Quantum Mechanics has faced deep controversies and debates since its origin when Werner Heisenberg proposed the first mathematical formalism capable to operationally account for what had been recently discovered as the new field of quantum phenomena. Today, even though we have reached a standardized version of QM which is taught in Universities all around the world, there is still no consensus regarding the conceptual reference of the theory and, if or if not, it can refer to something (...) beyond measurement outcomes. In this work we will argue that the reason behind the impossibility to reach a meaningful answer to this question is strictly related to the 20th Century Bohrian-positivist re-foundation of physics which is responsible for having introduced within the theory of quanta a harmful combination of metaphysical dogmatism and naive empiricism. We will also argue that the possibility of understanding QM is at plain sight, given we return to the original framework of physics in which the meaning of understanding has always been clear. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to physically interpret the Modal Kochen–Specker theorem. In order to do so, we analyze the features of the possible properties of quantum systems arising from the elements in an orthomodular lattice and distinguish the use of “possibility” in the classical and quantum formalisms. Taking into account the modal and many worlds non-collapse interpretation of the projection postulate, we discuss how the MKS theorem rules the constraints to actualization, and thus, the relation between (...) actual and possible realms. (shrink)

In classical physics, probabilistic or statistical knowledge has been always related to ignorance or inaccurate subjective knowledge about an actual state of affairs. This idea has been extended to quantum mechanics through a completely incoherent interpretation of the Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein statistics in terms of "strange" quantum particles. This interpretation, naturalized through a widespread "way of speaking" in the physics community, contradicts Born's physical account of Ψ as a "probability wave" which provides statistical information about outcomes that, (...) in fact, cannot be interpreted in terms of 'ignorance about an actual state of affairs'. In the present paper we discuss how the metaphysics of actuality has played an essential role in limiting the possibilities of understating things differently. We propose instead a metaphysical scheme in terms of powers with definite potentia which allows us to consider quantum probability in a new light, namely, as providing objective knowledge about a potential state of affairs. (shrink)

Michael S. Moore defends the ideas of free will and responsibility, especially in relation to criminal law, against several challenges from neuroscience. I agree with Moore that morality and the law presuppose a commonsense understanding of humans as rational agents, who make choices and act for reasons, and that to defend moral and legal responsibility, we must show that this commonsense understanding remains viable. Unlike Moore, however, I do not think that classical compatibilism, which is based on a conditional understanding (...) of the ability to do otherwise, provides a sufficiently robust account of free will, even when it is amended as Moore suggests. I argue that free will and responsibility can be defended more robustly by observing that, at the level of agency, there can be alternative possibilities and mental causation in a stronger sense than recognized by classical compatibilism, even if physical determinism is true. Moore’s arguments could thus be strengthened by embracing this compatibilist libertarian position. At the same time, I note that, although the idea of responsibility is robustly defensible, there are independent reasons for rejecting a retributivist approach to punishment. (shrink)

In [9], Newton da Costa together with the author of this paper argued in favor of the possibility to consider quantum superpositions in terms of a paraconsistent approach. We claimed that, even though most interpretations of quantum mechanics attempt to escape contradictions, there are many hints that indicate it could be worth while to engage in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause [1, 2, 3] have raised several arguments against this approach and claimed that (...) —taking into account the square of opposition— quantum superpositions are better understood in terms of contrariety propositions rather than contradictory propositions. In [14] we defended the Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions and provided arguments in favor of its development. In the present paper we attempt to analyze the meanings of modality, potentiality and contradiction in QM, and provide further arguments of why the PAQS is better suited, than the Contrariety Approach to Quantum Superpositions proposed by Arenhart and Krause, to face the interpretational questions that quantum technology is forcing us to consider. (shrink)

Quantum theory is perhaps our best confirmed theory for a description of the physical properties of nature. On top of demonstrating great empirical effectiveness, many technological developments in the 20th century (such as the interpretation of the periodic table of elements, CD players, holograms, and quantum state teleportation) were only made possible with Quantum theory.Despite its success in the past decades, even today it still remains without a universally accepted interpretation.This book provides an interdisciplinary perspective on (...) the question; 'What is Quantum Mechanics talking about?', a question which continues to be one of the most fascinating and important questions in science.Using an interdisciplinary approach to foundational problems in Quantum Mechanics (QM), ranging from philosophical questions about the interpretation of QM to technical problems in quantum computation, this book explores quantum mechanics from different perspectives (physical, logical, philosophical and mathematical), by researchers from Europe, North America, and South America. (shrink)

In this work we discuss the widespread use and application of the notion of 'particle' within the standard understanding of quantum mechanics, trying to prove how it is not just an innocent and unproblematic “way of talking”, as it is often claimed, but the expression of an atomist metaphysics that represents rather a way of perceiving and thinking that inadvertently determines our understanding of the mathematical formalism and the experimental content of quantum mechanics. We show how (...) the retention of atomist concepts, especially due to Bohr’s work, appears not only as an epistemological obstacle but furthermore as an efficient factory of false problems and misleading intuitions that have concentrated the attention of researchers for some time. Revisiting again Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics, we discuss if it would be possible to advance beyond the substantialist account of QM going back to the operational-invariance of intensive quantities. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate the history of relationalism and its present use in some interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the first part of this article we will provide a conceptual analysis of the relation between substantivalism, relationalism and relativism in the history of both physics and philosophy. In the second part, we will address some relational interpretations of quantum mechanics, namely, Bohr’s relational approach, the modal interpretation by Kochen, the perspectival modal version by Bene and (...) Dieks and the relational interpretation by Rovelli. We will argue that all these interpretations ground their understanding of relations in epistemological terms. By taking into account the analysis on the first part of our work, we intend to highlight the fact that there is a different possibility for understanding quantum mechanics in relational terms which has not been yet considered within the foundational literature. This possibility is to consider relations in ontological terms. We will argue that such an understanding might be capable of providing a novel approach to the problem of representing what quantum mechanics is really talking about. (shrink)

In, Newton da Costa together with the author of this paper argued in favor of the possibility to consider quantum superpositions in terms of a paraconsistent approach. We claimed that, even though most interpretations of quantum mechanics attempt to escape contradictions, there are many hints that indicate it could be worth while to engage in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause have raised several arguments against this approach. In the present paper we attempt to (...) answer the main questions presented by Arenhart and Krause. We will argue, firstly, that the obstacles presented by them are based on a specific metaphysical stance, which we will characterize in terms of what we call the Orthodox Line of Research. Secondly, that this is not necessarily the only possible line, and that a different one, namely, a Constructive Metaphysical Line of Research provides a different perspective in which the Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions can be regarded as a valuable prospect that could be used by different interpretations of quantum mechanics. Finally, we provide a set of specific answers to the main problems raised by Arenhart and Krause in order to clarify our line of research as well as the original perspective introduced by the PAQS. (shrink)

Scientists often think of the world as a dynamical system, a stochastic process, or a generalization of such a system. Prominent examples of systems are the system of planets orbiting the sun or any other classical mechanical system, a hydrogen atom or any other quantum–mechanical system, and the earth’s atmosphere or any other statistical mechanical system. We introduce a general and unified framework for describing such systems and show how it can be used to examine some familiar philosophical questions, (...) including the following: how can we define nomological possibility, necessity, determinism, and indeterminism; what are symmetries and laws; what regularities must a system display to make scientific inference possible; how might principles of parsimony such as Occam’s Razor help when we make such inferences; what is the role of space and time in a system; and might they be emergent features? Our framework is intended to serve as a toolbox for the formal analysis of systems that is applicable in several areas of philosophy. (shrink)

We ordinarily think that we human beings have agency: we have control over our choices and make a difference to our environments. Yet it is not obvious how agency can fit into a physical world that is governed by exceptionless laws of nature. In particular, it is unclear how agency is possible if those laws are deterministic and the universe functions like a mechanical clockwork. In this short paper, I first explain the apparent conflict between agency and physical determinism (...) (referring to recent work by Helen Steward on "agency incompatibilism"), then review some salient responses one might give to this conflict, and finally sketch a response that rests on a distinction between “physical” and “agential possibilities.” Agency, I suggest, is a higher-level phenomenon, which comes with its own level-specific notion of possibility, and it cannot be adequately analyzed in physical terms alone or just through the lens of physical possibility. (The paper was written as an informal position paper for a symposium on "Possibilities".). (shrink)

In this paper we intend to discuss the importance of providing a physical representation of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. This proposal goes in the opposite direction to the project present in orthodox contemporary philosophy of physics which attempts to “bridge the gap” between the quantum formalism and common sense “classical reality”—precluding, right from the start, the possibility of interpreting quantum superpositions through non-classical notions. We will argue that (...) in order to restate the problem of interpretation of quantum mechanics in truly ontological terms we require a radical revision of the problems and definitions addressed within the orthodox literature. On the one hand, we will discuss the need of providing a formal redefinition of superpositions which captures explicitly their contextual character. On the other hand, we will attempt to replace the focus on the measurement problem, which concentrates on the justification of measurement outcomes from “weird” superposed states, and introduce the superposition problem which focuses instead on the conceptual representation of superpositions themselves. In this respect, after presenting three necessary conditions for objective physical representation, we will provide arguments which show why the classical representation of physics faces severe difficulties to solve the superposition problem. Finally, we will also argue that, if we are willing to abandon the presupposition according to which ‘Actuality = Reality’, then there is plenty of room to construct a conceptual representation for quantum superpositions. (shrink)

The discipline of parallelization in the manifold of all possible measurement results is shown to be responsible for the existence of all quantum correlations, with the upper bound on their strength stemming from the maximum of possible torsion within all norm-composing parallelizable manifolds. A profound interplay is thus uncovered between the existence and strength of quantum correlations and the parallelizability of the spheres S^0, S^1, S^3, and S^7 necessitated by the four real division algebras. In particular, (...) parallelization within a unit 3-sphere is shown to be responsible for the existence of EPR and Hardy type correlations, whereas that within a unit 7-sphere is shown to be responsible for the existence of all GHZ type correlations. Moreover, parallelizability in general is shown to be equivalent to the completeness criterion of EPR, in addition to necessitating the locality condition of Bell. It is therefore shown to predetermine both the local outcomes as well as the quantum correlations among the remote outcomes, dictated by the infinite factorizability of points within the spheres S^3 and S^7. The twin illusions of quantum entanglement and non-locality are thus shown to stem from the topologically incomplete accountings of the measurement results. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to provide a physical representation of quantum superpositions. For this purpose we discuss the constraints of the quantum formalism to the notion of possibility and the necessity to consider a potential realm independent of actuality. Taking these insights into account and from the basic principles of quantum mechanics itself we advance towards the definition of the notions of power and potentia. Assuming these notions as a standpoint we analyze the meaning of (...) ‘observation’ and ‘interaction’. As a conclusion we provide a set of axioms which comprise our interpretation of quantum mechanics and argue in favor of a redefinition of the orthodox problems discussed in the literature. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze the definition of quantum superpositions within orthodox Quantum Mechanics and their relation to physical reality. We will begin by discussing how the metaphysical presuppositions imposed by Bohr on the interpretation of QM have become not only interpretational dogmas which constrain the limits of the present Orthodox Line of Research, but also how these desiderata implicitly preclude the possibility of developing a physical representation of quantum superpositions. We will then continue analyzing how (...) most interpretations of QM argue against the existence of superpositions. Firstly, we will focus on those interpretations which attempt to recover a classical representation about ''what there is'', and secondly, we will concentrate on the arguments provided by Dieks and Griffiths who, staying close to the orthodox formalism, also attempt to ''get rid of the ghost of Schrodinger's cat''. Contrary to the OLR, we will argue -based on our definition of Meaningful Physical Statements - that from a representational realist perspective which stays close to the orthodox Hilbert space formalism, quantum superpositions are not only the key to the most important -present and future- technological and experimental developments in quantum information processing but also, they must be considered as the kernel of any interpretation of QM that attempts to provide a physical representation of reality. We will also argue that the price to pay for such representational realist development must be the abandonment of the idea that 'Actuality = Reality'. (shrink)

In [7] the authors of this paper argued in favor of the possibility to consider a Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions. We claimed that, even though most interpretations of quantum mechanics attempt to escape contradictions, there are many hints -coming from present technical and experimental developments in QM- that indicate it could be worth while to engage in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause have raised several arguments against the PAQS [1, 2, 3]. In (...) [11, 12] it was argued that their reasoning presupposes a metaphysical stance according to which the physical representation of reality must be exclusively considered in terms of the equation: Actuality = Reality. However, from a different metaphysical standpoint their problems disappear. It was also argued that, if we accept the idea that quantum superpositions exist in a potential realm, it makes perfect sense to develop QM in terms of a paraconsistent approach and claim that quantum superpositions are contradictory, contextual existents. Following these ideas, and taking as a standpoint an interpretation in terms of the physical notions of power and potentia put forward in [10, 12, 15], we present a paraconsistent formalization of quantum superpositions that attempts to capture the main features of QM. (shrink)

Physical time plays a different role in general relativity than in quantum mechanics and the particle physics based on it. The first section of this chapter provides a brief survey of the main approaches to quantum gravity and then proceeds to consider the lessons that can be drawn from two distinct strategies for discovering a theory of quantum gravity. In the next section, the chapter first explicates the fate of time in approaches to quantum gravity (...) that start with general relativity (GR) and attempt to quantize it. Second, it investigates approaches to quantum gravity that start from quantum particle physics. The third and fourth sections respectively offer an assessment of time as understood in string theory and 'non‐commutative' field theory. One of the important possibilities for time in quantum gravity is that it might fail to commute with space. (shrink)

Prism Adaptation is a useful method to study the mechanisms of sensorimotor adaptation. After-effects following adaptation to the prismatic deviation constitute the probe that adaptive mechanisms occurred, and current evidence suggests an involvement of the cerebellum at this level. Whether after-effects are transferable to another task is of great interest both for understanding the nature of sensorimotor transformations and for clinical purposes. However, the processes of transfer and their underlying neural substrates remain poorly understood. Transfer from throwing to pointing is (...) known to occur only in individuals who had previously reached a good level of expertise in throwing, not in novices. The aim of this study was to ascertain whether anodal stimulation of the cerebellum could boost after-effects transfer from throwing to pointing in novice participants. Healthy participants received anodal or sham transcranial direction current stimulation of the right cerebellum during a PA procedure involving a throwing task and were tested for transfer on a pointing task. Terminal errors and kinematic parameters were in the dependent variables for statistical analyses. Results showed that active stimulation had no significant beneficial effects on error reduction or throwing after-effects. Moreover, the overall magnitude of transfer to pointing did not change. Interestingly, we found a significant effect of the stimulation on the longitudinal evolution of pointing errors and on pointing kinematic parameters during transfer assessment. These results provide new insights on the implication of the cerebellum in transfer and on the possibility to use anodal tDCS to enhance cerebellar contribution during PA in further investigations. From a network approach, we suggest that cerebellum is part of a more complex circuitry responsible for the development of transfer which is likely embracing the primary motor cortex due to its role in motor memories consolidation. This paves the way for further work entailing multiple-sites stimulation to explore the role of M1-cerebellum dynamic interplay in transfer. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new categorical approach which attempts to provide an original understanding of QM. Our logos categorical approach attempts to consider the main features of the quantum formalism as the standpoint to develop a conceptual representation that explains what the theory is really talking about —rather than as problems that need to be bypassed in order to allow a restoration of a classical “common sense” understanding of what there is. In particular, we discuss a solution (...) to Kochen-Specker contextuality through the generalization of the meaning of global valuation. This idea has been already addressed by the so called topos approach to QM —originally proposed by Isham, Butterfiled and D ̈oring— in terms of sieve-valued valuations. The logos approach to QM presents a different solution in terms of the notion of intensive valuation. This new solution stresses an ontological reading of the quantum formalism and the need to restore an objective conceptual representation and understanding of quantum physical reality. (shrink)

With the discovery of the phytohormone auxin in the late 1920s, it became possible to link the regulation of complex plant growth responses to a single biologically active compound. Among all the plant growth regulators characterised so far, only auxin appears to be actively transported throughout the plant to create complex variations in concentration patterns and flow directions over time. This stimulated interest in the specific mechanisms underlying auxin transport as key factors in plant growth responses. Research (...) in the last decade revealed several genes involved in the controlled transport of auxin and greatly improved our understanding of the basic principles of auxin‐mediated responses. We are at this point, however, only starting to understand the complex interplay and control of factors that ultimately underlie the observed spatiotemporal variations in auxin transport and thus mediate plant growth and environmental responses. This review highlights important findings that provide us with a framework of molecular players and potential regulatory mechanisms that should contribute to the formulation of a comprehensive dynamic model of spatiotemporal auxin distribution. BioEssays 27:1246–1255, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. Erwin Schroedinger was one of the first proponents of such a view, but he dismissed it after he realized it led to macroscopic superpositions (if the (...) wave function evolves in time according to the equations that has his name). The Many-Worlds interpretation1 accepts the existence of such macroscopic superpositions but takes it that they can never be observed. Superposed objects and superposed observers split together in different worlds of the type of the one we appear to live in. For these who, like Schroedinger, think that macroscopic superpositions are a problem, the common wisdom is that there are two alternative views: "Either the wave function, as given by the Schroedinger equation, is not everything, or is not right" [Bell 1987]. The deBroglie-Bohm theory, now commonly known as Bohmian Mechanics, takes the first option: the description provided by a Schroedinger-evolving wave function is supplemented by the information provided by the configuration of the particles. The second possibility consists in assuming that, while the wave function provides the complete description of the system, its temporal evolution is not given by the Schroedinger equation. Rather, the usual Schroedinger evolution is interrupted by random and sudden "collapses". The most promising theory of this kind is the GRW theory, named after the scientists that developed it: Gian Carlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini and Tullio Weber.. It seems tempting to think that in GRW we can take the wave function ontologically seriously and avoid the problem of macroscopic superpositions just allowing for quantum jumps. In this paper we will argue that such "bare" wave function ontology is not possible, neither for GRW nor for any other quantum theory: quantum mechanics cannot be about the wave function simpliciter. That is, we need more structure than the one provided by the wave function. As a response, quantum theories about the wave function can be supplemented with structure, without taking it as an additional ontology. We argue in reply that such "dressed-up" versions of wave function ontology are not sensible, since they compromise the acceptability of the theory as a satisfactory fundamental physical theory. Therefore we maintain that: 1- Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; 2- Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously. Moreover, we will argue that any of the traditional responses to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics (Bohmian mechanics, GRW and Many-Worlds), contrarily to what commonly believed, share a common structure. That is, we maintain that: 3- All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the notion of quantum entanglement from the perspective of the logos categorical approach [26, 27]. Firstly, we will argue that the widespread distinctions, on the one hand, between pure states and mixed states, and on the other, between separable states and entangled states, are completely superfluous when considering the orthodox mathematical formalism of QM. We will then argue that the introduction of these distinctions within the theory of quanta is due to another two completely (...) unjustified metaphysical presuppositions, namely, the idea that there is a “collapse” of quantum states when being measured and the idea that QM talks about “elementary particles”. At distance from these distinctions and taking the logos approach as a standpoint, we will propose an objective formal account of the notion of entanglement in terms of potential coding which introduces the necessary distinction between intensive relations and effective relations. We will also discuss how this new definition of entanglement provides an anschaulich content to this —supposedly “spooky”— quantum relational feature. (shrink)

In a recent paper [3] Arroyo and Arenhart presented a detailed critical analysis regarding some essential aspects of representational realism and the logos approach to Quantum Mechanics (QM) addressed in terms of i) “a diagnosis of what is wrong with currently available solutions”; ii) “a proposal of a new methodology for addressing the problem”; and finally, iii) “a positive proposal to answer the question, which is arrived at by following the methodology suggested.” In this work we provide a (...) detailed reply to some deep misunderstandings that arise in this presentation and which, in turn, allow Arroyo and Arenhart to conclude that “contrarily to what de Ronde has suggested, his proposal is not a way to avoid commitment to uncritical images of reality, but rather, one further position in the already huge cart of options of quantum mechanics.” After providing a more accurate account of our diagnosis, we continue to address our methodology which —like that of Einstein, Heisenberg, Pauli and Schrödinger— goes back to the Greek-Modern account of physics. We then present our proposal grounded on the invariant-objective search for theoretical unity and discuss why intensive powers of action cannot be considered in dispositional or teleological terms with respect to actuality. Finally, we list some of the main results already accomplished by the logos approach and discuss the essential role of ‘intuition’ and ‘understanding’ within the realist setting. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the prospects for combining contemporary Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) with branching-time semantics in the tradition of Kripke, Prior, Thomason and Belnap. I begin by outlining the salient features of ‘decoherence-based’ EQM, and of the ‘consistent histories’ formalism that is particularly apt for conceptual discussions in EQM. This formalism permits of both ‘branching worlds’ and ‘parallel worlds’ interpretations; the metaphysics of EQM is in this sense underdetermined by the physics. A prominent argument due to (...) Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986 ) supports the non-branching interpretation. Belnap et al. (Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterministic World, 2001 ) refer to Lewis’ argument as the ‘Assertion problem’, and propose a pragmatic response to it. I argue that their response is unattractively ad hoc and complex, and that it prevents an Everettian who adopts branching-time semantics from making clear sense of objective probability. The upshot is that Everettians are better off without branching-time semantics. I conclude by discussing and rejecting an alternative possible motivation for branching time. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze and discuss the historical and philosophical development of the notion of logical possibility focusing on its specific meaning in classical and quantum mechanics. Taking into account the logical structure of quantum theory we continue our discussion regarding the Aristotelian Square of Opposition in orthomodular structures enriched with a monadic quantifier. Finally, we provide an interpretation of the Orthomodular Square of Opposition exposing the fact that classical possibility and quantum possibility behave formally (...) in radically different manners. (shrink)

This paper analyses the early history of David Bohm’s mechanics from the perspective of Ludwik Fleck’s thought-collectives and shows how the thought-style of the scientific community limits the possible modes of thinking and what new possibilities for the construction of a new theory arise if these limits are removed.

Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individuals that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should explain the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable on the model of individual agents. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, to a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. (...) Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that there really are group or corporate agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them, and that a proper approach to the social sciences, law, morality, and politics must take account of this fact. Unlike some earlier defences of group agency, their account is entirely unmysterious in character and, despite not being technically difficult, is grounded in cutting-edge work in social choice theory, economics, and philosophy. (shrink)

It is widely held that quantum mechanics is the first scientific theory to present scientifically internal, fundamental difficulties for a realistic interpretation (in the philosophical sense). The standard (Copenhagen) interpretation of the quantum theory is often described as the inevitable instrumentalistic response. It is the purpose of the present article to argue that quantum theory doesnot present fundamental new problems to a realistic interpretation. The formalism of quantum theory has the same states—it will be argued—as (...) the formalisms of older physical theories and is capable of the same kinds of philosophical interpretation. This result is reached via an analysis of what it means to give a realistic interpretation to a theory. The main point of difference between quantum mechanics and other theories—as far as the possibilities of interpretation are concerned—is the special treatment given tomeasurement by the “projection postulate.” But it is possible to do without this postulate. Moreover, rejection of the projection postulate does not, in spite of what is often maintained in the literature, automatically lead to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. A realistic interpretation is possible in which only the reality ofone (our) world is recognized. It is argued that the Copenhagen interpretation as expounded by Bohr is not in conflict with the here proposed realistic interpretation of quantum theory. (shrink)

In a recent paper Griffiths [38] has argued, based on the consistent histories interpretation, that Hilbert space quantum mechanics is noncontextual. According to Griffiths the problem of contextuality disappears if the apparatus is “designed and operated by a competent experimentalist” and we accept the Single Framework Rule. We will argue from a representational realist stance that the conclusion is incorrect due to the misleading understanding provided by Griffiths to the meaning of quantum contextuality and its relation to (...) physical reality and measurements. We will discuss how the quite general incomprehension of contextuality has its origin in the ''objective-subjective omelette'' created by Heisenberg and Bohr. We will argue that in order to unscramble the omelette we need to disentangle, firstly, representational realism from naive realism, secondly, ontology from epistemology, and thirdly, the different interpretational problems of QM. In this respect, we will analyze what should be considered as Meaningful Physical Statements within a theory and will argue that Counterfactual Reasoning -considered by Griffiths as ''tricky''- must be accepted as a necessary condition for any representational realist interpretation of QM. Finally we discuss what should be considered as a problem in QM from a representational realist perspective. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a Simondonian interpretation of quantum mechanics taking as a standpoint his “preindividual hypothesis” in order to consider the problem of contextuality. We will examine whether the epistemological obstacle produced by the notion of entity can be bypassed by specifying, according to Simondon and the Kochen-Specker Theorem, the mode of existence of quantum potentialities.

This book provides an interdisciplinary approach to one of the most fascinating and important open questions in science: What is quantum mechanics really talking about? In the last decades quantum mechanics has given rise to a new quantum technological era, a revolution taking place today especially within the field of quantum information processing; which goes from quantum teleportation and cryptography to quantum computation. Quantum theory is probably our best confirmed physical theory. (...) However, in spite of its great empirical effectiveness it stands today still without a universally accepted physical representation that allows us to understand its relation to the world and reality. The novelty of the book comes from the multiple perspectives put forward by top researchers in quantum mechanics, from Europe as well as North and South America, discussing the meaning and structure of the theory of quanta. The book comprises in a balanced manner physical, philosophical, logical and mathematical approaches to quantum mechanics and quantum information. Going from quantum superpositions and entanglement to dynamics and the problem of identity; from quantum logic, computation and quasi-set theory to the category approach and teleportation; from realism and empiricism to operationalism and instrumentalism; the book considers from different angles some of the most intriguing questions in the field. From Buenos Aires to Brussels and Cagliari, from Florence to Florianópolis, the interaction between different groups is reflected in the many different articles. This book is interesting not only to the specialists but also to the general public attempting to get a grasp on some of the most fundamental questions of present quantum physics. (shrink)

Animals and plants are metaorganisms and associate with microbes that affect their physiology, stress tolerance, and fitness. Here the hypothesis that alteration of the microbiome may constitute a fast‐response mechanism to environmental change is examined. This is supported by recent reciprocal transplant experiments with reef corals, which have shown that their microbiome adapts to thermally variable habitats and changes over time when transplanted into different environments. Further, inoculation of corals with beneficial bacteria increases their stress tolerance. But corals differ in (...) their ability to flexibly associate with different bacteria. How scales of microbiome flexibility may reflect different metaorganism adaptation mechanisms is discussed and future directions for research are pinpointed. It is posited that microbiome flexibility is a broad phenomenon that contributes to the ability of organisms to respond to environmental change. Importantly, adapting with microbial help may provide an alternate route to organismal adaptation that facilitates rapid responses. (shrink)

In the framework of the topos approach to quantum mechanics we give a representation of physical properties in terms of modal operators on Heyting algebras. It allows us to introduce a classical type study of the mentioned properties.

Evaluative Conditioning (EC) refers to changes in our liking or disliking of a stimulus due to its pairing with other positive or negative stimuli. In addition to stimulus-based mechanisms, recent research has shown that action-based mechanisms can also lead to EC effects. Research, based on action control theories, has shown that pairing a positive or negative action with a neutral stimulus results in EC effects (Stimulus-Response binding). Similarly, research studies using Operant Conditioning (OC) approaches have also observed EC effects. The (...) aim of the present study is to directly compare EC effects elicited by two different response-based approaches – S-R bindings and OC. To this end, participants were randomly assigned to an S-R binding procedure and an OC procedure. EC effects were measured in conditions and compared. Implications for EC theory are discussed. (shrink)

Climate change and other harmful large-scale processes challenge our understandings of individual responsibility. People throughout the world suffer harms—severe shortfalls in health, civic status, or standard of living relative to the vital needs of human beings—as a result of physical processes to which many people appear to contribute. Climate change, polluted air and water, and the erosion of grasslands, for example, occur because a great many people emit carbon and pollutants, build excessively, enable their flocks to overgraze, or otherwise stress (...) the environment. If a much smaller number of people engaged in these types of conduct, the harms in question would not occur, or would be substantially lessened. However, the conduct of any particular person (and, in the case of climate change, of even quite large numbers of people) could make no apparent difference to their occurrence. My carbon emissions (and quite possibly the carbon emissions of much larger groups of people dispersed throughout the world) may not make a difference to what happens to anyone. When the conduct of some agent does not make any apparent difference to the occurrence of harm, but this conduct is of a type that brings about harm because many people engage in it, we can call this agent an overdeterminer of that harm, and their conduct overdetermining conduct. In this essay we explore the moral status of overdetermining harm. (shrink)

Approaches to quantum gravity often involve the disappearance of space and time at the fundamental level. The metaphysical consequences of this disappearance are profound, as is illustrated with David Lewis's analysis of modality. As Lewis's possible worlds are unified by the spatiotemporal relations among their parts, the non-fundamentality of spacetime---if borne out---suggests a serious problem for his analysis: his pluriverse, for all its ontological abundance, does not contain our world. Although the mere existence---as opposed to the fundamentality---of spacetime (...) must be recovered from the fundamental structure in order to guarantee the empirical coherence of the non-spatiotemporal fundamental theory, it does not suffice to salvage Lewis's theory of modality from the charge of rendering our actual world impossible. (shrink)

The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and (...) a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical. (shrink)

We interpret the philosophy of Niels Bohr as related to the so called ''linguistic turn'' and consider paraconsistency in the light of the Bohrian notion of complementarity. Following [16], Jean-Yves Beziau has discussed the seemingly contradictory perspectives found in the quantum mechanical double slit experiment in terms of paraconsistent view-points [7, 8]. This interpretation goes in line with the well known Bohrian Neo-Kantian epistemological account of quantum mechanics. In the present paper, we put forward the idea that (...) one can also consider, within quantum mechanics and departing from the philosophy of the danish physicist, a more radical paraconsistency found within one of the main formal elements of the theory, namely, quantum superpositions. We will argue that, rather than epistemological, the contradictions found within quantum superpositions could be interpreted as ontological contradictions. (shrink)

In the climate ethics debate, scholars largely agree that individuals should promote institutions that ensure the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This paper aims to establish that there are individual duties beyond compliance with and promotion of institutions. Duties of individuals to reduce their emissions are often objected to by arguing that an individual’s emissions do not make a morally relevant difference. We challenge this argument from inconsequentialism in two ways. We first show why the argument also seems to undermine (...) the case for duties to promote institutions that the arguments’ proponents endorse. Second, we argue that individuals ought to cut emissions if they exceed their fair share of emissions entitlements and, by emitting, contribute to climate-related harm. In response to inconsequentialism, we specify the notion of ‘contribution’ via the so-called NESS theory, according to which an act is causally relevant for and contributes to an outcome if it is a Necessary Element of a Set of conditions that is Sufficient for the outcome. After refuting two objections to our approach, we conclude by discussing how to deal with possible conflicts between duties to promote institutions and to reduce one’s emissions. (shrink)

In this paper we study a classical and theoretical system which consists of an elastic medium carrying transverse waves and one point-like high elastic medium density, called concretion. We compute the equation of motion for the concretion as well as the wave equation of this system. Afterwards we always consider the case where the concretion is not the wave source any longer. Then the concretion obeys a general and covariant guidance formula, which leads in low-velocity approximation to an equivalent de (...) Broglie-Bohm guidance formula. The concretion moves then as if exists an equivalent quantum potential. A strictly equivalent free Schrödinger equation is retrieved, as well as the quantum stationary states in a linear or spherical cavity. We compute the energy of the concretion, naturally defined from the energy density of the vibrating elastic medium. Provided one condition about the amplitude of oscillation is fulfilled, it strikingly appears that the energy and momentum of the concretion not only are written in the same form as in quantum mechanics, but also encapsulate equivalent relativistic formulas. (shrink)

This book is a critical introduction to the long-standing debate concerning the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics and the problems it has posed for physicists and philosophers from Einstein to the present. Quantum theory has been a major infulence on postmodernism, and presents significant problems for realists. Keeping his own realist position in check, Christopher Norris subjects a wide range of key opponents and supporters of realism to a high and equal level of scrutiny. With a characteristic (...) combination of rigour and intellectual generosity, he draws out the merits and weaknesses from opposing arguments. In a sequence of closely argued chapters, Norris examines the premises of orthodox quantum theory, as developed most influentially by Bohr and Heisenberg, and its impact on varous philosophical developments. These include the ideas developed by W.V Quine, Thomas Kuhn, Michael Dummett, Bas van Fraassen, and Hilary Puttnam. In each case, Norris argues, these thinkers have been influenced by the orthodox construal of quantum mechanics as requiring drastic revision of principles which had hitherto defined the very nature of scientific method, causal explanati and rational enquiry. Putting the case for a realist approach which adheres to well-tried scientific principles of causal reasoning and inference to the best explanation, Christopher Norris clarifies these debates to a non-specialist readership and scholars of philosophy, science studies and the philosophy of science alike. Quantum Theory and the Flight From Realism suggests that philosophical reflection can contribute to a better understanding of these crucial, current issues. (shrink)

In this paper we derive a theorem which proves that the physical interpretation implied by the first postulate of quantum mechanics is inconsistent with the orthodox formalism. In order to expose this inconsistency we will analyze how the concept of ‘physical system’ is built within classical theories through the notion of invariance and explain in what sense a vector in Hilbert space is not capable of fulfilling these same mathematical conditions. Through an analysis of the mathematical formalism we (...) derive a No Dynamical Invariance theorem which proves that, contrary to what is claimed in the first postulate, a vector in Hilbert space cannot be interpreted coherently as the state of a physical system. We conclude the paper by analyzing the consequences of the NDI theorem with respect to several ongoing debates in QM. (shrink)

This essay considers and evaluates recent results and arguments from classical chaotic systems theory and non-relativistic quantum mechanics that pertain to the question of whether our world is deterministic or indeterministic. While the classical results are inconclusive, quantum mechanics is often assumed to establish indeterminism insofar as the measurement process involves an ineliminable stochastic element, even though the dynamics between two measurements is considered fully deterministic. While this latter claim concerning the Schrödinger evolution must be qualified, (...) the former fully depends on a resolution of the measurement problem. Two alleged proofs that nature is indeterministic, relying, in turn, on Gleason's theorem and Conway and Kochen's recent 'free will theorem', are shown to be wanting qua proofs of indeterminism. We are thus left with the conclusion that the determinism question remains open. (shrink)

A new landscape of prenatal testing is presently developing, including new techniques for risk-reducing, non-invasive sampling of foetal DNA and drastically enhanced possibilities of what may be rapidly and precisely analysed, surrounded by a growing commercial genetic testing industry and a general trend of individualization in healthcare policies. This article applies a set of established ethical notions from past debates on PNT for analysing PNT screening-programmes in this new situation. While some basic challenges of PNT stay untouched, the new development (...) supports a radical individualization of how PNT screening is organized. This reformation is, at the same time, difficult to reconcile with responsible spending of resources in a publicly funded healthcare context. Thus, while the ethical imperative of individualization holds and applies to PNT, the new landscape of PNT provides reasons to start rolling back the type of mass-screening programmes currently established in many countries. Instead, more limited offers are suggested, based on considerations of severity of conditions and optimized to simultaneously serve reproductive autonomy and public health within an acceptable frame of priorities. The new landscape of PNT furthermore underscores the ethical importance of supporting and including people with disabilities. For the very same reason, no ban on what may be analysed using PNT in the new landscape should be applied, although private offers must, of course, conform to strict requirements of respecting reproductive autonomy and what that means in terms of counselling. (shrink)

Defenders of deontological constraints in normative ethics face a challenge: how should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain whether some course of action would violate a constraint? The most common response to this challenge has been to defend a threshold principle on which it is subjectively permissible to act iff the agent's credence that her action would be constraint-violating is below some threshold t. But the threshold approach seems arbitrary and unmotivated: what would possibly determine where (...) the threshold should be set, and why should there be any precise threshold at all? Threshold views also seem to violate ought agglomeration, since a pair of actions each of which is below the threshold for acceptable moral risk can, in combination, exceed that threshold. In this paper, I argue that stochastic dominance reasoning can vindicate and lend rigor to the threshold approach: given characteristically deontological assumptions about the moral value of acts, it turns out that morally safe options will stochastically dominate morally risky alternatives when and only when the likelihood that the risky option violates a moral constraint is greater than some precisely definable threshold (in the simplest case, .5). I also show how, in combination with the observation that deontological moral evaluation is relativized to particular choice situations, this approach can overcome the agglomeration problem. This allows the deontologist to give a precise and well-motivated response to the problem of uncertainty. (shrink)

The first priority of this response is to address Libet's rebuttal of my reinterpretation of his data. Then, because many authors have commented on various aspects of the debate, the rest of the response is organized in terms of subject matter, not as replies to each individual commentator. First, I reply to an objection expressed by two separate commentators to part of my reinterpretation of those of Libet's data supposedly supporting backward referral. This leads to a brief discussion of the (...) whole concept of backward referral. The relevance of the flash-lag illusion to possible measurement errors in the Libet/Trevena and Miller paradigm is addressed next. Finally, I have a few words to say on the relationship between quantum mechanical ontology and free will. (shrink)

Aquantum logic (σ-orthocomplete orthomodular poset L with a convex, unital, and separating set Δ of states) is said to have theexistence property if the expectation functionals onlin(Δ) associated with the bounded observables of L form a vector space. Classical quantum logics as well as the Hilbert space logics of traditional quantum mechanics have this property. We show that, if a quantum logic satisfies certain conditions in addition to having property E, then the number of its blocks (...) (maximal classical subsystems) must either be one (classical logics) or uncountable (as in Hilbert space logics). (shrink)

We argue that the notion of individual is controversial not only for indistinguishable particles but also in the case of quantum distinguishable systems. We also argue that not only a picture in which “actual individuals” are taken into account is in contradiction with the quantum formalism, but also the case of “possible individuals” turns inconsistent within the quantum realm.

The concept of classical r matrices is developed from a purely canonical standpoint. The final purpose of this work is to bring about a synthesis between recent developments in the theory of integrable systems and the general theory of quantization as a deformation of classical mechanics. The concept of quantization algebra is here dominant; in integrable systems this is the set of dynamical variables that appear in the Lax pair. The nature of this algebra, a solvable Lie algebra in (...) such models as the Sine-Gordon and Toda field theories but semisimple in the case of spin systems, provides a useful scheme for the classification of integrable models. A completely different classification is obtained by the nature of the r matrix employed; there are three kinds: rational, trigonometric, and elliptic. All cases are studied in detail, with numerous examples. Some of the problems connected with quantization are discussed. (shrink)