Most of the recent work on propaganda in philosophy has come from a narrowly epistemological standpoint that sees it as flawed messaging that negatively impacts public reasonableness and deliberation. This article posits two problems with this approach: first, it obscures the full range of propaganda's activities; and second, it prevents effective ameliorative measures by offering an overly truncated assessment of the problems to be addressed. Following Ellul and Hyska, I argue that propaganda aims at shaping actions and (...) not just beliefs, and that the propaganda activities that shape action include modifying beliefs but also much more. Examining this larger set of activities results in a shift in how we conceptualize the way that propaganda works. In particular, I add a novel argument that propaganda works by creating and reshaping publics, transforming who they are and their characteristic action. This article concludes that a more complete philosophical account of propaganda cannot just draw on epistemology but must also call on the tools of social ontology and political philosophy to create a more robust critical account. (shrink)

I argue that propaganda does not characteristically interfere with individual rationality, but instead with group agency. Whereas it is often claimed that propaganda involves some sort of incitement to irrationality, I show that this is neither necessary nor sufficient for a case’s being one or propaganda. For instance, some propaganda constitutes evidence of the speaker’s power, or else of the risk and futility of opposing them, and there is nothing irrational about taking such evidence seriously. I (...) outline an alternative account of propaganda inspired by Hannah Arendt, on which propaganda characteristically creates or destroys group agency. One aspiring to control the public should have an interest in both creating and suppressing group agency, I argue, both because groups have capacities that individuals don’t, and because participation in group action can have a transformative effect upon the individual. Finally, I suggest that my characterization of propaganda suggests a vision of resistance to propaganda quite unlike the one that emerges from irrational-belief accounts, on which propaganda cannot be resisted by oneself. (shrink)

If citizens are to make enlightened collective decisions, they need to rely on true factual beliefs, but misinformation impairs their ability to do so. Although some cases of misinformation are deliberate and amount to propaganda, cases of inadvertent misinformation are just as problematic in affecting the beliefs and behavior of democratic citizens. A review of empirical evidence suggests that this is a serious problem that cannot entirely be corrected by means of deliberation.

On May 14, 1940, Otto Neurath and Marie Reidemeister fled from the harbour of Scheveningen in The Hague to England. It was the last boat that could escape from Holland before the German occupiers took the city. Years earlier, in 1934, they had fled the same danger from Vienna to Holland. Otto Neurath can be seen as the godfather of today's infographics. In the Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum (Social & Economic Museum) that he founded in Vienna, developments in various areas of (...) society were shown by means of pictorial statistics to a broad audience - rich and poor, literate and illiterate. At the Museum, Otto Neurath acted as the scientific director and inspirer, Marie Reidemeister as the 'Transformer' of data into sketches, and Gerd Arntz as the head of the graphics department which designed pictograms and layouts. These three continued that work in Holland under the acronym Isotype (International System Of TYpographic Picture Education). After internment as 'enemy aliens' on the Isle of Man, Neurath & Reidemeister were able to continue their work in the UK. Through Wolfgang Foges and his book packaging firm Adprint, they were commissioned to design Isotype charts for books supported by the Ministry of Information during the war - what might be called 'soft propaganda'. From 1942, Isotypes were supplied for information about the embryonic welfare state (Beveridge Plan), for illustrated books about Britain's allies (USA and USSR), and on what British democracy should look like after the war. This book illustrates around 250 Isotypes from these publications and provides information about the producers, authors, editors, and designers, and not least about the working relationship between the Isotype Institute and Adprint. The examples presented show the remarkable quality of the graphics, produced under less than ideal circumstances during wartime. (shrink)

From nearly the author's first experience entering the underwater city of Rapture in BioShock, she is treated to a taste of Andrew Ryan's propaganda. Andrew Ryan regularly says that citizens of Rapture need to avoid all contact with the surface world because it's filled with parasites who seek to destroy Rapture. Even though what Ryan says about the outside world is true, he's lying because he believes it to be false. According to Harry Frankfurt, bullshit is when the speaker (...) doesn't particularly care whether what she says is true or false. The analysis in this chapter suggests that propaganda is more closely connected to bullshitting than lying. The author says that if propaganda is more closely associated with bullshit than lies, then this also means that one should be particularly worried by governments (or individuals with power, such as Andrew Ryan) that engage in lots of propaganda. (shrink)

This chapter provides a high-level introduction to the topic of propaganda. We survey a number of the most influential accounts of propaganda, from the earliest institutional studies in the 1920s to contemporary academic work. We propose that these accounts, as well as the various examples of propaganda which we discuss, all converge around a key feature: persuasion which bypasses audiences’ rational faculties. In practice, propaganda can take different forms, serve various interests, and produce a variety of (...) effects. Propaganda can aim to affect not only audiences’ beliefs and attitudes, but also their emotions and moods, and in turn how audiences subsequently reason or act. While propaganda is often thought of as false or misinformation, it can instead involve framing effects (“The war on drugs”), covert messaging (“There are Muslims among us”), emotionally charged slogans (“Make America Great Again”), or myths (“The American dream”). These forms of propaganda mislead audiences, not by introducing false information, but by making some beliefs and values, rather than others, salient. In fact, propaganda can even employ straightforwardly true claims (again, as in “There are Muslims among us”) and seemingly objective bureaucratic reports (“Crime has risen 4.2%”). To understand how these and other mechanisms enable propaganda to persuade by arational means, further study is needed. To that end, throughout the chapter we identify a number of places where the study of meaning and communication can help elucidate propaganda, as well as the places where propaganda issues challenges for the study of meaning. (shrink)

I analyze Jason Stanley’s model for how propaganda works, paying close attention to Stanley’s own rhetoric. I argue that Stanley’s language be supplemented with a vocabulary that helps us to attend to what sorts of things move democratic knowers (epistemically speaking), what sorts of things do not, and why. In addition, I argue that the reasonableness necessary for considering the views of others within democratic deliberation ought to be understood, not as an empathic, but as an interactive capacity. Finally, (...) I critique some of the ways in which Stanley speaks about the marginalized populations he aims to support.Analizo el modelo debido a Jason Stanley sobre el modo en que funciona la propaganda, prestando atención en particular a la retórica del propio Stanley. Argumento la conveniencia de que el lenguaje de Stanley se complemente con un vocabulario que nos ayude a prestar atención a las cosas que motivan a los agentes de conocimiento democráticos (epistémicamente hablando), a las que no lo hacen, y por qué. Adicionalmente, argumento que la razonabilidad que se necesita para tomar en consideración los puntos de vista de otros en la deliberación democrática debería entenderse como una capacidad no de empatía, sino de interacción. Finalmente, critico alguna de las formas en que Stanley habla de las poblaciones marginadas a las que quiere dar apoyo. (shrink)

How Propaganda Became Public Relations pulls back the curtain on propaganda: how it was born, how it works, and how it has masked the bulk of its operations by rebranding itself as public relations. Cory Wimberly uses archival materials and wide variety of sources — Foucault’s work on governmentality, political economy, liberalism, mass psychology, and history — to mount a genealogical challenge to two commonplaces about propaganda. First, modern propaganda did not originate in the state and (...) was never primarily located in the state; instead, it began and flourished as a for-profit service for businesses. Further, propaganda is not focused on public beliefs and does not operate mainly through lies and deceit; propaganda is an apparatus of government that aims to create the publics that will freely undertake the conduct its clients’ desire. Businesses have used propaganda since the early twentieth century to construct the laboring, consuming, and voting publics that they needed to secure and grow their operations. Over that time, corporations have become the most numerous and well-funded apparatuses of government in the West, operating privately and without democratic accountability. Wimberly explains why liberal strategies of resistance have failed and a new focus on creating mass subjectivity through democratic means is essential to countering propaganda. This book offers a sophisticated analysis that will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in social and political philosophy, Continental philosophy, political communication, the history of capitalism, and the history of public relations. (shrink)

This is the editor’s introduction to the book symposium on Jason Stanley’s influential book "How Propaganda Words" (Oxford University Press, 2015). After a few brief remarks situating the book in the landscape of current analytic philosophy, I offer a detailed presentation of each chapter of the book, in order to familiarize the reader with its main tenets and with the author’s argumentative strategy. I flag the issues that the contributors to the symposium discuss, and describe their main points. I (...) end with expressing hope that the symposium will help continue the conversation around ideology and propaganda within analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter examines what protest is from the point of view of pragmatics, and how it relates to propaganda—specifically what Jason Stanley calls ‘positive propaganda.’ It analyzes the phrase “Black Lives Matter,” taking it to be a political speech act that offers a unique route to understanding of the pragmatics of protest. From this, it considers the moral-epistemological function of protest, and develops an account of the authority that protest, as a speech act, both calls upon and makes (...) explicit. It then argues that, rather than simply its effects, it is protest’s distinct pragmatic features—that is, its entitlement conditions, and the uptake it aim at—that best capture its important moral, political, and epistemic elements. It therefore rejects the idea that protests are paradigmatic examples of ‘positive propaganda,’ because the propaganda model cannot capture protests’ function of foregrounding the socially located moral authority of the protestor. (shrink)

This paper examines Jason Stanley’s account of propaganda. I begin with an overview and some questions about the structure of that account. I then argue for two main conclusions. First, I argue that Stanley’s account over-generalizes, by counting mere incompetent argumentation as propaganda. But this problem can be avoided, by emphasizing the role of emotions in effective propaganda more than Stanley does. In addition, I argue that more propaganda is democratically acceptable than Stanley allows. Focusing especially (...) on sexual assault prevention campaigns, I show that propaganda can be acceptable even when it represents some in our communities as worthy of contempt. (shrink)

How does propaganda differ from the legitimate persuasive practices that animate a healthy democracy? The question is especially salient as digital technologies facilitate new modes of political persuasion and the public square saturates with information factual and fabricated alike. In answer, we propose a typology based on the rhetorical strategies that propaganda and its legitimate counterpart each employ. We argue that the point of contrast between the phenomena turns on two key features: whether the rhetorical strategy sufficiently engages (...) our deliberative capacities, and whether it runs counter to our epistemic interests. While in practice the boundary between the concepts is not always sharp, the account identifies a set of conceptual tools that help better frame and come to grips with propaganda and legitimate political persuasion in an information-dense and increasingly complex media landscape. (shrink)

Drawing on work from Marina Sbisà’s “Ideology and the Persuasive Use of Presupposition” (1999), Rae Langton has developed a powerful account of the subtle mechanisms through which hate speech and propaganda spread. However, this model has a serious limitation: it focuses too strongly on individual speech acts isolated from their wider context, rendering its applicability to a broader range of cases suspect. In this chapter, I consider the limits of presupposition accommodation to clarify the audience’s role in helping hate (...) speakers, and claim the necessary mechanisms are much more active and social than Langton suggests, with effects not capturable in the analysis of isolated speech acts. I revisit Sbisà’s work on presupposition and develop an alternative model that (1) improves upon the Langtonian model for explaining the power of hate propaganda, and (2) is more in line with Sbisà’s original approach to ideology and the normative aspects of presupposition. (shrink)

Jason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works characterises and explores one democratically problematic kind of propaganda, ‘undermining propaganda’, which involves ‘[a] contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals’. Stanley’s model for how undermining propaganda functions is Rae Langton and Caroline West’s treatment of moves in pornographic language games. However, Stanley doesn’t consider whether his theory of propaganda might in turn (...) illuminate the harmful nature of pornography, in light of the familiar contention that some pornography acts as a kind of misogynistic propaganda. Drawing on Catharine MacKinnon’s writings on pornography, this paper will explore one way of developing the claim that pornography sometimes functions as undermining propaganda, in something close to Stanley’s sense. Moreover, I will suggest that the discussion points to a new response to the so-called authority problem for Rae Langton’s silencing argument against the protected status of pornography.El libro de Jason Stanley How Propaganda Works caracteriza y explora un tipo de propaganda democráticamente problemático, la ‘propaganda debilitadora’, que envuelve ‘[una] contribución al discurso público que se presenta como si incorporase determinados ideales, pero que es de un tipo que tiende a erosionar esos mismos ideales’. El modelo de Stanley para el funcionamiento de la propaganda debilitadora es el del tratamiento de los movimientos en los juegos de lenguaje pornográficos debido a Rae Langton y Caroline West. Sin embargo, Stanley no reflexiona acerca de si su teoría sobre la propaganda podría, a su vez, iluminar la dañina naturaleza de la pornografía, a la luz de la conocida tesis de que hay pornografía que actúa como una forma de propaganda misógina. A partir de los trabajos de Catharine MacKinnon sobre pornografía, este artículo pretende explorar una forma de desarrollar la tesis de que la pornografía funciona en ocasiones como propaganda debilitadora, en un sentido próximo al de Stanley. Además, sugeriré que la discusión apunta a una nueva respuesta al llamado problema de la autoridad en relación con el argumento del silenciamiento debido a Rae Langton en contra de un estatuto de protección para la pornografía. (shrink)

ABSTRACTJason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works intends to offer a novel account of what propaganda is, how it works, and what damage it does inside a democratic culture. The book succeeds in showing that, contrary to the stereotype, propaganda need not be false or misleading. However, Stanley offers contradictory definitions of propaganda, and his theory, which is both over- and under-inclusive, is applied in a dismissive, highly ideological way. In the end, it remains unclear how much damage (...) propaganda does. Voters in modern democracies would be ignorant and irrational even without propaganda. (shrink)

The alt-right is an online subculture marked by its devotion to the execution of a racist, misogynistic, and xenophobic politics through trolling, pranking, meme-making, and mass murder. It is this devotion to far-right politics through the discordant conjunction of humor and suicidal violence this article seeks to explain by situating the movement for the first time within its constitutive online relationships. This article adds to the existing literature by viewing the online relationships of the alt-right through the genealogy of (...) class='Hi'>propaganda. Through situating the alt-right alongside the genealogy of propaganda, the article offers new insights into the social isolation, increasingly extreme social and political positions, nihilism, and violence that have emerged within the alt-right. The article concludes by applying the lessons of the alt-right for online organizing across the political spectrum and argues that a class-based politics of the left is an important part of countering the rise of the alt-right. (shrink)

This article frames Trump's politics through a genealogy of propaganda, going back to P.T. Barnum in the 19th century and moving through the crowd psychologist Gustave Le Bon and the public relations counsel Edward Bernays in the 20th. This genealogy shows how propaganda was developed as a tool by eager professionals who would hire themselves to the elite to control the masses. Trump’s propaganda presents a break in that he has not only removed professionals from control over (...) his propaganda, he has mobilized it as a force against them. His lower and middle class supporters may not materially gain from Trump’s politics, but they get to vent their ressentiment on the professional class and see them too become the targets of propagandistic control. Ultimately, the conflict between working class whites, those without college degrees, and professionals earns little for its participants and occludes the role that elites play in class dynamics in the United States. This article adds substance and context to the claims that Trump’s appeal is anti-professional while showing that the claims that his supporters are ‘voting against their interests’ does not reflect the real psychological benefits many Trumpists get from supporting him. (shrink)

This book aims to develop a sophisticated understanding of propaganda. It begins with a brief history of early Western propaganda, including Ancient Greek classical theories of rhetoric and the art of persuasion, and traces its development through the Christian era, the rise of the nation-state, World War I, Nazism, and Communism. The core of the book examines the ethical implications of various forms of persuasion, not only hate propaganda but also insidious elements of more generally acceptable communication (...) such as advertising, public relations, and government information, setting these in the context of freedom of expression. Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion examines the art of persuasion but it also hopes to establish a "self-defense" resistance to propaganda. As Jacques Ellul warned in 1980, any new technology enters into an already existing class system and can be expected to develop in a way favourable to the dominant interests of that system. The merger of AOL and Time-Warner confirms the likelihood of corporate interests dominating the future of the Internet, but the Internet has also opened up new possibilities for a politically effective counter-culture, as was demonstrated at the meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in late 1999 and numerous similar gatherings since. (shrink)

Abstract The aim of this paper is to examine the propaganda power of Madison’s Solidarity Sing-Along. To do so, I will modify the Epistemic Merit Model of propaganda so that it can account for a broader spectrum of propaganda. I will show how this is consistent with other accounts of musical pragmatics and the potential political function of songs and music. This will provide the ground for a robust interpretation of the political meanings of the Solidarity Sing-Along. (...) I will assume the Madison protests and the Solidarity Sing-Along can be considered a paradigm case of peaceful protest as it has been claimed that the Madison protest and the role of art within those protests set the stage for the Occupy Movement protests later in the same year. (shrink)

The article describes main forms of socialist propaganda in polish sports press of the 1950’s decade. As the analysis shows, sports magazines, despite their apparent thematic distance from political issues, had become tools of social impact. The main force of influence was concentrated in texts created typically for propaganda purposes, but also texts devoted to sports competitions contained political components. The most important manifestations of propaganda in the sports press were the mixing of sport with politics, promoting (...) Soviet training and tactical patterns, over-emphasizing successes, informing about the socialist commitments made by athletes on public holidays, as well as criticizing social and political conditions in capitalist countries. (shrink)

This book develops a sophisticated account of propaganda and its intriguing history. It begins with a brief overview of Western propaganda, including Ancient Greek theories of rhetoric, and traces propaganda’s development through the Christian era, the rise of the nation-state, World War I, Nazism, Communism, and the present day. The core of the book examines the ethical implications of various forms of persuasion, not only hate propaganda but also insidious elements of more generally acceptable communication such (...) as advertising, public relations, and government information, setting these in the context of freedom of expression. This new edition is updated throughout, and includes additional revelations about a key atrocity story of World War I. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 207 Seiten: 631-655.

According to some, the current political fracture is best described as political polarization – where extremism and political separation infest an entire whole population. Political polarization accounts often point to the psychological phenomenon of belief polarization – where being in a like-minded groups tends to boost confidence. The political polarization story is an essentially symmetrical one, where both sides are subject to the same basic dividing forces and cognitive biases, and are approximately as blame-worthy. On a very different account, what's (...) going on is best described propaganda – where a discrete set of bad actors have manipulated some part of the media environ-ment. The propaganda story is usually told as a highly asymmetrical story, where only some media consumers are under the spell of the propagandists. Which is right? I consider two analyses of the 2016 American election: Robert Talisse's polarization-style account in Overdoing Democracy, and Benkler et. al.'s propaganda-style account in Network Propaganda. I suggest that the propaganda account has better empirical support. I also offer a diagnosis of the appeal of the polarization story. Those who accept a polarization account are often political centrists, who accuse those at the political extremes of motivated reasoning – of believing what they find comfortable. Such centrists also tend to treat political extremism as the product of the irrational belief polarization, arising from living in like-minded groups. But, I argue, these arguments are too quick. First, we can’t dismiss a group as irrational merely be-cause they are likeminded. The existence of like-minded group can be explained in terms of irrational belief polarization, but it can also be explained by rational convergence on the truth. Second, belief polarization is not always irrational, such as when its emotional effects are used to repair impaired self-confidence. Third, political centrists are also subject to similar debunking argument. When we accept a polarization account, we get to feel the comfort of being “above it all”. Political centrists are just as plausibly subject to the irrational effects of living in like-minded groups. Belief polarization isn’t just for extremists. (shrink)

Words don’t just describe the world; they change the world. We do things with words as John L. Austin (1975) has argued. But words can also change how we think about something. In this piece I wish to examine the everyday usage of words referring to strategic fouling, as it cuts across various languages. In some languages this rule-violation gave rise to figurative language after the practice became widespread. We find euphemisms but also dysphemisms, as well as evaluative language (whose (...) purpose here is to excuse the action). This is important, because ‘if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought’ (as George Orwell observed). I will argue that euphemisms and other evaluative language which refer to strategic fouling are a piece of sporting propaganda, aiming to dull our senses to such rule-violations. (shrink)

In this article, I seek to define the status and role of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense as a historical document. I argue that although Paine’s influential pamphlet offers no original ideas and seems simply to reinforce existing trends, its layered text transcends the regurgitation of propaganda and extends to literary achievement in its reflection of social and economic conditions, its deliberate narrative style, and its usage of literary devices and culture references grounded in historical context. Consequently, my methodology is (...) necessarily focused through literary discourse to achieve historical understanding of this key document from the American Revolution. (shrink)

What is the relationship between war propaganda and nationalism, and what are the effects of each on support for, or participation in, violent acts? This is an important question for international criminal law and ongoing speech crime trials, where prosecutors and judges continue to assert that there is a clear causal link between war propaganda, nationalism, and mass violence. Although most legal judgments hinge on the criminal intent of propagandists, the question of whether and to what extent (...) class='Hi'>propaganda and nationalism interact to cause support for violence or participation remains unanswered. Our goal here is to contribute to research on propaganda and nationalism by bridging international criminal law and the behavioral and brain sciences. We develop an experiment conducted with Serbian participants that examines the effects of propaganda as identified in the latest international speech crime trial as causing mass violence, and thereby test hypotheses of expert witness Anthony Oberschall’s theory of mass manipulation. Using principal components analysis and Bayesian regression, we examine the effects of propaganda exposure and prior levels of nationalism as well as other demographics on support for violence, ingroup empathy, and outgroup empathy. Results show that while exposure to war propaganda does not increase justifications of violence, specific types of war propaganda increase ingroup empathy and decrease outgroup empathy. Further, although nationalism by itself is not significant for justifying violence, the interaction of increased nationalism and exposure to violent media is significant for altering group empathies. The implications of these findings are discussed with respect to international criminal law and the cognitive science of nationalism. (shrink)

This article discusses the role of communication research in the Cold War, moving from a US-centered to a comparative-transnational point of view. It examines research on prop-aganda and mass communication in the United States and the Soviet Union, focusing not only on the similarities and differences, but also on mutual perceptions and transnational entanglements. In both countries, communication scientists conducted their research with its benefits for propaganda practitioners and waging the Cold War in mind. It has been suggested that (...) after an initial period of close cooperation between politics and communication science, early expectations of the potential of systematic research for controlling the hearts and minds of people through propaganda started to fade. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, communication research eventually became a ‘normal’ scholarly discipline. (shrink)

A political discourse of peace marked the distribution and use of radioisotopes in biomedical research and in medical diagnosis and therapy in the post-World War II period. This occurred during the era of expansion and strengthening of the United States' influence on the promotion of sciences and technologies in Europe as a collaborative effort, initially encouraged by the policies and budgetary distribution of the Marshall Plan. This article follows the importation of radioisotopes by two Spanish research groups, one in experimental (...) endocrinology and one in molecular biology. For both groups foreign funds were instrumental in the early establishment of their laboratories. The combination of funding and access to previously scarce radioisotopes helped position these groups at the forefront of research in Spain. (shrink)

This article examines a case study of international Communist propaganda during the Cold War. The Institute of Historical and Socio-Political Research, a historical propaganda organization affiliated to the Romanian Communist Party, succeeded in penetrating the Iron Curtain by distributing its works through a social network provided by the Italian Liberation Movement Institute, and in publishing its works in Italy, with the help of the Gramsci Institute, as well as publishers like Editori Riuniti and Nicola Teti. The ISISP established (...) a mutually beneficial partnership with various Italian actors: ISISP and the regime succeeded in publishing international propaganda; the Italian publishing houses were paid by ISISP to print and distribute their edited volumes, with the double advantage of keeping political ties with the RCP while also protecting their own limited finances. (shrink)

In this paper I explore privacy as a concept that becomes relevant and sometimes necessary under specific circumstances, but unnecessary in others. Privacy, I suggest, can be thought of as the right to be left alone and is integral to related concepts such as freedom, liberty, and independence. In light of the ongoing expansion of data-mining technologies, business models, and emerging modes of governance, I suggest that privacy is simultaneously more necessary and more at risk than ever. Privacy, in other (...) words, is fragile and must be appreciated, understood, and defended. At the same time, privacy is increasingly an obstacle for businesses, governments, and financial interests, all of whom are eager to extract our data, manage our expectations, and shape and control our desires. To achieve their objectives, I describe how these organizations have long used propaganda and persuasive techniques to shape and manage the opinions, values, and expectations of the public. These days, I argue, the meaning of privacy is being made to evolve in order to bolster these organizations’ interconnected efforts to expand their power and control and to pave the way for the imposition of digital IDs. I also reflect on the way propaganda is being used today, the ways it has been described in the past, and the ways it will evolve in the future—either in defense of freedom, liberty, and independence, or in service of organizations intent on expanding their power and control over managed populations. (shrink)

Because the propaganda model challenges basic premises and suggests that the media serve antidemocratic ends, it is commonly excluded from mainstream debates on media bias. Such debates typically include conservatives, who criticize the media for excessive liberalism and an adversarial stance toward government and business, and centrists and liberals, who deny the charge of adversarialism and contend that the media behave fairly and responsibly. The exclusion of the propaganda model perspective is noteworthy, for one reason, because that perspective (...) is consistent with long standing and widely held elite views that 'the masses are notoriously short-sighted' (Bailey 1948: 13) and are 'often poor judges of their own interests' (Lasswell 1933: 527), so that 'our statesmen must deceive them' (Bailey 1948: 13); and they 'can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality' (Walter Lippmann 1921: 310). In Lippmann's view, the 'manufacture of consent' by an elite class had already become 'a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government' by the 1920s (Lippman 1921: 248). (shrink)

English Abstract This paper examines arguments made by the Argentinean philosopher Risieri Frondizi in his essay “On the Unity on the Philosophies of the Two Americas” regarding the legitimacy of unifying the philosophic traditions of the Americas. It argues that the present situation is much as it was in the 1950’s: the two largest philosophical communities of the Americas are still generally isolated from each other and the integration of these communities is a legitimate aspiration. The paper then examines the (...) concern, mentioned by Frondizi, that Pan-Americanism is political propaganda concealing U.S. imperialism in Latin America. It concludes that Frondizi’s arguments in favor of unifying American philosophies should encourage philosophers across the Americas to integrate the philosophical traditions of the Americas through a dialogue that explicitly addresses the United States’ history of anti-democratic actions in Latin America. Resumen en español Este articulo examina los argumentos formulados por el filósofo argentino Risieri Frondizi en su ensayo “Sobre la unidad de las filosofías de las dos Américas” con respeto a la legitimidad de la unificación de las tradiciones filosóficas de las Américas. Argumenta que la situación actual es tanto como lo fue en la década de 1950: las dos comunidades filosóficas más grandes de las Américas en general siguen siendo aislados unos de otros y la integración de estas comunidades es una aspiración legítima. Este articulo entonces se examina la preocupación, mencionada por Frondizi, que el panamericanismo es un tipo de propaganda política que oculta el imperialismo de EE.UU. en América Latina. Llega a la conclusión de que los argumentos de Frondizi en favor de unificación de las filosofías de las Américas deben fomentar los filósofos de las Américas para integrar las tradiciones filosóficas de las Américas a través de un diálogo que aborde explícitamente la historia de las acciones anti-democráticas en América Latina de los Estados Unidos. (shrink)

This paper explores the functioning of political propaganda during the Brabant Revolution, that is, during Belgium's contribution to the ‘Age of the Democratic Revolution’. More in particular, it examines the differences between royalist and patriot propaganda. Detailed reference to the political dialogue pamphlets of the time allows for the reconstruction of the first instance of nation-building in Belgian history. In more general terms, the paper hopes to contribute to the argument for an historic and developmental approach to the (...) study of nation, with particular attention for its multi-faceted and emancipatory functionality. (shrink)

We are surrounded by communication of many kinds whose aim is to persuade rather to convince, to manipulate rather than to reason. Advertising and much public discourse is like this. How should we react to this fact? Perhaps even more importantly: What does this fact mean about modern society? Not all persuasion is regrettable or to be disapproved. Not all persuasion is propaganda. And perhaps not even all propaganda is necessarily bad. This last point was the focus of (...) a controversy between W. E. B. Du Bois, who held that propaganda could be used for good, and Alain Locke, who held that all propaganda corrupts our thinking. My own view is that propaganda can be used for good, but Locke was perfectly right to be worried about it.Estamos rodeados de muchos tipos de comunicación, cuya finalidad es persuadir antes que convencer, manipular antes que razonar. La publicidad y gran parte del discurso público es así. ¿Cómo deberíamos reaccionar a este hecho? Quizá más importante aún: ¿qué dice este hecho acerca de la sociedad moderna? No toda persuasión es lamentable o debería desaprobarse. No toda persuasión es propaganda. E incluso quizá no toda propaganda es necesariamente mala. Este último punto centró la controversia entre W.E.B. du Bois, quien sostenía que la propaganda podría utilizarse para un buen fin, y Alain Locke, quien sostenía que toda propaganda corrompe el pensamiento. Mi propio punto de vista es que la propaganda puede utilizarse para un buen fin, pero que Locke tenía razón al preocuparse por ella. (shrink)

Este artículo explora los modos en que las imágenes de perpetradores pueden encarnarse en las maquinarias propagandísticas. En este sentido, analiza parte del material de archivo de la televisión oficial argentina durante la Guerra de las Islas Malvinas que aparece en el film documental 1982 (Lucas Gallo, 2020), a fin de elaborar una revisión no sólo de la imbricación de las imágenes con las políticas de exterminio, sino para discutir la concepción del archivo como ficción y como instrumento de la (...) memoria. Palabras clave: guerra de Malvinas; archivo; imagen de perpetrador; propaganda; dictadura argentina. (shrink)

In this essay, I want to explore one of the most ironic episodes in the history of propaganda, the attempt by various federal agencies to moderate American WWII anti-Japanese propaganda films. My texts will be four films, two produced by the military, and two by Hollywood: December 7th (1943), directed by Gregg Toland and revised by John Ford; Air Force (1943), directed Howard Hawks; Know Your Enemy: Japan (1945), directed by Frank Capra; and Betrayal for the East (1945), (...) directed by William Berke. As all of these films are readily available on YouTube, I will be brief in my description of them. Instead, I will focus on how they served to intensify racial hatred of Japanese in general and Japanese-Americans in particular, and how the federal government tried to control that propaganda—but was limited by its own policies regarding Japanese-Americans. (shrink)

Examples of propaganda abound in contemporary society. Even though propaganda is increasingly prevalent in modern society, this phenomenon has received scant philosophical attention. This is particularly true of philosophy of art even as art, from posters and murals to films and novels, has been instrumental in the dissemination of propaganda. My dissertation develops a new model of propaganda to account for the phenomenon of art propaganda. I call this model the epistemic merit model, because I (...) argue that propaganda essentially lacks epistemic merit. ;My project proceeds in four parts: offer a diagnosis of why propaganda has virtually escaped philosophical scrutiny, survey the field of propaganda studies in the disciplines of sociology, social psychology, and communication theory, perform a conceptual analysis of propaganda, and show how my new model is particularly well-suited to cases of art propaganda. (shrink)

A crescendo of panting to her stiff-lunged yearspressed in on her for three days and a bit before the succumbingno word could be wedged between gasps.A knife twist in her life’s two year tail two years’witness to others’ ministerings at her flesh-raw chestturned outward to the airenforced fluency in the language of lint.From nests of treason in her breastat night the insurgency pushed outinto the bloodlinesoutriders of a black hostthe dreadful propaganda of cellsbridgeheads locked down in bone and braina (...) Reichstag fire flowering in her backherstory crumblingmidnight dominoes along her spine.At the endat the panting postin the room curtained for deathher body spat and crackled with a foreign fevereven past the last breath and her eyes drying.In the bare room a malignant hum.When they came for her a thin smoke hung. (shrink)

Drawing from midcentury and contemporary theoretical work on propaganda, this study provides an analysis of the propagandistic properties of the "Shared Values" initiative developed by Charlotte Beers, former chief of public diplomacy under U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. The campaign was broadcast in several Muslim countries before it was abandoned in 2003. The campaign's utilization of truth, its treatment of Muslim audiences as means to serve broader policy objectives rather than as a population to be engaged on its (...) own terms, and its use of palaver all suggest the "Shared Values" videos, as an example of mass communication, had serious ethical shortcomings. (shrink)

This article assesses the relationship between propaganda and nationalism as an ideology in the Serbian massmedia. Serious analysis of contemporary propaganda is a complex discipline, primarily because of the use of the mass media. The issue is further complicated by the fact that the introduction of ever new technologies results in new channels of public media, which demand specific and new methods of propaganda and manipulation. In the study of propaganda in Serbian media as it affects (...) the war in Bosnia Herzegovina, the following elements were found to be of particular interest : propaganda and ideology ; the use of language for propaganda purposes; the context of propaganda; propaganda organization and propagandists; the public; the level of source criticism; and the iconography. (shrink)

In discussing warfare we tend to maintain a theoretical cleavage between the "home front" and the "battle front" that is supposed to parallel the physical distance that separates them. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the academic literature that surrounds World War I, with each discipline for decades having studied its correspondent aspect of the war. While this has provided us with incredibly detailed research into the minutiae of battles and the changing attitudes of the masses, it has done (...) little to help us combine these details into a full-scale picture of what was actually experienced by civilians and soldiers alike. Therefore this paper will instead attempt an interdisciplinary approach to understanding this war by looking at the alarmism that helped lead to the war and the censorship and propaganda campaigns that helped shape it. Thus it will be shown that only by returning to the concerted efforts of politicians and journalists years before the war can we see how the "war to end all war" eventually led to the creation of "shell shock" and the loss of a generation. (shrink)

Physicalism is the default position in science and in the philosophy of mind, but it should not be, I argue, because of two errors. By its epistemological error, physicalism gives physics priority over the evidence of first person experience. Only what I experience in first person is certain, so observation is prior to any theory. Physics itself is based on observation, avoiding the epistemological error, and then physics can progress, even changing its own ontology. However, physicalism imposes the ontology of (...) physics on every science, and in physics everything is causal. By its ontological error, physicalism tries to explain causally what is intentional. And it happens that causality and intentionality are mutually exclusive, showing that the ontology of physics is insufficient wherever intentions are present. This ontological insufficiency prevents that physicalism can repeat the success of physics with any science where intentions play a rôle, and thus it is blocking the advance of both the social sciences and the philosophy of mind. To overcome this obstacle, I propose to go back to the essentials: we should consider again the transcendental problem raised by Descartes and its solutions by Hume and Kant. On top of this subjectivist solution, we should take advantage of Darwin and Turing, and we should extend our ontology beyond causality to include intentionality, and here my proposal is problem solving. Then you could join our Post-Kantian subjectivism and say with me: The world is not a huge machine, as physicalism proposes, but an enigmatic problem. (shrink)

This article examines word-based puzzles as texts. In particular, it analyzes the potential of using a seemingly harmless pastime — the solving of puzzles — for propagandistic ends. Propaganda is an attempt to manipulate and dominate discourses some of whose manifestations are texts. Because a thorough examination of puzzles has not yet been undertaken, word-based puzzles will be considered first in general, followed by a detailed examination of the potential propagandistic impact of puzzles drawn from the official Nazi newspaper, (...) Völkischer Beobachter [Folkish Observer]. (shrink)