Aristotle is often credited with views about practical reasoning, desire, and action collectively referred to as the theory of the practical syllogism.Some commentators are skeptical about the existence of any such general theory, but most would agree that a theory of some sort is outlined in the De Motu Animalium and that it influences Aristotle’s account of akrasia in the icomachean Ethics.This paper will begin by describing the most important ideas in the De Motu Animalium discussion of (...) the practical syllogism. The ideas are simple but I think that their implications and philosophical importance have not been appreciated. I will suggest that the practical syllogism is Aristotle’s model for the rational explanation of action. Other commentators have made this claim, but I think that it can be given a very precise sense. Aristotle thinks that an action can be rationally explained if the agent acts in response to the strength of the reasons that he sees for acting. The practical syllogism is an argument that expresses the reasons in favor of the action, so if the agent acts for those reasons the action is explained by the practical syllogism. The second part of the paper considers the work that the practical syllogism does in Aristotle’s account of akrasia. I will argue that in akrasia—at least in the most extreme kind of akrasia—the agent acts intentionally to satisfy a desire but the action cannot be explained by a practical syllogism. Aristotle distinguishes between explanation by the motivational strength of desires and explanation by a practical syllogism. The last part of this paper comments on David Charles’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views about desire, practical reason, and akrasia. Charles discusses the traditionally disputed questions in a provocative way, and more importantly his suggestions fit together into a complex and philosophically sophisticated reading of Aristotle. I disagree with his most important claims, but I can best explain and defend my own interpretation by contrasting it with his. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: The Practical Side of Deliberation The Analogy between the Theoretical and Practical Syllogism and the Importance of the Middle Term Formulating the Practical Syllogism and the Analogous Middle Term The Middle Term and the Ethical Agent The Middle Term and Ethical Virtue: Deliberation Re‐visited A Note on the Enkratic, the Akratic, and the Learner Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes Reference Further reading.

Prevailing interpretations of Aristotle’s use of syllogistic language outside the Organon hold that he offers a single, comprehensive theory of the practical syllogism spanning his ethical and biological works. These comprehensive theories of the practical syllogism are plausible neither philosophically nor as interpretations of Aristotle. I argue for a multivocal account of the practical syllogism that distinguishes (1) Aristotle’s use of syllogistic language to explain aspects of his account of animal motion in MA from (...) (2) his use of syllogistic language to explain aspects of his account of the distinctive practical cognition of the phronimos in EN. I offer a novel account of the role of syllogistic language in ethics, arguing that it elucidates a nuanced account of universals and particulars in ethics according to which acting virtuously requires an understanding of underlying universal values and a capacity to relate them to concrete, particular features of our circumstances. (shrink)

In the present paper, I want to contribute to a correct understanding of Aristotle's action theory by explaining just how two of the key concepts which it involves are connected and by showing that, contrary to what a number of commentators have said, there are causal concepts. The concepts in question are those of deliberation and the so-called "practical syllogism.".

Does Aristotle by his phrase “syllogisms of things to be done” mean syllogisms of a distinctive and inherently practical content, perhaps syllogisms subject to an unfamiliar logic? Or does he just mean syllogisms that are relevant in contexts concerning what to do next? I propose the second interpretation, taking the syllogisms in question to constitute the deductive kernel of stretches of practical thinking. They are pieces of deduction that take on a practical function in context.

Does Aristotle by his phrase “syllogisms of things to be done” mean syllogisms of a distinctive and inherently practical content, perhaps syllogisms subject to an unfamiliar logic? Or does he just mean syllogisms that are relevant in contexts concerning what to do next? I propose the second interpretation, taking the syllogisms in question to constitute the deductive kernel of stretches of practical thinking. They are pieces of deduction that take on a practical function in context.

"The aim of this paper is to inscribe the argument on the Practical Syllogism of De motu animalium, chapter 7, in its immediate context. Now this framework is by no means a logical one. The De motu is a psychological or zoological treatise, whose scope belongs to natural philosophy. Moreover De motu's Practical Syllogism cannot be restricted to practical, i.e. anthropological, cases, like akrasia. It is inserted in a physiological development regarding the biological explanation of (...) animal emotions, reactions and actions. Thus, the necessity of the conclusion – here the action itself – does not mean that the conditions for acting are reducible to propositions or to logical connections: rather it stands for the necessity that governs the agent-patient relation in animal movement.". (shrink)

This article tackles a number of puzzles related to Aristotle’s practical syllogism, notably the relationship between deliberation and the practical syllogism, the distinction between deliberative and reconstructive practical syllogisms, and the nature of the conclusion of the practical syllogism.

In Nicomachean Ethics VII Aristotle describes akrasia as a disposition. Taking into account that it is a disposition, I argue that akrasia cannot be understood on an epistemological basis alone, i.e., it is not merely a problem of knowledge that the akratic person acts the ways he does, but rather one is akratic due to a certain kind of habituation, where the person is not able to activate the potential knowledge s/he possesses. To stress this point, I focus on the (...) gap between potential knowledge and its activation, whereby I argue that the distinction between potential and actual knowledge is at the center of the problem of akrasia. I suggest that to elaborate on this gap, we must go beyond the limits of Nicomachean Ethics to Metaphysics IX, where we find Aristotle’s discussion of the distinction between potentiality and actuality. I further analyze the gap between potential and actual knowledge by means of Aristotle’s discussion of practical syllogism, where I argue that akrasia is a result of a conflict in practical reasoning. I conclude my paper by stressing that for the akratic person the action is determined with respect to the conclusion of the practical syllogism, where the conclusion is produced by means of a ‘conflict’ between the universal opinion which is potential and the particular opinion which is appetitive. (shrink)

The present paper proposes to analyse the role of the practical syllogism in G.E.M. Anscombe’s theory of action. To this end, I have rst of all chosen to examine, even if in broad terms, the conception of practical syllogism as it is present in the Aristotelian doctrine, and to reveal/delineate some critical points found within it. The following section is the central part of the paper, where, starting from § 33 of Intention, a re ection is (...) carried out on the practical syllogism, which is among Aristotle’s most signi cant discoveries, chie y bringing into focus its teleological prospective. Action, in Anscombe’s thought, almost seems be the cornerstone of a profound, and in a certain sense “contextual”, comprehension of the subject. (shrink)

(2013). In the beginning was the doing: the premises of the practical syllogism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 303-321.

The purpose of this dissertation is to show how it is that three interpreters of Aristotle's texts on deliberation and the practical syllogism come to views which differ considerably from each other. I argue that the differences are largely due to which set of texts the interpreter takes as most important in relation to Aristotle's theory of the practical syllogism. Neither G. E. M. Anscombe, John M. Cooper, nor Martha Craven Nussbaum has expressed adequately Aristotle's use (...) of the practical syllogism in his writings. I argue that the practical syllogism is one phenomenon for which Aristotle has different purposes in the different places that it appears in his texts. Due to its different appearances, it is sometimes given different interpretations because of the context in which it appears. ;In the first chapter I list several texts which are relevant to Aristotle's theory of deliberation and of the practical syllogism. I then state briefly the kinds of views that are held on the relationship between deliberation and the practical syllogism, which leads me to formulate the questions to which this dissertation is to offer answers. In order to respond to these questions, I develop a separate set of questions which guide my examination of the interpretations by Anscombe, Cooper, and Nussbaum on deliberation and the practical syllogism in Aristotle's texts. My elucidation of these three interpreters' views is shown in chapters two through four. In the fifth and final chapter, I return to the former questions and answer them according to my elucidations of the interpreters' views. I then take four passages from Aristotle--DA 434a16-21, MA 701a17-25, EN 1112b11-12, 15-20, and EN 1147a24-28--which passages are important to his theory of the practical syllogism, and show the differences among the interpretations of these passages by Anscombe, Cooper, and Nussbaum. This, in conjunction with what I have shown up to this point, enables me to offer a conclusion concerning the entire controversy. My conclusion is compatible with the view that the practical syllogism and deliberation are one phenomenon for Aristotle, which phenomenon he puts to several uses. (shrink)

Among scholars it is common to assume that Aristotle’s practical syllogism does two jobs. It is often taken to explain both animal motion and human deliberation. I will call this the “two-jobs view of the practical syllogism”. In what follows, I will argue that the two-jobs view of the practical syllogism is not working. I will then try to give a very brief and incomplete sketch of how to conceive of a non-two-jobs view of (...) the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Finally, I will discuss two possible problems for the non-two-jobs view. (shrink)

Among scholars it is common to assume that Aristotle’s practical syllogism does two jobs. It is often taken to explain both animal motion and human deliberation. I will call this the “two-jobs view of the practical syllogism”. In what follows, I will argue that the two-jobs view of the practical syllogism is not working. I will then try to give a very brief and incomplete sketch of how to conceive of a non-two-jobs view of (...) the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Finally, I will discuss two possible problems for the non-two-jobs view. (shrink)

Aristotle says that conclusions of practical syllogisms are actions that occur εὐθύς, which is normally translated to indicate temporal immediacy. Both aspects of this—that the conclusions are actions, and that they occur immediately—seem wrong. Interpreting εὐθύς as atemporal, specifically as indicating that nothing more is needed to explain the action, makes better sense of practical syllogisms and solves the problems raised by calling their conclusions actions.

The relation between ex falso and disjunctive syllogism, or even the justification of ex falso based on disjunctive syllogism, is an old topic in the history of logic. This old topic reappears in contemporary logic since the introduction of minimal logic by Johansson. The disjunctive syllogism seems to be part of our general non-problematic inferential practices and superficially it does not seem to be related to or to depend on our acceptance of the frequently disputable ex falso (...) rule. We know that the acceptance of the ex falso is a sufficient condition for the acceptance of the disjunctive syllogism, but the interesting question is: is the ex falso a necessary condition for the acceptance of the disjunctive syllogism? The aim of the present paper is to discuss some possible ways to define systems that combines the preservation of the disjunctive syllogism with the rejection of the ex falso. (shrink)

This pioneer study of Aristotle's theory of deduction in early medieval Islam provides invaluable first-hand information on both the classical and the Islamic ...

This article discusses how inference to the best explanation can be justified as a practical meta - argument. It is, firstly, justified as a practical argument insofar as accepting the best explanation as true can be shown to further a specific aim. And because this aim is a discursive one which proponents can rationally pursue in — and relative to — a complex controversy, namely maximising the robustness of one’s position, IBE can be conceived, secondly, as a meta (...) - argument. My analysis thus bears a certain analogy to Sellars ’ well - known justification of inductive reasoning ; it is based on recently developed theories of complex argumentation. (shrink)

Traditionally, syllogisms are arguments with two premises and one conclusion which are constructed by propositions of the form “All… are…” and “At least one… is…” and their respective negated versions. Unfortunately, the practical use of traditional syllogisms is quite restricted. On the one hand, the “All…” propositions are too strict, since a single counterexample suffices for falsification. On the other hand, the “At least one …” propositions are too weak, since a single example suffices for verification. The present contribution (...) studies algebraic interpretations of syllogisms with comparative quantifiers (e.g., “Most… are…”) and quantitative quantifiers (e.g., “n/m… are…”, “all, except n… are…”). This modern version of syllogistics is intended to be a more adequate framework for argumentation theory than traditional syllogistics. (shrink)

Aristotle’s practical syllogism is an ethical topic. It is possible to construct an ethical syllogism that explains the actions of the good human being, with the first part of the minor premise referring to the agent’s character. The resulting account coheres with Aristotle’s discussions of the akratic, the enkratic and the learner, and with Aristotle’s view that practical wisdom requires full ethical virtue and conversely. The ethical syllogism is central to Aristotle’s ethic of virtue.

Aristotle’s practical syllogism is an ethical topic. It is possible to construct an ethical syllogism that explains the actions of the good human being, with the first part of the minor premise referring to the agent’s character. The resulting account coheres with Aristotle’s discussions of the akratic, the enkratic and the learner, and with Aristotle’s view that practical wisdom requires full ethical virtue and conversely. The ethical syllogism is central to Aristotle’s ethic of virtue.

Although written in Japanese, 実践的三段論法について（On Practical Syllogisms）pursues a logical form of the practical syllogism.

Practical reason is the means by which beliefs and desires come together to produce actions. Practical rationality is difficult because we have many beliefs and many desires, and they often pull us in conflicting directions. The theory of practical reason must explain the fact that desires can conflict with one another, and the fact that we can act against our all‐things‐considered judgment (weakness of will, akrasia, and incontinence). The standard explanation of these facts invokes some form of (...) partitioning among desires. Davidson's view creates, by contrast, a partition within practical reason itself. He distinguishes between forms of rationality that are constitutive of action, and forms of rationality that are normative standard from which action can fall short. Davidson's “principle of continence,” a rule against weakness of will, is such a principle: it is required for acting well, but not for acting. (shrink)

This article is primarily concerned with Aristotle’s theory of the syllogistic, and the investigation of the hypothesis that logical symbolism and methodology were in these early stages of a geometrical nature; with the gradual algebraization that occurred historically being one of the main reasons that some of the earlier passages on logic may often appear enigmatic. The article begins with a brief introduction that underlines the importance of geometric thought in ancient Greek science, and continues with a short exposition of (...) Aristotle’s views and methods in regard to logic. We then offer an interpretation of syllogisms, as well as of the main proof methods that are utilized by Aristotle, in terms of diagrams that can be seen as analogous to those of Euclidean geometry; where the various proofs proceed by appropriately manipulating an initially drawn diagram, in a way parallel to constructions that occur in Euclid’s Elements. In this way, logic is presented as following, to a large degree, methodological tenets established by the practice of geometry. Finally, we present a diagrammatic decision procedure that allows one to directly read off the validity of syllogisms from a corresponding diagram, in a way such that no further manipulation of it is necessitated. (shrink)

Islamic law has an advanced legal theory, apart from the four basic decision-making methods, many judgment-gaining theories based on interpretation and reasoning have been derived which have been developed by Islamic jurists in the process. Islamic jurists have used some of their knowledge and techniques to correct the problematic results that arise from both the incorrect use of methods of obtaining judgments and the expansion of the scope of these methods. With these interdisciplinary studies, it was aimed to interpret the (...) criticisms directed against the analogy process and the causes accurately. One of the methods used at the point of revealing whether these criticisms and objections are based on a justified reason and evidence is the debating method. The method of debating, which has become an independent discipline along with fiqh and kalām in the Islamic scientific tradition, began to form during the periods when sects were formed (II century Hijri). The discipline of debate, which has found a practical field in the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), has been particularly effective in interpreting analogy (qiyas), which constitutes an important part of fiqh, and is even assumed to be among the methods of inference (istidlāl). Many Fasād al-waḍʻ (invalidity of an argument of syllogism) is one of the methods of debating has been used in uṣūl al-fiqh. Fasād al-waḍ‘ has been described as the binding of a provision to a cause (ʻillat) that is the opposite of what that cause requires. This is a situation that completely invalidates the cause. In Fasād al-wad‘, the objector proves that the analogy is erroneous by directing objections to the person who brings the evidence. Since Fasād al-wad‘ is a type of objection directed to the basis of the fiction of analogy, it has been accepted by Islamic jurists as one of the strong objections directed to the cause/analogy. However, the issue of which cause this type of objection can be directed against has been discussed among Islamic jurists. Hanafīs accept Fasād al-wad‘ as a sound objection method, but they think that it is not possible to object to the effective causes (al-ʻillat al-muaththirah) with it. Because, according to Hanafīs, the correctness of the effective quality has been revealed by the Qur’ān, the Sunnah and the consensus (ijmā’). Because these proofs do not produce false qualifications. According to Shafeis, all causes and provision can be objected with Fasād al-wad’. In fact, some Shāfi'ī jurists consider this method as a general type of objection, not aunique one to the analogy. Due to these different interpretations that Islāmic law schools attribute to the conditions of analogy and the nature of Fasād al-wad‘, different results may arise in furû issues. In this study, Fasād al-wad‘as a type of objection to the analogy process in Islamic legal procedure has been examined and the nature of Fasād al-wad‘ has been tried to be revealed by determining the comparative furû. Thus, it is aimed to identify and analyse the diversity of legal reasoning methods, which have an important place in the logic of law in Islam and can be gathered under the name of analogy. (shrink)

This book is a study of the role of intellect in human action as described by Thomas Aquinas. One of its primary aims is to compare the interpretation of Aristotle by Aquinas with the lines of interpretation offered in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. The book seeks to clarify the problems involved in the appropriation of Aristotle's theory by a Christian theologian, including such topics as the practical syllogism and the problems of akrasia. Westberg argues that Aquinas was much closer (...) to Aristotle than is often recognized, and he puts forward important new interpretations of the relation of intellect and will in the stages of intention, deliberation, decision, and execution. In the concluding section of the book, he shows how this new interpretation yields fruitful insights on a range of theological topics, including sin, law, love, and the moral virtues. (shrink)

Resumen Se sostiene que la operación general de la silogística en la Lógica cumple con un programa trazado tempranamente por Hegel, consistente en concebir la unidad de la forma racional del silogismo y el contenido absoluto de la idea como resultado de una dialéctica inmanente a la propia forma del silogismo, mediante la cual éste abandona su carácter meramente formal y alcanza su propio concepto: ser forma objetiva o racional. Para esto se acude a la sección Subjetividad de la Doctrina (...) del Concepto, procurando reconstruir los antecedentes sistemáticos del capítulo sobre el silogismo, así como la operación específica que éste realiza en vista del tránsito a la sección Objetividad. El sentido de dicha operación consiste en la superación de un exceso que, al comienzo, la necesidad de la sustancia tiene por sobre la libertad del concepto, de lo cual resulta un exceso del concepto por sobre la sustancia. Para verificar esta operación se examinan los silogismos del estar y la necesidad, concluyendo con la determinación del tipo de objeto y de conocimiento que resulta del silogismo, y con la proyección del problema a estadios ulteriores de la Lógica, en los cuales el problema avistado adquiere un cariz marcadamente práctico.In this paper I argue that the general operation of syllogistic in the Logic fulfills a philosophical program that was early outlined by Hegel. This program conceives the unity of the rational form of the syllogism and the absolute content of the idea as a result of an immanent dialectic to the syllogism's form, by which it abandons its merely formal character and attains its own concept: being an objective or rational form. For the purposes of this argument, I analyze the Subjectivity section of the Doctrine of the Concept and reconstruct the systematic background of the chapter on syllogism, as well as the specific operation it performs in view of the transit to the Objectivity section. This operation consists in overcoming a certain excess that the necessity of the substance has, first, over the freedom of the concept, which results in an excess of the concept over the substance. To clarify this operation, I examine the syllogisms of qualitative existence and necessity. Finally, I show the determination of the type of object and knowledge that results from the syllogism and explain how this problem projects to later stages of Logic, in which the analyzed problem acquires a relevant practical aspect. (shrink)