Experiences are interpreted as conscious mental occurrences that are of phenomenal character. There is already a kind of (weak) intentionality involved with this phenomenal interpretation. A stricter conception of experiences distinguishes between purely phenomenal experiences and intentional experiences in a narrow sense. Wittgenstein’s account of psychological (experiential) verbs is taken over: Usually, expressing mental states verbally is not describing them. According to this, I believe can be seen as an expression of one’s own belief, but not as an expression of (...) a belief about one’s belief. Hence, the utterance I believe it is raining shows that I believe that it is raining, although it is not said by these words that I believe that it is raining. Thinking thoughts such as I believe it is raining, but it is not raining (a variant of Moore’s paradox) is an absurdity between what is already said by silently uttering It is not raining and what is shown by silently uttering I believe it is raining. The paper agrees with a main result of Wittgenstein’s considerations of Moore’s paradox, namely the view that logical structure, deducibility, and consistency cannot be reduced solely to propositions—besides a logic of propositions, there is, for example, a logic of assertions and of imperatives, respectively. (shrink)

We consider countable so‐called rich subsemigroups of ; each such semigroup T gives a variety CPEAT that is axiomatizable by a finite schema of equations taken in a countable subsignature of that of ω‐dimensional cylindric‐polyadic algebras with equality where substitutions are restricted to maps in T. It is shown that for any such T, if and only if is representable as a concrete set algebra of ω‐ary relations. The operations in the signature are set‐theoretically interpreted like in polyadic equality set (...) algebras, but such operations are relativized to a union of cartesian spaces that are not necessarily disjoint. This is a form of guarding semantics. We show that CPEAT is canonical and atom‐canonical. Imposing an extra condition on T, we prove that atomic algebras in CPEAT are completely representable and that CPEAT has the super amalgamation property. If T is rich and finitely represented, it is shown that CPEAT is term definitionally equivalent to a finitely axiomatizable Sahlqvist variety. Such semigroups exist. This can be regarded as a solution to the central finitizability problem in algebraic logic for first order logic with equality if we do not insist on full fledged commutativity of quantifiers. The finite dimensional case is approached from the view point of guarded and clique guarded (relativized) semantics of fragments of first order logic using finitely many variables. Both positive and negative results are presented. (shrink)

We prove an Omitting Types Theorem for certain algebraizable extensions of first order logic without equality studied in [SAI 00] and [SAY 04]. This is done by proving a representation theorem preserving given countable sets of infinite meets for certain reducts of ?- dimensional polyadic algebras, the so-called G polyadic algebras (Theorem 5). Here G is a special subsemigroup of (?, ? o) that specifies the signature of the algebras in question. We state and prove an independence result connecting our (...) representation theorem to Martin's axiom (Theorem 6). Also we show that the countable atomic G polyadic algebras are completely representable (Corollary 16) contrasting results on cylindric algebras. Several related results are surveyed. (shrink)

SC, CA, QA and QEA denote the classes of Pinter's substitution algebras, Tarski's cylindric algebras, Halmos' quasi-polyadic algebras and quasi-polyadic equality algebras, respectively. Let ω ≤ α < β and let K ∈ {SC,CA,QA,QEA}. We show that the class of α -dimensional neat reducts of algebras in Kβ is not elementary. This solves a problem in [3]. Also our result generalizes results proved in [2] and [3].

We experimentally investigated the influence of context-based biases, such as prestige and popularity, on the preferences for quotations. Participants were presented with random quotes associated to famous or unknown authors, or with random quotes presented as popular, i.e. chosen by many previous participants, or unpopular. To exclude effects related to the content of the quotations, all participants were subsequently presented with the same quotations, again associated to famous and unknown authors, or presented as popular or unpopular. Overall, our results showed (...) that context-based biases had no, or limited, effect in determining participants’ choices. Quotations preferred for their content were preferred in general, despite the contextual cues to which they were associated. We conclude discussing how our results fit with the well-known phenomenon of the spread and success of misattributed quotations, and we draw some more general implications for cultural evolution research. (shrink)

Looking at the operation of forming neat $\alpha $ -reducts as a functor, with $\alpha $ an infinite ordinal, we investigate when such a functor obtained by truncating $\omega $ dimensions, has a right adjoint. We show that the neat reduct functor for representable cylindric algebras does not have a right adjoint, while that of polyadic algebras is an equivalence. We relate this categorial result to several amalgamation properties for classes of representable algebras. We show that the variety of cylindric (...) algebras of infinite dimension, endowed with the merry go round identities, fails to have the amalgamation property answering a question of Németi’s. We also study two variants of the so-called cylindric polyadic algebras introduced by Ferenczi (all are reducts of polyadic equality algebras, that are also varieties). We show that one is more cylindric than polyadic, and that the other is more polyadic than cylindric. Our classification is determined by results on neat embeddings and amalgamation expressed from the point of view of category theory, thereby witnessing, and, indeed, further emphasizing, the dichotomy between the cylindric and polyadic paradigms. For example, the first class does not have the unique neat embedding property, fails to have the amalgamation property and the neat reduct functor does not have a right adjoint, while the second class has the unique neat emdedding property, the superamalgamation property and the neat reduct functor is strongly invertible. Other results, like first order definability of the class of neat reducts and the class of completely representable algebras, confirming our classification along these lines are presented. (shrink)

We review, and in the process unify two techniques , for proving results concerning amalgamation in several classes studied in algebraic logic. The logical counterpart of these results adress interpolation and definability properties in modal and algebraic logic. Presenting them in a functorial context as adjoint situations, we show that both techniques can indeed be seen as instances of the use of the Keisler-Shelah ultrapower Theorem in proving Robinson's Joint Consistency Theorem. Some new results are surveyed. The results of this (...) paper are presented in such a way that further establishes the hitherto existing well developed duality theory between boolean algebras with operators and modal logic. (shrink)

Fix 2 < n < ω. Let CA n denote the class of cylindric algebras of dimension n, and let RCA n denote the variety of representable CA n ’s. Let L n denote first-order logic restricted to the first n variables. Roughly, CA n, an instance of Boolean algebras with operators, is the algebraic counterpart of the syntax of L n, namely, its proof theory, while RCA n algebraically and geometrically represents the Tarskian semantics of L n. Unlike Boolean (...) algebras having a Stone representation theorem, RCA n ⊊ CA n. Using combinatorial game theory, we show that the existence of certain finite relation algebras RA, which are algebras whose domain consists of binary relations, implies that the celebrated Henkin omitting types theorem fails in a very strong sense for L n. Using special cases of such finite RA ’s, we recover the classical nonfinite axiomatizability results of Monk, Maddux, and Biro on RCA n and we re-prove Hirsch and Hodkinson’s result that the class of completely representable CA n ’s is not first-order definable. We show that if T is an L n countable theory that admits elimination of quantifiers, λ is a cardinal < 2 ℵ 0, and F = 〈 Γ i : i < λ 〉 is a family of complete nonprincipal types, then F can be omitted in an ordinary countable model of T. (shrink)

Following research initiated by Tarski, Craig and Nemeti, and futher pursued by Sain and others, we show that for certain subsets G of $^\omega \omega $ , atomic countable G poiyadic algebras are completely representable. G polyadic algebras are obtained by restricting the similarity type and axiomatization of ω-dimensional polyadic algebras to finite quantifiers and substitutions in G. This contrasts the cases of cylindric and relation algebras.

Fix a finite ordinal \ and let \ be an arbitrary ordinal. Let \ denote the class of cylindric algebras of dimension \ and \ denote the class of relation algebras. Let \\) stand for the class of polyadic algebras of dimension \. We reprove that the class \ of completely representable \s, and the class \ of completely representable \s are not elementary, a result of Hirsch and Hodkinson. We extend this result to any variety \ between polyadic algebras (...) of dimension \ and diagonal free \s. We show that that the class of completely and strongly representable algebras in \ is not elementary either, reproving a result of Bulian and Hodkinson. For relation algebras, we can and will, go further. We show the class \ is not closed under \. In contrast, we show that given \, and an atomic \, then for any \, \ is a completely representable \. We show that for any \, the class of completely representable algebras in certain reducts of \s, that happen to be varieties, is elementary. We show that for \, the the class of polyadic-cylindric algebras dimension \, introduced by Ferenczi, the completely representable algebras coincide with the atomic ones. In the last algebras cylindrifications commute only one way, in a sense weaker than full fledged commutativity of cylindrifications enjoyed by classical cylindric and polyadic algebras. Finally, we address closure under Dedekind-MacNeille completions for cylindric-like algebras of dimension \ and \s for \ an infinite ordinal, proving negative results for the first and positive ones for the second. (shrink)

We give a new characterization of the class of completely representable cylindric algebras of dimension 2 #lt; n ≤ w via special neat embeddings. We prove an independence result connecting cylindric algebra to Martin's axiom. Finally we apply our results to finite-variable first order logic showing that Henkin and Orey's omitting types theorem fails for Ln, the first order logic restricted to the first n variables when 2 #lt; n#lt;w. Ln has been recently (and quite extensively) studied as a (...) many-dimensional modal logic. (shrink)

SC , CA , QA and QEA stand for the classes of Pinter's substitution algebras, Tarski's cylindric algebras, Halmos' quasipolyadic algebras, and quasipolyadic equality algebras of dimension , respectively. Generalizing a result of Németi on cylindric algebras, we show that for K {SC, CA, QA, QEA} and ordinals , the class Nr K of -dimensional neat reducts of -dimensional K algebras, though closed under taking homomorphic images and products, is not closed under forming subalgebras (i.e. is not a variety) if (...) and only if > 1.From this it easily follows that for 1 , the operation of forming -neat reducts of algebras in K does not commute with forming subalgebras, a notion to be made precise. (shrink)

We give a new characterization of the class of completely representable cylindric algebras of dimension 2 #lt; n w via special neat embeddings. We prove an independence result connecting cylindric algebra to Martin''s axiom. Finally we apply our results to finite-variable first order logic showing that Henkin and Orey''s omitting types theorem fails for L n, the first order logic restricted to the first n variables when 2 #lt; n#lt;w. L n has been recently (and quite extensively) studied as (...) a many-dimensional modal logic. (shrink)

Let 1 n. We show that the class NrnCAβ of n-dimensional neat reducts of β-dimensional cylindric algebras is not closed under forming elementary subalgebras. This solves a long-standing open problem of Tarski and his co-authors Andréka, Henkin, Monk and Németi. The proof uses genuine model-theoretic arguments.

We show that not all epimorphisms are surjective in certain classes of infinite dimensional cylindric algebras, Pinter's substitution algebras and Halmos' quasipolyadic algebras with and without equality. It follows that these classes fail to have the strong amalgamation property. This answers a question in [3] and a question of Pigozzi in his landmark paper on amalgamation [9]. The cylindric case was first proved by Judit Madarasz [7]. The proof presented herein is substantially different. By a result of Németi, our result (...) implies that the Beth-definability Theorem fails for certain expansions of first order logic. (shrink)

We show that it is impossible to define a substitution operator for arbitrary representable cylindric algebras that agrees in its basic properties with the notion of substitutions introduced for dimension complemented algebras.

Drawing on social exchange theory, this study examines a mechanism, namely organizational social capital, through which self-sacrificial leadership is related to two types of employee behaviours: organizational citizenship behaviours and counterproductive behaviours. The results of two different studies in Egypt showed that self-sacrificial leadership is positively related to OSC which, in turn, is positively related to OCBs and negatively related to CPBs. Overall, the findings suggest that self-sacrificial leaders are more likely to achieve desirable employee behaviours through improving the quality (...) of social relationships among employees. (shrink)

SC, CA, QA and QEA denote the class of Pinter’s substitution algebras, Tarski’s cylindric algebras, Halmos’ quasi-polyadic and quasi-polyadic equality algebras, respectively. Let . and . We show that the class of n dimensional neat reducts of algebras in K m is not elementary. This solves a problem in [2]. Also our result generalizes results proved in [1] and [2].

We redefine a system of varieties definable by a schema of equations to include finite dimensions. Then we present a technique using ultraproducts enabling one to lift results proved for every finite dimension to the transfinite. Let \(\bf Ord\) denote the class of all ordinals. Let \(\langle \mathbf{K}_{\alpha}: \alpha\in \bf Ord\rangle\) be a system of varieties definable by a schema. Given any ordinal \(\alpha\), we define an operator \(\mathsf{Nr}_{\alpha}\) that acts on \(\mathbf{K}_{\beta}\) for any \(\beta>\alpha\) giving an algebra in \(\mathbf{K}_{\alpha}\), (...) as an abstaction of taking \(\alpha\)-neat reducts for cylindric algebras. We show that for any positive \(k\), and any infinite ordinal \(\alpha\) that \(\mathbf{S}\mathsf{Nr}_{\alpha}\mathbf{K}_{\alpha+k+1}\) cannot be axiomatized by a finite schema over \(\mathbf{S}\mathsf{Nr}_{\alpha}\mathbf{K}_{\alpha+k}\) given that the result is valid for all finite dimensions greater than some fixed finite ordinal. We apply our results to cylindric algebras and Halmos quasipolyadic algebras with equality. As an application to our algebraic result we obtain a strong incompleteness theorem (in the sense that validitities are not captured by finitary Hilbert style axiomatizations) for an algebraizable extension of \(L_{\omega,\omega}\). (shrink)

We give a simple new construction of representable relation algebras with non-representable completions. Using variations on our construction, we show that the elementary closure of the class of completely representable relation algebras is not finitely axiomatizable.

We give a simple new construction of representable relation algebras with non-representable completions. Using variations on our construction, we show that the elementary closure of the class of completely representable relation algebras is not finitely axiomatizable.

We show that there exists an atomic polyadic equality algebra of dimension n that is elementary equivalent to a completely representable algebra, but its diagonal free reduct is not completely representable.

In this note we give an interpretation of cylindric algebras as algebras of sentences of first order logic. We show that the isomorphism types of such algebras of sentences coincide with the class of neat reducts of cylindric algebras. Also we show how this interpretation sheds light on some recent results. This is done by likening Henkin's Neat Embedding Theorem to his celebrated completeness proof.

Biobanking is a relatively new concept in Egypt. Building a good relationship with different stakeholders is essential for the social sustainability of biobanks. To establish this relationship, it is necessary to assess the attitude of different groups towards this concept. The objective of this work is to assess the knowledge, attitude, and opinions of Egyptian patients towards biobanking issues. We designed a structured survey to be administered to patients coming to the outpatient clinics in 3 university hospitals in Egypt. The (...) survey included questions estimating the level of knowledge about the term “Biobank”, together with questions about the attitudes and opinions about related issues. Two hundred and fifty-nine patients participated in the survey. Eighty-one percent of participants reported that they never heard about the term before. About 85% expressed that they would be willing to donate their samples for research and about 87% thought that sample donation did not contradict their religious beliefs. Fifty eight percent were willing to participate in a genetic research project, 27.8% supported sharing their sample with pharmaceutical companies, and 32.4% agreed to share their samples with institutions abroad. Although there is limited knowledge about biobanking among Egyptian patients, many had a positive attitude towards sample donation and didn’t show religious concerns against it. However, they showed concerns regarding participation in genetic research and with sharing their samples across borders or with pharmaceutical companies. Public education about biobanking is possible, taking into consideration the specific cultural and legal framework in Egypt. (shrink)

We give a novel application of algebraic logic to first order logic. A new, flexible construction is presented for representable but not completely representable atomic relation and cylindric algebras of dimension n (for finite n > 2) with the additional property that they are one-generated and the set of all n by n atomic matrices forms a cylindric basis. We use this construction to show that the classical Henkin-Orey omitting types theorem fails for the finite variable fragments of first order (...) logic as long as the number of variables available is > 2 and we have a binary relation symbol in our language. We also prove a stronger result to the effect that there is no finite upper bound for the extra variables needed in the witness formulas. This result further emphasizes the ongoing interplay between algebraic logic and first order logic. (shrink)

The aim of this research is to explore the process linking participative leadership to organizational identification. The study examines the relationship between participative leadership and internal CSR perceptions of employees and also investigates the role that pride in membership plays in the affiliation of CSR perceptions with organizational identification. By studying these relationships, the paper aspires to contemplate new presumed mediators in the association of participative leadership with organizational identification as well as determine a possible novel antecedent of employee CSR (...) perceptions. Empirical evidence is provided from data that was collected through a survey distributed to employees working for small- and medium-sized enterprises in three countries in the Middle East and North Africa regions, particularly the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, and Tunisia. Findings show that participative leadership leads to positive internal CSR perceptions of employees and that these CSR perceptions lead to pride in membership which, in turn, results in organizational identification. Implications of these findings are also discussed. (shrink)

Coping with everyday life limits the extent of one’s scepticism. It is practically impossible to doubt the existence of the things with which one is immediately engaged and interacting. To doubt that, say, a door exists, is to step back from merely using the door (opening it) and to reflect on it in a detached, theoretical way. It is impossible to simultaneously act and live immersed in situation S while doubting that one is in S. Sceptical doubts—such as ‘Is this (...) really a door?’, ‘Am I really walking?’ — require a reflective withdrawal in thought from the situation at hand. Maintaining sceptical doubt while coping with everyday life requires a split consciousness, a bad faith, with one part of consciousness doubting the existing of things that the other part takes forgranted. For this reason, a sustained lived sceptical doubt is sometimes thought to be impossible. -/- In this article, I examine Wittgenstein's response to scepticism in "On Certainty". I argue that one of his responses is "the response based on action", which is (as other Wittgenstein interpreters have noted) a characteristically pragmatist response. I then evaluate the quality of this pragmatist response to scepticism, noting that actions just as much as representations are susceptible to mis-interpretation. It is argued that despite the insights contained in it, Wittgenstein's contextualism about meaning is inadequate to rescue the Wittgensteinian response to scepticism. (shrink)

Concerning the ubiquity of social media, this research tried to examine the impacts of using Telegram on Iranian EFL learners’ foreign language motivation, foreign language anxiety, and attitude toward learning. To achieve these purposes, 60 Iranian EFL learners at the intermediate level were selected and randomly divided into two groups: experimental and control. After that, both groups were pretested on motivation and anxiety variables. After pretesting, the participants in the experimental class received treatmentviausing the Telegram application, and the control students (...) were trained traditionally without using any social media. After an 18-session instruction, a post-test of motivation and a post-test of anxiety were given to both groups, and also an attitude questionnaire was distributed among the experimental group to inspect their attitudes toward the Telegram application in language learning. The results of using two one-way ANCOVA tests showed significant differences between the post-tests of the control and experimental groups in favor of the experimental group. The findings demonstrated that using the Telegram application increased the motivation of the experimental group and decreased their level of foreign language anxiety. Also, the results of one sample t-test showed that the participants of the experimental group held positive attitudes toward using the Telegram application in English language learning. The implications of this research can encourage both teachers and learners to use social media-based instruments in English teaching and learning. (shrink)

This article aims to contribute to the literature on conceptual change by engaging in direct theoretical and empirical comparison of contrasting views. We take up the question of whether naïve physical ideas are coherent or fragmented, building specifically on recent work supporting claims of coherence with respect to the concept of force by Ioannides and Vosniadou [Ioannides, C., & Vosniadou, C. (2002). The changing meanings of force. Cognitive Science Quarterly 2, 5–61]. We first engage in a theoretical inquiry on the (...) nature of coherence and fragmentation, concluding that these terms are not well‐defined, and proposing a set of issues that may be better specified. The issues have to do with contextuality, which concerns the range of contexts in which a concept (meaning, model, theory) applies, and relational structure, which is how elements of a concept (meaning, model, or theory) relate to one another. We further propose an enhanced theoretical and empirical accountability for what and how much one needs to say in order to have specified a concept. Vague specification of the meaning of a concept can lead to many kinds of difficulties.Empirically, we conducted two studies. A study patterned closely on Ioannides and Vosniadou's work (which we call a quasi‐replication) failed to confirm their operationalizations of “coherent.” An extension study, based on a more encompassing specification of the concept of force, showed three kinds of results: (1) Subjects attend to more features than mentioned by Ioannides and Vosniadou, and they changed answers systematically based on these features; (2)We found substantial differences in the way subjects thought about the new contexts we asked about, which undermined claims for homogeneity within even the category of subjects (having one particular meaning associated with “force”) that best survived our quasi‐replication; (3) We found much reasoning of subjects about forces that cannot be accounted for by the meanings specified by Ioannides and Vosniadou. All in all, we argue that, with a greater attention to contextuality and with an appropriately broad specification of the meaning of a concept like force, Ioannides and Vosniadou's claims to have demonstrated coherence seem strongly undermined. Students' ideas are not random and chaotic; but neither are they simply described and strongly systematic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Master" versus "Servant":Contradictions in Drama and Theatre EducationShifra Schonmann (bio)Mr Jourdain: You mean to say that when I say "Nicole, fetch me my slippers" or "Give me my night-cap" that's prose?Philosopher: Certainly, sir.Mr Jourdain: Well, my goodness! Here I've been talking prose for the last forty years and never known it, and mighty grateful I am to you for telling me!—Molière, Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme1My basic claim is that (...) our young field—drama and theatre education—feels old. Are we being stifled by applied drama and theatre, so that it has put real obstacles in the way of broadening the horizons of the field? I know that by asking this question I risk setting myself up as a living target for all those who maintain that applied theatre is the "hot" and the appropriate concept in the field. For more than twenty-five years now, we have been working with our students in teacher education departments and with children in schools in the manner of applied drama and theatre, but we have named it differently. It is as if we had been speaking the language of applied drama and theatre for twenty-five years—and we did not know that this was the case. (It reminds me of Moliere's Monsieur Jourdain who suddenly discovers that he has been speaking prose for the past forty years.) I would like to make it very clear from the outset that my claim is not against applied drama and theatre; it is a claim for another proportion (balance) between the instrumental function and the artistic-aesthetic function of our drama and theatre work in education.Is this a new claim? Not at all. But in the midst of our intensive endeavors in the field, it strikes me again and again that we have been running after our own tails, doing almost the same things over the past twenty-five [End Page 31] years. I have tried to understand why we are wandering around, surrounded by the same basic circles and experiencing a feeling of déjà-vu. What, really, is our problem? As a result of asking myself these questions, I began to analyze programs of the major conferences of the last ten years in drama and theatre education: Exeter (Researching Drama and Theatre in Education), AATE (American Alliance for Theatre and Education), IDEA (International Drama/Theatre and Education Association), and IDIERI (International Drama in Education Research Institute). These are considered to be the main international professional gatherings in the field (most of which I have attended). I have been looking into the headings that express the topics that were discussed. My data show that the majority of the topics were concerned with the by-products that drama and theatre can produce but not with the artistic and/or the aesthetic dimensions of the field. Sometimes I wonder if we fail to see the wood for the trees.In the Dictionary of Developmental Drama, written by Richard Courtney, an attempt was made to clarify the terms of drama used in a variety of practical fields.2 In this dictionary, we cannot find the applied theatre entry or process drama entry, but we can find entries such as developmental drama, drama in education, drama therapy, dramatic activity, educational drama, educational theatre, forum theatre, and many others. The terminology used among drama workers, leaders, and researchers is not precise. When drama educators and researchers meet, we engage in extensive discussion, often exchanging experiences and successful strategies. Quite some time can pass before we realize that our concepts of drama education differ considerably. These concepts range from completely spontaneous activities, such as improvisational exercises, to very carefully planned work, such as staging written scripts. Courtney's dictionary is the only one that I know that tries to define the basic concepts in our field: It is necessary but not adequate or up to date.In the "Drama Way" Project, a comprehensive work by Jouni Piekkari et al., coordinated by the University of Turku in Finland, I found a good attempt to set up a "mini" dictionary.3 The "Drama Way" Project identified a number of... (shrink)

In our daily lives we conceive of our surroundings as an objectively given reality. The world is perceived through our senses, and ~hese provide us, so we believe, with a faithful image of the world. But occ~ipnally we are forced to realize that our senses deceive us, e. g., by illusions. For a while it was believed that the sensation of color is directly r~lated to the frequency of light waves, until E. Land (the inventor of the polaroid camera) showed (...) in detailed experiments that our perception of, say, a colored spot depends on the colors of its surrounding. On the other hand, we may experience hallucinations or dreams as real. Quite evidently, the relationship between the "world" and our "brain" is intricate. Another strange problem is the way in which we perceive time or the "Now". Psychophysical experiments tell us that the psychological "Now" is an extended period of time in the sense of physics. The situation was made still more puzzling when, in the nineteen-twenties, Heisenberg and others realized that, by observing processes in the microscopic world of electrons and other elementary particles, we strongly interfere with that world. The outcome of experiments - at least in general - can only be predicted statistically. What is the nature ofthis strange relationship between "object" and "observer"? This is another crucial problem of the inside-outside or endo-exo dichotomy. (shrink)

Background:The ability to save the life of an extremely premature baby has increased substantially over the last decade. This survival, however, can be associated with unfavourable outcomes for both baby and family. Questions are now being asked about quality of life for survivors of extreme prematurity. Quality of life is rightly deemed to be an important consideration in high technology neonatal care; yet, it is notoriously difficult to determine or predict. How does one define and operationalise what is considered to (...) be in the best interest of a surviving extremely premature baby, especially when the full extent of the outcomes might not be known for several years?Research question:The research investigates the caregiving dilemmas often faced by neonatal nurses when caring for extremely premature babies. This article explores the issues arising for neonatal nurses when they considered the philosophical and ethical questions about quality of life in babies ≤24 weeks gestation.Participants:Data were collected via a questionnaire to Australian neonatal nurses and semi-structured interviews with 24 neonatal nurses in New South Wales, Australia.Ethical considerations:Ethical processes and procedures have been adhered to by the researchers.Findings:A qualitative approach was used to analyse the data. The theme ‘difficult choices’ was generated which comprised three sub-themes: ‘damaged through survival’, ‘the importance of the brain’ and ‘families are important’. The results show that neonatal nurses believed that quality of life was an important consideration; yet they experienced significant inner conflict and uncertainty when asked to define or suggest specific elements of quality of life, or to suggest how it might be determined. It was even more difficult for the nurses to say when an extremely premature baby’s life possessed quality. Their previous clinical and personal experiences led the nurses to believe that the quality of the family’s life was important, and possibly more so than the quality of life of the surviving baby. This finding contrasts markedly with much of the existing literature in this field.Conclusion:Quality of life for extremely premature babies was an important consideration for neonatal nurses; however, they experienced difficulty deciding how to operationalise such considerations in their everyday clinical practice. (shrink)

This volume was initially conceived as a thematic issue of the Sfera Politicii journal and some of its chapters (written by Gabriela Tănăsescu, Henrieta A. Şerban, Lorena Stuparu and Cristian-Ion Popa) were published as such in the 9 (163), September 2011 issue under the title „Theory and Political Ideology”. To enlarge the discussion on the theme, new papers have been added to the previous ones for inclusion in this book. By choosing to title it „Political theories versus ideologies?” we (...) wanted to suggest from the beginning the difficulty of a consensus on such a disputable topic. As it has multiple facets, there are several possible ways to deal with it. Each contribution in this collection is an attempt to clarify a different aspect of the issue. So, a category of texts seeks to explore the nature of political theory, the value neutrality thesis concerning the social sciences, and the distinctions between theory and ideology. One of them is devoted to a trans-theoretical analysis of the naturalist and the interpretivist models of political theory; another one, by scrutinizing the original meaning of „philosophy”, aims at showing that, when philosophy neglects the ancient harmony between philo and sophia, by focusing only on the last one, it runs the risk of failing into ideology; the first efforts of some modern thinkers, (fascinating by mathesis universalis) to apply mathematics to politics, or Michael Oakeshott ‘s concept of ideology are also dealt with in other texts. By broadening the discussion on the neutrality thesis, one of the articles brings to light the philosophical prejudices underlying both „the constitutional” and „the welfare” models, i.e., a „rule ethics” and, respectively, a utilitarian one. Several papers investigate the status of the theories of international relations. Some of them address the peculiar question whether the so called theories of European integration satisfy the criteria of what political scientists mean by an empirical study of phenomena. To put it differently: Can we refer to such theories as a scientifically approaching to the unification European process, i.e., as being able to explaining and making predictions? A subsidiary question would be: are they ideologically neutral? The problem is explicitly put in another article, whose author, by suspecting such theories’ claim to neutrality, is asking if it is possible not a scientific approach to the European integration, but a normative one, namely, a philosophy of European unification „without ideology”. Some articles, pointing out the weakness and vulnerabilities of the traditional theories of international relations when confronted with new political realities, endorse a constructivist interpretation that is likely to offer a better account for actions such as humanitarian interventions. In a similar line of thinking, constructivism is seen by another contributor as a perspective in terms of which some traditional political concepts should be revised. An example is „the national interest”, a concept that can be explained in all its aspects neither by the realist nor by liberal theories. Subjects such as „the end of ideology”, or the ideological left-wing deviations of today liberalism for electoral reasons, or that of a likely „international solidarity” ideology are discussed in this volume too. If it is to draw a conclusion from most contributions, we would say that, irrespective of its versions, normative, or empirical (scientific), or analytical, political theory conceived of itself as being not only different from, but also opposed to ideology. And it still pretends to be so. Lots of the facets of the topic have remained, obviously, unexplored. Among them, the contemporary efforts to reconcile the normative and the empirical dimensions of political theory would have been worth of addressing – maybe, in a future enterprise. Engaging in the difficult endeavor of assembling and integrating individual texts into a coherent account, we hope to be successful in stimulating further debate on the theme, a debate in which the present volume is only a modest contribution. (shrink)

According to Goodman one important advantage of his Structure of Appearance over Carnap’s Aufbau is that his is a nominalist, whereas Carnap’s is a platonist, construction. Superficially, it is clear enough why Goodman should say this: Carnap employs set-theory, whereas Goodman allows himself only mereology. One object of this paper is to show that this superficial impression is rather misleading—that closer comparison of the two books reveals that each has a claim to be regarded as the more nominalist. Another aim (...) is to show that Goodman takes his book to be quintessentially nominalist partly because his conception of nominalism is somewhat eccentric. And a third aim is to show that when nominalism is understood in Goodman’s fashion it is difficult to see what the motivation for it is; more specifically, that Goodman’s arguments for his version of nominalism are not compelling. (shrink)

LetXbe a standard Borel space, and letEbe acountableBorel equivalence relation onX, i.e., a Borel equivalence relationEfor which every equivalence class [x]Eis countable. By a result of Feldman-Moore [FM],Eis induced by the orbits of a Borel action of a countable groupGonX.The structure of general countable Borel equivalence relations is very little understood. However, a lot is known for the particularly important subclass consisting of hyperfinite relations. A countable Borel equivalence relation is calledhyperfiniteif it is induced by a Borel ℤ-action, i.e., by (...) the orbits of a single Borel automorphism. Such relations are studied and classified in [DJK]. It is shown in Ornstein-Weiss [OW] and Connes-Feldman-Weiss [CFW] that for every Borel equivalence relationEinduced by a Borel action of a countable amenable groupGonXand for every probability measure μ onX, there is a Borel invariant setY⊆Xwith μ = 1 such thatE↾Y is hyperfinite. Motivated by this result, Weiss [W2] raised the question of whether everyEinduced by a Borel action of a countable amenable group is hyperfinite. Later on Weiss showed that this is true forG= ℤn. However, the problem is still open even for abelianG. Our main purpose here is to provide a weaker affirmative answer for general amenableG. We need a definition first. Given two standard Borel spacesX, Y, auniversally measurableisomorphism betweenXandYis a bijection ƒ:X→Ysuch that both ƒ, ƒ-1are universally measurable. Notice now that to assert that a countable Borel equivalence relation onXis hyperfinite is trivially equivalent to saying that there is a standard Borel spaceYand a hyperfinite Borel equivalence relationFonY, which isBorelisomorphic toE, i.e., there is a Borel bijection ƒ:X→YwithxEy⇔ ƒFƒ. We have the following theorem. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Folk Taxonomies Versus Official TaxonomiesNick Haslam (bio)Keywordsclassification, DSM-IV, folk taxonomyFlanagan and Blashfield’s paper continues a highly original program of research on clinicians’ understandings of psychopathology. This work is unique in bringing concepts and methods from cognitive anthropology to bear on psychiatric classification. At first blush, it might seem questionable to treat clinicians’ beliefs about psychiatric disorders as folk taxonomies, no different in kind from classifications of birds produced (...) by members of a forest-dwelling tribe. Unlike birds and other natural objects of folk taxonomies, mental disorders are not concrete entities and they cannot be distinguished on perceptual grounds. Unlike tribespeople, clinicians are not simply “folk” whose naïve classifications can be compared with those of scientific authorities. They are, in fact, heavily exposed to the reigning official taxonomy during their professional training, and their thinking can hardly remain unaffected by it. It is a testament to Flanagan and Blashfield’s work that despite these apparent disanalogies, their folk-taxonomic approach manages to illuminate how clinicians carve up the psychiatric domain.This paper reports some careful, creative, and labor-intensive studies to make a few fundamental claims about how clinicians classify. First, the authors argue that clinicians hold simplified taxonomies compared with the official DSM-IV taxonomy: They encompass fewer disorders and classify them in a shallower hierarchy. Second, they claim that clinicians substantially agree in how they classify disorders, and that a consensus classification can therefore be extracted from their individual taxonomies. Third, they argue that clinicians’ taxonomies show only a modest consistency with DSM-IV, and that the discrepancies may be systematic and important. Notably, for example, clinicians did not preserve the fundamental divide between the DSM’s Axes I and II. My comments address the second and third claims.Is There a “Consensus” among the Clinicians?One of the main achievements of Flanagan and Blashfield’s paper is to develop a “consensual taxonomy,” which is laid out in their Table 2a. This taxonomy clearly distils how their clinicians tended to judge the relations among diagnoses. However, it is an exaggeration to present it as a consensus. If, by Romney, Weller, and Batchelder’s (1986) third criterion, “cultural consensus” requires that the primary factor in a principal components analysis accounts for “most” of the variance in clinicians’ judgments, then Flanagan and Blashfield’s analysis [End Page 281] fails to show consensus. Their first factor accounts for only twenty-five percent of the variance, well short of the required majority. This finding implies that there is three times as much inconsistency or variability among clinicians’ taxonomic judgments than there is consistency and commonality. The observed factor-analytic findings are compatible with the average correlation between pairs of clinicians being only about 0.2, a very weak level of agreement.This is not to say that there is no consistency among the clinicians, or that there is no value in summarizing that consistency, but it does indicate that there is a great deal of diversity as well. Clinicians’ folk taxonomies seem to be highly idiosyncratic, more a Babel of distinctive classifications than a chorus of agreement. It is therefore risky to draw strong generalizations about how clinicians classify, and to imply that there is a single consensual taxonomy.Several things are very interesting about this diversity of classifications. First, Flanagan and Blashfield show that it cannot be explained by the clinicians’ differing levels of experience or by the different methodologies used to elicit their taxonomies. The variability among clinicians must therefore have some other basis, which awaits further investigation. Second, the level of agreement (“consensus”) obtained here is significantly lower than what has been found in more orthodox studies of folk taxonomy. By implication, the classification of psychiatric disorders is a slipperier enterprise than the classification of animals and plants. People who have extensive professional experience and training in the field of psychopathology—vocational training that includes the standardizing forces of accrediting bodies and a dominant psychiatric nosology—nevertheless tend not to agree substantially about how to map that territory. One guess about why this might be is that clinicians’ folk taxonomies are not merely descriptive maps of the interrelations among diagnostic entities, but are... (shrink)

I focus particularly on the case of the glory seekers. Driven by a foolhardy overestimation of their worth, seekers of glory do not value peace as others do. They may not even value peace at all. Their quest for glory then often obstructs peace, which is perhaps why Hobbes condemns vainglory as irrational. But once we clarify what it is that glory seekers seek, it becomes uncertain that gratifying appetites for glory is necessarily against right reason. If Hobbes is then (...) to say that the laws of nature are the dictates of right reason, he must either show that glory seeking is against right reason, or he must explain why the right reason of glory seekers, which argues against the laws of nature, does not count against the normative force of such laws. (shrink)

Dr. Fouts began his lecture with the story of how he and his wife Deborah became involved with Washoe—the first non-human to acquire the signs of American Sign Language (ASL). Project Washoe began in 1966 with Drs. Allen and Beatrix Gardner in Reno, Nevada. There had been other experiments that attempted to get chimpanzees to speak. These experiments were not successful due to anatomical and neurological differences between humans and chimpanzees. (Fouts showed some video of the chimpanzee Vicki trying to (...) say the four words she had learned—mama, papa, up, cup.) Part of the issue is the construction of the chimpanzee’s vocal box while another part of the issue is that chimpanzee vocalizations are tied to their .. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Broome’s target in his paper is the popular claim that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. He takes this to be the reductive claim that rationality reduces to responding correctly to reasons, which in turn he takes to entail that the property of rationality is identical to the property of responding correctly to reasons. It is this identity claim that Broome attempts to refute by showing that the properties that are supposed to be identical cannot be so (...) because they themselves do not share all properties. In this short commentary, I shall say something about the overall structure of Broome’s argument. More specifically, I shall argue that in its current form his argument rests on a very controversial premise, but that it can be replaced with an argument that avoids it and has wider significance. I shall also question the way Broome deals with the so-called Kantian argument against his own argument. Finally, I shall sketch an alternative view of rationality, which agrees with Broome that it supervenes on the mind, but disagrees with him on the question of whether it itself is a purely mental property. (shrink)

This commentary suggests that there are two distinct types of interacting cognitive processes. Conscious processes emerge from unconscious processes. The key problem of SOC is that it uses an overly narrow notion of the “cognitive unconscious” to show that the “cognitive unconscious” is not necessary. Yet, it has little to say about the roles of conscious and unconscious processes in general.

This article discusses how, in addition to providing a definition for translation, the concept of equivalence may explain why we can say that sentence S in language L is a translation of sentence S1 in language L1. It analyzes two main kinds of equivalence that are used in analytical philosophy to define translation: semantic equivalence and functional equivalence. This analysis shows that drawing a distinction between semantic and functional equivalence is a way to understand the distinction between different levels or (...) aspects of meaning. Both semantic equivalence, introduced by Gottlob Frege, and functional equivalence, proposed by Wilfrid Sellars, were developed in Donald Davidson’s theory of meaning. After discussing the limits of Davidson’s definitions of equivalence, this article will argue that functional equivalence is a reason for comparing Davidson’s philosophy to positions such as those expressed by Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. (shrink)

There are themes in Wittgenstein's later work which are extremely radical. By ‘radical’ I mean both that they cut to the very root of crucial philosophical issues, and that they tend to be ignored by the established philosophical positions of the day. More specifically, these themes focus on the understanding of epistemological bedrock, and they lead in directions about which it is difficult to get a hearing in major philosophical circles.

This essay constitutes an attempt to probe the very idea of a saying/showing distinction of the kind that Wittgenstein advances in the Tractatus—to say what such a distinction consists in, to say what philosophical work it has to do, and to say how we might be justified in drawing such a distinction. Towards the end of the essay the discussion is related to Wittgenstein’s later work. It is argued that we can profitably see this work in such a (...) way that a saying/showing distinction arises there too. In particular, in the final sub-section of the essay, it is suggested that we can see in Wittgenstein’s later work an inducement to say what we are shown. (shrink)