The contemporary physical description of the universe reflects the inanimate world only. Broadening this description by including life may limit the application of well?established physical laws and may find new forces of the universe governing living organizations. This may also require adoption of some new assumptions and methodological principles, such as a broader principle of uncertainty, and recognition of the fact that humans? ability to manifest biofield communication is distributed very unevenly in the population. Based on available body of scientific (...) literature it is suggested that at this time, before the theoretical basis of the biofield is developed, it is important to conduct a broad experimental study of highly psi?gifted individuals in order to accumulate scientific knowledge of humans? ability to interact with matter, i.e., known physical fields and living organisms by intent. One can expect that current studies of organisms? genomes and attempts to utilize stem cells in medicine will call for the recognition of the biofield and its operative control function in organisms. However, developing a from?the?top?down view on the organism by the suggested approach will shorten this process and it deserves appropriate investment of social resources. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider the narrow and wider benefits of permitting assisted dying in the specific context of organ donation and transplantation. In addition to the commonly used arguments, there are two other neglected reasons for permitting assisted suicide and/or euthanasia: assisted dying enables those who do not wish to remain alive to prolong the lives of those who do, and also allows many more people to fulfill their wish to donate organs after death. In the first part (...) of this chapter I explore the possibility of allowing those who die with assistance to donate their organs and the potential benefits of doing so in countries where some form of assisted dying is legal; in the second part I consider the added force that organ donation considerations bring to the argument in favour of legalizing assisted dying in countries where such practices remain forbidden. (shrink)

Bioethicists often present ‘saving lives’ as a goal distinct from, and competing with, that of extending lives by as much as possible. I argue that this usage of the term is misleading, and provides unwarranted rhetorical support for neglecting the magnitudes of the harms and benefits at stake in medical allocation decisions, often to the detriment of the young. Equal concern for all persons requires weighting equal interests equally, but not all individuals have an equal interest in (...) ‘life-saving’ treatment. (shrink)

Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34 (2006): 109-35.

In the distribution of resources, persons must be respected, or so many philosophers contend. Unfortunately, they often leave it unclear why a certain allocation would respect persons, while another would not. In this paper, we explore what it means to respect persons in the distribution of scarce, life-saving resources. We begin by presenting two kinds of cases. In different age cases, we have a drug that we must use either to save a young person who would live for many (...) more years or an old person who would only live for a few. In different numbers cases, we must save either one person or many persons from certain death. We argue that two familiar accounts of respect for persons―an equal worth account, suggested by Jeff McMahan, and a Kantian account, inspired by the Formula of Humanity―have implausible implications in such cases. We develop a new, “three-tiered” account: one that, we claim, generates results in such cases that accord better with many people’s considered judgments than those produced by its rivals. (shrink)

Wilkinson’s discussion of the individual and family consent to organ and tissue donation is to be welcomed because it draws attention to the “incoherent hybrid” of the current position.1 I wish to highlight some areas of his discussion and propose that, in a situation of posthumous organ and tissue donation, the cadaver has no individual rights and family rights should under no circumstances automatically outweigh the potential transplant recipients’ right to a life-saving treatment.Transplant immunobiology and clinical transplantation is a (...) revolutionary area of medicine and has saved thousands of lives. In the UK, between 1 April 2004 and 31 March 2005, organs from 752 people who died were used to save or dramatically improve many people’s lives through 2242 transplants.2 In the US, 23 506 transplants were performed between January and October 2005 from 12 084 donors.3 Information from available databases shows that demand for organs, cells and tissues has outstripped the supply. As of 18 January 2006, 6553 people are still waiting for transplants in the UK and there are 90 636 waiting list transplant candidates in the US.2,3 As of 01 January 2006, there are 15 977 people active on the Eurotransplant waiting list.4 It is likely that non-compulsory posthumous donation of organs has resulted in the loss of many thousands, possibly many …. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that reproductive genetic manipulation technologies like mitochondrial replacement and germline CRISPR modifications cannot be said to save anyone’s life because, counterfactually, no one would suffer more or die sooner absent the intervention. The present article argues that, on the contrary, reproductive genetic manipulations may be life-saving (and, from this, have therapeutic value) under an appropriate population health perspective. As such, popular reports of reproductive genetic manipulations potentially saving lives or preventing disease are (...) not necessarily mistaken, though such terminology still requires further empirical validation. (shrink)

In discussion surrounding the destruction of cultural heritage in armed conflict, one often hears two important claims in support of intervention to safeguard heritage. The first is that the protection of people and the protection of heritage are two sides of the same coin. The second is that the cultural heritage of any people is part of the common heritage of all humankind. In this article, I examine both of these claims, and consider the extent to which they align with (...) the current practices that they are intended to justify. (shrink)

This is the earliest critical discussion in the context of modern/contemporary philosophy in the analytical tradition arguing that somebody with a reasonably stable character and the company of the right people would be able to enjoy eternity.

In this article, I critique a moral argument developed in Frances Kamm’s Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm. The argument, which I label the Best Outcome Argument, aims to criticize the Taurekian idea that it is not worse if more people die than if fewer do in conflict situations, where it is hard to distinguish individuals from one another solely by reference to the relative strength of their claims. I argue that the Best Outcome Argument is flawed for three (...) reasons: the symmetry feature defined by the impartiality principle holds only in a limited class of conflict situations; individuals should be treated in a consistent way throughout the whole process of reasoning; comparative evaluations gained in different contexts, at least in some cases, cannot be used in one and the same argument. (shrink)

This book is about logic and evidence and its antithesis, fallacies, and powerful rhetoric. This book provides a tool box of knowledge about decision-making and evaluating public policy that citizens need to know in order to make informed decisions about policy proposals.

An ongoing debate in the United States relating to COVID-19 features the purported tension between containing the coronavirus to save lives or opening the economy to sustain livelihoods, with ethical overtones on both sides. Proponents of opening the economy argue that sustaining livelihoods should be prioritized over virus containment, with ethicists asking, “What about the risk to human life?” Defendants of restricting the spread of the virus endorse saving lives through virus containment but contend with the ethical (...) concern “What about people’s livelihoods and individual freedoms?” A commonly held belief is that political ideology drives these differential preferences: liberals are more focused on saving lives, whereas conservatives favor sustaining livelihoods with no additional government intervention in the free-market economy. We examine these lay beliefs among US residents in four studies and find that economic system justification (ESJ), an ideology that defends the prevailing economic system when under threat, is a reliable psychological predictor beyond political ideology. Specifically, compared to those who scored low on ESJ, people who scored high on ESJ judged China as more justified in downplaying the spread of virus to protect its interest in the global free-market economy, supported in-person over online learning, viewed shelter in place as less desirable, and perceived the opening of the Texas economy as more legitimate. We also find that multiple psychological mechanisms might be at work—resistance to market interventions, perceived legitimacy of opening the economy, perceived seriousness of the health crisis, and violation of human rights. (shrink)

Numerous state laws and the federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) have been enacted to prevent or redress genetic discrimination in employment and health insurance, but laws protecting against genetic discrimination in life insurance have been less common and weak. Consequently, some individuals with a genetic risk of a serious illness have declined presymptomatic genetic testing, thereby decreasing their prevention and treatment options and increasing their mortality risk. In 2020, Florida became the first state to prohibit life insurance companies from (...) using the results of presymptomatic genetic tests in underwriting. Although the law was “only” intended to prevent genetic discrimination, a possible or even likely consequence of the law will be to encourage timely genetic testing by at‐rick individuals and thereby save lives. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper considers what should be done about offers of organs for transplant that come with racist strings attached. Saving lives or improving their quality seem powerful reasons to accept the offer. Fairness, justice, and rejecting racism seem like powerful reasons against. This paper argues that conditional allocation should occur when it would provide access to organs for at least one person without costing others their access to organs. The bulk of the paper concentrates on defending this (...) claim against these objections: (i) that the good that might come about through conditional allocation does so through wrongful complicity in the racist's wrongdoing; (ii) that conditional allocation symbolizes support for racism; and (iii) that conditional allocation is unjust or unfair and is, for that reason, impermissible. The final section, on conditional allocation as a policy, considers the speculative possibility that conditional allocation would reduce access to organs for some, but it argues that, even then, conditional allocation could be justified. (shrink)

In this book Shrader-Frechette reveals how politicians, campaign contributors, and lobbyists--and their power over media, advertising, and public relations--have conspired to cover up environmental disease and death.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:OBEYING BAD ORDERS AND SAVING LIVES: THE STORY OF A FRENCH OFFICER Pierre d'Elbée Société Caminno, Paris The story is told that during the Paris riots of 1 848, a military officer received an order to evacuate a certain square by firing upon the "rabble." He left the garrison with his troops and started for the square to be cleared. Upon his arrival, he took up a (...) position with his soldiers who raised their guns to fire upon the crowd. In the profound silence that ensued, he cried: "I have received the order to fire upon the rabble; but as I perceive before me many honest people, I ask them to depart so that I may execute this order." In a few moments, the square was vacant. In circumstances such as these, a decision that saves both others and oneself is not easy to achieve. In such a repressive framework where legal violence is permitted, it is the duty of an officer to obey the order of his superiors, and when we hear or read this story for the first time, we do not see how a happy outcome is possible. The story ought to be dramatic, but what is astonishing is precisely that it is not. We expect the worst, which is what usually happens, the most optimistic among us perhaps hoping secretly for a happy end. But happy endings belong to the universe ofthe marvelous, and life does not resemble a story, as the pessimist murmurs within us. Still, it is the happy ending that in fact occurs, and our astonishment is bound to its improbability. Is it chance? Luck? Inspiration? Premeditation? No doubt there is something of all of this in the officer's decision, and his elegant intervention raises a smile in our skeptical hearts. It testifies that although not easy, one can discover a new way that responds to the secret hope of being really ourselves without getting caught within the web of necessity. Such an attractive path merits no doubt that we dwell on it a little more. 46Pierre d'Elbée Let us follow the officer and imagine we are in his place. It is clear that what is most striking in this story is the moment ofthe face-to-face between the officer and the crowd. It is worthwhile to back up a little, however. From the moment he receives his order to the moment of the face-to-face, the officer must live through some very bad moments: it is no little thing to fire upon a crowd even if legality is on our side. We all know that the worst crimes have been perpetrated under the cover of obedience. Such refuge within authority is rather a hell where one abdicates a part of oneself. The function ofan officer does not stop him from being equally a man, one with feelings, beliefs, values. He knows that the rioters, whatever their fight, cannot be reduced to the term "rabble." Rabble, "rabid," dog. These people deserve no doubt a bit more consideration than that. Who can assert that the riot does not express real sufferings, legitimate rights, slighted dignities? Who could feel comfortable executing the individual who claims his due? A praiseworthy indignation. From that point to justify an heroic ethics of non-violence, is only a small step. "No, I will not fire upon a crowd whose wrong or right deed is to be angry." The officer must undoubtedly have in mind similar thoughts. Inversely, perhaps he justifies himself by saying to himselfthat after all, the rioters disturb the public order. Ifone does not react vigorously and repressively, the riot could degenerate into a general revolution. The order is justified not only by legality but also by a morality ofthe common good. And anyway, ifhe does not empty the square by firing upon the crowd, someone else will. So he might as well do the dirty job himselfto avoid shifting the weight ofthis responsibility onto someone else. And thus, to the devil with such qualms. Life is sufficiently complicated as it is. Let us put it simply: my job as an officer is to obey orders? I obey. On... (shrink)

In , John Broome defends a very weak consequentialist account of the value of saving lives. This paper challenges the commitments of this kind of account and describes some reasons for saving lives that would appeal to a non-consequentialist.

Organ donation and transplantation touch on profound, and at times elusive, values and beliefs. These involve personal identity, embodiment, the relationship between the individual and the community, and death. Different cultural and religious perspectives, reflecting deeply ingrained but often unspoken assumptions about human identity and responsibilities, subtly but profoundly affect attitudes to donation and transplantation.

I argue that, because of scarcity, the right to life cannot imply an obligation on others to save the life of the right-holder, and that collectivising resources for health care not only ensures that resources are used inefficiently and inappropriately but also removes from people the authority to make decisions for themselves about matters of health, life and death.

Sir, I have recently had occasion to give my support to a local demand by parents and teachers for a patrolled crossing over a busy road outside their children's school. I have been appalled at what I have learned. First, that such requests are considered on the evidence of traffic volume, the number of children killed and injured, and the degree of ‘negligence’ of a child in contributing to his own injury. Second, the battle to justify the need for a (...) crossing patrol has to be fought over and over again, by each school independently. Must we then draw up, for every school, a profit and loss account of children killed and injured balanced against inconvenience to traffic? Traffic volume is irrelevant, any traffic constitutes a risk. Can a five-year-old be ‘negligent’ in law? A child is a child is a child: of course he is ‘negligent’ — whatever that means! Whose children are they but ours who drive the traffic? There can be no argument. The issue is, do we suffer some occasional inconvenience as we drive or do we prefer to risk death and injury to our children? There is only one answer and I am sure the police are only too painfully aware of it but find themselves trapped in a maze of bureaucratic nonsense, sanctified by committal to print and blessed by precedent. (shrink)

Sir, I have recently had occasion to give my support to a local demand by parents and teachers for a patrolled crossing over a busy road outside their children's school. I have been appalled at what I have learned.First, that such requests are considered on the evidence of traffic volume, the number of children killed and injured, and the degree of ‘negligence’ of a child in contributing to his own injury. Second, the battle to justify the need for a crossing (...) patrol has to be fought over and over again, by each school independently. Must we then draw up, for every school, a profit and loss account of children killed and injured balanced against inconvenience to traffic? Traffic volume is irrelevant, any traffic constitutes a risk. Can a five-year-old be ‘negligent’ in law? A child is a child is a child: of course he is ‘negligent’ — whatever that means! Whose children are they but ours who drive the traffic?There can be no argument. The issue is, do we suffer some occasional inconvenience as we drive or do we prefer to risk death and injury to our children? There is only one answer and I am sure the police are only too painfully aware of it but find themselves trapped in a maze of bureaucratic nonsense, sanctified by committal to print and blessed by precedent. (shrink)

Bioethics is not a spectator sport. Health is an applied field that requires that insight be connected to the real world. Few have done more thoughtful writing on the need to advance a moral basis...

In certain cases of sudden death, forensic experts may discover during an investigation or autopsy that family members of the deceased are also at risk of harm—from genetic disease, for instance. But do they have a duty to warn them? Looking at similar duties of physicians and researchers to warn third parties of risk suggests they do.

The essays in this volume, with the exception of Gary Ferngren's, derive from ancestral versions originally presented at a symposium, 'Conflicts with Newborns: Saving Lives, Scarce Resources, and Euthanasia: held May 10-12,1984, at the Mercer University School of Medicine, Macon, Georgia. We wish to express our gratitude to the Georgia Endowment for the Humanities for a generous grant for the symposium and to Mercer University and the Medical Center of Central Georgia for additional financial support. The vit:ws expressed (...) in this volume do not necessarily represent those of the Georgia Endowment for the Humani ties, Mercer University, or the Medical Center of Central Georgia. We have endeavored to bring together a group of individuals with contrast ing viewpoints to display some of the range of approaches to a major problem in public policy: medical decisions regarding the treatment of defective newborns. So many persons contributed to the symposium that acknowledg ment of each would be impossible. Although unnamed, we express our sincere appreciation to each. Three individuals, however, must be recognized: R. Kirby Godsey, President, Mercer University; William P. Bristol, Dean, Mercer University School of Medicine; and Kenneth C. Henderson, Medical Director and Director of Medical Education, Medical Center of Central Georgia. Without their support, the symposium could not have succeeded and this volume would not have been possible. We wish also to express our gratitude to S. G. M. (shrink)

There are individuals, including children, dying needlessly in poverty-stricken third world countries. Many of these deaths could be prevented if pharmaceutical companies provided the drugs needed to save their lives. Some believe that because pharmaceutical companies have the power to save lives, and because they can do so with little effort, they have a special obligation. I argue that there is no distinction, with respect to obligations and responsibilities, between pharmaceutical companies and other types of companies. As a (...) result, to hold pharmaceutical companies especially responsible for saving lives in third world countries is unjustified. (shrink)

The essays in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy explore an innovative voucher program for encouraging kidney donation. Discussions cluster around a number of central moral and political/theoretical themes: What are the direct and indirect health care costs and benefits of such a voucher system in human organs? Do vouchers lead to more effective and efficient organ procurement and allocation or contribute to greater inequalities and inefficiencies in the transplantation system? Do vouchers contribute to the inappropriate commodification (...) of human body parts? Is there a significant moral difference between such a voucher system and a market in human organs for transplantation? This paper argues that while kidney vouchers constitute a step in the right direction, fuller utilization of market-based incentives, including, but not limited to, barter exchanges, would save more lives and further reduce human suffering. (shrink)

One of the goals of medicine is to improve well-being, in line with the principle of beneficence. Likewise, scientists claim that the goal of human embryonic stem cell research is to find treatments for diseases. In hESC research, stem cells are harvested from a 5-day-old embryo. Surplus embryos from infertility treatments or embryos created for the sole purpose of harvesting stem cells are used in the research, and in the process the embryos get destroyed. The use of human embryos for (...) research purpose raises ethical concern. In this context, the religious leaders play the role to be the moral compass and “reality check” to engage with the public. In Malaysia, the Ministry of Health has outlined the Guidelines for Stem Cell Research and Therapy, reflecting on Islamic principles. Since there has not been much focus on the viewpoints of other faiths in Malaysia, this study attempts to explore the ethical guiding principles deliberated by religious leaders from the Buddhist, Hindu and Catholic traditions and identify if there is a common ground between the mainstream religious views and principles of medical ethics, in relation to hESC research. Eleven religious leaders representing the Buddhist, Hindu and Catholic traditions were interviewed. Interestingly, though reasoning of religious leaders came from different angles, their underlying concerns revolve around the values of “do no harm” and “intention to save lives”. These values are also the key principles in medical ethics. The findings are applied to answer the question as to whether religious and medical guiding principles can co-exist and complement in ethical decision-making, without compromising the values. (shrink)

One challenge to the idea that animals have a moral right to life claims that any such right would require us to intervene in the wild to prevent animals from being killed by predators. I argue that belief in an animal right to life does not commit us to supporting a program of predator-prey intervention. One common retort to the predator challenge contends that we are not required to save animals from predators because predators are not moral agents. I suggest (...) that this retort fails to overcome the predator challenge. I seek to articulate a more satisfactory argument explaining why we are not required to save wild prey from predators and how this position is perfectly consistent with the idea that animals have a basic right to life. (shrink)

A few months after the publication of the French translation of his book Causing Death and Saving Lives, Jonathan Glover was kind enough to return to some of the theses defended in this book. In forty years, this work has become a classic of applied ethics in the English-speaking world. Glover tackled a series of questions involving the lives of men and women, including abortion, infanticide, suicide, euthanasia, the death penalty and war. We asked him here about (...) the method he considers the best in moral philosophy, and returned to his criticism of certain dominant ideas at the time. Jonathan Glover also discusses some of the positions of his former students Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan. (shrink)

S. Prakash Sethi, President, International Center for Corporate Accountability, Inc., University Distinguished Professor, Baruch College, City University of New York, writes: "Saving Human Lives gives a step by step account of how management systems can be built that can prevent hitherto "unpreventable" disasters. Professor Allinson weaves convincing arguments from original linguistic, literary and ethical analyses and shows how these arguments apply to highly detailed and well documented case studies. Those of us in the field of business ethics are (...) grateful for this creative combination of philosophical argumentation and the marshalling of widespread, empirical evidence that persuades us that, notwithstanding commonly held beliefs, most industrial crises are preventable through sound management structures and decision-making processes only when they are rooted in ethical values and beliefs on the part of top management." This is a pioneering work. Recent disasters such as the tsunami disaster continue to demonstrate Professor Allinson’s thesis that valuing human lives is the core of ethical management. His unique comparison of the ideas of the power of Fate and High Technology, his penetrating analysis of the very concept of an "accident", demonstrate how concepts rule our lives. His wide-ranging investigation of court cases and government documents from the seventeenth through the twentieth centuries, and from places as diverse as the USA, UK and New Zealand provide ample supporting evidence for the universality and the power of explanation of his thesis. Saving Human Lives will have an impact beyond measurement on the field of management ethics. (shrink)

Arrigo, DeBatto, Rockwood, and Mawe take issue with a number of arguments in our previous article. We respond in four major ways: pointing out that they never really take on, let alone refute, the key argument in our article—that utilitarian, deontic, and virtue ethical theories are not only consistent with the use of enhanced interrogation and torture in the ticking time bomb scenario but these prescribe it; there are numerous other exegetical problems in their article; they make unsubstantiated claims about (...) the ineffectiveness of EITSLs techniques that we argue are much too strong; and they conflate the ethical with the legal and but even in doing so miss many important issues regarding the legality of EITSLs in the war on terrorism. (shrink)