannot actively cultivate them, or why we cannot form a philosophical theory of doing so. If there is a way in which we can cultivate our passionate attachments, then these thinkers argue that we must look outside philosophy: to the contingency of personal preference, to self-help instruction manuals, to guidance from religious traditions, or in extremis to clinical psychology. My study aims to show that this attitude is overly pessimistic. Not only do we have reason to view passionate attachments as susceptible to growth, change, and improvement, but we should view these entities as amenable to self-cultivation. Only by understanding this process can we construct a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments. Focusing on Pierre Hadot’s and Michel Foucault’s respective accounts of Hellenistic self-cultivation, provides vital conceptual tools to formulate a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments. First, their accounts of Hellenistic self-cultivation offer the conceptual resources for a philosophical theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. Second, the exercises of self-cultivation they focus on allow us to outline a practical method though which we can cultivate our passionate character. This takes the exercises of self-cultivation beyond their historical use, as well as beyond their role in the respective projects of these Francophone thinkers. Doing this brings out a significantly new dimension to the role of the passionate attachments in the flourishing life: not only are they valuable in the way Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf suggest, but we can offer theoretical and practical accounts how we can cultivate them based on the Hellenistic conception of self-directed character change. (shrink)

‘수신(修身)’은 공자 이래로 유가 철학의 주요 주제였으며, 동중서(董仲舒)를 비롯한 한대 (漢代) 유가들 또한 이런 전통을 계승했다고 할 수 있다. 그런데 전통적으로 공자를 비롯하여 춘추전국 시대 유가 철학자들은 말을 조심할 것을 강조하였으며 말이 진리를 온전히 담아낼 수 없다고 생각하였다. 따라서 그들은 수신의 과정에서 언어에 대한 경계를 강조하였다. 그러나 한대 유가들은 언어에 대해 강한 신뢰를 보인다. 동중서는 성인이 하늘의 뜻[天 意]에 따라 명칭을 지었다고 본다. 하늘은 비록 말하지 않고 행위 하지 않지만 ‘명(名)’을 통해 자신의 뜻을 드러낸다. 양웅(揚雄)은 “말은 마음의 소리이고 글은 마음의 (...) 그림이다” 라고 주장함으로써, 말과 글이 내면을 완벽하게 표현해줄 수 있다고 믿었다. 또한 왕충(王 充)은 동중서와 달리 하늘의 의지 등을 믿지 않는 자연철학자이지만, 말과 글은 그것을 사 용하는 사람의 생각[意]과 감정[情]을 그대로 표현한다고 믿었다. 한대 유가들의 언어관은 수신의 구체적인 방법에 있어서도 변화를 가져왔다. 양웅은 수 신을 위해 성인의 말씀이 담긴 오경(五經)의 학습을 강조하며, 스승의 가장 중요한 역할은 오경을 올바르게 이해하도록 도와주는 것이라고 본다. 또한 양웅은 오경의 말씀을 행동으 로 옮기는 것도 중요하지만, 성인의 말씀을 듣는 것만으로도 내면의 변화를 가져올 수 있 다고 보았다. 왜냐하면 말과 글은 사람의 정(情)을 움직이기 때문이다. 그리고 왕충은 ‘논 설(論說)’이 자기 자신을 갈고 닦는 데 중요한 방편이라고 생각했다. 좋은 문장은 마음속 에서 진정으로 우러나오는 것이기 때문에, 문장은 마음을 갈고 닦는 데 효과적이며 더 나 아가 다른 사람을 다스리는 데에도 중요하다. 왜냐하면 다른 사람을 다스리는 데 가장 우 선시해야 할 것은 올바른 도(道)를 정립하는 것이기 때문이다. 이와 같이 한대 유가들은 성인의 말씀을 읽고 들으며 좋은 문장을 쓰는 것이 수신의 좋은 방편이라고 생각했다. (shrink)

근대 이후 다양한 철학적 흐름에서 자아에 대한 객관주의적 입장은 비판을 계속 받아왔다. 최근에는 객관주의적 자아 대신 새로운 대안으로 떠오르는 개념이 ‘변화적 자아’ 또는 ‘과정적 자아(self-in-process)’이다. 우리의 자아는 고정된 본질을 가진 실체가 아니라 역사적 우연성들 의 영향을 받으며 진화하는 자아이다. 스스로의 행위에 의해 변형되며, 따라서 경험을 통해 드러 나고 경험에 의해 변형되는 자아이다. 변화적 자아에서는 의식 대신에 ‘몸’이 중심축이다. 몸이 라는 것은 단순히 뇌와 신체를 가리키는 것은 아니며, 그것은 생리학적 심리학적 현상일 뿐만 아니라, 사유, 느낌, 욕구의 역동적 복합성이다. 이 글은 몸적 (...) 자아에 근거하여 중국 고대 철학자인 순자의 수신(修身) 개념을 분석하고자 한다. 본 논문에서는 구체적으로 세 가지 질문에 초점을 맞추고자 한다. 첫째, 순자가 왜 의례의 장 (場)으로서 몸에 집중했는가? 둘째, 인간은 몸을 통해서 어떻게 자아를 형성하고 표현하는가? 셋째, 자아는 어떻게 성장하는가? 순자가 의례의 장으로서 몸짓에 주목한 이유는 인간의 몸이 언표화되지 않는 그 이상의 것, 즉 인간의 내면의 상태를 전달할 수 있다고 믿었기 때문이다. 인간의 몸짓은 다른 의사소통 수 단보다 훨씬 더 근원적이고 직접적인 기호이다. 그리고 우리는 의례 습득을 통해 단순히 어떤 사회에서 올바르다고 승인되는 몸짓을 습득하는 데에서 그치는 것이 아니라 우리의 자아를 형 성한다. 의례 과정에서 존대와 처신의 기제를 통해 나의 자아를 표현하고 상대방의 자아를 대우 한다. 개인의 자아는 상호작용 의례를 행하는 과정에서 형성되고 실현된다. 또한 순자는 『순자』 ｢권학(勸學)｣에서 수신의 단계로 법(法)-> 류(類)-> 예(禮) 또는 통류(統類)의 과정을 제시한다. 이것은 개인이 수신을 통해 차이성-> 유사성-> 통일성의 세계로 나아가는 과정을 묘사한 것이다. 다시 말하면 수신이라는 것은 자신만의 고유한 방식을 통해 자아 정체성을 형성하는 것이기도 하지만, 동시에 개별 존재 간의 유사성, 더 나아가 통일성을 깨닫는 길이기도 하다. 그리고 이 것은 인간됨의 길이기도 하다. (shrink)

The aim of Ethics and Self-Cultivation is to establish and explore a new 'cultivation of the self' strand within contemporary moral philosophy. Although the revival of virtue ethics has helped reintroduce the eudaimonic tradition into mainstream philosophical debates, it has by and large been a revival of Aristotelian ethics combined with a modern preoccupation with standards for the moral rightness of actions. The essays comprising this volume offer a fresh approach to the eudaimonic tradition: instead of conditions for rightness of (...) actions, it focuses on conceptions of human life that are best for the one living it. The first section of essays looks at the Hellenistic schools and the way they influenced modern thinkers like Spinoza, Kant, Nietzsche, Hadot, and Foucault in their thinking about self-cultivation. The second section offers contemporary perspectives on ethical self-cultivation by drawing on work in moral psychology, epistemology of self-knowledge, philosophy of mind, and meta-ethics. (shrink)

Many writers have commented on the striking similarities between Chinese philosophy and the depth psychology of Carl Jung following Jung's own interest in the topic. Although previous studies have focused almost exclusively on the Taoist classics, remarkably, the Confucian tradition is potentially even more affirmative of Jung's ideas. Confucian humanist philosophy is commonly perceived to be a rigid system of social morality, when it is really concerned with nurturing authentic individuality in order to influence the world and establish universal harmony. (...) The Confucian ChungYung, a classic work usually translated as the Doctrine of the Mean, presents an account of transformative growth that is surprisingly close to Jung's central theory of individuation. The integral metaphysics of ChungYung resonates with the spirit of archetypal psychology, which also sees that harmony on a universal scale is influenced by the whole, authentic self. ChungYung and Jung are practiced as methods of transformative self-cultivation, maintaining universal harmony as the ultimate goal. Both recognize that developing inherent characteristics will connect the individual to society, nature, and destiny. This dissertation describes the main themes relating to self-cultivation, first in the ChungYung, then in Jungian depth psychology, in both cases incorporating commentary from relevant secondary sources into the narrative. These accounts are completed with a comparison of the two systems alongside each other to demonstrate in which areas they are most similar. (shrink)

The opposition between learning as a process of self-cultivation and learning as a form of vocational training for the workplace is becoming ever more deeply entrenched in the twenty-first-century university. In language education in particular, the distinction between these two competing aims influences the way in which educators approach curriculum design and inevitably shapes the attitudes learners bring to the classroom. In this article, we contest what we see as the overly simplistic opposition between Bildung and Ausbildung by deploying a (...) conception of play that suspends the pragmatic demands of everyday existence. We argue that when learning activities are envisaged as a form of free-flowing, playful exploration, skills-based language training can be understood as an experience of Bildung in which the language learner creatively renegotiates their own identity through an encounter with both their own values and those of the target culture. (shrink)

Challenging the popular perception that Confucianism provides mostly a moral defense of political hierarchy, this article demonstrates that Confucianism is more than compatible with democracy and f...

In this thesis, I have explored, explicated and argued for some specific areas of commonalities between the philosophy of John Dewey and the teaching of Confucius. Both theories start with the same fundamental assumption that there is no such thing as immutable human nature, and their shared emphasis on education is based on this supposition. John Dewey and Confucius agree that the self mainly consists of habits and that the transformation of the self implies growth, i.e., the acquisition of new (...) and intelligent habits. The Deweyan conception of growth overlaps the Confucian doctrine of self-cultivation in that both concepts focus on the obtainment of inner moral qualities that are of great communal import. Dewey's construal of freedom seems to parallel jen, the Confucian ideal, because both thinkers maintain that human perfection is the ultimate goal for which we should strive unceasingly. (shrink)