This article adopts a Systemic Functional Linguistics framework of appraisal theory to interpret the behavioural and attitudinal resources in written narratives and proposes the idea of proximity as an alternative representation to explain the meaning-making process of Chinese students’ possible selves in a less examined context of UK-based transnational university in China, by focusing on the lexical and semantic explanation of how these Chinese students use and are mediated by contextual resources in discourse. Six written narratives were collected (...) from six Chinese students from the School of International Communications at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China. The overall findings revealed that all six Chinese students from different years shaped proximal past, current and future possible disciplinary selves through repeated engagement and positive alignment with the contextual values, although they had differentiated developmental processes of using and being mediated by the contextual recourses. This article concludes by arguing for a need to investigate the Chinese learners in the current changing world by looking at their repertoire experience of disciplinary learning and reservoir context. (shrink)

Summary The study examined the relation between possible selves, academic performance, motivation, self?esteem and persistence on task. The assumption was that envisioning a desired end?state produces information processing favouring the desired state and, as a consequence, the action seems more likely and people are able to construct more efficient plans. We hypothesized that academic performance is best for subjects who are able to produce well?elaborated, vivid pictures of future selves. The sample consisted of 289 students, 14 (...) and 15 years old, of both sexes. The statistical analysis revealed that those who endorsed specific, elaborated positive selves outperformed the other groups in academic achievement. There was also indication that this group of students showed more persistence on task. The results are discussed in terms of their importance for the motivational role of possible selves in achievement situations. (shrink)

The article presents a critique of the commonly held assumption about the practical advantage of endurantism over perdurantism regarding the problem of future-directed self-concern of a person. The future-directed self-concern of a person crucially depends on the possibility of the right differentiation of diverging futures of distinct persons, therefore any theory of persistence that does not entail a special nonbranching relation of a person to only their future self seems to be counterintuitive or unrealistic for practical purposes (...) of personal persistence. I argue that this pragmatic rationale about future-directed self-concern is equally challenging for both theories of persistence. Moreover, I indicate, that both of these theories fall and stand on the practical feasibility of hidden ontological presuppositions about specific second-order notions of concerns of persons for their future. (shrink)

“Poland 2050” Report is a publication of a distinctive sort. While the idea of producingthis report has a long history, it began to take shape about two years ago. It isbased on the two tenets. The first, raised at numerous conferences held in the past underthe auspices of the “Poland 2000 Plus” Committee, is the conviction that economicgrowth does not transpose automatically into societal (or more broadly “civilizational”)advancement. Indeed, the preliminary analysis has indicated that the two processes are,in fact, divergent. (...) While there have been convergent processes evident in Poland’s andthe EU’s economic domains, no such convergence is significantly evident in the case ofsocietal progress. This gave rise to the vision set forth in this Report, formulated as“minimizing Poland’s developmental gap with respect to the more advanced EU states.”The second tenet upon which this Report is based is even more important. Numerousanalyses carried out by the Committee indicate that quantitative changes cannot bepredicted four decades in advance with great likelihood. And so, we did not base ourReport on existing quantitative trends, but rather on analysis of the pathways that willmake it possible to minimize Poland’s developmental gap with respect to the advancedEU states. The Report also strives to highlight threats that exist in the social and “civilizational”sphere.The Report was based on the materials published in the three volumes of the publicationWizja przyszłości Polski – Studia i Analizy [A Vision of Poland’s Future—Studies and Analyses], vol. 1: Społeczeństwo i państwo [Society and State], vol. 2: Gospodarkai środowisko [Economy and Environment], and vol. 3: Ekspertyzy [ExpertStudies]. (shrink)

“Poland 2050” Report is a publication of a distinctive sort. While the idea of producingthis report has a long history, it began to take shape about two years ago. It isbased on the two tenets. The first, raised at numerous conferences held in the past underthe auspices of the “Poland 2000 Plus” Committee, is the conviction that economicgrowth does not transpose automatically into societal (or more broadly “civilizational”)advancement. Indeed, the preliminary analysis has indicated that the two processes are,in fact, divergent. (...) While there have been convergent processes evident in Poland’s andthe EU’s economic domains, no such convergence is significantly evident in the case ofsocietal progress. This gave rise to the vision set forth in this Report, formulated as“minimizing Poland’s developmental gap with respect to the more advanced EU states.”The second tenet upon which this Report is based is even more important. Numerousanalyses carried out by the Committee indicate that quantitative changes cannot bepredicted four decades in advance with great likelihood. And so, we did not base ourReport on existing quantitative trends, but rather on analysis of the pathways that willmake it possible to minimize Poland’s developmental gap with respect to the advancedEU states. The Report also strives to highlight threats that exist in the social and “civilizational”sphere.The Report was based on the materials published in the three volumes of the publicationWizja przyszłości Polski – Studia i Analizy [A Vision of Poland’s Future—Studies and Analyses], vol. 1: Społeczeństwo i państwo [Society and State], vol. 2: Gospodarkai środowisko [Economy and Environment], and vol. 3: Ekspertyzy [ExpertStudies]. (shrink)

I very much enjoyed reading and thinking about Krister Bykvist's interesting and carefully written paper. My comments will not be criticisms. I will not challenge the conclusions the paper draws about the complicated examples of conflicts between preferences that it discusses. For example, I will not attempt to defend any of the views criticized in section IV of the paper. And I agree with the positive solution presented in section V, when that solution is characterized in the broadest possible (...) way. In cases where a choice that I must make now will create one or the other of two possible future ‘selves’ whose preferences would conflict over the question of which choice I should make, prudence tells me to create the self that will experience a higher level of well-being or welfare. (shrink)

The concept of karma is one of the most general and basic for the philosophical traditions of India, one of an interconnected cluster of concepts that form the basic presuppositions of Indian philosophy. And like many general, pervasive, and basic philosophical concepts, the idea of karma exhibits both semantic complexity and a certain fluidity and open texture. That is, the concept may not have a determinate application in all possible cases, it can be fleshed out in quite different ways (...) in different contexts and philosophical traditions, and it should be understood as open in its future applications. Thus, any complete account of the concept of karma must take into consideration its diverse uses across .. (shrink)

Can we understand what makes someone the same person without understanding what it is to be a person? Prereflectively we might not think so, but philosophers often accord these questions separate treatments, with personal-identity theorists claiming the first question and free-will theorists the second. Yet much of what is of interest to a person—the possibility of survival over time, compensation for past hardships, concern for future projects, or moral responsibility—is not obviously intelligible from the perspective of either question alone. (...) Marya Schechtman encourages us to adopt a more unified perspective. (shrink)

An important platitude about prudential rationality is that I should not refuse to sacrifice a smaller amount of present welfare for the sake of larger future benefits. I ought, in other words, to treat my present and future as of equal prudential significance. The demands of prudence are less clear, however, when it comes to one’s past selves. In this paper, I argue that past benefits are possible in two ways, and that this fact cannot be (...) easily accommodated by traditional approaches to prudential rationality. Against univocal accounts of prudential rationality, I hold that the possibility of past benefits suggests that a bias toward the present and future is defensible when it comes to some welfare goods, but that prudential reasons are temporally neutral between when it comes to the success or failure of one’s long-term projects. (shrink)

The reaction to multiple religious belonging has been fraught with anxiety in the monotheistic traditions. Nevertheless, increasing numbers of people report belonging to multiple religions. I propose that it is most useful to think of multiple religious belonging not so much as an expression of choice, but just the opposite. Multiple religious belonging is best explained as the ontological condition of two or more religious traditions constituting the self, so that the self’s possibilities are constrained by those religions. Furthermore, I (...) argue that multiple religious belonging per se does not threaten traditional religious communities. Threats are by definition future possibilities, and ontologically speaking, we always already belong to multiple religions. We belong to multiple religions because every religious tradition is an amalgam of earlier distinct traditions. There is nothing new about multiple religious belonging. It is nearly unremarkable. Two philosophers in particular-one a twentieth-century German phenomenologist, the other a second-century Indian Buddhist-have given particularly careful examination of the phenomenon of belonging. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concept of Wirkungsgeschichte [history of effects] and Nāgārjuna’s teaching of śūnyatā [emptiness] both imply that multiple religious belonging is the ontological condition of all human beings, and that producing any monolithic religious identity requires significant mental gymnastics. (shrink)

Personal utilitarianism applies act-utilitarianism to the problem of individual choice. It is based on the view that the good life is achieved through maximizing the sum of individual measures of utility over a population. the population being the sequence of semi-autonomous selves from which the individual is composed. I begin by showing how our lives can usefully be partitioned into selves because the weights put on our various choice motives are constantly changing and, consequently, our preferences themselves concerning (...) what we should choose at any given time can also change from moment-to-moment. In particular, because we put disproportionate weight on our present needs relative to our future ones, we often become impatient and choose options that offer immediate gratification. I use concepts from game theory to describe multiple selves, and to discuss how strategic interactions between selves are possible, and then conclude by considering the practical problem of how to achieve the good life, or how can we get our selves to choose what is best for us in the long run. (shrink)

Chapter 1 of this book argued that moral philosophy should be based on seven principles of theory selection adapted from the sciences. Chapter 2 argued that these principles support basing normative moral philosophy on a particular problem of diachronic instrumental rationality: the ‘problem of possible future selves.’ Chapter 3 argued that a new moral principle, the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative, is the rational solution to this problem. Chapter 4 argued that the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative has three equivalent formulations akin to (...) but superior to Kant’s formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Chapter 5 argued that my principle’s three formulations make it rational to adopt a Moral Original Position to derive moral principles. The present chapter derives Four Principles of Fairness from the Moral Original Position--principles of coercion minimization, mutual assistance, fair negotiation, and virtue—and unifies them into a single principle of rightness: Rightness as Fairness. Finally, this chapter argues that Rightness as Fairness entails a novel approach to applied ethics called ‘principled fair negotiation’, illustrating how the theory provides a plausible new framework for addressing applied cases including lying, suicide, trolleys, torture, distribution of scarce resources, poverty, and the ethical treatment of animals. (shrink)

This book argues that moral philosophy should be based on seven scientific principles of theory selection. It then argues that a new moral theory—Rightness as Fairness—satisfies those principles more successfully than existing theories. Chapter 1 explicates the seven principles of theory-selection, arguing that moral philosophy must conform to them to be truth-apt. Chapter 2 argues those principles jointly support founding moral philosophy in known facts of empirical moral psychology: specifically, our capacities for mental time-travel and modal imagination. Chapter 2 then (...) shows that these capacities present human decisionmakers with a problem of diachronic rationality that includes but generalizes beyond, L.A. Paul’s problem of transformative experience: a problem that I call “the problem of possible future selves.” Chapter 3 then argues that a new principle of rationality—the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative—is the only rational solution to this problem, as it requires our present and future selves to forge and uphold a recursive, bi-directional contract with each another given mutual recognition of the problem. Chapter 4 then shows that the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative has three identical formulations analogous but superior to Immanuel Kant’s various formulations of his ‘categorical imperative.’ Chapter 5 shows that these unified formulas jointly entail a particular test of moral principles: a Moral Original Position similar to John Rawls’ famous ‘original position’, but which avoids a variety of problems with Rawls' model. Chapter 6 then shows that the Moral Original Position generates Four Principles of Fairness, which can then be combined into a single principle of moral rightness: Rightness as Fairness. This new conception of rightness is shown to reconcile four dominant moral frameworks (deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and contractualism), as well as entail a new method of moral decisionmaking for applied ethics: a method of “principled fair negotiation” according to which applied ethical issues cannot be wholly resolved through principled debate, but must instead be resolved by actual negotiation and compromise. This method is then argued to generate novel, nuanced analyses of a variety of applied moral issues, including trolley cases, torture, and the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals. Chapter 7 then shows that Rightness as Fairness reconciles three leading political frameworks—libertarianism, egalitarianism, and communitarianism—showing how all three embody legitimate moral ideals that can, and should, be fairly negotiated against each other to settle the scope, and nature, of domestic, international, and global justice on an ongoing, iterated basis. Finally, Chapter 8 argues that Rightness as Fairness satisfies all seven of the principles of theory-selected defended in Chapter 1 more successfully than rival theories. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the rise of ‘the breast cancer gene’ as a field of medical, cultural and personal knowledge. We address its significance in the Norwegian public health care system in relation to so-called biological citizenship in this particular national context. One of our main findings is that, despite its claims as a measure for health and disease prevention, gaining access to medical knowledge of BRCA 1/2 breast cancer gene mutations can also produce severe instability in the individuals (...) and families affected. That is, although gene testing provides modern subjects with an opportunity to foresee their biological destiny and thereby become patients in waiting, it undoubtedly also comes with difficult existential dilemmas and choices, with implications that resonate beyond the individual and into different family and love relations. By elaborating on this finding we address the question of whether the empowerment slogan, which continues to be advocated through various health, BRCA and breast cancer discourses, reinforces a naïve or an idealized notion of the actively responsible patient: resourceful enough to seek out medical expertise and gain sufficient knowledge, on which to base informed decisions, thereby reducing the future risk of developing disease. In contrast to this ideal, our Norwegian informants tell a different story, in which there is no apparent heroic mastery of genetic fates, but rather a pragmatic attitude to dealing with a dire situation over which they have little control, despite having complied with medical advice through national guidelines and follow-up procedures for BRCA 1/2 carriers. In conclusion we claim that the sense of safety that gene testing and its associated medical solutions allegedly promise to provide proved illusory. Although BRCA-testing offers the potential for protection from adverse DNA-heritage, administered through possibilities for self-monitoring and self-management of the body, the feeling of ‘being in good health’ has hardly been reinforced by the emergence of gene technology. (shrink)

Even given the final truths of what is right and wrong, good and bad, ethics is not complete. For one may yet ask “Why should I be moral?” Of course, we have no prior assurance that it will be possible to provide a non-moral and justifiable answer to the rational and self-interested person. Nevertheless, I claim that reasons for being moral can be provided even for the rational, self-interested, and remorseless individual who knows he will not be caught. In (...) defending my claim I will draw on empirical data from recent social psychology and game theory. Actual human selves are malleable in a number of ways. I will show that it is rational for the self-interested person to modify selves in such a way that moral actions are increasingly preferred. Specifically, I will argue that it is in one’s rational self-interest to enhance empathy in others and future selves in such a way that for increasing numbers other-injury becomes a component of self-injury, and other-benefit becomes a component of self-benefit. This will allow a linkage to be drawn from rational and self-interested action to moral action. The development of this theory will begin by distinguishing my approach from that of Gauthier, then three interpretations of the “Why be moral?” question will be delineated, next the decision theoretic components of my account will be presented, and finally the role of empathy will be considered in detail. (shrink)

During two centuries of industrial revolution, history's most powerful ruling class has been produced, equipped, and armed to the teeth --not just with bullets but also with powerful media and an aggressive ideology of domination. Increasingly, the democratic institutions crafted at the dawn of capitalism are being undermined or overrun by corporate and financial overseers. Despite the fact that history gives ample reason to fear the worst for the future, social and political theory can be a form of resistance (...) and hope. The papers in this volume express this hope, exploring progressive and liberatory institutional conceptions; analyzing multiple experiences of alienation and culture; reconceiving gender, sexuality, and desire; and scrutinizing humanitarian intervention for both corrupted elements and future possibilities for the just defense of the defenseless. These papers were selected from among the best of those presented at the RPA's 4th biennial conference, held in November 2000 at Loyola University - Chicago. (shrink)

This article explores twelve short narrative films created by women and trans people living with disabilities and embodied differences. Produced through Project Re•Vision, these micro documentaries uncover the cultures and temporalities of bodies of difference by foregrounding themes of multiple histories: body, disability, maternal, medical, and/or scientific histories; and divergent futurities: contradictory, surprising, unpredictable, opaque, and/or generative futures. We engage with Alison Kafer's call to theorize disability futurity by wrestling with the ways in which “the future” is normatively deployed (...) in the service of able-bodiedness and able-mindedness, a deployment used to render bodies of difference as sites of “no future”. By re-storying embodied difference, the storytellers illuminate ongoing processes of remaking their bodily selves in ways that respond to the past and provide possibilities for different futures; these orientations may be configured as “dis-topias” based not on progress, but on new pathways for living, uncovered not through evoking the familiar imaginaries of curing, eliminating, or overcoming disability, but through incorporating experiences of embodied difference into time. These temporalities gesture toward new kinds of futures, giving us glimpses of ways of cripping time, of cripping ways of being/becoming in time, and of radically re-presencing disability in futurity. (shrink)

A common reading of the Cyrenaics is that they are a school of extreme hedonist presentists, recognising only the pleasure of the present moment, and advising against turning our attention to past or future pleasure or pain. Yet they have some strange advice which tells followers to anticipate future harms in order to lessen the unexpectedness of them when they occur. It’s a puzzle, then, how they can consistently hold the attitude they do to our concern with our (...) present selves, and yet endorse the practise of dwelling on possible future painful scenarios. To establish that this is a puzzle, though, we must first be convinced that the report is true. Cicero is our only clear source for the Cyrenaic advice, and scholars have noted reasons to be suspicious of the reliability of his report. I discuss these doubts, and why they ultimately fail to undermine Cicero’s testimony as a source. Defending Cicero as a source for Cyrenaic thought removes a barrier to taking seriously an aspect of Cyrenaic psychology which could radically alter our understanding of their views. (shrink)

Moral expertise requires a level of reliability in moral matters that is significantly higher than that of the average person. The author argues that this requirement of epistemic superiority in moral matters is sometimes fulfilled by our future selves and generally fulfilled by present moral philosophers. Our future selves are more reliable in answering moral questions than we are, when they have been prepared to answer those questions by various epistemic activities. But if our future (...) selves are our epistemic superiors in such cases, moral philosophers are epistemic superiors in moral matters more generally since their epistemic advantages are even more significant. The author concludes by arguing that moral philosophers plausibly even qualify as moral experts. (shrink)

This book investigates the relationship between our present and future selves. It focuses specifically on diachronic self-regarding decisions: choices involving our earlier and later selves, in which the earlier self makes a decision for the later self. The author connects the scientific understanding of the neurobehavioral processes at the core of individuals' perceptions of their future selves with the philosophical reflection on individuals' moral relationship with their future selves. She delineates a descriptive theory (...) of the perception of the future self that is based on empirical evidence and that systematizes and integrates the current theoretical literature. She then argues for the morality of prudence and interprets diachronic self-regarding decisions as decisions between two agents-the earlier and later selves-that belong to the realm of intergenerational ethics, which regulates the relationship between contemporary people and future generations. Finally, the author provides a moral theory of prudence based on respect for one's agency. This theory identifies what the present and the future selves owe to one another in diachronic self-regarding decisions. Moral Choices for Our Future Selves will be of interest to researchers and students working in ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. (shrink)

This article discusses the datafied embodiment of the Internet of Bodies (IoB) technology by applying the methodology of postphenomenology. Firstly, the author claims that the boundaries of dual distinction between real and virtual, online and offline, and embodiment and disembodiment have become increasingly blurred. Secondly, the author argues that postphenomenology can help us to study today’s emerging technologies’ mediating role in human–world relations. Thirdly, the author analyses the implication of embodiment from phenomenological and postphenomenological perspectives and then demonstrates in what (...) sense the data collected from the IoB devices can constitute our embodiment and selfhood. Fourthly, the author elucidates how the IoB devices are datafying our bodies and the whole lifeworld and how these devices mediate and transform our religious practices and experiences. Fifthly, the author points out that the Quantified Religion as the possible new religious model would smooth out the differences and diversities between religions and then create homogeneous religious data selves, which will mediate, reshape, constitute and even replace our physical selves. Ultimately, the author argues that responsible designing of the IoB devices and establishing the ownership of personal religious data can be seen as significant measures in the face of the risk of our quantified religious future. Contribution: This article contributes to understanding the potential religious transformations caused by the IoB technology. This article analyses the mediating role the IoB technology plays in the relationship between humans and the world through a postphenomenological perspective, thereby explaining how body data harvested from the IoB devices can datafy and constitute our embodiment and selfhood. The article argues that the Quantified Religion as a new religious model will emerge in the future IoB era, and it will mediate, constitute and shape our religious practices and experiences through personal data harvesting and analysis. (shrink)

In this exploratory study, we present findings from semi-structured interviews with 11 self-identified lesbian and gay (LG) humanitarian aid workers of Doctors without Borders (MSF). We investigate their perceptions of workplace inclusion in terms of perceived satisfaction of their needs for authenticity and belonging within two organizational settings, namely office and field. Through our combined deductive and inductive approach, based on grounded theory, we find that perceptions of their colleagues’ and supervisors’ attitudes and behaviors, as well as organizational inclusiveness practices (...) play a role in LGs’ perceived authenticity, but not belonging, in the workplace. However, these organization-level characteristics do not account for between-participant differences in perceived authenticity. Therefore, we inductively construct a typology of three groups, which we coined conscious first-missioners, authentic realists, and idealistic activists, based on how LG humanitarian aid workers assess and deal with not being able to be their authentic selves when they are in the field, because homosexuality is illegal in many project countries. Conscious first-missioners are separated from the other two groups based on having gone to the field once, whereby they felt in control over the decision on how to manage their sexuality. Alternatively, authentic realists and idealistic activists alike felt they did not really have a choice in how to manage their sexuality, but handled that differently. We find the importance of one’s sexuality as well as adherence to the overarching organizational mission relevant individual-level factors herein. Furthermore, we find disclosure of sexual identity to be strongly context-dependent, as participants are ‘out of the closet’ in the office, but go back into the closet when they enter the field, with different country contexts even leading to different decisions concerning self-disclosure, thus demonstrating the importance of careful sexual identity management. This so-called disclosure dilemma, we find, may not be merely an individual choice, but rather a shared dilemma involving multiple stakeholders, such as the organization and fellow team members. We discuss the findings’ contributions to existing literature on LGs’ workplace experiences and implications for future research on inclusion of sexual and other invisible minorities in the workplace. (shrink)

The temporal period between the moment of deliberation and the execution of the intention varies widely—from opening an umbrella when one feels the first raindrops hit to planning and writing a book. I investigate the distinctive ability that adult human beings have to deliberate for their far future selves exhibited at the latter end of this temporal spectrum, which I term prospective deliberation. What grounds it when it is successful? And, why does it fail in some cases? I (...) shall argue that an agent is warranted in deliberating for a future self when her reasons give her the right kind of cross-temporal authority. I argue that this authority is distinctive and cannot be accounted for by theories of agential authority that take desires, value judgments, or willings as the ground of authority in standard cases of deliberation. According to the theory I propose having the right kind of cross-temporal agential authority is not only a matter of having epistemic access to a future self’s reasons or being the same metaphysical person as a future self, it requires confidence that the agent’s reasons support undertaking such a normative commitment and that that future self will see the normative force of those reasons as the agent sees them. In other words, cross-temporal agential authority requires that the past self and the future self share a normative perspective. I show that this further condition only obtains if the agent sees her reasons in deliberation as having certain features. (shrink)

In this fascinating and inventive work, A. David Napier argues that the central assumption of immunology—that we survive through the recognition and elimination of non-self—has become a defining concept of the modern age. Tracing this immunological understanding of self and other through an incredibly diverse array of venues, from medical research to legal and military strategies and the electronic revolution, Napier shows how this defensive way of looking at the world not only destroys diversity but also eliminates the possibility of (...) truly engaging difference, thereby impoverishing our culture and foreclosing tremendous opportunities for personal growth. To illustrate these destructive consequences, Napier likens the current craze for embracing diversity and the use of politically correct speech to a cultural potluck to which we each bring different dishes, but at which no one can eat unless they abide by the same rules. Similarly, loaning money to developing nations serves as a tool both to make the peoples in those nations more like us and to maintain them in the nonthreatening status of distant dependents. To break free of the resulting downward spiral of homogenization and self-focus, Napier suggests that we instead adopt a new defining concept based on embryology, in which development and self-growth take place through a process of incorporation and transformation. In this effort he suggests that we have much to learn from non-Western peoples, such as the Balinese, whose ritual practices require them to take on the considerable risk of injecting into their selves the potential dangers of otherness—and in so doing ultimately strengthen themselves as well as their society. _The Age of Immunology,_ with its combination of philosophy, history, and cultural inquiry, will be seen as a manifesto for a new age and a new way of thinking about the world and our place in it. (shrink)

Although Ainslie dismisses the hot/cool framework as pertaining only to suppression, it actually also has interesting implications for resolve. Resolve focally involves access to our future selves. This access is a cool system function linked to episodic memory. Thus, factors negatively affecting the cool system, such as stress, are predicted to impact two seemingly unrelated capabilities: willpower and episodic memory.

Mental time travel requires the sense of a past and future self, which is lacking in the early years of life. Research on the development of autobiographical memory and development of self sheds light on the difference between memory in other animals and its cultural narrative basis in humans.

In this article, I defend the thesis that selfishness and altruism can be intrapersonal . In doing so, I argue that the notions of intrapersonal altruism and selfishness usefully pick out behavioural patterns and have predictive value. I also argue that my thesis helps enrich our understanding of the prudential, and can subsume some interesting work in economic and psychological theory.

It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometimes conflict. In certain famous cases of conflict—medical Newcomb problems—CDT and BT seem to get (...) things right, while EDT seems to get things wrong. In other cases of conflict, including some recent examples suggested by Andy Egan, EDT and BT seem to get things right, while CDT seems to get things wrong. In still other cases, EDT and CDT seems to get things right, while BT gets things wrong. It's no accident, this essay claims, that all three decision theories are subject to counterexamples. Decision rules can be reinterpreted as voting rules, where the voters are the agent's possible future selves. The problematic examples have the structure of voting paradoxes. Just as voting paradoxes show that no voting rule can do everything we want, decision-theoretic paradoxes show that no decision rule can do everything we want. Luckily, the so-called “tickle defense” establishes that EDT, CDT, and BT will do everything we want in a wide range of situations. Most decision situations, this essay argues, are analogues of voting situations in which the voters unanimously adopt the same set of preferences. In such situations, all plausible voting rules and all plausible decision rules agree. (shrink)

This book is the culmination of the COST Action CA15212 Citizen Science to Promote Creativity, Scientific Literacy, and Innovation throughout Europe. It represents the final stage of a shared journey taken over the last 4 years. During this relatively short period, our citizen science practices and perspectives have rapidly evolved. In this chapter we discuss what we have learnt about the recent past of citizen science and what we expect and hope for the future.

As you face a life-defining change, you might ask yourself: Who will I become? This can be understood as a question about the nature and character of your future life, asked from your first person, or subjective, perspective. The nature and character of your conscious, first person, lived experience is a defining constituent of what it is like to be you. Framed this way, knowing the nature of your future lived experience is a way of knowing your (...) class='Hi'>future self. In this paper, I explore this way of understanding one’s self and its implications for understanding life-defining changes in high-stakes contexts. My exploration of this way of understanding one’s self highlights the role of experience in grasping perceptual truths, and the importance of imagination, empathy, and testimony in self-understanding and prediction. (shrink)

I explore the moral implications of four possible futures: a broken future where our affluent way of life is no longer available; a virtual future where human beings spend their entire lives in Nozick's experience machine; a digital future where humans have been replaced by unconscious digital beings; and a theological future where the existence of God has been proved. These futures affect our current ethical thinking in surprising ways. They raise the importance of intergenerational (...) ethics, alter the balance between competing moral theories, and push morality in a more objective direction. (shrink)

The movement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research from universities to big corporations has had a significant impact on the development of the field. In the past, AI research was primarily conducted in academic institutions, which foster a culture of peer reviewing and collaboration to enhance quality improvements. The growing interest in AI among corporations, especially regarding Machine Learning (ML) technology, has shifted the focus of research from quality to quantity. Corporations have the resources to invest in large-scale ML projects and (...) they are often more interested in fast results than in ensuring that AI algorithms are reliable and safe. This paper proposes that the description of a Darwinian process made by the mathematician and physicist Freeman Dyson can be used to understand the implications of ML research scenario. The context of the Darwinian process—or lack thereof—can be used to draw a parallel between historical and current implications of technology expansion strongly driven by economic interests, making clear the consequences of shifting AI research from academia to industry. Finally, this paper indicates future directions for AI research to create a healthier environment for the evolution of ML technology. (shrink)

The idea that people’s numerical identity may sometimes be discontinuous over time initially appears to provide useful material for defending restrictions on putatively self-harming behaviour in a non-paternalistic manner. According to this line of thinking, sometimes a putatively self-harming act is, in fact, a matter of ‘harm to others’. Yet, in this paper I argue that if we, as we ought to do, take into consideration the non-identity problem, this challenges the notion that the agent at T1 is in fact (...) imposing harm on anyone, even when we accept that he or she is numerically different from the agent at T2. If the life of the agent at T2 is still worth living, the agent is not worse off than he or she would have been in spite of the consequences pertaining to the putatively self-harming act since he or she would otherwise never have come into existence. In this way, the argument I put forward in this paper calls in question the ability of the shifting identity argument to actually justify imposing restrictions on self-harming behaviour. (shrink)

Cet article s’interroge sur la manière dont la distinction entre soi et autrui – ainsi que les débats associés sur la partialité, l’altruisme et les exigences d’une morale – peut être amenée à être reformulée dans les différentes configurations de futurs possibles. L’article s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux cas où l’argumentation en faveur d’une partialité présente pourrait être remise en cause.

ABSTRACT This essay tells the story of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's “dissociation of concepts,” which they introduced in 1958 and is in use as a tool of criticism by many rhetorical critics. The story begins in England with John Locke's development of associative reasoning in 1770 and then moves to France, with Remy de Gourmont extending associative reasoning with the concept of dissociation in 1899. Gourmont's dissociation crosses the Atlantic and is then developed by Kenneth Burke in 1931. In turn, Perelman (...) and Olbrechts-Tyteca absorbed and expanded Locke, Gourmont, and Burke's theories of association and dissociation in 1958. They crafted a tool, the dissociation of concepts, that equips rhetorical reasoning with the capacity to navigate between the promise and perils of fission and fusion. Since 1958, many scholars have made productive use of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's innovation. The essay concludes with some possible futures for their dissociation of concepts. (shrink)

We need an account of corporate agency that is temporally robust – one that will help future people to cope with challenges posed by corporate groups in a range of credible futures. In particular, we need to bequeath moral resources that enable future people to avoid futures dominated by corporate groups that have no regard for human beings. This paper asks how future philosophers living in broken or digital futures might re-imagine contemporary debates about corporate agency. It (...) argues that the only temporally robust account is moralised extreme collectivism, where full moral personhood is accorded to those corporate groups that are reliably disposed to respond appropriately to moral reasons. (shrink)

‘There is a tide in the affairs of men.Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;’Those who edit academic journals rarely seek fortune in finan...

The regularly published abortion statistics are insufficiently detailed to make it easy to assess the significance of increases or decreases in the annual number of abortions. Numbers of abortions are related only to a few broad age groups of the women at risk, the size of those age groups is not normally stated, and the age and marital status groupings employed differ from those used for comparable data about trends in child bearing. By matching demographic data on trends in pregnancies (...) which are deliberately terminated (abortion) and those which are not (fertility), this note attempts a) to assess the true impact of abortion among women living in England and Wales during 1973-76, and b) to consider whether the annual volume of abortions may increase over the next decade and what such an increase might signify. (shrink)

Non-invasive prenatal testing is at the forefront of prenatal screening. Current uses for NIPT include fetal sex determination and screening for chromosomal disorders such as trisomy 21. However, NIPT may be expanded to many different future applications. There are a potential host of ethical concerns around the expanding use of NIPT, as examined by the recent Nuffield Council report on the topic. It is important to examine what NIPT might be used for before these possibilities become consumer reality. There (...) is limited research exploring views of women on possible future uses of NIPT, particularly those of women who have undergone NIPT. In this study, we examined the views of women who undertook NIPT previously on the acceptability of and interest levels in using NIPT for a number of current and possible future applications. These included several medical conditions encompassing psychiatric, neurodevelopmental and adult-onset conditions as well as non-medical traits such as intelligence. One thousand women were invited to participate and 235 eligible surveys were received. Women generally reported an interest in using NIPT for medical conditions that severely impacted quality of life and with an onset earlier in life and stressed the importance of the accuracy of the test. Concerns were raised about the use of NIPT for non-medical traits. Respondents indicated that termination of pregnancy was not their only reason for testing, particularly in the case of sex. These results can further inform the ethical debate around the increasing integration of NIPT into healthcare systems. (shrink)

We live in an age of impotence. Stuck between global war and global finance, between identity and capital, we seem to be incapable of producing the radical change that is so desperately needed. Is there still a way to disentangle ourselves from a global order that shapes our politics as well as our imagination? In his most systematic book to date, renowned Italian theorist Franco Berardi tackles this question through a solid yet visionary analysis of the three fundamental concepts of (...) Possibility, Potency, and Power. Characterizing Possibility as the content, Potency as the energy, and Power as the form, Berardi suggests that the road to emancipation unravels from the awareness that the field of the possible is only limited, and not created, by the power structures that implement it. Other futures and other worlds are always already inscribed within the present, despite power's attempt at keeping them invisible. Overcoming any temptation of giving in to despair or nostalgia, Berardi proposes the notion of 'futurability' as a way to remind us that even within the darkness of our current crisis lies dormant the horizon of possibility. (shrink)

This review article puts two recent publications —Existence and Heritage: Hermeneutic Explorations in African and Continental Philosophies by Tsenay Serequeberhan and What Fanon Said. A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought by Lewis R. Gordon—in conversation with Achille Mbembe’s renowned On the Postcolony, first published in French in 2000, in English in 2001, and here reviewed in the 2015 Wits University Press edition. The opportunity for such a literary dialogue to take place across fifteen years is occasioned both by (...) the latest South African edition of On the Postcolony, which in itself invites a fresh reading of Mbembe’s manifesto on postcolonial authoritarianism in Africa, as well as by the different potential outcome of the postcolonial condition that Gordon and Serequeberhan envision and propose with respect to Mbembe. I argue that while Mbembe’s pessimistic portrayal of the postcolonial present is one whereby it is difficult to envision transformation, both Serequeberhan and Gordon’s books offer a rich philosophical terrain from which to imagine possible futures, grounded in notions of dialogue and solidarity, that, however, vary significantly for each author. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to articulating the ethical puzzles that arise from the possibility of time travel. I divide the puzzles into three different categories: permissibility puzzles, obligation puzzles, and conflicts between past and future selves. In each category, I suggest that ethical problems involving time travel are not as dissimilar to parallel “normal” ethical puzzles as one might think.

How to Pool Risks across Generations makes the case for the collective provision of pensions, on fair terms of social cooperation. Through the insurance of a mutual association which extends across society and over multiple generations, we share one another's fates by pooling risks across both space and time. Resources are transferred, not simply between different people, but also within the possible future lives of each person: from one's more fortunate to one's less fortunate future selves. (...) The book opens with an investigation of the longevity and investment risk that even a single individual on a desert island would face in providing for her old age. From this atomistic starting point, it builds up, within and across the chapters, to increasingly collective forms of pension provision. By joining together, it is possible to tame the risks we would face as individuals each with our own private pension pot. A collective pension can be justified as a 'social union of social unions': an enduring corporate body, which is formed by agreements to pool risks, in a manner that involves reciprocity between the various individuals that constitute the collective. Even though all individuals age and die, a collective pension scheme remains evergreen, as the average age of members remains relatively unchanged, through the influx of new members to replace those who retire. It is therefore possible to smooth risks indefinitely across as well as within generations, to the mutual advantage of each. (shrink)