„Polyamorie“ ist die Bezeichnung für das explizite und konsensuelle Eingehen mehrerer Liebesbeziehungen zur selben Zeit. Mit polyamoren Konstellationen korreliert, dafür wird in diesem Beitrag argumentiert, eine Ethik der Beziehungsgestaltung und sie schließen darüber hinaus für gewöhnlich das Teilen äquivalenter gesellschaftspolitischer Prämissen ein, auf die im Folgenden an einigen Stellen hingewiesen wird. Eine Ethik der Polyamorie umfasst zwei Eigenschaften: Polyethiken brechen zum einen mit dem traditionellen Verständnis vom Individuum oder Handlungssubjekt. Ich werde zeigen, dass polyamoren Beziehungsnetzwerken und der Ethik, die in (...) ihnen idealiter gelebt wird, ein relationales Denken zugrunde liegt. Zum anderen zeichnen sich Polyethiken durch ein besonderes Augenmerk auf die Beziehungen, die als poly bezeichnet werden können, aus, in denen typischerweise eine Reihe von Werten realisiert werden. Zuvor gilt es allerdings, das Verständnis von Liebe zu definieren, das nach meinem Verständnis einem Polycule bzw. polyamoren Beziehungsnetzwerken im Allgemeinen zugrunde liegt. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the ways in which dominant poly discourses position polyamorists among other queer and feminist-friendly practices while setting polygamists outside of those practices as the heteronormative and hyper-patriarchal antithesis to queer kinship. I begin by examining the interlocking liberal discourses of freedom, secularism and egalitarianism that frame the putative distinction between polyamory and polygamy. I then argue that the discursive antinomies of polyamory/polygamy demarcate a distinction that has greater affective resonance than logical validity—an affective resonance, (...) moreover, that is built on neocolonial framings of polygamy as barbaric and idealizations of polyamory that whitewash its practices. (shrink)

Polyamorie ist romantische Liebe, die sich auf mindestens zwei Personen bezieht oder beziehen kann. Eine solche Definition klingt leichter als sie es tatsächlich ist. Um eine genaue und adäquate Analyse von Polyamorie zu leisten, muss, erstens, geklärt werden, was Liebe – die hier allein als romantische Liebe thematisiert wird – überhaupt ist. Sie ist, so soll gezeigt werden, ein spezifisches dispositionales Emotionsmuster, das eine besonders starke Form der subjektiven Bedeutsamkeit konstituiert. Auf dem Hintergrund dieses Verständnisses von romantischer Liebe im Allgemeinen (...) soll dann, zweitens, gezeigt werden, dass polyamore Liebe keine andere Form der Liebe ist als monoamore Liebe, sondern sich als romantische Liebe allein durch die divergierende Anzahl der Personen, die Gegenstand der Liebe sind, von monoamorer Liebe unterscheidet; besonderer Auszeichnungen wie verantwortlich oder konsensuell, wie sie in der Literatur geläufig sind, bedarf eine so verstandene polyamore Liebe, um sie hinreichend zu definieren, also nicht. Beachtet man aber, dass es eine Sache ist, polyamore Liebe, verstanden als emotionales Phänomen, zu definieren, und eine durchaus ganz andere Sache, polyamore Beziehungen zu definieren, bleibt Raum für die Frage, wann genau eine Beziehungskonstellation eigentlich polyamor ist, oder wann eine polyamore Person einfach nur mehrere Personen liebt, ohne dass die entstehende Beziehungskonstellation als solche aber polyamor wäre. Schließlich soll, drittens, das Verhältnis von Polyamorie und Sexualität beleuchtet werden. Auch wenn Sexualität für gewöhnlich als eines der hervorstechenden Elemente der romantischen Liebe verstanden wird, gehört sie gar nicht notwendig zu ihr – und jedenfalls hätte die Behauptung, dass eine notwendige Beziehung zwischen Polyamorie und gelebter Sexualität besteht, begrifflich-normative Konsequenzen, die man wohl gar nicht haben will. Es wird gezeigt, warum es keine notwendige Beziehung zwischen Liebe und Sexualität gibt – weder zwischen monoamorer noch zwischen polyamorer Liebe und Sexualität. Auch asexuelle polyamore (romantische) Liebe ist somit möglich. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag hinterfragt das weitläufige Verständnis von Polyamorie als eine Form der Liebe beziehungsweise Beziehungsform, die (1) notwendigerweise romantische Liebesbeziehungen in einem engen Verständnis beinhaltet, das heißt einschließlich Sex, und (2) Freundschaft ausschließt. Über eine Untersuchung und Zurückweisung der These, dass romantische Liebesbeziehungen ohne Sex nicht denkbar sind, kommt der Beitrag zu einer Analyse von romantischen Liebesbeziehungen und Freundschaften. Anhand einer vergleichenden Analyse der in romantischen Liebesbeziehungen wie auch in engen Freundschaften realisierten Beziehungsgüter kann gezeigt werden, dass sich diese kaum (...) in einem normativ relevanten Sinne unterscheiden. Letztendlich kann Polyamorie damit plausiblerweise nur auf einem weiten Verständnis romantischer Liebesbeziehungen aufbauen, was das Konzept inklusiver gestaltet und in polyamoren Beziehungskonstellationen Raum für Freundschaften und nicht-sexuelle romantische Beziehungen bietet. Dieser Artikel leistet damit nicht nur einen explikativen und präzisierenden Beitrag zur philosophischen Debatte rund um Polyamorie, sondern möchte den Begriff neu prägen. (shrink)

Die Vorstellung, dass wir mehrere Menschen zugleich lieben können, wird in modernen, westlich geprägten Gesellschaften sowohl als fast trivialerweise wahr anerkannt, als auch als grundsätzlich verfehlt abgelehnt. Während beispielsweise kein Zweifel daran besteht, dass wir üblicherweise unsere Eltern und zeitgleich etwaige Geschwister sowie umgekehrt Eltern für gewöhnlich alle ihre Kinder lieben und wir zudem zumeist mehrere enge und tiefe Freundschaften pflegen, ist die gesellschaftlich vorherrschende Auffassung von romantischer Liebe weitgehend von der Idee geprägt, dass es sich ausschließlich um exklusive Zweierbeziehungen (...) handeln könne. Darüber hinaus haftet allen von der romantischen exklusiven Paarbeziehung abweichenden Formen, Liebe in Beziehungskonstellationen zu leben, eine diese moralisch mindestens als implizit fragwürdig, wenn nicht sogar offen als verwerflich kennzeichnende Be- beziehungsweise Verurteilung an. Tatsächlich gibt es allerdings viele Alternativen zur Monogamie. Der vermutlich berühmtesten, der Polyamorie, widmet sich der vorliegende Schwerpunkt. Das Wort „Polyamorie“ ist ein griechisch-lateinischer Hybrid (griech. polýs, viel/mehrere; lat. amor, Liebe) und die Bezeichnung für das zeitgleiche und konsensuelle Eingehen mehrerer Liebesbeziehungen. „Polycule“ ist das englische Kunstwort für eine ganze Reihe deutscher Ausdrücke für polyamore Beziehungsmodelle wie etwa auch „konsensuell- nichtmonogames Beziehungsnetzwerk“, „Sorgegemeinschaft“, „Wahlfamilie“ oder „Polykül“. Polyamore Beziehungsmodelle sind demnach breit gefächert und können letztlich alle möglichen Beziehungskonstellationen zwischen Personen umfassen, die einander auf die eine oder andere liebende Weise nahestehen. Dieser Schwerpunkt wirft vereinzelt Schlaglichter der philosophischen und ethischen Reflexion auf einige der Fragen und Herausforderungen, die sich hinsichtlich ethischer Polyamorie stellen beziehungsweise die mit dieser Form der nichtmonogamen Beziehungspraxis und -haltung einhergehen. Unsere Autor*innen eröffnen Diskussionsräume über einige grundlegende Aspekte einer Auseinandersetzung mit dem Phänomen der Polyamorie. Damit stecken wir mit diesem Schwerpunkt das große Feld der philosophischen und ethischen Analyse rund um die Polyamorie lediglich grob ab – eine systematische und umfassende philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Phänomen der Polyamorie muss an anderer Stelle erfolgen. Nichtsdestotrotz erleichtern wir mit diesem Schwerpunkt den Einstieg in die vielfältigen philosophischen und ethischen Fragen, die sich mit dem Phänomen der Polyamorie ergeben und bereiten den Grund für eine dezidierte und genaue Auseinandersetzung mit den Herausforderungen, vor die wir uns mit ihr gestellt sehen. (shrink)

Polyamory is a form of consensual non-monogamy. To render it palatable to critics, activists and theorists often accentuate its similarity to monogamy. I argue that this strategy conceals the distinctive character of polyamorous intimacy. A more discriminating account of polyamory helps me answer objections to the lifestyle whilst noting some of its unique pitfalls. I define polyamory, and explain why people pursue this lifestyle. Many think polyamory is an inferior form of intimacy; I describe four of (...) their main objections. I explain how commitment to ‘the polyamorous possibility’ prompts one to viscerally experience personal, practical, and social constraints. Unlike monogamous dynamics, these confrontations are mediated by third parties who destabilise the familiar dynamics of coupled life. Polyamory can be emotionally challenging but, as I outline in the article, it is sustained by interpersonal emotional work that helps people feel and understand their emotions, communicate without confrontation, and contain the difficult emotions of others. This work is qualitatively and quantitatively intensified in polyamory. Finally, I rebut objections to polyamory whilst also acknowledging the ways polyamory has its own pitfalls. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 46, no. 2. © 2020 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 287 Julienne Obadia Responsibility, Respectability, Recognition, and Polyamory: Lessons in Subject Formation in the Age of Sexual Identity Introduction: It’s About Time “Sexuality” has become a strikingly capacious category in recent years. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans* have been joined by queer, questioning, intersex, pansexual, Two Spirit, asexual, and ally, as the acronym LGBT increasingly serves as (...) a base for expanded formulations such as LGBTQQIP2SAA. In light of this trajectory, perhaps it should not have surprised me to hear so many of my polyamorist interlocutors identifying polyamory as their sexual orientation. While polyamory’s emergence as a named practice in 1990 was more closely associated with the sexual revolution than the gay liberation movement, the increasing intelligibility of polyamory as a sexual orientation, I argue, offers important insights into how, and to what effect, the category of sexuality is expanding, and illuminates contemporary mechanisms of subject formation in American late liberalism. It is tempting to analyze this phenomenon solely within the historical context of the twentieth century rise of identity politics. However, a focus on recent decades is insufficient for understanding the increasing capaciousness of the sexual orientation framework. I argue that, more than simply demonstrating a proliferation of sexual identities, polyamory ’s reconfiguration also highlights the powerful demands made of subjects of sexual orientation to be respectable by espousing particular forms of intimacy over others. These demands call for a longer historical 288 Julienne Obadia view of marriage, monogamy, and whiteness as constitutive of US social, political, and legal recognition. Consider my encounter with Steve: At the 2013 annual “Poly Living” convention in Philadelphia, organized by the polyamory advocacy group, Loving More, I gathered with the other attendees in a large circle in the main hall. After a brief welcome by the organizers, we introduced ourselves one by one and then dispersed for drinks and informal mingling. I took a seat alone and, after a moment, a man in his sixties with a graying ponytail and wearing a Hawaiian shirt approached me. “You’re an anthropologist?” he asked. “Can I talk to you for a minute?” I smiled and gestured at the seat across from me, and he introduced himself, putting his beer on the table beside mine and sitting down. Fidgeting nervously, he explained that he and his wife had been married for over twenty years, but the last several years had been sexless, with her desire waning while his had not. After learning about polyamory, he cautiously suggested it and she reluctantly agreed to let him do some sexual exploring outside the marriage, but with tight restrictions: He could go to events like these and could have limited sexual interaction with others, but he could not have penetrative sex, nor could he pursue any emotional or more-than-casual intimacy with anyone. He found these constraints difficult, understandably so at such events, where people were in fact encouraged to seek out emotional intimacy and enjoy a wide range of consensual connections. Such limitations ran counter to polyamory’s ethos, which, as indicated by the organization’s name, sought more love, although particular arrangements varied significantly. As he elaborated on these details, I realized that Steve was not simply sharing as people often did, unprompted, at these events, which seek to foster open communication, curiosity, and self-exploration. He was torn about how to identify his sexual desire and make sense of his difficulty finding fulfillment within his wife’s conditions. He paused, looking at me searchingly with a mix of distress and hope, and asked if his desire to see other people was natural. “Is it possible,” he asked, “that being poly is a sexual orientation I was born with, like being gay?” He hoped that, precisely in my capacity as an anthropologist, I might have some definitive expert knowledge about human sexuality—an incontrovertible yes or no about the provenance of his desire and the legitimacy of his dissatisfaction. Julienne Obadia 289 As Steve’s conundrum makes clear, the intelligibility of polyamory as an immutable sexual orientation is very recent. Its inclusion marks a dramatic shift from Eve Sedgwick’s observation nearly three decades ago... (shrink)

This article highlights a somewhat neglected aspect of love : their complexity. We suggest distinguishing between three major related types of emotional complexity: emotional diversity, emotional ambivalence, and emotional behavior. The notion of emotional complexity has far-reaching implications for understanding emotions and our wellbeing. This is illustrated by examining the notion of emotional complexity in two common yet complex phenomena in the romantic realm: romantic compromises and polyamory.

This paper responds to arguments that polyamorous groups or care networks do not qualify for equal treatment with marriages. It refutes the points that polyamory is inherently hierarchical or unstable, that there are too few people in such arrangements to mount an argument for recognition, that polyamory harms children, and that there are insurmountable legal and practical hurdles to network marriage. Finally, it respond to the charge that extending recognition to polyamorists will devalue the recognition of same-sex marriage.

This essay addresses various moral objections to polyamory and argues that none succeeds. Brake also argues that in some respects polyamory can be superior to monogamy given that polyamorists often endorse ideals such as radical honesty, non-possessiveness, and rejection of jealousy. Moreover, Brake argues that the effects of polyamory in a society in which it is widespread can be very beneficial.

This groundbreaking look at the array of styles and modes of relationships proposes a new paradigm for understanding intimate relationships, challenging the monogamy/polyamory binary and offering fresh possibilities for thinking about contemporary love, sex, gender, and sexuality.

Coupledom and notions of intimacy and family formation with one committed partner are hallmarks of family and relationship science. Recent national surveys in the United States and Canada have found that consensually non-monogamous relationships are common, though prevalence of specific types of consensual non-monogamy are unknown. The present research draws on a United States Census based quota sample of single adults to estimate the prevalence of desire for, familiarity with, and engagement in polyamory—a distinct type of consensually non-monogamous relationship (...) where people typically engage in romantic love and sexual intimacy with multiple partners. Results show that 1 out of 6 people desire to engage in polyamory, and 1 out of 9 people have engaged in polyamory at some point during their life. Approximately 1 out of 15 people reported that they knew someone who has been or is currently engaged in polyamory. Among participants who were not personally interested in polyamory, 1 out of 7 indicated that they respect people who engage in polyamory. Few sociodemographic correlates emerged; no differences in prevalence were found based on political affiliation, income, religion, geographic region, or race/ethnicity. Sexual minorities, men, and younger adults reported greater desire to engage in polyamory. Men and people with lower education backgrounds were more likely to have previously engaged in polyamory. Given that emotional and sexual intimacy is an important part of most people’s lives, understanding the varied ways in which people navigate their intimate lives is critical for the fields of relationship, sexuality, and family science. (shrink)

(English abstract further below.) -/- Wer denkt, Polyamorie erfordere ein geringeres Maß an Verpflichtung als Zweierbeziehungen, der liegt gründlich daneben. Wie aber gestaltet sich polyamoröse wechselseitige Verpflichtung idealerweise? In diesem Beitrag untersuche ich, ob sich ein bestimmtes, auf Iris Murdochs Konzeption von Liebe als gerechter Aufmerksamkeit beruhendes Ideal wechselseitiger Verpflichtung in romantischen Partnerschaften fruchtbar auf polyamoröse Beziehungsgeflechte anwenden lässt. Ich beginne damit, Murdochs im deutschsprachigen Raum kaum rezipierte Liebeskonzeption ausführlich darzustellen und diese dabei von Simone Weils Position abzugrenzen, der Murdoch (...) wesentliche Elemente entnimmt. In einem zweiten Schritt skizziere ich das von Murdochs Position inspirierte Ideal wechselseitiger Verpflichtung. In Auseinandersetzung mit Überlegungen, die John Enman-Beech und Julienne Obadia mit Blick auf die in polyamorösen Beziehungsgeflechten verbreitete Praxis angestellt haben, Beziehungsvereinbarungen einzugehen, werbe ich drittens für die skizzierte Idealkonzeption, indem ich zeige, dass sich mit ihr den von Enman-Beech und Obadia aufgeworfenen Herausforderungen, die sich im Zuge intrapolykularer Beziehungsvereinbarungen stellen, in zwei Hinsichten mit Erfolg begegnen lässt. Erstens hebe ich hervor, dass eine am skizzierten Ideal orientierte Praxis bereits die Art von prozeduralen Normen implementiert, auf deren Bedeutung Enman-Beech zu Recht hinweist. Zweitens argumentiere ich dafür, dass das skizzierte Ideal nicht den Schwierigkeiten ausgesetzt ist, die sich nach Obadia mit denjenigen Elementen intrapolykularer Beziehungsvereinbarungen verbinden, die sie als Vertragskomplex bezeichnet, und ein weniger pessimistisches Bild davon nahelegt, wie vermittelst solcher Beziehungsvereinbarungen konstituierte Individuen aufzufassen sind. -/- ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this paper, I focus on a certain ideal conception of how lovers may commit to each other in polyamorous relationships. Drawing on an analysis of Iris Murdoch’s adaptation of Simone Weil’s ideas, I sketch what I have elsewhere called the ideal lovers’ pledge—a conception of a commitment between lovers that is spelled out in terms of Weil’s and Murdoch’s shared notion of love as just attention. I then argue that this conception is well-suited to meet certain challenges that arise in the context of thinking about relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships, challenges that have been brought out in recent work by John Enman-Beech and Julienne Obadia. First, I show that practices of forging relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships that are oriented toward the ideal I propose will naturally implement the kind of procedural norms that Enman-Beech rightly highlights. Second, I argue that the ideal I propose does not generate the kinds of problems that according to Obadia arise due to a constellation of assumptions that she thinks underlie the practice of forging relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships – a constellation she dubs the contract complex. The proposed ideal thus suggests an alternative under-standing of such agreements and implies a less pessimistic account of what kind of individuals are constituted by way of forging such agreements. (shrink)

Compersion ist ein affektiver Zustand, der häufig im Zusammenhang mit Polyamorie und allgemein nicht-monogamen Beziehungen diskutiert wird. Er wird in der Regel als eine positive emotionale Reaktion darauf beschrieben, dass die*der Partner*in Zeit und/oder Intimität mit anderen genießt, gewissermaßen als ‚das Gegenteil von Eifersucht‘. Wir argumentieren dafür, dass eine buddhistische Perspektive dazu beitragen kann, die Natur dieser bislang schlecht verstandenen Emotion zu erschließen. Indem wir eine buddhistische Perspektive auf Compersion einnehmen, die auf den sogenannten ‚vier göttlichen Verweilzuständen‘ basiert, d. h. (...) auf nicht-egozentrischen Zuständen, die Buddhist*innen zufolge ein gelingendes Leben erlauben, beschreiben wir (auch moralpraktisch) wichtige Facetten dieser Emotion, die sonst leicht übersehen werden. Ein solcher Ansatz, so argumentieren wir, bereichert nicht nur unser Verständnis von Compersion, sondern trägt auch zum Gelingen aller Arten von Beziehungen bei. (shrink)

The downsides of monogamy are felt by most people engaged in long-term relationships, including restrictions on self-discovery, limits on friendship, sexual boredom, and a circumscribed understanding of intimacy. Yet, a "happily ever after" monogamy is assumed to be the ideal form of romantic love in many modern societies: a relationship that is morally ideal and will bring the most happiness to its two partners. -/- In Why It’s OK to Not Be Monogamous, Justin L. Clardy deeply questions these assumptions. He (...) rejects the claim that non-monogamy among honest, informed and consenting adults is morally impermissible. He shows instead how polyamorous relationships can actually be exemplars of moral virtue. The book discusses how social and political forces sustain and reward monogamous relationships. The book defines non-monogamy as a privative concept; a negation of monogamy. Looking at its prevalence in the United States, the book explains how common criticisms of non-monogamy come up short. Clardy argues, as some researchers have recently shown―monogamy relies on continually demonizing non-monogamy to sustain its moral status. Finally, the book concludes with a focus on equality, asking what justice for polyamorous individuals might look like. (shrink)

When people talk about anarchism, what they have in mind is typically political anarchism, that is, the view that there should be no state. As the philosopher and anarchism scholar David Miller observes, however, anarchism itself is a more general view, namely the view that there should be no rulers. Miller writes that “although the state is the most distinctive object of anarchist attack, it is by no means the only object. Any institution which, like the state, appears to anarchists (...) coercive, punitive, exploitative or destructive is condemned in the same way”—including, for example, religious institutions, schools, or economic systems (Miller 1984: 8). In this sense, one can be an anarchist about different things. Relationship anarchy is anarchism about personal relationships. -/- Several thinkers in the anarchist tradition have held views on personal relationships (e.g., Godwin 1793; Bakunin 1866; Goldman 1910). In what follows, however, our focus is not on the general issue of anarchist views on relationships, but on the ideas of the contemporary movement of self-identifying relationship anarchists. -/- The ideas of relationship anarchy in this sense—hereafter RA—have been developed in queer and countercultural communities over the last two decades. Rather than focusing primarily on mechanisms of political power, RA theorists have been concerned with understanding and challenging the power dynamics at play in close personal relationships. Andie Nordgren, the movement’s central, founding theorist, describes RA as a radical commitment “to avoid defining relationships by attempts to exercise power over each other” (Nordgren 2018). -/- Our aim is to give a concise presentation and defense of RA. We will approach RA as a theory in applied ethics—in particular, as a theory in sexual ethics and relationship ethics—and relate it to ongoing debates in these areas. We, the authors, are both queer men with a background in countercultures where RA is widely practiced and discussed. One of us is an activist working on trans- and sex workers’ rights (Sørlie), the other is a philosophy professor (Moen). Although we make several claims about the scope, content, and justification of RA, we do not claim to speak with any special authority on the issue. Moreover, many of the points that we make here, while not attributable to a specific source, are not original to us, but are the result of several years of fruitful discussion with others in the RA community. -/- We start by considering the cases where, from an RA perspective, current mainstream relationship norms are too restrictive. Then we turn to the cases where current norms are too permissive. Our views on what counts as “mainstream” relationship norms are, no doubt, influenced by the fact that we are writing from a Scandinavian perspective. -/- We then proceed to consider the relationship between RA and polyamory. We argue that RA is compatible with some, but not all, forms of polyamorous practice. We also argue that, from an RA perspective, the increasingly popular term “consensual non-monogamy” is a misleading term that should be avoided. In the conclusion, we explain how RA, as a position in applied ethics, can be justified within consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethical frameworks alike. -/- We have restricted our scope, in what follows, to chosen relationships between adults. Thus, we are not dealing with, for example, kinship relationships into which one is born, nor relationships between adults and minors. Although many issues and arguments deserve to be explored in greater depth than we can do here, we hope, nevertheless, to be able to convey the main nature and thrust of RA. (shrink)

This volume features original essays on the philosophy of love. The essays are organized thematically around the past, present, and future of philosophical thinking about love. In section I, the contributors explore what we can learn from the history of philosophical thinking about love. The chapters cover Ancient Greek thinkers, namely Plato and Aristotle, as well as Kierkegaard's critique of preferential love and Erich Fromm's mystic interpretation of sexual relations. Section II covers current conceptions and practices of love. These chapters (...) explore how love changes over time, the process of falling in love, envy in romantic partnerships, and a new interpretation of grand-parental love. Finally, Section III looks at the future of love. These chapters address technological developments related to love, such as algorithm-driven dating apps and robotic companions, as well as the potential of polyamory as a future romantic ideal. This book will be of interest to researchers and advanced students in moral philosophy and social and political philosophy who are working on issues related to philosophy of love. (shrink)

This book examines, through a multi-disciplinary lens, the possibilities offered by relationships and family forms that challenge the nuclear family ideal, and some of the arguments that recommend or disqualify these as legitimate units in our societies. That children should be conceived naturally, born to and raised by their two young, heterosexual, married to each other, genetic parents; that this relationship between parents is also the ideal relationship between romantic or sexual partners; and that romance and sexual intimacy ought to (...) be at the core of our closest personal relationships - all these elements converge towards the ideal of the nuclear family. The authors consider a range of relationship and family structures that depart from this ideal: polyamory and polygamy, single and polyparenting, parenting by gay and lesbian couples, as well as families created through current and prospective modes of assisted human reproduction such as surrogate motherhood, donor insemination, and reproductive cloning. (shrink)

In some cultures, people tend to believe that it is very important to be sexually exclusive in romantic relationships and idealise monogamous romantic relationships; but there is a tension in this ideal. Sex is generally considered to have value, and usually when we love someone we want to increase the amount of value in their lives, not restrict it without good reason. There is thus a call, not yet adequately responded to by philosophers, for greater clarity in the reasons §why (...) it might be reasonable for a couple to adopt a policy of sexual exclusivity. This article argues that we cannot justify the demand for sexual exclusivity by a need to protect the relationship from the risk of one partner ‘trading-up’, or by appealing to jealousy. However, sexual exclusivity can be intelligible if it supports the romantic relationship and helps to distinguish it from other relationships. Nonetheless, sexual exclusivity ought not to be the hegemonic social norm that it currently is in some societies because this diminishes the potential value it might have and gives the idea of faithfulness the wrong focus. (shrink)

True Love Without Uniqueness: Good Reasons for Romantic Love Love involves emotions, and emotions are things that happen to us. So how can love be true? Love can be true only if people can have reasons for loving someone. I explore the tension between these two thoughts and propose a way of resolving it. I argue that reasons for romantic love are not limited to the other person’s properties, not even when relational properties such as a common sense of humour (...) are included. A full-blown romantic relation provides relation-dependent reasons that derive from the values that are realized within the relationship. These include trust, vulnerability and intimacy. True love is justified in part by such relation-dependent reasons. How this is consistent with the emotional dimension of love becomes clear once it is appreciated that people can have reasons for the emotions they experience. As this is not always recognized, the mystery of love is sometimes overrated. I end by discussing whether true love must be unique in the sense of being limited to one particular person. I argue that true love need not be combined with the norms of monogamy, but is consistent with those of polyamory. (shrink)

Is love best when it is fresh? For many, the answer is a resounding “yes.” The intense experiences that characterize new love are impossible to replicate, leading to wistful reflection and even a repeated pursuit of such ecstatic beginnings. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev takes these experiences seriously, but he’s also here to remind us of the benefits of profound love—an emotion that can only develop with time. In The Arc of Love, he provides an in-depth, philosophical account of the experiences that arise (...) in early, intense love—sexual passion, novelty, change—as well as the benefits of cultivating long-term, profound love—stability, development, calmness. Ben-Ze’ev analyzes the core of emotions many experience in early love and the challenges they encounter, and he offers pointers for weathering these challenges. Deploying the rigorous analysis of a philosopher, but writing clearly and in an often humorous style with an eye to lived experience, he takes on topics like compromise, commitment, polyamory, choosing a partner, online dating, and when to say “I love you.” Ultimately, Ben-Ze’ev assures us, while love is indeed best when fresh, if we tend to it carefully, it can become more delicious and nourishing even as time marches on. (shrink)

Sex raises fundamental philosophical questions about topics such as personal identity and well-being, the relationship between emotion and reason, the nature of autonomy and consent, and the dual nature of persons as individuals but also social beings. This article serves as an overview of the philosophy of sex in the English-speaking philosophical tradition and explicates philosophical debate in several specific areas: sexual objectification, rape and consent, sex work, sexual identities and queer theory, the medicalization of sexuality, and polyamory. It (...) situates these topics in a framework of shifting cultural attitudes and argues for the importance of the philosophy of sex. It ends with some suggestions about future research, particularly with regard to the changing nature of pornography and sexual justice in legal theory. (shrink)

Undoubtedly Romantic love has come to saturate our culture and is often considered to be a, or even the, major existential goal of our lives, capable of providing us with both our sense of worth and way of being in the world. The Radicalism of Romantic Love interrogates the purported radicalism of Romantic love from philosophical, cultural and psychoanalytic perspectives, exploring whether it is a subversive force capable of breaking down entrenched social, political and cultural norms and structures, or whether, (...) in spite of its role in the fight against certain barriers, it is in fact a highly conservative impulse. Exploring both the grounds for the central place of Romantic love in contemporary lives and the meaning, extent and nature of its supposed radicalism, this volume considers love from a variety of theoretical perspectives, with attention to matters of gender, sexuality, class and ethnicity. With authors examining a range of questions, including the role of love in the same-sex marriage debate, polyamory and the notion of love as a political force, The Radicalism of Romantic Love illuminates a fundamental but perplexing aspect of our contemporary lives and will appeal to scholars across the social sciences and humanities with interests in the emotions and love as a social and political phenomenon. (shrink)

This is the 8th edition of the book, with eight new essays to the volume. Table of contents: Are We Having Sex Now or What? (Greta Christina); Sexual Perversion (Thomas Nagel); Plain Sex (Alan Goldman); Sex and Sexual Perversion (Robert Gray); Masturbation and the Continuum of Sexual Activities (Alan Soble); Love: What’s Sex Got to Do with It? (Natasha McKeever); Is “Loving More” Better? The Values of Polyamory (Elizabeth Brake); What Is Sexual Orientation? (Robin Dembroff); Sexual Orientation: What Is (...) It? (Kathleen Stock); Asexuality (Luke Brunning and Natasha McKeever); LGBTQ ... Z? (Kathy Rudy); How to Be a Pluralist About Gender Categories (Katharine Jenkins); The Negotiative Theory of Gender Identity and the Limits of First-Person Authority (Burkay Ozturk); Racial Sexual Desires (Raja Halwani); Sex and Technology: The Ethics of Virtual Connection (Neil McArthur); A Realist Sexual Ethics (Micah Newman); Sexual Morality and the Concept of Using Another Person (Thomas Mappes); Sexual Use (Alan Soble); Dark Desires (Seiriol Morgan); The Harms of Consensual Sex (Robin West); Casual Sex, Promiscuity, and Objectification (Raja Halwani); Is Prostitution Harmful? (Ole Martin Moen); BDSM (Shaun Miller); Two Views of Sexual Ethics: Promiscuity, Pedophilia, and Rape (David Benatar); Sexual Gifts and Sexual Duties (Alan Soble); A Bibliography of the Philosophy of Sex . (shrink)

An analysis and critique of irrationalist and romanticising threads in thinking about love.

Desire, Love, and Identity: Philosophy of Sex and Love combines classical readings with contemporary articles exploring love and sex as defining features of our identity. This volume includes readings from a wide variety of perspectives, addressing topics such as sexual objectification, sexual identity, the ethics of sex work, love and sex online, friendship, polyamory, and BDSM. Alongside ancient, modern, and contemporary selections are sixteen original contributions written by emerging voices in the field. A wide-ranging, engaging, accessible introduction to the (...) subject, the text includes further readings and discussion questions to promote thought, discussion, and composition on subjects deeply intertwined with students' identities. (shrink)

Desire, Love, and Identity: Philosophy of Sex and Love combines classical readings with contemporary articles exploring love and sex as defining features of our identity. This volume includes readings from a wide variety of perspectives, addressing topics such as sexual objectification, sexual identity, the ethics of sex work, love and sex online, friendship, polyamory, and BDSM. Alongside ancient, modern, and contemporary selections are sixteen original contributions written by emerging voices in the field. A wide-ranging, engaging, accessible introduction to the (...) subject, the text includes further readings and discussion questions to promote thought, discussion, and composition on subjects deeply intertwined with students' identities. (shrink)

hese are replies to my critics at at Society for German Idealism and Romanticism (SGIR) Author-Meets-Critics session, Pacific APA 2021. -/- Published version of the full symposium is available on SGIR Review's homepage.

When can ever be justified in banning a religious practice? This paper focusses on Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach. Certain religious practices create a clash between capabilities where the capability to religious belief and expression is in conflict with the capability of equal status and nondiscrimination. One example of such a clash is the case of polygamy. Nussbaum argues that there may be circumstances where polygamy may be acceptable. On the contrary, I argue that the capabilities approach cannot justify polygamy in (...) any circumstance. Her approach rules out polygamy, but may not rule out all non-monogamous relationships, such as polyamory. Finally, I conclude that the capabilities approach would benefit from a more robust understanding of recognition. (shrink)

Christopher Bennett has argued that state support of conjugal relationships can be founded on the unique contribution such relationships make to the autonomy of their participants by providing them with various forms of recognition and support unavailable elsewhere. I argue that, in part because a long history of interaction between two people who need each other’s validation tends to produce less meaningful responses over time, long-term conjugal relationships are unlikely to provide autonomy-enhancing support to their participants. To the extent that (...) intimate relationships can provide a unique form of reciprocal support, Bennett fails to show that couples have an advantage over multiple-partner arrangements in doing so. (shrink)

Contrasting institutionalism and sexual liberation is the essence of Black Mirror episode, Striking Vipers, which challenges the socially constructed boundaries imposed on sexual experiences in its consideration of how two conflicting lifestyles, traditional commitment and sexual openness, can cohabitate together. Through use of virtual eroticism, the episode takes the privileged standing of heteronormative monogamy and exposes its inadequacy as an institution without concluding that it must be jettisoned entirely. By contrasting real‐world intimacy with virtuality, it considers the meaningfulness of sexual (...) fantasies, thereby questioning the very definition of true intimacy. Striking Vipers ultimately explores the possibility that what is real may not always be what is most meaningful. Physical relationships can be just as artificial as fantasy, and imagination can be just as meaningful as reality. It concludes with the suggestion that neither heteronormative monogamy nor virtual escapism are fully satisfying. Instead, both romantic expressions may provide the necessary balance between monotonous devotion and unrestrained sexuality. (shrink)

Polygamy is a hotly contested practice and open to widespread misunderstandings. This practice is defined as a relationship between either one husband and multiple wives or one wife and multiple husbands. Today, “polygamy” almost exclusively takes the form of one husband with multiple wives. In this article, my focus will center on limited defenses of polygamy offered recently by Chesire Calhoun and Martha Nussbaum. I will argue that these defenses are unconvincing. The problem with polygamy is primarily that it is (...) a structurally inegalitarian practice in both theory and fact. Polygamy should be opposed for this reason. (shrink)

In this collection, liberal and feminist philosophers debate whether marriage reform ought to stop with same-sex marriage. Some authors argue for abolishing marriage or for new legal forms such as polygamy or temporary marriage. Others argue that the liberal values justifying same-sex marriage do not entail further reform.