Religious exemptions have a long history in American law, but have become especially controversial over the last several years. The essays in this volume address the moral and philosophical issues that the legal practice of religious exemptions often raises.

Justifying religious exemptions is a complicated matter. Citizens ask to not be subject to laws that everyone else must follow, raising worries about equal treatment. They ask to be exempted on a religious basis, a basis that secular citizens do not share, raising worries about the equal treatment of secular and religious citizens. And they ask governmental structures to create exceptions in the government’s own laws, raising worries about procedural fairness and stability. We nonetheless think some (...) religious exemptions are appropriate, and in some cases, that exemptions are morally required. So how are we to determine when religious exemptions are justified? This article employs a public reason framework to provide an answer. I show how to publicly justify religious exemptions. My thesis is that a citizen merits a religious exemption under four conditions: if she has sufficient intelligible reason to oppose the law, if the law imposes unique and substantial burdens on the integrity of those exempted that are not off-set by comparable benefits, if the large majority of citizens have sufficient reason to endorse the law, and if the exempted group does not impose significant costs on other parties that require redress. If these conditions are met, then legislative and/or judicial bodies should carve out an exemption for those requesting them. (shrink)

In February 1997, the Committee on Bioethics of the American Academy of Pediatrics updated its position on religious exemptions to medical care. In its earlier statement, the committee noted that forty-four states have religious exemptions to the child abuse and neglect statutes, and they argued for the repeal of these exemptions. The committee did not indude in its statement a position on religious exemptions to childhood immunization requirements that exist in forty-eight states, although (...) this issue was discussed in committee meetings. In its revised statement, the committee concluded that “The AAP does not support the stringent application of medical neglect laws when children do not receive recommended immunizations.” In this paper, we consider whether failure to immunize one's child is a form of medical neglect and, if so, whether states should repeal their religious exemptions to the immunization statutes. We argue that failure to vaccinate a child properly is medical neglect. (shrink)

In February 1997, the Committee on Bioethics of the American Academy of Pediatrics updated its position on religious exemptions to medical care. In its earlier statement, the committee noted that forty-four states have religious exemptions to the child abuse and neglect statutes, and they argued for the repeal of these exemptions. The committee did not indude in its statement a position on religious exemptions to childhood immunization requirements that exist in forty-eight states, although (...) this issue was discussed in committee meetings. In its revised statement, the committee concluded that “The AAP does not support the stringent application of medical neglect laws when children do not receive recommended immunizations.” In this paper, we consider whether failure to immunize one's child is a form of medical neglect and, if so, whether states should repeal their religious exemptions to the immunization statutes. We argue that failure to vaccinate a child properly is medical neglect. (shrink)

According to the standard liberal egalitarian approach, religious exemptions from generally applicable laws can be justified on the grounds of equal respect for each citizen’s conscience. I contend that claims of conscience cannot justify demands for exemptions, since they do not meet even the most inclusive standards of public justification. Arguments of the form ‘My conscience says so’ do not explicate the rationale behind the practices that the claimants seek to protect. Therefore, such arguments do not constitute (...) even pro tanto reasons for exemptions. Rather, they are what Francis Bacon called idola fori – ‘idols of the marketplace’– conventional justifications that are deemed rational and even self- evident, while in fact they are not. (shrink)

To what extent does the case for exemptions from laws to accommodate religious commitments rest specifically on egalitarian arguments? To what extent should specifically egalitarian or anti-discrimination concerns be used to determine when such exemptions should be granted? This Article considers both of these questions. It argues that while egalitarian considerations have a role to play in both the general justification and case-by-case evaluation of exemption claims, neither the justification, nor the evaluation of exemptions, properly rests (...) solely on specifically egalitarian considerations. At the level of justification, there is an important, independent role for something akin to the principle of respect for conscience recently put forward by Martha Nussbaum; and, when citizens come to evaluate particular claims for exemptions, the anti-discrimination approach put forward by Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager in the context of the U.S. and its constitutional tradition is more plausibly seen as a complement to the “balancing test” which has been used historically rather than as an alternative to it. (shrink)

Many philosophers and jurists believe that individuals should sometimes be granted religiouslygrounded exemptions from laws or rules. To determine whether an exemption is merited in a particular case, the religious claim must be weighed against the countervailing values that favour the uniform application of the law or rule. This paper develops and applies a framework for assessing the weight of religious claims to exemption, across two dimensions. First, the importance of the burdened religious practice, which is (...) determined by its level of obligatoriness and centrality, according to the beliefs of the individual claimant. Second, the extent of the burden on the practice, which depends on the cost the individual bears if she both undertakes the religious practice and obeys the law or rule, where costs are assessed using an impartial account of individual interests. Exemptions should be granted when claims are weighty on either of these dimensions and the countervailing value is relatively weak. The final section of the paper responds to an important objection to this approach, which concerns administrability. (shrink)

Volume 25, Issue 3, September 2019, Page 290-292.

The standard liberal egalitarian approach to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws implies that such exemptions may be necessary in the name of equal respect for each citizen’s conscience. In each particular case this approach requires balancing the claims of devout believers against the countervailing claims of other citizens. I contend, firstly, that under the conditions of deep moral and ideological disagreement the balancing procedure proves to be extremely inconclusive. It does not provide an unequivocal solution even (...) in the imaginary case based on the biblical story of Abraham’s sacrifice, not to speak of real-life cases that are far less suggestive. Secondly, I argue that it is possible to consider demands for religious exemptions respectfully, without even challenging the way they are justified, but still reject them for principled reasons—namely, because these demands cannot be met without arbitrarily bending popular sovereignty to the dictate of religious doctrines. (shrink)

Why do we grant religious exemptions? Many distinguished scholars and judges have been drawn to the idea that conscience is entitled to special protection, because a person in its grip cannot obey the law without betraying his deepest, most identity-defining commitments. The weakness of this justification is shown by philosopher Harry Frankfurt's account of what he calls “volitional necessity,” which clarifies the structure of the argument that invocations of conscience imply. Frankfurt shows that a person can be bound (...) in this way by allegiances that there is no reason to respect; volitional necessity can arise from anything at all that a person cares about. Conscience is thus a poor basis for claims upon other people. Accommodation must rather depend on some idea of the value of religion. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to propose a middle ground in the debate over religious exemptions from measles vaccination requirements. It attempts to strike a balance between public health concerns on the one hand and religious objections on the other that avoids two equally serious errors: making religious liberty an absolute and disregarding religious beliefs altogether. Some think that the issue is straightforward: science has spoken and the benefits to public health outweigh any other (...) concerns. The safety of the community, they say, demands that everybody be vaccinated so that measles outbreaks can be prevented, but such voices often ignore the freedom of religion, which is a mistake. Using Martha Nussbaum’s work on religious liberty, this paper claims that the exemptions should be preserved if a certain level of vaccination rates can be maintained. (shrink)

I address the long-standing problem of toleration in diverse liberal societies in light of the progress of same-sex marriage and continued vehement opposition to it from a significant portion of the population. I advance a view that contrasts with recent discussions by Teresa Bejan, Mere Civility, and especially Cecile Laborde, Liberalism’s Religion. Laborde emphasizes the importance of state sovereignty in fixing the boundaries of church and state, emphasizing the priority of public authority and constitutional supremacy. I argue that emphasis on (...) priority needs to be complemented by a recognition of the importance of forms of reconciliation that go beyond ‘mere civility’. Reflections on toleration in the liberal and democratic traditions – including in the canonical discussions of Locke, Rousseau, Smith and Tocqueville, and in more recent political science – have recognized that the health of liberal democracy benefits enormously from the educative and morally formative resources furnished by religious c... (shrink)

Under federal law, an individual religious exemption from vaccines is valid when it is based on subjective, sincere beliefs rooted in religion but not dependent on the existence, veracity, or accurate understanding or application of denominational tenets or doctrines. Despite the subjective nature of the individual religious exemption, Catholic institutions may recognize or deny individual religious exemptions on the basis of the institution’s own religious exemptions. For example, under the doctrine of the common good, (...) the significant risk to the community presented by non-vaccinated individuals could be grounds for an institution to deny an individual’s otherwise valid religious exemption. This paper attempts to clarify the decision-making framework used by law to balance individual religious exemptions and compelling state interests, then proposes a similar decision-making framework, consistent with Catholic moral principles, for religious institutions to use when balancing individual conscience objections and compelling duties to society. (shrink)

Theorists of democratic multiculturalism have long-defended individuals’ religious exemptions from generally-applicable laws. Examples include Sikhs being exempt from motorcycle helmet laws, or Jews and Muslims being exempt from humane animal slaughter laws. This paper investigates religious exemptions for organisations. Should organisations ever be granted exemptions from generally-applicable laws in democratic societies, where those exemptions are justified by the organisation’s religion? The paper considers four arguments for this, which respectively rely on: the ‘transferring up’ to (...) organisations of individuals’ claims to autonomy or recognition; organisations’ own claims to autonomy or recognition; organisations’ status in the accountability-community; and organisations’ procedural constraints. The paper concludes that only the last argument works—and then, only with caveats. (shrink)

Background: While employers are increasingly considering and implementing COVID-19 vaccination requirements, little is known about the reasons offered by employees seeking religious exemptions.Methods: We conducted a mixed methods analysis of all the requests for religious exemptions submitted during the initial implementation of a COVID-19 vaccination requirement at a single academic medical center in the United States.Results: Five hundred sixty-five (3.4%) employees requested religious exemptions. At least 305 (54.0%) requesters had job titles suggesting that they (...) had direct patient contact. Four hundred ninety-nine (88.3%) of requesters self-identified as Christian, of whom 120 (21.2%) identified as Roman Catholic. Requesters offered 0 to 8 (mean 2.7) categories of reasons for their request. The most frequently stated reasons pertained to the use of fetal cell lines in vaccine development and manufacturing (382, 67.6%), interest in maintaining purity (221, 39.1%), or belief in divine healing (172, 30.4%). Some requesters also volunteered evidence of the sincerity of their beliefs including examples of their religious practices (116, 20.5%), other practices (66, 11.7%), and emotional states (32, 5.7%). One hundred fifty-two applications (26.9%) contained text copied without attribution, primarily from sample religious exemption request letters available on the Internet.Conclusions: Most requesters focused on the use of fetal cell lines in the development or manufacturing of the vaccines as the justification for their request. The development of vaccines that are not reliant on fetal cell lines may increase vaccination rates. Understanding reasons for religious exemption requests may inform vaccine education and vaccination policies. (shrink)

The 1981 Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) established the validity of both cardio-respiratory and neurological criteria of death. However, many religious traditions including most forms of Haredi Judaism (ultra-orthodox) and many varieties of Buddhism strongly disagree with death by neurological criteria (DNC). Only one state in the U.S., New Jersey, allows for both religious exemptions to DNC and provides continuation of health insurance coverage when an exception is invoked in its 1991 Declaration of Death Act (NJDDA). (...) There is yet no quantitative or qualitative data on the frequencies of religious exemptions in New Jersey. This study gathered information about the frequency of religious exemptions and policy in New Jersey that was created out of respect for religious beliefs. Literature and internet searches on topics related to religious objections to DNC were conducted. Fifty-three chaplains and heads of bioethics committees in New Jersey hospitals were contacted by phone or email requesting a research interview. Respondents answered a set of questions about religious exemptions to DNC at the hospital where they worked that explored the frequency of such religious exemptions in the past five years, the religious tradition indicated, and whether any request for a religious exemption had been denied. This study was approved by the Northeastern University Institutional Review Board (IRB #: 16–03-15). Eighteen chaplains and bioethics committee members participated in a full research interview. Of these, five reported instances of religious exemptions to DNC occurring at the hospital at which they worked for a total of approximately 30–36 known exemptions in the past five years. Families sought religious exemptions because of faith in an Orthodox Judaism tradition and nonreligious reasons. No failed attempts to obtain an exemption were reported. Religious exemptions to DNC in New Jersey do occur, although very infrequently. Prior to this study, there was no information on their frequency. Considering religious exemptions do occur, there is a need for national or state policies that addresses both religious objections to DNC and hospital resources. More information is needed to better understand the impact of granting religious exemptions before new policy can be established. (shrink)

Objective Having failed to achieve adequate influenza vaccination rates among employees through voluntary programmes, healthcare organisations have adopted mandatory ones. Some programmes permit religious exemptions, but little is known about who requests religious objections or why. Methods Content analysis of applications for religious exemptions from influenza vaccination at a free-standing children’s hospital in Cincinnati, Ohio, USA during the 2014–2015 influenza season. Results Twelve of 15 260 employees submitted applications requesting religious exemptions. Requestors included (...) both clinical and non-clinical employees. All requestors voluntarily identified their religious affiliation, and most were Christian. Content analysis identified six categories of reasons used to justify an exemption: risks/benefits, ethical/political, lack of direct patient contact, providence, purity and sanctity of life. Individuals articulated reasons in 1–5 categories. The most frequently cited category was purity; the vaccine and/or its mode of administration were impure, or receiving the vaccine would make the individual impure. Two individuals asserted that the vaccine contained cells derived from aborted human fetuses. Individuals also volunteered information supporting the sincerity of their beliefs including distress over previous vaccination and examples of behaviour consistent with their specific objection or their general religious commitment. All requests were approved. Conclusions Less than 0.1% of employees requested religious exemptions. Partnering with religious leaders and carefully correcting erroneous information may help address requestors’ concerns. (shrink)

Legal and philosophical theories of religious exemptions have primarily understood them as a means toward one or more moral ends: protecting rights and securing equality, primarily. But exemptions also serve an under-theorized stabilizing function in resolving conflicts between law and belief. In this paper, I argue that these conflicts pose a challenge to public justification, and ipso facto to political stability. I then show how religious exemptions can support stability by ameliorating these conflicts, and elaborate (...) parameters for identifying those exemptions most likely to achieve this stability-enhancing effect. (shrink)

Legal and philosophical theories of religious exemptions have primarily understood them as a means toward one or more moral ends: protecting rights and securing equality, primarily. But exemptions also serve an under-theorized stabilizing function in resolving conflicts between law and belief. In this paper, I argue that these conflicts pose a challenge to public justification, and ipso facto to political stability. I then show how religious exemptions can support stability by ameliorating these conflicts, and elaborate (...) parameters for identifying those exemptions most likely to achieve this stability-enhancing effect. (shrink)

Many religious freedom laws provide exemptions to persons who refuse to comply with certain laws on religious grounds. But these exemptions are increasingly used (by claimants and others) to advance political goals. For example, religious freedom lawsuits helped to undermine the Affordable Care Act’s guarantee of coverage for contraceptives. And the recent Masterpiece Cakeshop case was part of a broader effort to protest the right to same-sex marriage. This paper argues that the state should not (...) grant religious exemptions when they are used to advance political goals. A religious exemption creates a legal inequality between citizens that can only be justified if the protection is not used politically. As such, the state should ensure that laws providing religious exemptions are written, interpreted, and enforced so as to prevent their political misuse. (shrink)

Of the many questions Cécile Laborde addresses in her magisterial Liberalism’s Religion, several relate to what she describes as ‘the puzzle of exemptions’. I examine some of the issues raised by her efforts to solve that puzzle: whether her ideal of moral integrity squares with the nature of religious belief; whether we should find the case for collective religious exemptions in freedom of association and the ‘coherence interests’ of associations; how much significance we should give to (...) the ‘competence interests’ of organised religions; and by which criteria we should assess individual claims to religious exemption. (shrink)

I investigate the normative and conceptual account of the relationship between public recognition and dignitarian, or egalitarian, commitments. I do so through addressing the normative dispute, sparked by legal cases such as Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, as to whether there are dignitarian grounds for rejecting religious exemptions to antidiscrimination laws. I argue that there are such grounds. Specifically, I argue that, if granted, such exemptions would inflict dignitary (...) harms against LGBTQ individuals by denying them the public recognition necessary for reliably sustaining civic self-respect. Such exemptions would deny this recognition in two distinct ways. First, such exemptions would institutionalize humiliation of LGBTQ individuals as market actors. Second, such exemptions would condition market access for LGBTQ individuals on unequal terms. Through making this argument, I hope to make three primary, and related, contributions: I introduce a concept of civic self-respect; I argue that the normative import of public recognition is grounded in the good of civic self-respect; and I rely on this normative framework to show how religious exemptions to public accommodations laws inflict dignitary harms. My argument is relevant to both political philosophers and legal scholars grappling with questions of why public recognition matters and what it demands. (shrink)

Recently, there have been at least five best sellers critical of religion and religious belief. It seems, at least among readers in the U.S., that there is great interest in questions about the rationality of religious belief. Ironically, critical thinking texts seldom examine the topic. After reviewing a series of previous arguments that people have an ethical duty to think critically, this paper will evaluate a number of arguments intended to exempt religious belief from the sorts of (...) rational critique covered in critical thinking classes. After critiquing each argument, I conclude that the proper scope of critical thinking should include religious beliefs. In summary, if people have an ethical duty to think critically about important beliefs and religious beliefs are indeed important, then people have an obligation to think critically about religious beliefs. Nothing in the paper addresses the question of whether it is or is not rational to endorse a religion. (shrink)

Several possible approaches can be applied by the state when it responds to religious conscientious objections. These approaches compare the response to religious-conscientious objections with that to non-religious objections. If the content of the objector’s conscience is significant when deciding to grant conscientious exemptions, three approaches to the practice of granting conscientious exemptions are possible: First, a non-neutral liberal approach that takes into consideration the content of the conscience but not its religiosity as such; second, (...) a pro-religious approach; and third, an anti-religious approach. This paper contends that the non-neutral liberal approach and the pro-religious approach should be rejected in favor of an anti-religious approach to granting conscientious exemptions. The proposed anti-religious approach is as follows: (1) unjustified intolerance should not be tolerated; (2) empirical evidence links religion and intolerance – that is, people’s responses to measures of religion and intolerance are closely related; (3) theoretical evidence links (some) religions and intolerance; and (4) the religiosity of conscience gives the state a reason to refuse to grant conscientious exemptions. (shrink)

Religious exemptions present an anomaly in American law. Under the power of religious exemptions, individuals and organizations whose actions violate civil and criminal laws are exempt from those l...

ABSTRACT:This essay explores a more inclusive and equitable interpretation of "religion" within the context of religious vaccine exemptions. The existing literature critiques the prevalent interpretation of the meaning of religion in religious exemption cases, but frequently overlooks the importance of incorporating the concept of "lived religion." This essay introduces the concept of lived religion from religious studies, elucidates why this lived religion approach is crucial for redefining "religion," and illustrates its application in the domain of (...) class='Hi'>religious vaccine exemptions. The author contends that broadening the meaning of religion by employing the concept of lived religion would promote a more inclusive and equitable implementation of religious vaccine exemptions. (shrink)

abstract The most well‐known liberal‐egalitarian defence of cultural rights, provided by Will Kymlicka, presents culture as a primary good, and thus a resource that ought to be distributed according to some fair egalitarian criteria. Kymlicka relies on the intuition that inequalities between persons that are the result of brute luck rather than personal choice are unjust in making the case for various multicultural rights. This article makes two main claims. First, the standard luck egalitarian intuition on which Kymlicka's argument relies (...) cannot justify what he calls ‘polyethnic rights,’ in particular cultural and religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Second, I argue that such exemptions are justifiable by appealing to the public value of fair equality of opportunity, properly construed. (shrink)

All of the 50 states of the United States have laws governing childhood vaccinations; 48 allow for religious exemptions, while 19 also offer exemptions based on some sort of personal philosophy. Recent disease outbreaks have caused these states to reconsider philosophical exemptions. However, we cannot, consistent with the U.S. Constitution, give preference to religion by creating religious exemptions only. The Constitution requires states to put religious and nonreligious claims on equal footing. Given the (...) ubiquity of nonreligious objections to vaccination, I conclude that the best response is to remove all exemptions, as two states have already done. But removing exemptions should not end our concern for children. Removing exemptions only bars children from public schools; it still leaves them unvaccinated, a danger to others, and reliant on whatever nonpublic schooling is available. If public school attendance is not enough of an incentive for vaccine reluctant parents, perhaps we should look into stronger measures. (shrink)

Exemptions from laws of general application are sometimes granted on the basis of an individual’s unwillingness to comply with the law. Most such volitional exemptions involve a conflict between the law and the demands of an individual’s religious or secular moral convictions. I argue here that a limited number of volitional exemptions can be justified on the basis of a futility principle. When otherwise morally permissible penalties for violating the law cannot be expected to induce the (...) compliance of an intransigent minority, the penalties are futile, and the state has some principled reason to exempt the minority from the law’s requirements. Since the futility principle only applies to some cases of conscientious objection, it differs in important ways from justifications grounded in a general entitlement to religious or moral exemptions. (shrink)

Granting differential treatment is often considered a way of placing some groups in a better position in order to maintain or improve their cultural, economic, health-related or other conditions, and to address persistent inequalities. Critics of multiculturalism have pointed out the tension between protection for groups and protection for group members. The ‘rule-and-exemption’ approach has generally been conceived as more resistant to such criticism insofar as exemptions are not conceded to minorities or ethical and religious groups as such, (...) but to individuals who are part of those groups. However, I show that when a government grants an exemption, it inevitably provides a definition of the relevant group in question, and the tendency is to take cultural membership as ‘given’ or as defined by group spokespersons. I discuss some problems related to these definitions and defend instead a definition based on shared group interests. (shrink)

When generally applicable rules clash with one’s cultural, religious or moral commitments, should exemptions be granted? The debate on exemptions raises the question both of what it means to treat people equally and of what it means to protect diversity adequately. The objective of this paper is to defend the no-exemption argument and to make it a more attractive position for liberals. I first argue that exemptions violate the principle of equal treatment because they rely on (...) distinctions that cannot be neutrally justified. I then argue that diversity can be adequately accommodated if we use a more demanding interpretation of the justification of generally applicable rules. There should be no exemption to fully justified rules, but rules are only fully justified when the particular demands that they impose on individuals are justified, i.e. when they are either neutral or pass both a Necessity Test and a Sufficiency Test. When rules are not fully justified, they should be repealed or modified. Based on this focus on the demands of rules, equality can be reconciled with an adequate accommodation of diversity. (shrink)

Supporters of neutrality as benign neglect argue that a neutral state should not grant any type of recognition to cultural or religious groups. Liberal multiculturalists argue instead that due to the non-neutral nature of public institutions, democratic states must adopt policies that recognize and accommodate the distinctive needs of ethnocultural groups. This article examines a different way of conceiving the principle of neutrality. In this conception, developed by Alan Patten in the framework of liberal multiculturalism, a state can only (...) be neutral when it extends equivalent levels of assistance/hindrance to rival conceptions of the good. Neutrality is thus reinterpreted to become a principle justifying the religious exemptions. The article highlights some aspects of this theory that should be reconsidered.// -/- Les défenseurs de la neutralité bienveillante soutiennent qu’un État neutre ne doit accorder aucun type de reconnaissance aux groupes culturels ou religieux. Les multiculturalistes libéraux avancent pour leur part que, en raison de la nature non neutre des institutions publiques, les États démocratiques doivent adopter des politiques vi-sant la reconnaissance et l’accommodement des besoins distinctifs des groupes ethnoculturels. Cet article examine une manière diffé-rente de concevoir le principe de neutralité. Dans cette conception, développée par Alan Patten dans le cadre du multiculturalisme libé-ral, un État ne peut être neutre que s’il assiste ou entrave de manière équivalente les différentes conceptions du bien. La neutralité est ainsi réinterprétée pour devenir un principe permettant de justifier les exemptions religieuses. L’article souligne certains aspects de cette théorie qui méritent d’être repensés. (shrink)

While supporters argue that exemptions are needed to equalize opportunities, critics claim they are unwarranted in principle and discriminatory in practice: equal treatment requires only facial neutrality whereas exemptions treat citizens unequally insofar as individuals with idiosyncratic commitments similarly burdened by general rules are rarely given an exemption.The upshot of this critique is that the burdens of cultural and religious commitments ought to be treated as expensive tastes. I argue that religious and cultural commitments cannot be (...) reduced to expensive tastes that can be revised in the face of resource expectations and that, for this reason, opportunities are not equal when minorities must choose between adherence to such commitments and availing of valuable opportunities, when members of more dominant communities need not. I also explain why treating religious and cultural commitments in this way does not entail the adoption of a primordial view of culture that puts these commitments beyond revision and choice. (shrink)

Critical congenital heart disease screening is rapidly becoming the standard of care in the United States after being added to the Recommended Uniform Screening Panel in 2011. Newborn screens typically do not require affirmative parental consent. In fact, most states allow parents to exempt their baby from receiving the required screen on the basis of religious or personally held beliefs. There are many ethical considerations implicated with allowing parents to exempt their child from newborn screening for CCHD. Considerations include (...) the treatment of religious exemptions in our current legal system, as well as medical and ethical principles in relation to the rights of infants. Although there are significant benefits to screening newborns for CCHD, when a parent refuses for religious or personal beliefs, in the case of CCHD screening, the parental decision should stand. (shrink)

I focus on some controversial features of Peter Balint’s stimulating and provocative reassessment of the place of toleration in contemporary diverse societies. First, I question his argument that we must enlarge the concept of toleration to include indifference and approval if toleration is to be compatible with state neutrality. Secondly, I suggest that his idea of active neutrality of intent risks encountering the same difficulties as neutrality of outcome, although these will be mitigated the more the state’s neutrality takes a (...) ‘hands-off’ form. Thirdly, while accepting his claim that exemptions depart from neutrality insofar as they attribute a significance to religious and conscientious convictions that they deny to mere preferences, I argue that that departure is not arbitrary and remains within the spirit of neutrality of intent. (shrink)

Is religious faith consistent with being an intellectually virtuous thinker? In seeking to answer this question, one quickly finds others, each of which has been the focus of recent renewed attention by epistemologists: What is it to be an intellectually virtuous thinker? Must all reasonable belief be grounded in public evidence? Under what circumstances is a person rationally justified in believing something on trust, on the testimony of another, or because of the conclusions drawn by an intellectual authority? Can (...) it be reasonable to hold a belief on a topic over which there is significant, entrenched disagreement among informed inquirers, or should such disagreement lead all parties to modify or suspend their own judgments? Is there anything about faith that exempts it from measurement against such epistemic norms? And if we would so evaluate it, how exactly should we understand the intellectual commitments faith requires? The volume's introduction provides a roadmap of the central issues and controversies as currently discussed by philosophers. In fourteen new essays written to engage nonspecialists as well as philosophers working in religion and epistemology, a diverse and distinguished group of thinkers then consider the place of intellectual virtue in religious faith, exploring one or more of the specific issues noted above. (shrink)

Just as physicians can object to providing services due to their ethical and/or religious beliefs, medical students can have conscience-based objections to participating in educational activities. In 1996, the Medical Student Section of the American Medical Association introduced a resolution calling on the AMA to adopt a policy in support of exemptions for students with ethical or religious objections. In that report, students identified abortion, sterilization, and procedures performed on animals as examples of activities that might prompt (...) requests for conscience-based exemptions. In response to the student initiative, the Council on Medical Education recommended the adoption of seven “principles to guide exemption of medical students from activities based on conscience.” The House of Delegates adopted these principles in their entirety. (shrink)

The U.S. 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act exempts members of health care sharing ministries from the individual mandate to have minimum essential insurance coverage. Little is generally known about these religious organizations and even less critical attention has been brought to bear on them and their ACA exemption. Both deserve close scrutiny due to the exemption’s less than clear legislative justification, their potential influence on the ACA’s policy and ethical success, and their salience to current religious (...) liberty debates surrounding the expansion of religious exemptions from ACA responsibilities for both individuals and corporations. Analyzing documents of the United States’ three largest health care sharing ministries and related material, I examine these organizations and their ACA exemption with particular consideration of their ethical dimensions. Here a thick description of the nature and workings of health care sharing ministries precedes a similar account of the ACA exemption. From these empirical analyses, five ethical and policy concerns emerge: the charity versus insurance status of these ministries; the conflation of two ACA religious exemptions; the tension between the values of religious liberty and of justice; the potential undermining of ACA policy goals; and the questionable compliance of health care sharing ministries with ACA exemption requirements. An accurate and informed understanding of HCSMs is required for policymakers and others to justify the ACA exemption of health care sharing ministry members. A sufficient justification would address at least the five ethical and policy concerns raised here. (shrink)

Dans le dernier chapitre de son ouvrage Liberalism’s Religion [2017], Cécile Laborde soutient que ce sont les pratiques et les croyances visant à protéger l’intégrité individuelle qui peuvent être candidates aux exemptions. Elle propose, de ce fait, deux tests (de sincérité et d’acceptabilité) afin d’évaluer le lien entre ces croyances et pratiques et l’intégrité de l’individu et envisage la mise en place d’un processus délibératif. Nous soutenons, dans cet article, que ces deux tests et la mise en place d’un (...) processus délibératif ne sont pas faisables, car ils ne tiennent pas compte, voire ils participent à l’invisibilisation des voix des femmes de confession musulmane dans la sphère publique au sein des sociétés libérales occidentales Notre critique se formule ainsi en trois points. Tout d’abord, nous questionnons le test de sincérité épaisse et l’évaluation de la cohérence entre les croyances/pratiques d’un individu et son intégrité, alors que différents espaces publics des démocraties libérales occidentales invisibilisent les femmes musulmanes et rendent leur parole inaudible. Nous interrogeons ensuite le test d’acceptabilité mince, en contexte de sécurisation de l’islam et des musulman·e·s autorisant la reproduction de discours racialisant l’islamité et culturalisant l’oppression de genre. Pour finir, nous avançons que penser le processus de délibération démocratique implique de rendre compte des formes d’injustice épistémique et de blessure morale qui prennent place à l’encontre des groupes minorisés – notamment des femmes musulmanes. Cette critique sera appuyée par des extraits du débat parlementaire suisse dans le cadre de l’initiative parlementaire contre la dissimulation du visage. (shrink)

"Whole brain death" (neurological death) is well-established as a legal standard of death across the country. Recently, New Jersey became the first state to enact a statute recognizing a personal religious exemption (a conscience clause) protecting the rights of those who object to neurological death. The Act also mandates adoption through the regulatory process of uniform and up-to-date clinical criteria for determining neurological death.