The leading models of disability struggle to fully encompass all aspects of “disability.” This difficulty arises, the author argues, because the models fundamentally misunderstand the nature of disability. Current theoretical approaches to disability can be understood as “nounal,” in that they understand disability as a thing that is caused or embodied. In contrast, this paper presents an adverbial perspective on disability, which shows that disability is experienced as a personally irremediable impediment to daily-living tasks or goals-like-ours. The picture (...) class='Hi'>theory of disability technically constitutes a species of relational approach because its analysis references the interplay between an individual and their environment; it differs from other relational accounts, however, by interpreting disability as a certain kind of negative experience—rather than a function of that relationship. This purely descriptive theory makes no normative claims about disability and operates as both a mechanism for the evaluation of the experience of disability and a heuristic device for the proper interpretation of disability. When disability is reframed in this way, the theory offers a particularist perspective which shows if, when, where, and how disability is experienced. (shrink)

What precisely, W. J. T. Mitchell asks, are pictures (and theories of pictures) doing now, in the late twentieth century, when the power of the visual is said to be greater than ever before, and the "pictorial turn" supplants the "linguistic turn" in the study of culture? This book by one of America's leading theorists of visual representation offers a rich account of the interplay between the visible and the readable across culture, from literature to visual art to the mass (...) media. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on picture theory, which is sometimes spoken of as a theory of the proposition. By a proposition, Wittgenstein like Frege means something that determines its sense by means of a correlation between the mode of combination of its constituent symbols and the structure of its sense. It has been an orthodoxy amongst Tractatus interpreters, and continues to be such in the wider philosophical community, that Wittgenstein follows the Russell in offering a correspondence theory (...) of truth. The expression of a Tractarian fact provides that fact's mode of combination, and from here there can be no further question as to the ontological types of its constituents. Tractarian facts, it is however added, are not truth conditions but items whose existence explains the obtaining of truth conditions: a Tractarian atomic fact is not a truth condition but a truthmaker. (shrink)

This book is intended to challenge Frege's Begriffsschrift as the foundation of philosophical work which either uses formal methods or is inspired by them s it attempts the synthesis of the antithetical ideas associated with Wittgenstein, the Picture-Theory, and the language-game conceived as the untimate level of explanation.

It is suggested that wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning is, In part a synthesis and resolution of the early metaphysics of moore and the theory of judgment held by russell about 1910. Moore's theory of the objective existence of concepts and their propositional role is considered. Russell's unsuccessful attempt at the problem of the false proposition is discussed. The ptm offers a more successful solution, Through the concept of logical form, Akin to the russellian concept of (...) order. But this solution still fails because it does not hold for ordinary language. (shrink)

The general features of a picture theory of meaning (PTM) are stated. The PTM is then applied to a particular ontological perspective, and suggestions are made for generalizing the PTM to most ontological perspectives. Several ways around the classic problem for the PTM-that the language used to describe a situation must have at least one more component than the situation described-are offered.

In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein appeals to clarity when he characterises the aim, task and results of philosophy. In this essay I suggest that his ‘picture theory’ of language implies that clarity has aesthetic significance in philosophical work. Wittgenstein claims that the task of philosophy is to make thoughts clear. In the ‘picture theory’ of thought and language, a thought expressed in language is a proposition with a sense and a proposition is a picture of (...) reality. The question I pose is: how should we construe clarity, if making a thought clear is making clear a picture of reality? Following a close analysis of the picture theory, paying particular attention to the notions of depicting, presenting and mirroring, I conclude that the result of philosophical work – the clarification of propositions – will be pleasurable, inexpressible and intrinsically valuable. For these reasons I suggest that the attainment of a clear thought is an aesthetic experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw attention to the often-overlooked Tractarian distinction between representing and depicting, provide a clear account of it and examine how it affects our understanding of the notions of ‘being a picture’, meaningfulness, truth, and falsity in the Tractatus. I also look at the recent debate in the literature on the notion of truth and show that Glock’s claim that the official theory of the Tractatus is to be accounted in terms of obtainment only and (...) deflationary accounts such as Hacker’s derive from a failure to notice the distinction between representing and depicting or a misconception of depicting. Finally, I argue against the idea that either representing or depicting should be dispensed with. Both are necessary for Wittgenstein to account for every case of a proposition being a picture of reality. (shrink)

I argue that the picture theory provides both a common referential hase and a common logical syntax for languages embodying alternative conceptual schemes. I offer an analysis of depiction, explicating the Tractarian concepts of pictorial structure, pictorial relationship, and representational form. Significant failure of reference and the existence of languages with incompatible ontological commitments show that on the molar level depiction is not required for sense. Using three premises, taken to be axiomatic for Wittgenstein, I show that analysis (...) leads to a base of elementary propositions which must depict in order to be significant. There, the relations between pictorial structure, pictorial relationship and representational form are such that reference is secured and conceptual relativity precluded. (shrink)

Recently, commentators such as Kenny and Hacker have disagreed about whether Wittgenstein's early picture theory of meaning is at all compatible with his later theory of “meaning‐as‐use”. Arguing in favor of their compatibility, Kenny finds that meaning‐as‐use supplements, rather than rivals the earlier conception of meaning.

The proposition 'seattle is west of spokane' has three parts: two\nproper names and the predicate 'is west of.' the fact pictured has\ntwo: seattle and spokane. but the picture theory holds that there\nmust be a one-to-one correspondence between fact and proposition.\nhow does wittgenstein solve this problem in the 'tractatus'? on one\ninterpretation the fact contains a third part, a relation, corresponding\nto the predicate (evans and stenius). on another the proposition\nis transformed by analysis into a two-dimensional diagram, the predicate\ndisappearing in the (...) process (copi and anscombe). both are rejected.\ntwo new suggestions are offered: (1) the number of possible configurations\nof 'simple' objects is not greater than the number concatenations\nof names, so no predicate is needed in 'elementary' propositions;\n(2) or the predicate can be taken as the analogue of the direction\narrow on a map and not counted as a part of the proposition. (shrink)

In earlier papers, I have sketched some aspects of a semantical theory of quantification, developed in terms of the concept of a model set. Furthermore, I have indicated a method of relating this semantical, or half-semantical, theory to the usual deductive methods. This method turned on considering proofs of logical truth as frustrated attempts to describe a counter-example to the sentence to be proved. In this paper, I propose to relate some of the observations that were made in (...) the earlier papers to the doctrines which are generally known as picture theories of language. My main thesis is that these theories can be related rather closely to the logic of quantification by developing them in a suitable direction, and by using the concept of a model set as a mediating link. (shrink)

The Wind Will Carry Us (1999) opens with a series of long takes of a car winding steadily down a road in the Iranian countryside. In other words, it opens with a sequence which, to anybody who knows Kiarostami's work, will be immediately recognizable as typical of it: Life and Nothing More (1992) returns repeatedly to such sequences, and ends with one; such sequences turn up in Through the Olive Trees (1994) and Taste of Cherry (1997); the protagonist of Where (...) is the Friend's Home? (1987) is too young to drive, but we see him from a distance meandering in a similar pattern on more than one occasion (and sequences of the same type return in Certified Copy (2010)). As with the other sequences, the opening of The .. (shrink)

I rely on Frascolla's interpretation of the Tractatus ontology to develop an account of depiction in which a picture is conceived of as a visual structure constituted by pixels that are conceived of, in their turn, as elementary propositions. Then I argue that such an account is complementary to the considerations about «noticing aspects» in the Philosophical Investigations, to the extent that the visual structure constituted by pixels provides a design allowing the picture’s viewer to notice aspects. Finally (...) I argue that a joint reading of the considerations about pictures in the Tractatus and in the Philosophical Investigations allows us to address some important issues in the contemporary philosophical debate about depiction. (shrink)

I argue that the current view (as held by, eg., Warnock, Anscombe and Stenius) of Wittgenstein's theory of language in the Tractates is mistaken. This view maintains that Wittgenstein's theory is one of 'isomorphism'; that, roughly, a sentence has meaning in virtue of its being a facsimile of a fact or possible fact. But a detailed study of significant passages in the Tractattis shows that Wittgenstein held no such view. His use of important terms, such as Salz, Bild, (...) Sachverhalt, Tatsache , etc., has been crucially misunderstood. There is no isomorphism. The theory is not about sentences at all, but about talking sense. (shrink)

In a paper published in this journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1962, pp. 46?64, Mr. H. R. G. Schwyzer has argued that ?the current view (as held by, eg., Wamock, Anscombe and Stemus) of Wittgenstein's theory of language in the Tractatus is mistaken?. The editor of the journal has asked me for a reply. My reply concerns only my own book, and it amounts to the statement that Mr. Schwyzer's attack on the book has very little to do with (...) what is said in it. (shrink)

The author presents a rejoinder to mister schwyzer, arguing against\nschwyzer's claim that the author's view of wittgenstein's theory\nof language in the 'tractatus' is mistaken. (staff).

0. My aims in this paper are largely expository: I am more interested in presenting the picture theory than deciding its truth. Even so, I hope that the arguments by which I develop the theory will do something to support it, since I believe that what I will present as Wittgenstein's view is indeed the truth. This is not an admission of insanity, though some things that have been thought intrinsic to the picture theory are (...) things it would be insane to believe. So clearly the view I will present, when compared to the most embracing interpretations, is a partial and selective one. It would be another kind of madness, one I am just as eagre to disown, to suppose that my own favoured selection is the only possible one. That is pretty well the last remark in this paper about other commentators. I trust my reticence entitles me to be presumed catholic until proven nonconformist. (shrink)

Providing an alternative to pyschoanalytically based descriptions, this major study presents a unique, new theoretical account of the way emotions and thought patterns interact in creating aesthetic effects in films. Using diverse examples, Torben Grodal shows how films activate effects in the viewer and how these effects are moulded by genres which determine the way in which characters will react in given situations.

This paper builds upon ethnomethodological and social constructivist studies of representation in the natural sciences to examine sociological theory, a field that is much closer to home. An analysis of diagrams and related illustrations in theory texts shows that labels, geometric boundaries, vectors, and symmetries often are used to convey a sense of orderly flows of causal influences in a homogeneous field. These graphic elements make up what I call a "rhetorical mathematics" that conveys an impression of rationality. (...) Although theory pictures rarely show much beyond what a text already says in its writing, they simulate a hermeneutic passage from written ideas to an independent representational or mathematical space. The paper discusses two modes of textual disruption of the rhetorical mathematics of theory pictures: parody and deconstruction. Parody makes ironic use of graphic devices in order to expose the rationalistic associations that come with the territory. Deconstruction displaces (and, if taken far enough, dissolves entirely) the Flatland of pictorial rationality. These negative maneuvers raise the possibility of using figural space for alternative modes of sociological inquiry. (shrink)

This paper shows how different axiomatic and constructive approaches within quantum field theory can be understood in terms of the so-called ,picture theory' of Heinrich Hertz. Each approach will count as a different picture due to the different status of the various concepts (symbols) they are employing, like observables, gauge invariance, confinement or the space-time continuum. An important difference with the original Hertzian approach is the fact that the different approaches in quantum field theory have (...) partially overlapping, partially supplementing domains of application. This also marks some of the parallels and differences with contemporary debates on structural realism and model-theoretic approaches in the philosophy of physics. The objection that the talk about different pictures just relies on the fact that quantum field theory is unfinished will be countered. Finally, the Hertzian approach will be briefly elaborated and embedded into its philosophical successor projects of Cassirer and Goodman. German Dieser Aufsatz zeigt, wie verschiedene axiomatische und konstruktive Ansätze in der Quantenfeldtheorie mit Hilfe der sogenannten ,,Bildtheorie“ von Heinrich Hertz verstanden werden können. Aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Stellungen der verschiedenen Konzepte (Symbole), die diese Ansätze benutzen - wie etwa Observable, Eichinvarianz, Confinement oder Raum-Zeit-Kontinuum - wird jeder als ein eigenes Bild zu betrachten sein. Ein wichtiger Unterschied zu Hertz' ursprünglicher Fassung der Bildtheorie sind dabei die unterschiedlichen Anwendungsbereiche der Ansätze in der Quantenfeldtheorie. Diese überschneiden sich zum Teil, zum Teil ergänzen sie einander. Dadurch ergeben sich für die bildtheoretische Interpretation wichtige Parallelen und Unterschiede zu anderen Positionen in der Philosophie der Physik, insbesondere zum Strukturrealismus und zur Modell-Theorie. Neben diesen diskutiere ich den Einwand, dass die Redeweise von verschiedenen Bildern in der Quantenfeldtheorie nur deshalb möglich sei, weil die Theorie noch nicht abgeschlossen ist. Schließlich erweitere ich die Hertzsche Bildtheorie und setze sie dabei in Beziehung zu ihren philosophischen Nachfolgeprojekten bei Cassirer und Goodman. (shrink)

From a perceptual psychology and philosophy conference on linear perspective: points out standard fallacies about perspective, then challenges psychology's and philosophy's widespread assumption that a satisfactory understanding of depiction in any medium can be reached via theories of spatial--or any other kind of--visual perception.