Like Kant, Foucault challenges us to rethink the way we relate freedom and truth by stressing the idea of "maturity" understood as a release from the "self-incurred tutelage" (the expression is from Kant) that otherwise characterizes so much of our lives. Though, rather than linking freedom and truth via the concept of autonomy (or lawfulness), as Kant does, Foucault outlines a possible experience of ethics as an individualizing ideal that contrasts with the model of establishing codes within a conception of (...) moral order. Foucault's project can be read as attempting to decouple ethics from the epistemological concern with the objectivity of a moral order in order to reconnect it to the formation of a political sensibility that sees truth(fulness) in a certain practice of freedom, as opposed to seeing our freedom confirmed or granted by a certain kind of (mode of relating to the) truth. I call this reading of Foucault's investigations into ethics the "methodological/prescriptive" approach (asking and responding to what we can do, ethically-speaking) and contrast it with the sketch of an alternative reading which I call "ontological/historical" (asking and responding to what we are, ethically-speaking). This reading, instead of pushing beyond Kant in the direction of a Nietzschean sensibility, rather challenges Kant's moral law from the space of a Hegelian insistence on the (historical) realization or actualization of freedom in and through the normative constraints structuring existing power-relations. (shrink)

Foucault’s work is rich enough to sustain multiple readings. I argue in this paper for the continued construction and maintenance of what I have called the ‘American Foucault’, whose principal preoccupation is with the question of how to be free within our contemporary political constraints and possibilities. (Such a Foucault can be found in the works of American writers such as W. E. Connolly, Todd May, and Thomas Dumm.) Appreciation of Foucault’s contribution to an understanding of freedom is too (...) often hampered, however, by the insistence on the part of many of the most influential of Foucault’s critics (and some of his defenders) that his particular mode of thinking is ultimately too irresponsible. It is thought that Foucault’s refusal to account for the grounds of his work vitiates his overall project. I argue that, if we distinguish between the ‘account-ability’ demanded by his critics and the ‘response-ability’ that his work permits, we will be in a better position to appreciate the timeliness of his conception of freedom. (shrink)

s work is rich enough to sustain multiple readings. I argue in this paper for the continued construction and maintenance of what I have called the ‘American Foucault’, whose principal preoccupation is with the question of how to be free within our contemporary political constraints and possibilities. (Such a Foucault can be found in the works of American writers such as W. E. Connolly, Todd May, and Thomas Dumm.) Appreciation of Foucault’s contribution to an understanding of freedom is too (...) often hampered, however, by the insistence on the part of many of the most influential of Foucault’s critics (and some of his defenders) that his particular mode of thinking is ultimately too irresponsible . It is thought that Foucault’s refusal to account for the grounds of his work vitiates his overall project. I argue that, if we distinguish between the ‘account-ability’ demanded by his critics and the ‘response-ability’ that his work permits, we will be in a better position to appreciate the timeliness of his conception of freedom. Key Words: accountability • critique • Foucault • freedom • genealogy • responsibility • theory. (shrink)

It is argued in this article that Foucault’s most distinctive contribution to philosophical practice is to be found in his distinctive mode of taking up historiography, exploring critically the conditions and limits of knowledge through archival work. The focus on knowledge would seem to place him in the critical lineage of Kant; however, his appeal to history and archival explorations reconfigure the relation between sensibility and the understanding in a way that suggests a different concern with the conditions of “a (...) possible knowledge.” After discussing how Foucault’s archival work engages a distinct sensibility, I suggest that his concern with knowledge can best be understood not within a transcendental project, however historicized, but within the logical space of Hegel’s Doctrine of the Concept, specifically the discussion of the Idea of cognition where it is a question of the twin processes of unifying subjectivity and objectivity as expressive of cognition’s “urge to truth.” Understood within this conceptual context, Foucault’s distinctive archival approach to what he calls “subjectivation” and “objectivation” allows us to appreciate the distinction between knowledge and truth in a way that leaves open the possibility of transformation. (shrink)

It is argued in this article that Foucault’s most distinctive contribution to philosophical practice is to be found in his distinctive mode of taking up historiography, exploring critically the conditions and limits of knowledge through archival work. The focus on knowledge would seem to place him in the critical lineage of Kant; however, his appeal to history and archival explorations reconfigure the relation between sensibility and the understanding in a way that suggests a different concern with the conditions of “a (...) possible knowledge.” After discussing how Foucault’s archival work engages a distinct sensibility, I suggest that his concern with knowledge can best be understood not within a transcendental project, however historicized, but within the logical space of Hegel’s Doctrine of the Concept, specifically the discussion of the Idea of cognition where it is a question of the twin processes of unifying subjectivity and objectivity as expressive of cognition’s “urge to truth.” Understood within this conceptual context, Foucault’s distinctive archival approach to what he calls “subjectivation” and “objectivation” allows us to appreciate the distinction between knowledge and truth in a way that leaves open the possibility of transformation. (shrink)

Children and adolescents are not indifferent to the dramatic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the need to be forced to live in confinement. The change in life to which they have been abruptly subjected forces us to understand the state of their mental health in order to adequately address both their present and future needs. The present study was carried out with the intention of studying the consequences of confinement on anxiety, sleep routines and executive functioning of 1,028 children (...) and adolescents, aged from 6 to 18 years, residing in Spain to; assess if there are differences regarding these consequences in terms of sex and age; how anxiety affects executive functioning in males and females; and to examine the possible correlations between the measured variables. For this purpose, an online questionnaire containing five sections was designed: the first section gathers information on sociodemographic and health data, while the following sections gather information from different standardized scales which measure anxiety, sleep and executive functions, whose items were adapted in order to be completed by parents, and/or legal guardians. The statistical analyzes carried out highlights significant differences in executive functioning between males and females. In turn, in regards to age, greater difficulties were detected in anxiety in the 9 to 12 age group and greater sleep disturbances between 13 and 18 year olds. On the other hand, significant differences were found in intra-sexual executive functioning depending on whether they presented greater or lesser anxiety, with executive functioning being more tendentiously maladjusted in males than in females, revealing a significantly relevant effect size. Positive correlations are obtained between state anxiety and sleep and executive functioning alterations. Finally, through Path Analysis, it is verified that state anxiety is the variable with the greatest weight within the model that would explain the alteration in the executive functioning of the present sample. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper I reconstruct Kant’s proof of the existence of a ‘most real being’ while also highlighting the theory of modality that motivates Kant’s departure from Leibniz’s version of the proof. I go on to argue that it is precisely this departure that makes the being that falls out of the pre-critical proof look more like Spinoza’s extended natura naturans than an independent, personal creator-God. In the critical period, Kant seems to think that transcendental (...) idealism allows him to avoid this conclusion, but in the last section of the paper I argue that there is still one important version of the Spinozistic threat that remains. -/- . (shrink)

2. Since whatever is actual is also possible, some possibilities must be ingredient in actualities.

A challenge faced by defenders of the precautionary principle is to clarify when the evidence that a harmful event might occur suffices to regard this prospect as a real possibility. Plausible versions of the principle must articulate some epistemic threshold, orde minimisrequirement, which specifies when precautionary measures are justified. Critics have argued that formulating such a threshold is problematic in the context of the precautionary principle. First, this is because the precautionary principle appears to be ambiguous about the distinction (...) between risk and uncertainty: should the principle merely be invoked when evidential probabilities are absent, or also when probabilities have low epistemic credentials? Secondly, defenders of the precautionary principle face an aggregation puzzle: in judging whether or not thede minimisrequirement has been met, how should first-order evidential probabilities and their second-order epistemic standing be aggregated? This article argues that the ambiguity can be resolved, and the epistemological puzzle can be solved. Focusing on decisions in the context of climate uncertainty, I advance a version of the precautionary principle that serves as a plausible decision rule, to be adopted in situations where its main alternative—cost–benefit analysis—does not deliver. (shrink)

I suggest a Wittgensteinian explanation of the illusion of possibility of the violation of a necessary a posteriori identity, which satisfies the psychoanalytical criterion of Stephen Yablo.

Kant’s postulate of possibility states that possible is whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience. As has often been noted, this is a definition of real possibility. However, little attention has been paid to the relation of Kantian real possibility to the German philosophical tradition before him. I discuss three kinds of possibility present in this tradition – internal, external, and (Crusian) real possibility – and argue that Kant endorses internal and external possibility. Furthermore, I show, (...) specifically with respect to the concept of state (Zustand), that the three traditional conceptions are reminiscent of three conceptions of real possibility that Kant implicitly distinguishes. Lastly, I argue that, according to Kant, we need experience to prove real possibility (at least as regards the three conceptions of the real possibility of states) because otherwise we could not know whether the formal conditions of experience obtain. (shrink)

In his critique of my book Heidegger and Marcuse, Jeff Kochan (2006) asserts that I am committed to the possibility of private knowledge, transcendent truths, and individualism. In this reply I argue that he has misinterpreted my analysis of the Challenger disaster and Marcuse’s work. Because I do not dismiss Roger Boisjoly’s doubts about the Challenger launch, Kochan believes that I have abandoned a social concept of knowledge for a reliance on the private knowledge of a single individual. In fact, (...) I consider Boisjoly’s observations just as social, if not as scientific, as the results of rigorous scientific study. Kochan’s reliance on a principle of symmetry derived from science studies to explain such politically charged technological controversies tends to mask the role of power and ideology in social life. Kochan interprets Marcuse as a failed Heideggerian who regresses from Heidegger’s social conception of human being to traditional individualism. I am accused of sharing this view. This interpretation overlooks the importance of the Hegelian–Marxist category of ‘real possibility’ in Marcuse’s work and so mistakes his critique of conformist politics for individualist romanticism. Marcuse always attempted to ground radical opposition in a community of struggle without abandoning the heritage of a long critical tradition. This view I willingly share. Keywords: Philosophy of technology; Principle of symmetry; Challenger disaster; Herbert Marcuse; Martin Heidegger; Knowledge . (shrink)

A challenge faced by defenders of the precautionary principle is to clarify when the evidence that a harmful event might occur suffices to regard this prospect as a real possibility. Plausible versions of the principle must articulate some epistemic threshold, or de minimis requirement, which specifies when precautionary measures are justified. Critics have argued that formulating such a threshold is problematic in the context of the precautionary principle. First, this is because the precautionary principle appears to be ambiguous about (...) the distinction between risk and uncertainty: should the principle merely be invoked when evidential probabilities are absent, or also when probabilities have low epistemic credentials? Secondly, defenders of the precautionary principle face an aggregation puzzle: in judging whether or not the de minimis requirement has been met, how should first-order evidential probabilities and their second-order epistemic standing be aggregated? This article argues that the ambiguity can be resolved, and the epistemological puzzle can be solved. Focusing on decisions in the context of climate uncertainty, I advance a version of the precautionary principle that serves as a plausible decision rule, to be adopted in situations where its main alternative—cost–benefit analysis—does not deliver. (shrink)

Ross, Hintikka, Waterlow and Makin have all suggested that there is something problematic about Aristotle’s treatment of possibility. I will canvas their concerns and propose that the problem is not so much with Aristotle as the fact that the notion of possibility is not a single simple concept. I will present eight different components of the notion of possibility and suggest that Aristotle may have been aware of all of them. I will conclude whilst his treatment can appear inconsistent, it (...) is instead, an attempt to give a complete description of a complex notion. (shrink)

Allen Orr reviewed my book No Free Lunch in the Summer 2002 issue of the Boston Review . Orr's review is available at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR27.3/orr.html. The response below is at the request of the Boston Review and will be appearing in a subsequent issue.

In the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, a section of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents an account of the content and role of our concept of real possibility in terms of formal conditions of experience. However, much later in the Critique he introduces the idea of a material condition of possibility. What is this material condition of possibility, and how does it fit with the conception of possibility in terms of formal conditions? This essay argues that the key (...) to answering these questions—as well as to understanding Kant’s criticism of rational theology, in which the discussion of the material condition of possibility appears—is Kant’s account of how we can individuate objects. (shrink)

In this article I address the idea that in Husserl’s eidetic ontology all possibilities are fixed ‘in advance’ so that actual objects and events—despite their contingency—can only ever unfold possibilities that are ‘permitted’ to them by their essences. I show how this view distorts Husserl’s ontology and argue that this distortion stems from a misconstrual of the relations between essences and facts, and between ideal and real possibilities. These ‘local’ misconstruals reflect, I contend, a ‘global’ misunderstanding (...) that mistakes descriptive distinctions for ‘real’ separations, and that remains indebted to a non-Husserlian understanding of the a priori–a posteriori-distinction. In support of this argument, I first lay out the relevant objection to Husserl’s eidetics as I understand it. Then, I clarify the relation between ideal and real possibilities in the context of Husserl’s eidetics as I see it. Finally, I make a general point about the status of Husserl’s ontological differentiations ‘in the midst of life,’ namely in how what they differentiate is effective and (tacitly) manifest ever only as one moment (amongst many) of the complex whole that is a concrete life of consciousness. I end with some remarks on what this might mean for future phenomenological research on the imagination. (shrink)

For centuries humans have considered just two main possibilities for what awaits us at death: a “nothingness” like that of our before-life or some type of supernatural afterlife. The theory of a natural afterlife defines a vastly different, real possibility. The natural afterlife embodies all of the sensory perceptions, thoughts, and emotions present in the final moment of a near-death, dreamlike experience. With death this moment becomes timeless and everlasting to the dying person—essentially, a never-ending experience. The relativeness (...) and timelessness of the natural afterlife must be clearly understood to appreciate why it’s not supernatural yet indeed an afterlife and potentially the optimal heaven. The theory of a natural afterlife is now only a hypothesis; however, science, human experience, and logical deduction suggest that it’s extremely plausible and advances in science and technology could someday make it a scientific theory. This paper states the theory, describes the unconventional afterlife it defines, extensively analyzes its validity, and briefly addresses how it can significantly impact how people view death. Analytical tools, typically used for system modeling and language definition, are applied here to present an abstract model of a lifetime within time eternal. The model is used to support and explain the theory. (shrink)

McCall (1984) offered a semantics of counterfactual conditionals based on “real possible worlds” that avoids using the vague notion of similarity between possible worlds. I will propose an interpretation of McCall’s counterfactuals in a formal framework based on Baltag-Moss-Solecki events and protocols. Moreover, I will argue that using this interpretation one can avoid an objection raised by Otte (1987).

In Chapter I, I discuss Buchdahl’s view that the possibility of empirical lawlikeness could not have been established in the Principles of the Critique given the differences between transcendental, metaphysical and empirical lawlikeness, and the connection between the faculty of Reason and empirical lawlikeness. I then discuss the general conditions for empirical hypotheses according to Kant, which include the justification of the method by which an empirical hypothesis is obtained and the establishment of the general and specific constructability of the (...) empirical concept. -/- *In Chapter II, I discuss the nature of the general construction of concepts which is treated in the Schematism of the Critique, surveying the views of Pippin, Allison, Bennett and Butts in an effort both to make sense of a difficult part of the Critique and to demonstrate that the Schematism is indeed where Kant demonstrates how the construction of empirical concepts in general is possible. -/- *In Chapter III, I discuss Brittan’s and Butts’ views on the nature of the specific construction of empirical concepts, defending Butts’ interpretation as compatible with Buchdahl’s view that gaps exist between kinds of lawlikeness for Kant and, because of its connection with an interpretation of how metaphysical lawlikeness figures in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, insofar as it helps us to establish the possibility of empirical lawlikeness and natural science. (shrink)

Lewisian Genuine Realism about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds. It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical framework? Since (...) the desideratum is to incorporate impossible worlds into GR without compromising Lewis’ reductive analysis of modality, Chapter II defends that analysis against objections. The rest of the thesis is devoted to incorporating impossible worlds into GR. Chapter III explores GR-friendly impossible worlds in the form of set-theoretic constructions out of genuine possibilia. Then, Chapters IV-VI venture into concrete impossible worlds. Chapter IV addresses Lewis’ objection against such worlds, to the effect that contradictions true at impossible worlds amount to true contradictions tout court. I argue that even if so, the relevant contradictions are only ever about the non-actual, and that Lewis’ argument relies on a premise that cannot be nonquestion- beggingly upheld in the face of genuine impossible worlds in any case. Chapter V proposes that Lewis’ reductive analysis can be preserved, even in the face of genuine impossibilia, if we differentiate the impossible from the possible by means of accessibility relations, understood non-modally in terms of similarity. Finally, Chapter VI counters objections to the effect that there are certain impossibilities, formulated in Lewis’ theoretical language, which genuine impossibilia should, but cannot, represent. I conclude that Genuine Realism is still very much in the running when the discussion turns to impossible worlds. (shrink)

Andrew Chignell recently proposed an original reconstruction of Kant's ‘Only Possible Argument’ for the existence of God. Chignell claims that what motivates the ‘Grounding Premise’ of Kant's proof, ‘real possibility must be grounded in actuality’, is the requirement that the predicates of a really possible thing must be ‘really harmonious’, i.e. compatible in an extra-logical or metaphysical sense. I take issue with Chignell's reconstruction. First, the pre-Critical Kant does not present ‘real harmony’ as a general condition of (...) class='Hi'>real possibility. Second, the real harmony requirement is not what motivates the ‘Grounding Premise’ of the proof. Instead, this premise is sufficiently motivated by what Chignell labels the ‘content’ requirement. Finally, Kant's downgrading of the proof in his Critical period is not based on a concern regarding the real harmony of the predicates of God, but on his Critical restrictions on cognition in general and modal cognition in particular. (shrink)

There are ways in which the new tenseless theory of time is analogous to David Lewis’s modal realism. The new tenseless theory gives an indexical analysis of temporal terms such as ‘now’, while Lewis gives and indexical analysis of ‘actual’. For the new tenseless theory, all times are equally real; for Lewis, all worlds are equally real. In this paper I investigate this apparent analogy between these two theories, and ask whether a proponent of one is committed, by (...) parity of reasoning, to the other. I conclude that the analogy is merely apparent, and that independent reasons are needed to support each theory. (shrink)

Using possibly infinite computations on universal monotone Turing machines, we prove Martin-Löf randomness in ∅' of the probability that the output be in some set.

Czy coś naprawdę „odchodzi” całkowicie? Niniejszy artykuł jest poszukiwaniem „rzeczywistego usunięcia” i metafizyki, która musi temu towarzyszyć. Dlaczego to jest ważne? W badaniach nad sztuczną inteligencją naukowcy zaproponowali ruchomy punkt docelowy do momentu osiągnięcia sztucznej inteligencji. Zaczęło się od testu Turinga i ewoluowało przez dużą ilość argumentacji (np. Dreyfussa, dotyczącą tego, czego nie potrafią komputery, przez „osobliwość” Kurzweila oraz wiele innych kryteriów i tysiące dyskusji na temat tego, czym jest inteligencja i co oznaczałoby ją symulować lub, jak wolę, naśladować). Cała (...) ta dyskusja wciąż polega na rozważaniu analogii do ludzkiej inteligencji, a nie na zbliżaniu się do samej rzeczy, ale dobre analogie muszą dotyczyć czegoś znacznie więcej niż funkcji analogicznej: muszą zbliżać się do prawdziwej nieodróżnialności. Moje wywody będą zatem dotyczyły głównie dziedziny metafizyki i ontologii, tak jak rozumiem słowo „rzeczywisty” w wyrażeniu „rzeczywiste usunięcie”. Nie sądzę, aby współcześni badacze właściwie rozumieli problem czasu i jego wpływ na kryterium lub. kryteria sztucznej inteligencji. Stąd j w tych ramach oferuję „rzeczywiste usunięcie” w znaczeniu, które należy właśnie opisać. Argument AI ma implikacje dla całej metafizyki, ponieważ odnosi się do fundamentalnego charakteru czasu. (shrink)

Neste pequeno ensaio procurar-se-á determinar como, em Miguel Reale, a ontognoseologia se constitui como uma teoria geral da experiência, onde se concretizam e se relacionam dialecticamente o ser e o conhecer. Por outro lado, aferiremos como a tese da impossibilidade da experiência metafísica e, consequentemente, do seu conhecimento parte da concepção da irredutibilidade da experiência humana, que é sempre histórica, e que, por isso, reduz a inquirição metafísica ao nível da mera conjectura. Na dialéctica entre sujeito e objecto, no processo (...) do conhecimento, emerge o valor, a determinação axiológica, e na acção, na experiência histórica e cultural que fazemos de nós no e do Mundo emerge o sentido. Assim, pelo conhecer constituímo-nos e sendo actualizamos o Ser. (shrink)

Merab Mamardashvili’s philosophy can be defined as the philosophy of the transcendent event. An event is at once extremely concrete and extremely abstract. It occurs in an act of a special kind: an autonomous act which is not the realization of any pattern of transcendental historicity, is not attached to any teleology, that is, its meaning does not consist in the realization of a goal. It is, plainly speaking, purposeless and therefore indeterminate. However, this is not a variety of actionism, (...) not an outburst of absurdity subverting all order. An act turns out to be the realization of the “ontological abstraction of order” by means of a symbol actualized by the very event of the act. The article examines various aspects of the event from the aesthetic to the meta-historical. (shrink)

This essay, written in memory of Erik Olin Wright, explores the possibility of liberal socialism. Wright sought to rescue both liberalism and socialism from their demonstrated capacity for depredation. His legacy challenges reformers to proceed with the audacity of real, and realistic, utopianism together with an awareness that, unfortunately, the obverse of an appealing utopianism always beckons.