Research on the neurobiology and psychosocial features of Major Depressive Disorder has the ability to extend our understanding of affiliative behavior. In depression, decreased hedonic capacity and hypoactivity in dopaminergic and prefrontal circuitries may decrease the ability to experience affiliative relationships as rewarding. We suggest that neurobiological research on depression can provide a test case for theoretical models of affiliation.

By emphasizing nonlinear dynamics between appraisal and emotions, Lewis's model provides a valuable platform for integrating psychological and neural perspectives on the emotion-cognition interface. In this commentary, I discuss the role of neuroscience in shaping new conceptualizations of emotion and the putative role of theta oscillation within frontocingulate pathways in depression, a syndrome in which emotion-cognition relations are dysfunctional.

The stability of the perfect screw dislocation in silicon has been investigated using both classical potentials and first-principles calculations. Although a recent study by Koizumi et al . stated that the stable screw dislocation was located in both the 'shuffle' and the 'glide' sets of {111} planes, it is shown that this result depends on the classical potential used, and that the most stable configuration belongs to the 'shuffle' set only, in the centre of one hexagon. We also investigated the (...) stability of an sp 2 hybridization in the core of the dislocation, obtained for one metastable configuration in the 'glide' set. The core structures are characterized in several ways, with a description of the three-dimensional structure, differential displacement maps and derivatives of the disregistry. (shrink)

Research on emotion and emotion regulation is expected to improve our understanding of psychopathology. However, achieving this understanding requires overcoming several obstacles, including the paucity of objective markers of specific emotions or psychiatric diagnoses, and the fact that emotion regulation is a concept that can be difficult to operationalize. We review affective neuroscience research that has addressed these issues by focusing on psychological and neural mechanisms implicated in approach and avoidance behaviors, as revealed by studies of fear, anxiety, and reward (...) processing. Dysfunction in these mechanisms may serve as risk markers for psychopathology, while emotion regulation research demonstrates that some of them are susceptible to volitional control. The conclusion acknowledges limitations of affective neuroscience and highlights goals for future work. (shrink)

The authors of a much discussed recent book A Lot of People are Saying: The New Conspiracism and the Assault on Democracy, Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum argue that ‘a new conspiracism’ has emerged recently. Their examples include Donald Trump’s allegations that elections have been rigged, ‘Birther’ accusations about Barack Obama, ‘QAnon’ and ‘Pizzagate’. They characterize these as ‘conspiracism without the theory’. They argue that the new conspiracism is validated by repetition, disregards experts, and is satisfied with the (...) conclusion that allegations are ‘true enough’. Here I argue that there is no new conspiracism. Muirhead and Rosenblum have misconstrued their chief examples of new conspiracism and mischaracterized classic conspiracism. The non-existence of a new conspiracism matters. If those studying contemporary conspiracism suppose that many of the objects of their study are theory-free then they are liable to fail to examine the theories that actually are driving contemporary conspiracism. Also, if they suppose that they are confronting an entirely new phenomenon then they are in danger of failing to learn lessons from the rich history of conspiracy theorizing. (shrink)

PENULTIMATE DRAFT. At times, weird stories such as the Pizzagate spread surprisingly quickly and widely. In this paper I analyze the mental attitudes of those who seem to take those absurdities seriously: I argue that those stories are often imagined rather than genuinely believed. Then I make room for the claim that often these imaginings are used to support group ideologies. My main contribution is to explain how that support actually happens by showing that motivated cognition can employ imagination (...) as a seemingly rational tool to reinforce and protect beliefs. (shrink)

An important way in which philosophy can contribute to public discourse is by clarifying concepts that are central to it. This paper is a philosophical contribution in that spirit. It offers an account of fake news—a notion that has entered public debate following the 2016 US presidential election. On the view I defend, fake news is Frankfurtian bullshit that is asserted in the form of a news publication. According to Frankfurt’s famous account, bullshit has two characteristics. There is, firstly, an (...) “indifference to how things really are” on the part of the bullshitter. This does not mean that what a bullshitter says is always false. It might well be true. What it does mean, however, is that, unlike a liar, who tries to convince us that a given statement he believes to be false is true, a bullshitter simply does not care whether what he says is true. The same, I believe, is true of the publisher of fake news. Secondly, the bullshitter misrepresents “in a certain way … what he is up to”. Likewise, the publisher of fake news seems to misrepresent what he is up to. It appears that he wants to hide his actual motives. At any rate, so I will argue. (shrink)

At times, weird stories such as the Pizzagate spread surprisingly quickly and widely. In this paper I analyze the mental attitudes of those who seem to take those absurdities seriously: I argue that those stories are often imagined rather than genuinely believed. Then I make room for the claim that often these imaginings are used to support group ideologies. My main contribution is to explain how that support actually happens by showing that motivated cognition can employ imagination as a (...) seemingly rational tool to reinforce and protect ideologies. (shrink)