One of Plato’s aims in the Phaedrus seems to be to outline an ‘ideal’ form of rhetoric. But it is unclear exactly what the ‘true’ rhetorician really looks like, and what exactly his methods are. More broadly, just how does Plato see the relation between rhetoric and philosophy? I argue, in light of Plato’s epistemology, that the “true craft (techne) of rhetoric” which he describes in the Phaedrus is a regulative, but also an unattainable ideal. Consequently, the mythical palinode in (...) the dialogue is not (as some have claimed) an example of the true techne—and indeed it could not be. But neither is dialectic. Rather, dialectic is the closest approximation of the true techne of rhetoric which can be had; that is to say, dialectic is the best and highest kind of psychagogia (a ‘leading of the soul through words’). Plato’s purpose in describing the “true techne of rhetoric”, then, is not to reform or to rehabilitate rhetoric, but to urge us to abandon it in favor of the philosophical life. One implication of this is that Plato is just as hostile toward rhetoric as he is in the Gorgias. (shrink)

In Plato’s early dialogues, the impossibility of talking to the crowd appears as a constitutive element of the opposition between rhetoric and dialectic and raises the understudied question of the role of the audience in Socratic thought. However, Xenophon’s Socrates constantly identifies public and private speech. But this likening is also found in the Alcibiades Major, which gives a key to understand the true meaning of this assimilation: one can convince an audience, by talking to each individual in the crowd. (...) The need to address each one implies an adaptation of language that can be found in the texts of different disciples of Socrates. The rhetorical aspects of the Phaedrus’ psychagogia should then be understood, not as a new Platonic concept which allows the good orator to address the many, but rather as a new for- mulation of a well-known and shared Socratic ideal. (shrink)

Since antiquity, scholars have observed a structural tension within Plato’s Phaedrus. The dialogue demands order in every linguistic composition, yet it presents itself as a disordered composition. Accordingly, one of the key problems of the Phaedrus is determining which—if any—aspect of the dialogue can supply a unifying thread for the dialogue’s major themes (love, rhetoric, writing, myth, philosophy, etc.). My dissertation argues that “soul-leading” (psuchagōgia)—a rare and ambiguous term used to define the innate power of words—resolves the dialogue’s structural tension. (...) I clarify the conceptual and dramatic features of soul-leading by focusing on the dialogue’s uniquely prevalent use of the semantic network of “leading” and “following.” By continuing to foreground the language and drama of leading and following, I offer a new interpretation of the dialogue as a whole: the Phaedrus is Plato’s articulation of how the soul can be led into communion with reality. Chapter 1 discusses scholarly disputes about the unity of the Phaedrus and proposes that soul-leading adequately satisfies the criteria put forward for what would count as a unifying element. I argue that soul-leading unifies the dialogue both thematically and non-thematically; moreover, soul-leading is a theme capacious enough to account for the other principal contenders for unity put forward. Chapter 2 develops the ambiguous character of soul-leading by examining how the dialogue showcases dangerous forms thereof. Love and language are dangerous when they lead the soul toward goods which can never truly fulfill it. In order to clarify how love and language can mislead the soul, Socrates develops a set of accounts of how the soul is led, both internally and externally, in the three speeches on love. If the soul is to be led into communion with reality (the proper end of soul-leading), it must be led internally by the right part of the soul and externally by the right object of desire. Chapter 3 argues that all souls can, in principle, be harmonized and directed in the way that Chapter 2 requires. I show that Plato’s view of philosophy is neither elitist (i.e., some are intrinsically incapable of philosophy) nor naively essentialist. All can come into communion with reality because all are by nature equipped to do so. While Plato recognizes that there are forces which tend to prohibit one from exercising one’s capability of being rightly led, none of them are intrinsic to human nature. Chapter 4 argues that successful soul-leading require neither the leader nor the follower to be already well-disposed to what’s ultimate in order for the pair to come to a communion with what’s ultimate. Plato’s depiction of soul-leading love shows that love can itself promote the formation needed for both leader and follower to come into contact with reality. Love can do so because it is always already bound up reality in its responsiveness to beauty. Beauty itself calls the lover to itself by shining through the beautiful beloved, who acts as a reminder of transcendent Beauty. The lover mediates this same experience for the beloved. Each comes to desire the other as well as Beauty itself. Chapter 5 argues that the drama of the lovers’ formation mythically depicted in the Palinode (Chapter 4) is written into the drama of the dialogue as a whole. In the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus, we see an enactment of love’s formative role. Likewise, in the relationship between Phaedrus and Lysias, we see an enactment of the dangerous soul-leading discussed in Chapter 2. My focus on leading and following also allows me to show the thematic significance of the drama’s setting. Chapter 6 articulates the metaphysical conditions under which one can be led into communion with reality. Transcendent Beauty invites us into communion with itself and makes possible our ascent by providing us with divine guides and images which can transport us from our ordinary experiences to the true beings. Beauty accomplishes its work—leading us in a “divine dance” where we follow the gods up to Beauty and back down to each other—through images. When we handle images of reality rightly, they lead our souls into communion with reality. Further, when we have come into communion, we’ll be inspired to be co-workers of Beauty’s soul-leading work. When we articulate reality in language, we create new images that can serve to lead others toward reality. (shrink)

L'importance de l'analyse psychologique dans ce que l'on pourrait appeler, à la suite de George Briscoe Kerferd, « le mouvement sophistique », n'est pas en soi une découverte. De nombreuses études se sont en effet attachées à en souligner la portée, notamment dans ses rapports avec l'art rhétorique et son application pratique dans le cadre de la πόλις athénienne du Ve siècle où la parole — sous forme d'ἀγών, de débat contradictoire à l'assemblée ou au tribunal — prévalait sur tous (...) les autres instruments de pouvoir, violence et contrainte physique notamment. Dans un monde où « l’art politique, pour l'essentiel, maniement du langage », selon les mots de Jean-Pierre Vernant, analyser les mécanismes du logos, en connaître les règles, permettait de se rendre maître en persuasion, de posséder un instrument privilégié de victoire. Néanmoins, en marge de cet intérêt manifeste pour l'analyse du pouvoir du λόγος dans le corpus sophistique, on ne trouve, de manière assez paradoxale, qu'un nombre très limité de travaux s'attachant à questionner le sens, le statut et, in fine, la légitimité d'une « psychologie » au sens plein du terme. Et pourtant, la question se pose : peut-on parler d'une psychologie sophistique ou faut-il considérer que pour ces penseurs la ψυχή se donnait comme un état de fait dont il suffisait de connaître empiriquement le mécanisme? Y a-t-il quelque chose en-deçà de la psychagogie chez les sophistes? Dans cet article, nous tenterons de montrer qu’il est possible de voir en Alcidamas, disciple de Gorgias et auteur du Sur ceux qui composent des discours par écrit ou Sur les Sophistes, un éloge paradoxal, puisqu’écrit, de l’improvisation, un penseur de la ψυχή et non plus seulement de la potentialité psychagogique du λόγος. En effet, le développement d'une réflexion riche et complexe sur l’organisation logique et syntactique du discours d’une part, et sur l'âme et ses opérateurs d’autre part – réflexion qui conduit Alcidamas à réévaluer les modalités de relation entre l'orateur et son auditoire — permet de mettre en évidence une redéfinition (bien qu'en filigrane) de l'art rhétorique qui, ne pouvant plus dès lors reposer sur une revendication du pouvoir de la persuasion a maxima, devra accorder à la notion de vraisemblance une place centrale. (shrink)

This study asks after the fate of sophistry in the Eleatic Stranger's investigation of the best of the six regimes governed by law, and outlines as far as possible the role of the rhetor under the supervision of the true statesman, as well as the function and effects of myth on the citizens of the best regime. In short, I argue that Socrates' competitors do, in a qualified manner, still have a place in such a polis precisely where the work (...) of gathering intelligence finds its civic limit. (shrink)