Approaches to the naturalization of phenomenology usually understand naturalization as a matter of rendering continuous the methods, epistemologies, and ontologies of phenomenological and natural scientific inquiry. Presupposed in this statement of the problematic, however, is that there is an original discontinuity, a rupture between phenomenology and the natural sciences that must be remedied. I propose that this way of thinking about the issue is rooted in a simplistic understanding of the phenomenological reduction that entails certain assumptions about (...) the subject matter of phenomenology and its relationship to the natural sciences. By contrast, Merleau‐Ponty's first work, The Structure of Behavior, presents a radically different approach to the phenomenological reduction, one that traverses the natural sciences and integrates them into phenomenology from the outset. I outline the argument for this position in The Structure of Behavior and then discuss consequences for current methodological issues surrounding the naturalization of phenomenology, focusing on the relationship between empirical sciences of mind, phenomenological psychology, and transcendental phenomenology. This novel exegesis of Merleau‐Ponty's view on the reduction offers new insight into his oft‐quoted remark that the phenomenological reduction is impossible to complete. (shrink)

Phenomenological reduction as a philosophical conversion (periagoge) -/- Während Husserl in den Ideen I die Reduktion als eine neue „Methode“ des Denkens, d. h. als eine „epistemologische“ Reduktion versteht, schlägt Scheler eine Reduktion als eine „Tèchne“ der Umbildung vor, durch die der Mensch seiner exzentrischen Stellung in der Welt Gestalt zu geben sucht. Mich interessiert an diesem Zitat vor allem der Gebrauch des griechischen Terminus „Tèchne“. Was Scheler damit bezeichnet, hat offensichtlich nichts mit dem zu tun, was wir (...) heute unter dem Begriff der Technik verstehen. Er spricht eben von einer Kunst „des inneren Handelns“. Meines Erachtens verweist Scheler durch diesen griechischen Begriff auf Platons Gedanken. Für diese These kann man sich bereits auf eine Stelle aus der mittleren Phase im Denken Schelers stützen, in der er nämlich die phänomenologische Reduktion als den moralischen Akt darstellt, dem der „platonische Aufschwung“ (Vom Wesen der Philosophie, GW V, 67) zugrunde liegt. Es ist nun geradezu dieser „platonische Aufschwung“, der im Nachlass ausdrücklich als eine „Tèchne“ (Nachlass, GW XI, 118) beschrieben wird. Was heißt nun in diesem Kontext tèchne bei Platon? Schelers Gebrauch des griechischen Terminus tèchne für die Bezeichnung der phänomenologischen Reduktion erinnert sehr an die tèchne tês periagogês im Höhlengleichnis Platons, durch die die Gefangenen aus der Höhle hinausgehen können. Diese tèchne versteht Platon als einen Bildungsprozess des Menschen; er lernt dadurch, seinen Blick auf das Gute hin zu lenken, damit seine Seinsweise in der Welt zurechtgerückt werden könne. Es geht also um eine conversio oder Umkehrung der eigenen Positionalität in der Welt, die den Übergang vom Leben zum guten Leben zustande bringen kann. Diese tèchne ist grundlegend für das Verständnis der paideía bei Platon, die sich nicht mit einer bloßen Übertragung von Informationen begnügt, sondern vielmehr nach einer periagogé (Umkehrung) der ganzen Seele strebt. Es muss also – wie Sokrates sagt – eine besondere „Kunst der Umkehrung [tèchne tês periagogês]“ geben, die lehrt, auf welche Weise am leichtesten und wirksamsten die Seele umgewendet werden kann, und zwar unter Berücksichtigung dessen, dass sie bereits sehen kann, aber es alleine nicht schafft, das Gesicht zu wenden, „wohin es solle“ (Politeia, VII, 518 d). (shrink)

’. . . through the epoche, the gaze of the philosopher in truth first becomes fully free. . . . [F]ree of the strongest and most universal, and at the same time most hidden, internal bond, namely, of the pre-givenness of the world.’ This paper is concerned with the method of phenomenological reduction understood as a disciplined embodied practice.

In Phenomenological Reduction in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit: a New Proposal, Matheson Russell investigates the indebtedness of the Heidegger of Being and Time to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology by way of distinguishing in it differing types of transcendental reduction. He supplies an overview of recent attempts to identify such reductions in order then to propose a new interpretation locating two levels of reduction in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. These concern, first, an enquiry going back to the horizon of (...) 'existence', and, second, one going back to the horizon of 'temporality'. While the first level is argued to be explicit in the published text, the second, Russell claims, lies within the horizon of the unfinished parts of Being and Time. (shrink)

The article presents and critically examines the techniques of husserl's phenomenological reduction on the one hand and of yogic meditation on the other, The latter as expounded by patanjali in the 'yoga-Sutras'. By comparing and contrasting these, The author argues that patanjali provides clear and consistent techniques for performing phenomenological reduction. The inconsistency between phenomenological reduction as a technique and the goal of phenomenology as providing the foundations of knowledge is then brought into clear (...) focus. Finally, It is shown that yoga and phenomenology both logically lead to transcendental idealism. (shrink)

A clear understanding of the notion of phenomenological reduction is crucial for any evaluation of the claims of Husserlian phenomenology. The phenomenological reduction is said to be the distinctive step one has to take if one is to enter the realm of phenomenology proper. Husserl labored all his life to find the best way which would lead the nonphenomenologist into the new land which he thought he had discovered. Commentators have classified the ways discussed by Husserl (...) under at least three main headings: the Cartesian way, the way through psychology, and the way through ontology. In each of these ways, one is urged to perform a phenomenological reduction. But since the ways are different, the step also of the phenomenological reduction varies somewhat for each approach. Husserl and his interpreters tried hard to clarify these subtle distinctions, but up to now their ways of speaking have proven rather opaque, especially to philosophers accustomed to the standards of clarity of Analytic Philosophy. (shrink)

Interpretations abound about Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination. Some read him as taking the two to share the same distinctive essential nature, like contemporary conjunctivists. Others find in Husserl grounds for taking the two to fall into basically distinct categories of experience, like disjunctivists. There is ground for skepticism, however, about whether Husserl’s view could possibly fall under either of these headings. Husserl, on the one hand, operates under the auspices of the phenomenological (...) reduction, abstaining from use of any epistemic commitments about mind-transcendent reality, whereas conjunctive and disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, on the other hand, are both premised on some form of metaphysical realism. There seems to be a basic incompatibility between the former approach and the latter. I examine this line of thinking and argue that the incompatibility is only apparent. (shrink)

How can phenomenology describe an object as "the political"? The article endeavours to show how it is possible to apprehend such a theme from a _transcendental<D> perspective. After going through the methodic difficulties of the Cartesian way, which involves an egology intersubjectively extended to the monadology, the essay analyzes the non-Cartesian ways. Indeed, both of them pave the way for a political based on a plural structure. The way through the life-world as well as the way through psychology succeed in (...) depicting the political, either as living sociality or as the play between ethical co-attitudes. In each case, the reduction operates in a specific manner, either as a pure Cartesian bracketing, as a retrocession to social originality or as a nonparticipating in the world-interests. Nevertheless, only the way through psychology reaches the political at a strict transcendental level, whereas the way through the life-world always runs the risk of falling back. (shrink)

The point of the present article is to investigate whether the key conceptions of epochē and reduction as found in Husserl's phenomenology can be brought to bear in a fruitful rereading of the speech of Socrates in Plato's Symposium.1 In pursuit of this goal, I will begin by revisiting the traditional reading of this speech in terms of a scala amoris in which the erotic subject is guided from attachment to a series of inferior objects to the Beautiful and (...) Good itself such that the value of all preceding attachments is suspended. The critique that this approach to love instrumentalizes all but the transcendent Good is one that is found both within and without the text. In opposition to this reading, however, I will suggest that Husserl's notions of epochē and reduction enable us to read the speech not as an instrumentalizing scala but in terms of a reflective distance in which our immersion in and with the erotic object is suspended so that we might reappropriate the real meaning of erotic engagement. According to this reading, Plato does not negate the particular or lower forms of eros but reinscribes them with a value derived from their position in relation to the ultimate. The suspension of the lower forms, then, is not final but is merely employed in order to let what occurs in erotic engagement show itself. (shrink)

The point of the present article is to investigate whether the key conceptions of epochē and reduction as found in Husserl's phenomenology can be brought to bear in a fruitful rereading of the speech of Socrates in Plato's Symposium.1 In pursuit of this goal, I will begin by revisiting the traditional reading of this speech in terms of a scala amoris in which the erotic subject is guided from attachment to a series of inferior objects to the Beautiful and (...) Good itself such that the value of all preceding attachments is suspended. The critique that this approach to love instrumentalizes all but the transcendent Good is one that is found both within and without the text. In opposition to this reading, however, I will suggest that Husserl's notions of epochē and reduction enable us to read the speech not as an instrumentalizing scala but in terms of a reflective distance in which our immersion in and with the erotic object is suspended so that we might reappropriate the real meaning of erotic engagement. According to this reading, Plato does not negate the particular or lower forms of eros but reinscribes them with a value derived from their position in relation to the ultimate. The suspension of the lower forms, then, is not final but is merely employed in order to let what occurs in erotic engagement show itself. (shrink)

The evolution of Husserl’s thought did not follow a linear route. Time and again, crucial changes were taking place in its course. The content of fundamental concepts was shifting; successive discoveries of new thematics were happening; incessant expansions of the ever-under-rework teachings to new fields of application were being developed. The evaluation of Husserl’s work in its entirety becomes, thus, an extremely difficult task. The huge bulk of the writings, the multifariousness of their thematics, and the successive reforms and shifts (...) in it make the understanding of even the overall plan wherein the intermediate findings fall very difficult. One thing, though, is certain. In order to overcome all these obstacles to approaching Husserl’s work, we must first deepen our understanding of his method, the phenomenological method of philosophizing. Whatever is said in Husserl’s Phenomenology makes sense and has its value only to the extent that it is a result of ‘the’ phenomenological reduction. (shrink)

The paper begins with a characterization of its methodological point designed to bring out those features that would recommend it to philosophers. The concept of this method is emphatically distinguished from the scope given to it by philosophers who actually use it. Husserl, For instance, Held that all philosophical questions are accessible by this method of reduction. In the last part of the paper I am suggesting that there is a legitimate form of skepticism which husserl's position fails to (...) recognize. (shrink)

This paper proposes to show an elective affinity between the attempt to construct a transcendence within immanence; both in the writings of Descartes and in the Cartesian strain in the philosophy of Husserl and the revolutionary sensibility, that is, the attempt to render history transparent to itself, delivered from division, conflict, and politics. It views the work of Lukács in History and Class-Consciousness as the link between the two. It concludes by evoking Merleau-Ponty’s critique of both the completed reduction (...) and our class-consciousness as the bearer of the rationality of history. (shrink)

Cílem studie je interpretovat fenomenologii obrazotvornosti Gastona Bachelarda jakožto fenomenologickou redukci sui generis. Autor článku představuje snění jako proces návratu do naivního vědomí prvotní (zakládající) a primitivní povahy, v němž je možné dosáhnout stavu dětství, harmonizujícího vztah subjektu ke světu. Svět je v této koncepci znovu zhodnocován (valorizován) a otevírá se jako domov, a to jednak prostřednictvím vzpomínek, jednak recipročním charakterem obrazotvornosti. Studie ukazuje fenomenologickou redukci v Bachelardově pojetí jako opozitní, ale komplementární k vědeckému rozumu a zdůrazňuje její terapeutický charakter.

My purpose in this paper is to determine if there is still a place for God, in Husserl’s phenomenology, after the achievement of the phenomenological reduction. There are several different ways to address this issue. One can begin by asserting that there is no place in phenomenology, after bracketing the natural world of our lived experience, for any transcendence that is not, either the transcendence of the noema regarding the stream of consciousness in which it was generated, or (...) the worldly or mundane transcendence. One can also stress that the absolute consciousness that constitutes all kinds of objectivities – real or ideal – cannot tolerate at his side another absolute like the Christian God. Against these views, one can oppose the following: 1) in the intersubjective experience, the process of constitution of its specific noemata – the alter egos – goes beyond what seemed admissible in the standard intentional analysis of the process of constitution of worldly objectivities; 2) intentional consciousness shows an overall teleological structure that points beyond the simply given. In this paper, I try to explore the possibilities this opens in the core of intentional analysis to a phenomenological approach to God. (shrink)

_reduction in favour of his existentialist account of être au monde. I show that whilst Merleau-Ponty _ _rejected, what he saw as, the transcendental idealist context in which Husserl presents the _ _reduction, he nevertheless accepts the heart of it, the epoché, as a methodological principle. _ _Contrary to a number of Merleau-Ponty scholars, être au monde is perfectly compatible with the _ _epoché and Merleau-Ponty endorses both. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that Merleau-_ _Ponty’s (...) liberal use of the results of empirical psychology signify a rejection of the epoché. A proper _ _understanding of his views on the relation between phenomenology and psychology shows that, at _ _least in Merleau-Ponty’s eyes, the methods of phenomenology and the empirical sciences are _ _largely similar. I conclude that we have every reason to think that Merleau-Ponty accepted _ _Husserl’s demand that the phenomenologist place the world in brackets._. (shrink)

The transcendental phenomenological reduction is described as the transition from thinking to reflection, Which involves a change of attitude. Schmitt elaborates what it means to "bracket the objective world" and to suspend judgement. The traditional distinction between thinking and reflection, Based on the distinction between what is inside and what is outside the mind, Is shown to be inadequate. Reflection really involves critical detachment, A neutral attitude and disinterestedness; it must describe the new facts rather than explain them. (...) Hence, The reduction is the transition from a nonreflective to a reflective attitude. (staff). (shrink)

While all phenomenologists aim to grasp the “things themselves,” they disagree about the best method for doing this and about what the “things themselves” are. Many metaphysicians, especially Catholic realists, reject phenomenology altogether. I show that many phenomenological methods are useful for reaching the goals of both phenomenology and realist metaphysics. First, I present a history of phenomenological methods, including those used by Scheler, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Marion, Kearney, Rocha, and others. Next, I consider two sets of challenges (...) raised to some of these methods. Finally, I outline how to join these methods with each other and with the methods of realist metaphysics, ultimately arriving at an aesthetic method, inspired by the work of von Balthasar, for considering fundamental phenomena. (shrink)

Aron Gurwitsch wants to introduce a theory of organization developed by Gestalt psychology into Husserlian phenomenology. The problem is to show how it is possible to introduce a theory developed within a positive science into philosophical phenomenology. His solution is to show that aspects of this theory already are or can be phenomenological through what he calls an incipient phenomenological reduction. Specifically, it is the dismissal of the constancy hypothesis in which he identifies the possibility moving from (...) an explanatory science to a descriptive one. If the temptation can be resisted of returning to an explanatory approach and description can be radicalized, Gurwitsch believes that this reduction can become phenomenological and even attain transcendental levels. This possibility of reduction makes it possible for scientists, especially psychologists, to have a firsthand understanding of phenomenology, perhaps to convince them of this approach and realize the continuity of philosophy and the sciences and the need to maintain cooperation via phenomenology. (shrink)

Twentieth Century philosophical thought has expressed itself for the most part through two great Movements: the phenomenological and the analytical. Each movement originated in reaction against idealistic—or at least antirealistic—views of "the world". And each has collapsed back into an idealism not different in effect from that which it initially rejected. Both movements began with an appeal to meanings or concepts, regarded as objective realities capable of entering the flow of experience without loss of their objective status or of (...) their power to reveal to us an objective world as it would be if there were no subjective apprehensions of it. Both movements ended with a surrender of the objectivity of meanings and concepts in this strong sense, coming to treat them as at most more-or-less shareable components of a somehow communalized experience, but in any case incapable of revealing how things are irrespective of actual human experience. For the old Egocentric Predicament, with its "ideas" etc., is substituted a Lingocentric or Histrocentric Predicament of "language" and its elements. Hilary Putnam speaks for the current consensus: 'Internal realism says that we don't know what we are talking about when we talk about "things in themselves"' ( The Many Faces of Realism , p. 36). (shrink)

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Rene" Descartes started modern Western philosophy on its search for an absolutely certain foundation for knowledge. ...

This essay attempts a renewed, critical exposition of Husserl’s theory of the phenomenological reduction, incorporating manuscript material that has been published since the defining essays of the first generation of Husserl research. The discussion focuses on points that remain especially crucial, i. e. the concept of the natural attitude, the ways into the reduction, and the question of the “meaning of the reduction”. The reading attempted here leads to two, not necessarily related, focal points: a Cartesian (...) and a Life-world tendency. In following these two paths, Husserl was consistent in pursuing two evident leads in his philosophical enterprise; however, he was at the same time unable to systematically unify these two strands. Thus, I am offering an interpretation which might be called a modified “departure from Cartesianism” reading that Landgrebe proposed in his famous essay from the nineteen-fifties. This discussion should make apparent that Husserl’s theory of the phenomenological reduction deserves a renewed look in light of material that has since appeared in the Husserliana and by incorporating the most important results of recent tendencies in Husserl research. (shrink)

A major part of the mind–body problem is to explain why a given set of physical processes should give rise to qualia of one sort rather than another. Colour hues are the usual example considered here, and there is a lively debate between, for example, Hardin, Levine, Jackson, Clark and Chalmers as to whether the results of colour vision science can provide convincing explanations of why colours actually look the way they do. This paper examines carefully the type of explanation (...) that is needed here, and it is concluded that it does not have to be reductive to be effective. What needs to be explained more than anything is why inverted hue scenarios are more intuitive than other sensory inversions: and the issue of physicalism versus dualism is only of marginal relevance here. (shrink)

At least after 1907, Husserl recognized that in the Phenomenology of the LI (1901), i.e., in Eidetic Descriptive or Pure Eidetic Psychology, elements that were silently presupposed were actually in need of phenomenological clarification and reconsideration. This was also the case with regard to the problematic ontological status of the world, as it is experienced in the natural attitude. In order to overcome this difficulty, Husserl invents the method of transcendental reduction and, on its basis, transforms the Eidetic (...) Phenomenological Psychology of the LI into the Transcendental Phenomenology, which, in a systematic form, is first expounded in the Ideas I (1913). The transcendental reduction is conceived of as a widening and a radicalization in comparison to the possibilities of the psychological reduction that was already at work, albeit silently, in the LI. [...] Despite this, as Husserl repeatedly complained, the meaning of Transcendental Phenomenology was never completely understood by even his closest disciples and collaborators. This is no surprise. As we know, the series of difficulties one must face in the effort to appropriate Husserl’s Phenomenology, let alone the passing from the LI to the Ideas I, are disheartening, if not totally repelling. In Chap. 2, we have already seen and confronted various difficulties in the exposition of the teaching of the reduction, as well as some representative recent misappropriations of the meaning of the transcendental reduction. We have done the same with regard to the specific confusions related to the—notorious—notion of “unintelligibility.” In the present chapter, we will focus on another misappropriation of Husserl’s phenomenological method, the one for which Heidegger himself was responsible, and which the Heideggerians continue to follow unquestioningly. (shrink)

Phenomenology gives rise to certain ontological considerations that have far-reaching implications for standard conceptions of patient autonomy in medical ethics, and, as a result, the obligations of and to patients in clinical decision-making contexts. One such consideration is the phenomenological reduction in classical phenomenology, a core feature of which is the characterisation of our primary experiences as immediately and inherently meaningful. This paper builds on and extends the analyses of the phenomenological reduction in the works of (...) Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty in order to identify and explain its implications for our current understanding of the principle of respect for patient autonomy and the norms of clinical decision making. (shrink)

The intention of the discussion is twofold: to offer a reading of sartre's entire philosophy based on his reworking of husserl's "epoche", And to apply this reading to his treatment of human relationships. Care is taken to show how an understanding of sartre's use of the reduction illuminates his presentation of human relationships in "being and nothingness" and the later "critique".

So far, the value dimension underlying affectivity disorders has remained out of focus in phenomenological psychopathology. As early as at the beginning of the 20th century, however, German phenomenologist Max Scheler examined in depth the relationship between affectivity and value dimension through the concept of valueception (Wertnehmung). In this sense, a recent noteworthy contribution has been provided by John Cutting, who has drawn attention to the importance of Scheler’s analyses for psychiatry. In this work I take into consideration only (...) two aspects of Cutting’s proposal: 1) the relationship between the impairments of valueception and the perception of certain value classes; and 2) the interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological reduction and its juxtaposition with the modus vivendi of schizophrenia. According to Cutting, in the modus vivendi of schizophrenia the valueception impairment entails putting vital values in brackets and focusing on personal values, with a process that recalls Scheler’s phenomenological reduction. Regarding the first aspect, I share Cutting’s starting point, but then shift the focus on how important the valueception is for the intersubjective dimension. In particular, I maintain that rather than compromising the perception of vital values, valueception impairments in the modus vivendi of schizophrenia interfere with the intersubjective dimension and are interwoven with a process of disembodiment. My thesis is that the modus vivendi of schizophrenia involves a disturbance of the intersubjective dimension that arises from the level of valueception and that determines the person’s self-referential closure. With regard to the second point, by analyzing Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, I sustain that its main objective is to increase both the interaction with otherness and the openness to the world (Weltoffenheit). As a consequence, the modus vivendi of schizophrenia, in my opinion, is not comparable, as Cutting claims, with Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, but goes in a different direction. (shrink)

This paper offers a philosophical exploration of Nelson Maldonado-Torres’s formulation of the “decolonial reduction” as an instrument of phenomenology and ideological critique. Comparing the decolonial reduction to Edmund Husserl’s notion of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction or epoché, I argue that working through the demands of rigor for either mode of reduction points to areas of overlap: the work of transcendental phenomenology is incomplete without the performance of the decolonial reduction and vice versa. I then assess (...) Maldonado-Torres’s anchoring of the decolonial reduction in the spirit of the “decolonial attitude” and criticism of the Husserlian theoretical attitude. I conclude that foreclosing the theoretical attitude as a framework from which to perform the decolonial reduction implies significant limitations and pitfalls for the decolonial project. (shrink)

Despite the recent increase of interest in the work of Merleau-Ponty there is still a persistent tendency to overlook the uniqueness of the philosophical position he advances in Phenomenology of Perception. In this article I present a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the phenomenological reduction that explains how it is original. I do this by contrasting his presentation of the reduction with that of the early Husserl, highlighting how his emphasis on the phenomenology of the ‘perceived world’ (...) leads him to reject Husserl’s conception of phenomenology as a ‘philosophical science,’ and the Kantian language in which the this account is framed. I go on to critically discuss the interpretations of the reduction advanced by Stephen Priest and Joel Smith as examples of readings that fail to fully grasp Merleau-Ponty’s account of the ‘natural attitude’ as resting on the inherent objectivizing structure that is built into perception itself. The way that these authors misinterpret Merleau-Ponty helps to make maximally clear the profound philosophical significance that he places on the phenomenology of the ‘perceived world’. (shrink)

‘역사철학’은 역사 또는 역사학에 대한 반성적 탐구로서 역사 및 역사학에 철학적 기초를 마련하는 것을 목표로 하는 철학의 한 분야라고 정의할 수 있다. 그러나 ‘역사철학’이라 통칭하여 부르는 철학의 분과는 본성상 단일한 종류의 것이 아니다. 이것은 역사철학의 탐구가 다양한 차원과 다양한 수준에서 이루어지는 복합적 구성체임을 의미한다. 그렇기 때문에, 중층적 구조연관을 이루고 있는 역사철학의 각 영역이 해명하고자 하는 사태의 본성 및 그것이 전체 체계에 대해서 지니는 위상과 의의를 충분히 염두에 두지 않는 한, 역사학에 대한 역사철학의 정초관계는 온전히 해명될 수 없는 것이다. 나는 이 (...) 글에서 후설 현상학의 방법인 ‘현상학적 태도변경’과 ‘현상학적 환원’에 입각하여 역사철학 여러 분과 간의 경계를 구획하고 그들의 구조연관을 해명함으로써, 역사학의 토대로서의 역사철학의 체계를 개괄하고자 한다. 특히 사실과 본질, 그리고 존재와 인식이라는 두 가지 기준에 따라 나는 인식론적 역사철학과 존재론적 역사철학을 구분하고, 각각이 제기하고 있는 물음의 본성이 어떻게 다르며 그럼에도 또 양자가 어떻게 통일적인 구조연관을 이루는지 보일 것이다. (shrink)

The article traces out the history of the evolution in meaning of the phenomenological reduction in husserl's writings. The starting point is husserl's conviction that what is lacking most to philosophy as well as to science is a truly rigorous scientific method. Already in the "logical investigations" (1901) the phenomenological reduction is presented as the core of this method. But here this reduction is understood as a deliberate restriction or limitation of the mind to what (...) is adequately perceived in an "adequately fulfilling intuition" within the immanence of consciousness, Excluding any transcendence. In his lectures on "the idea of phenomenology" a significant expansion of the notion of reduction begins to appear. There is still the insistence on the absolutely given, But this now begins to include a certain "real transcendence" extending beyond the sphere of "real immanence to consciousness." this change appears first in his published works in the "ideas" of 1913. (shrink)