La philosophie se fait ici pensée du tragique de la vie, de la destinée et de la condition humaine qu'elle se préoccupe d'améliorer. Elle part de la pluralité existentielle des rationalités et des modes d'appréhension du réel pour dégager une éthique régulatrice pour tout agir sociopolitique, culturel ou religieux ordonné à l'idéal de coexistence pacifique. Ainsi, elle réfléchit sur les principes d'un exister authentique dans un monde défiguré par l'intolérance, l'intégrisme et l'impérialisme.

Nicholas Rescher presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, he rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. On the other hand, he opposes the rationalism inherent in neo-contractarian theory--both in the idealized communicative-contract version promoted in continental European political philosophy by J;urgen Habermas, and in the idealized social contract version of the theory of political justice promoted in the Anglo-American context by John Rawls. Against such tendencies, Rescher's pluralist (...) approach takes a more realistic and pragmatic line, eschewing the convenient recourse of idealization in cognitive and practical matters. Instead of a utopianism that looks to a uniquely perfect order that would prevail under ideal conditions, he advocates incremental improvements within the framework of arrangements that none of us will deem perfect but that all of us "can live with." Such an approach replaces the yearning for an unattainable consensus with the institution of pragmatic arrangements in which the community will acquiesce--not through agreeing on their optimality, but through a shared recognition among the dissonant parties that the available options are even worse. (shrink)

One of the most important “folk” anti-realist thoughts about certain areas of our thought and discourse—basic taste, for instance, or comedy—is that their lack of objectivity crystallises in the possibility of “faultless disagreements”: situations where one party accepts P, another rejects P, and neither is guilty of any kind of mistake of substance or shortcoming of cognitive process. On close inspection, however, it proves challenging to make coherent sense of this idea, and a majority of theorists have come to (...) reject it as incoherent. There are two significant exceptions in the contemporary literature: relativists often hold it up as something of a coup for their view that it can make straightforward sense of faultless disagreement; and the author of this paper has argued (Wright 2006) that making judicious intuitionistic revisions to classical logic can provide resources that suffice to stabilise the notion. The present paper argues that neither relativism nor intuitionism in fact provides a satisfactory account and indicates how an alethic pluralist framework enables us to do better. (shrink)

The paper examines the contours, features and developments of two faces of pluralism, as well as their interactions. First of all, based on the analysis of the pluralist theories, it underlines that pluralism is not perceived now only as a particular American school of thought, but mostly as a generic concept with meanings and connotations that vary from one epoch to another. Second of all, it scrutinizes the political pluralism in the United States, more exactly the relationship (...) between constitutional pluralism and party pluralism, as well as the pluralism of interest groups. The religious pluralism is seen both as denominational pluralism and as diversity of religious organizations. The paper shows that, in spite of the common ground in the constitutional provisions and much interference in their development, each of the two faces of pluralism has followed its own dynamics. Next, it focuses on the new religious pluralism, which has nourished controversies regarding its effects on democracy in America. Although prestigious scholars have warned that these new challenges face real perils, the author of this paper sides with those who see them less of a threat than an opportunity for democracy to develop new interactions and participative tools, without abandoning its principles and values. (shrink)

This book presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, it rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. On the other hand, it opposes the rationalism inherent in new-contractarian theory — both in the idealized communicative-contract version promoted in continental European political philosophy by Jürgen Habermas, and in the idealized social-contract version of the theory promoted in the Anglo-American context by John Rawls. Against such tendencies, this pluralist approach takes (...) a more realistic and pragmatic line, eschewing the convenient recourse of idealization in cognitive and practical matters. Instead of a utopianism that looks to a uniquely perfect order that would prevail under ideal conditions, it advocates incremental improvements within the framework or arrangements that none of us will deem perfect, but that all of us ‘can live with’. Such an approach replaces the yearning for an unattainable consensus with the institution of pragmatic arrangements in which the community will acquiesce — not through agreeing on their optimality, but through a shared recognition among the dissonant parties that the available options are even worse. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore and understand the Albanian Party System. The analysis will cover the period from the collapse of the communist regime in 1991 until 2014. It will try to investigate what forces drive the battle of the parties, what cleavages 'divide' society and consequently the party system as well as which are the parties that count the most. in order to assess this, the paper will focus on the parliamentary parties and will (...) relay on various theoretical concepts of the contemporary literature on political parties. First it will draw on Sartori's concept of 'relevance' in order to understand whether all the parliamentary parties over the course of twenty four years of pluralism are important or not and what weight do they have. Then it will use the Laakso - Taagepera index of the Effective Number of Parties to understand how power is distributed within the parliament. (shrink)

This original and ambitious book aims to change how we think about good lives. The perennial debates about good lives—the disagreements caused by conflicts between scientific, religious, moral, historical, aesthetic, and subjective modes of reflection—typically end in an impasse. This leaves the underlying problems of the meaning of life, the possibility of free action, the place of morality in good lives, the art of life, and human self-understanding as intractable as they have ever been. The way out of this impasse, (...) argues Kekes, is to abandon the assumption shared by the contending parties that the solutions of these problems can be rational only if they apply universally to all lives in all contexts. He believes that solutions may vary with lives and contexts and still be rational. Kekes defends a pluralistic alternative to absolutism and relativism that will, he holds, take philosophy in a new and more productive direction. (shrink)

Elements of the relation between religion and politics are standard themes in political theory: toleration and free exercise rights; the parameters of separation of church and state; arguments for and against constraints imposed on religious discourse by philosophic norms of public reason. But religious parties and partisanship are no part of political theory, despite contemporary interest in value pluralism and in liberal democratic theory's capacity to address multicultural, religious, and ethnic group claims. This essay argues that religious parties are (...) missing elements in discussions of identity politics. They play an important role not just in expressing but also in constructing and mobilizing religious political identity. Political activity linked to parties is a principal way of bringing diffuse, politically unorganized groups, whose leaders are self-appointed and not regularly accountable for the way they represent co-religionists in political life, into the democratic mainstream. With political organization and especially partisanship, the fact of pluralism is made concrete for democratic purposes. (shrink)

From within a “systemic approach” to deliberative democracy, political parties can be seen as crucial actors in facilitating deliberation, by playing epistemic, motivational, and justificatory functions that are central to the deliberative ideal. However, we point out that if we assume a purely outcome-oriented conception of the role of parties within a deliberative system, we risk losing sight of a central tenet of deliberative democracy and of its distinctive principle of legitimacy, namely, that citizens must be able to exercise critical (...) reflection on the grounds of democratic decisions. We argue that parties have a special responsibility in making a deliberative system meet this requirement, and that such special role can be fulfilled only if parties’ programs, values, and strategies are shaped through intra-party deliberation. On the grounds of this discussion, we define a model of intra-party deliberation that is based on the principles of mutual acceptability, pluralism, and publicity. (shrink)

Modern democracy is impossible without political parties. They are necessary in the process of the construction of the political class and building of relations between politicians and ‘ordinary people’. So, in Poland in the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries the significance of parties is also very important. Their history is older than the history of the reborn Poland. Especially in Galicia, an autonomous province of the Hapsburg empire, we can see the activities of many politicians. A part of them in (...) 1895 declared the birth of the Popular Party which is a constant element of the Polish political scene. The second traditional current is the socialistic movement, which is also always legally active in Poland. These two camps represent, in simplification, the ‘two Polands’—the first more traditional, conservative and provincial, and the second more progressive, ‘European’ and urban. Actually, in the typical consciousness of a Polish citizen, the political representation of the ‘black’ country is the party Law and Justice of Jarosław Kaczyński, and the ‘red’ country admires the Citizen Platform with Donald Tusk as a leader. But probably the idea of a twoparty system, like in the Anglo-Saxon world, is still very distant to reality, because in the European continent, the tradition of pluralism in a policentric version is still very significant. In Poland, even in the period of the ‘real socialism’ this conception of the organization of political life was realized, though naturally in the specific version. There were three legal parties and the Polish United Workers’ Party (the PUWP) was the most important. From 1976, the PUWP in the light of the Constitution had the official hegemony in the Republic. It is possible to compare this situation with the period 1926–39, when, after the coup d’état by Marshal Piłsudski, the Government still won in the election and the official elite wanted to create a stable political force with a perspective of permanent rule. But we must remember that between the wars opposition always was legal. In our times of demoliberalism, this is quite normal (though under the Constitution, unconstitutional parties, for example, communist or fascist, are unacceptable); however, interesting is the fact that when you observe sine ira et studio the evolutional trend of the Polish political system, you easily find the tendency of the ‘stabilization’ of the party system in the way of legal operations. From 1997, the laws concerning political parties have changed the possibilities of the conquest of seats in the Seym. Actually, only the parties having 5 per cent (or 8 per cent in coalition) of votes can gain the representation in the Diet. So it is possible to claim that the little parties today are in a more complicated situation than in the first years after the ‘operation of Round Table’ in 1989. The contemporary system is maybe more stable, but less liberal. There are theoreticians who note the danger of the alienation of the political class in the situation of the renewal of the alienation of the political elite, which de facto is more connected with the state than with the society. Many theoreticians emphasize that in the future the role and the character of political structures will be profoundly different from today. Maybe they are prophets, but we can expect that the Polish political parties or ‘post-parties’ and also political structure as a whole will have many similarities with their actual equivalents, because the mentality of the Polish nation, including the politicians, is more or less enduring. (shrink)

One under-theorized aspect of "multiculturalism and the antidiscrimination principle" is religious and ethnicity based political parties. With political organization, the fact of pluralism is made concrete for democratic purposes. When the struggle for empowerment is "waged within the world of democratic politics" it is waged through parties. That is the associational form modern democracies have settled on for participation, representation, and governing, and for countervailing power and regular opposition. Particularist parties and bloc voting are key instruments of political conflict (...) and, as important, of political integration. This Paper looks at the challenges these parties pose to democracy; specifically, at the principal reasons given for banning parties from participation in electoral politics. I identify four categories of justification for disqualification: violent overthrow, incitement to hate, altering the character of the nation, and outside support or control. This is a preliminary to setting out regulative principles of "defensive democracy.". (shrink)

In the Western countries it has recently become fashionable to assert that a genuine socialist system is a pluralist society, not the "monolithic" systems established in the socialist countries that represent socialist societies of a supposedly less democratic order. This idea is also being employed by certain Left parties in the West, which also identify the concepts of so-called "true socialism" and "true democracy" with pluralism.

Can parties such as the Swedish Democrats, the Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary, the UK Independence Party and the Italian Lega Nord all be classified consistently as part of the same family? Part I of this study summarizes the conceptual framework arguing that the traditional post-war Left-Right cleavage in the electorate and party competition has faded, overlaid by divisions over authoritarian-libertarianism and populism-pluralism. Building on this, part II discusses the pros and cons of alternative methods for (...) gathering evidence useful to classify party positions. Part III describes how these are measured in this study, using Chapel Hill Expert Survey data in 2014 and 2017, and how they are mapped on a multidimensional issue space. Part IV compares European political parties on these scales – including Authoritarian-Populist parties – across a wide range of European countries. The conclusion in part V draws together the main findings and considers their implications. (shrink)

This essay explores and criticizes Matteo Bonotti’s argument that parties and partisans in a publicly justified polity should appeal primarily, if not exclusively, to accessible justificatory reasons to fulfill their political duties. I argue that political parties should only support coercive policies if they rationally believe that the coercive law or policy in question can be publicly justified to those subject to the law or policy in terms of their own private—specifically intelligible—reasons. I then explore four practical differences between our (...) two approaches. In contrast to Bonotti’s accessible reasons approach, the intelligibility approach facilitates the provision of assurance between citizens and political officials, requires that parties and partisans support fewer coercive policies, allows more exemptions from generally applicable laws, and facilitates logrolling and alliance formation. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of disputed cultural practices within liberal, deliberative democracies, arguing against the currently dominant view, advocated by Susan Okin among others, that such problems represent a fundamental tension between two liberal values: gender equality and cultural autonomy. Such an approach, I argue, requires the state to render normative judgements about conceptions of the good life, something which is both arbitrary and unfair in societies characterised by reasonable pluralism. Disputed practices, I claim, are defined by the (...) existence of reasonable disagreement over their legitimacy, which means they need to be resolved in a way that abstains from morally evaluating the religious or cultural doctrines of the group in question. The paper therefore articulates a cost-based approach to such problems. The cost-based approach focuses our conceptual attention on the sorts of publicly identifiable costs that any state decision will have on the various parties to a dispute. By restricting itself to public reasons, this method thereby avoids arbitrarily privileging certain conceptions of the good at the expense of others when determining the boundaries of reasonable pluralism. (shrink)

While the transnational public sphere has existed in the Arendtian sense at least since the mid-19th century, a new kind of reflexively political global civil society emerged in the late 20th century. However, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), advocacy groups, and networks have limited agendas and legitimacy and, without the support of at least one state, limited means to realise changes. Since 2001, theWorld Social Forum (WSF) has formed a key attempt in forging links and ties of solidarity among diverse actors. Although (...) the WSF may seem a party of opinion when defined negatively against neoliberal globalisation, imperialism, and violence, in more positive ideological terms it remains a rather incoherent collection of diverse actors; while itself defined as a mere open space. There is a quest for new forms of agency such as a world political party. Various historical predecessors of global political parties, real and imagined, provide conceptual resources, useful experiences for envisaging the structure, and function of a possible planetary partyformation. H.G. Wells’s ‘open conspiracy’ is a particularly important future-oriented leftdemocratic vision. Wells believed that only a mass movement of truly committed individuals and groups could have the power to transform the world political organisation, by creating a democratic world commonwealth. Recently, for instance, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have formulated similar ideas. I argue that transformative political agency presupposes a shared programme, based on common elements of a wider and deeper world-view, and willingness to engage in processes of collective will-formation in terms of democratic procedures. From this perspective, I outline a possible organisation and some substantial directions for a global political party. The point is also to respond to the criticism of existing parties and cultivate the critical-pluralist ethos of global civil society, but in terms of democratic party-formation. Keywords: Arendt; citizenship; civil society; participation; political party; republicanism; rotation; Wells; world parliament; World Social Forum (Published: 22 June 2011) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 4 , No. 2, 2011, pp. 81-102. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v4i2.7334. (shrink)

The paper looks at challenges related to the ideas of integration and knowledge systems in extra-academic transdisciplinarity. Philosophers of science are only starting to pay attention to the increasingly common practice of introducing extra-academic perspectives or engaging extra-academic parties in academic knowledge production. So far the rather scant philosophical discussion on the subject has mainly concentrated on the question whether such engagement is beneficial in science or not. Meanwhile, there is quite a large and growing literature on extra-academic TD, mostly (...) authored by non-philosophers, seeking to develop TD research practices. We examine this literature in the light of recent discussions in pluralist philosophies of science. Some philosophical pluralists see the increase of extra-academic collaboration and participation in science as a potentially positive development. However, certain views promoted in the non-philosophical literature on extra-academic TD appear problematic in the light of the pluralistic discussions. For instance, the literature on TD appears to be overly optimistic with regard to integration, and the notion of knowledge systems used in it is problematic. We believe it would be worthwhile for scientific pluralists sympathetic to the aims of TD to look more closely into the complex settings in which extra-academic collaboration and participation happens in actual TD projects, and to offer constructive criticisms, exploiting insights developed within pluralist philosophy of science. (shrink)

For the past several decades, jurists have invested significant efforts in developing the law in general—and private law in particular—in terms of pluralism. However, the conceptualization of corporate law and governance according to pluralist principles rarely exists. This Essay is the first in the legal literature to address this deficiency by providing a unique pluralist theory of corporate governance regimes. It distinguishes between the plurality of corporate law’s sources, values, and principles, and discusses the implications for governance. Moreover, based (...) on the social systems’ thinking and the framework of complexity, this Essay provides theoretical grounds for skepticism about any policies or structures applicable to all times and contexts. Therefore, rather than perceiving corporate governance as being identically applicable to all corporations, the law must meet the challenge of complexity by designing governance arrangements following a firm-specific perspective. Furthermore, I argue that in conditions of complexity, corporate governance eco-systems should be designed with a firm-specific view that incorporates the effect of the corporation participants’ heterogeneity, the heterogeneity of its internal power relations, and the heterogeneity of industries and markets. These novel arguments have profound implications for redesigning fundamental legal doctrines—such as fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders, regulation of related party transactions, the officers’ duty of care, and the company purpose. (shrink)

Since 9/11, the possibilities for pluralism and tolerance have been severely tested by a discourse of terrorism and security. The development of an intelligent and cosmopolitan understanding between religious communities in Europe and America has been compromised by a range of legal and political responses to terrorism. While the debate about the berqa has clearly indicated the problems relating to Muslim cultural differences, we argue that legal pluralism and in particular the question of Shari’a tribunals may prove to (...) be a more decisive test of Western multiculturalism. This article examines the many criticisms raised against religious arbitration in domestic affairs and considers the presence of the Shari’a at various levels of society, claiming that the evolution of Sharia-mindedness is compatible both with a faith-based life and with liberal ideals. However, the problem with religious courts lies elsewhere, namely with the fragmentation of social life and the erosion of citizenship. The article concludes by examining the prospects and problems of Turkish entry into the European Union with special reference to the domestic policies of the Justice and Development Party. (shrink)

Depuis 2006, le Québec débat âprement des règles gouvernant la laïcité de ses institutions et se trouve confronté à deux modèles apparemment irréconciliables : le républicanisme « jacobin » et le libéralisme individualiste, issus respectivement de la France et du Canada. En s’inspirant de la pensée du philosophe politique John Rawls, les auteurs proposent ici d’explorer une voie médiane mieux adap­tée à l’expérience québécoise. Dans ses travaux tardifs, Rawls met en avant une forme de libéralisme républicain affranchi de l’indi­vidualisme normatif (...) de Kant et de Mill et récuse le paternalisme qui vise à imposer aux citoyens une certaine éthique de vie. Tout en étant neutre à l’égard des conceptions individualiste et com­munautarienne de la personne, il cherche à équilibrer les droits collectifs des peuples avec les droits individuels des personnes. -/- C’est donc une conception strictement institutionnelle de la laïcité que présentent les auteurs, qui redéfinissent au passage l’interculturalisme, la liberté rationnelle et le consentement, ainsi que l’expérience religieuse, qui devient hybride, à la fois subjective et objective. En se servant de Rawls, ils expliquent clairement pourquoi l’expression de la religion fait partie de la liberté reli­gieuse, mais aussi pourquoi il faut faire la distinction entre les objets qui relèvent des libertés fondamentales et ceux qui sont sujets à des accommodements. Ils tracent ainsi une authentique troisième voie, qui pourrait bien faire sortir de l’impasse le débat québécois sur la laïcité. (shrink)

Radical multiculturalism claims that cultural groups, not the individual, should be the yardstick for considerations of justice, because the group offers the individual the indispensable good of being rooted in a community and since membership in a culture is not voluntary, abolition of culture would lead to uprooting of individuals. Thus, by taking this good away on grounds of justice, liberalism perpetrates another injustice. Against this, liberalism upholds the principle of normative methodological individualism, arguing that groups cannot be defined without (...) recourse to the individual. Furthermore, the concept of cultural group is notoriously vague and not suitable to replace normative methodological individualism. Moreover, radical multiculturalism risks falling prey to self-defeating normative relativism. Since there is also a danger for the liberal to fall prey to culture-centrism, both parties agree on internal universalism. They also agree on the difference between membership in an association and membership in a cultural community. However, the liberal concludes that the state must not add its might to cultural dependency, but enable the individual to grow out of it. Furthermore, liberalism maintains that normative methodological individualism is sufficient for even group-related needs provided the group conforms to basic principles of justice. To this, radical multiculturalism objects that even if all cultural groups abide by the principles of justice of the larger society, liberalism still produces injustices for those whose language is not among the official languages of the polity. Since any democratic polity needs a medium of debate and deliberation that is universally understood, liberalism has to grant this point. Liberalism can only diminish its impact through intermediate levels of government and subsidiarity. (shrink)

Je montre dans ce texte que la thèse de Jean Wahl sur les Pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amérique n'est pas tant un tableau des pensées pluralistes qu'une problématisation du pluralisme. La révélation que Wahl va trouver à rebours de certains textes de William James, c'est celle d'un restant moniste, attentif au fond non relationnel de l'expérience, ce qui va le conduire à explorer, beaucoup plus hardiment que nombre de ses contempo- rains, les proximités entre James et Bradley. Cette voix moniste, que (...) l'on retrouverait derrière la lettre des «philosophies pluralistes», est le véritable enjeu de la thèse de 1920 qui, après un inventaire des critiques de l'unité abstraite, propose dans sa méditation conclusive une vision du monde dans laquelle, une fois la critique des abstractions du pluralisme opérée, subsiste ce sens du « particulier concret » qui en est la marque propre. Ce sera l'objet de la deuxième section. Alors qu'une partie du public français lit l'empirisme radical à travers la «volonté de croire», les derniers textes à partir des premiers, traduits et présentés dès leur parution par Renouvier dans La Critique, Wahl semble au contraire retrouver, dans les premiers textes l'accent des derniers, à travers l'insistance sur le fait brut de l'existence, hypothèse qui sera éclairée dans la troisième section. (shrink)

Fertility clinicians participate in non-sexual reproductive projects by providing assisted reproductive technology (ART) to those hoping to reproduce, in support of their reproductive goals. In most countries where ART is available, the state regulates ART as a form of medical treatment. The predominant position in the reproductive rights literature frames the clinician’s role as medical technician, and the state as a third party with limited rights to interfere. These roles broadly align with established functions of clinician and state in (...) Western liberal democracies, where doctors have duties to provide safe, beneficial and legal healthcare to all who seek it. Recognised state responsibilities include safeguarding equitable access to medical services and protecting and promoting reproductive liberty.I argue against this normative moral framing of clinician and state involvement in non-sexual reproduction, suggesting that clinician and state join the non-sexual reproductive project at the point of triggering conception. Begetting a child is more than just the provision and regulation of healthcare; it generates rights and confers responsibilities on all who join this morally significant project. All who collaborate have the right to join or refuse to join the project. I suggest this is intuitively understood in the sexual realm, but not in the non-sexual realm. My key substantive claim is that non-sexual reproduction is a pluralist pursuit that morally implicates more than the genetic and gestational contributors. I find that while the moral basis of a clinician or the state’s right to refuse to join the ART project is the same as for those providing gestational or genetic input, the reasons that morally underpin their refusal differs. (shrink)

This paper examines the properties of the validity and scope of arguments as standards for evaluating the epistemic qualities of particular deliberative exchanges within a context of value pluralism where parties can hold differing views of the common good based on incommensurable basic values. In this context, the task of political decisions is to maximise the interests of all, only judging between internally coherent versions of the common good on the basis of their mutual impact. The paper argues open, (...) democratic, deliberation provides the best chance of discovering such a path, through developing mutual understanding across incommensurable positions. Identifying the validity and scope of a deliberative exchange enhances this potential. Any deliberative exchange may be characterised in terms of its validity – the reasons that support its conclusions – and scope – the unquestioned assumptions that mark the boundaries of that reasoning. The paper explains the epistemic role of these two features in developing understanding across plural positions. Clarity about the validity of an exchange reveals positions that can be shared. Acknowledgement of its scope avoids over-extending its conclusions and reveals how positions differ, providing the starting point for further deliberation about their co-ordination. The paper ends by drawing the conclusion that deliberation characterised in this way should be democratic and open. (shrink)

This article builds upon the distinction between pluralism and plurality, the latter in the sense of variety or diversity. Plurality is an empirical fact, such as the biological diversity of the human species. In contrast, pluralism is a normatively underpinned social pattern according to which the diversity of interests, opinions, values, ideas, etc., of individuals and groups is recognized as a constitutive element of a political order. Pluralism can materialize only if a political order is not based (...) upon the claim of one undisputable truth. An embryonic form of pluralism through law emerged in ancient Greece with the institution of courts in which the parties to a legal dispute could argue over what the law said and hence officially present divergent meanings of justice. For the modern development the separation of law and justice was a major step towards pluralism insofar as the authority of the polity and the binding force of the law were no longer based upon the contention of one exclusive truth – auctoritas, non veritas facit legem. This Hobbesian principle banned religious, moral, philosophical and political discourses to the pre-political domain of privacy and secrecy from which pluralism could not result. Referring to the distinction between regulative and constitutive norms I submit that only the latter, not the former, can function as sources of pluralism. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a method to solve controversies in scenarios of legal pluralism. Shortly, in scenarios of legal pluralism some of the controversies involve members of culturally differentiated groups who justify their allegations with arguments that only make sense in the culture to which they belong. If the adjudicator does not share the same cultural worldview as the parts under litigation, how can he/she come to make a decision determining the parties’ rights and obligations? My answer (...) for this question includes (1) an account of knowledge to culturally differentiated groups, and (2) a method for the evaluation of the culturally-dependent arguments. (shrink)

Durant les trois premières décennies du XXe siècle, Zhang Dongsun fut l’un des penseurs les plus influents de République de Chine : une réputation qui reposait, en partie, sur son extraordinaire capacité à présenter la pensée occidentale d’une manière compatible avec les méthodes spécifiques de la pensée traditionnelle chinoise. L’une de ses contributions majeures fut sans doute d’avoir créé et développé une théorie moderne de la connaissance, fondée sur l’ancienne épistémologie bouddhiste chinoise et le chan, ce qui représente à bien (...) des égards une synthèse de la science moderne et de la pensée traditionnelle chinoise. Ainsi, cette étude se concentrera principalement sur sa théorie de la connaissance. Zhang Dongsun qualifiait sa théorie de « pluraliste » compte tenu de l’hypothèse que les divers éléments qui permettent la compréhension et le raisonnement sont mutuellement exclusifs et irréductibles. C’est pourquoi nous allons étudier de façon critique les éléments proposés dans le principal traité épistémologique de Zhang – « Epistémologie plurielle » – qui représente l’approche la plus complète, la plus systématique et la plus cohérente de sa théorie. (shrink)

With its sixteen years, experience of pluralism, the FDF appears to represent a new type of political party in Belgian politics. Owing to the multiplicity of its origins the federalist party of Brussels was obliged in an initial stage to reconcile manifold philosophical, ideological and political tendencies; in later years it has succeeding in giving an even more concrete contents to this pluralism. lt now consciously tends to make this pluralism a political advantage in its (...) competition with the traditional parties. Both the evolution and the structure of the party were strongly determined by this specific characteristic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:One True Ring or Many?Religious Pluralism in Lessing's Nathan the WiseChristopher AdamoIn the Central Scene of Nathan the Wise, Nathan responds to Saladin's pointed question pertaining to the "true religion" with the famous parable of the three rings.1 As John Pizer notes, Lessing deliberately crafts ambiguous fables to cultivate the reader's capacity for autonomous exercise of hermeneutic skill.2 That Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's Nathan the Wise evokes a wide (...) variety of interpretations, therefore, should be no surprise.3 However, for Pizer, Lessing's use of fable additionally represents a "key to his Enlightenment ideals, the inculcation of the idea that individuals are responsible for their own actions and for their own maturation as social beings, as later articulated by Kant" (Pizer, p. 101). If the genre of fable itself, for Lessing, serves as a pedagogic tool to cultivate in his readers the rational autonomy as envisioned by Kant in the opening lines of "What is Enlightenment?," then might that suggest Lessing's ring-parable is best read as an Enlightenment-humanist response to the theological and political problem of the plurality of revealed religions?Several recent Lessing scholars have taken this line. In his study Lessing's Philosophy of Religion and the German Enlightenment, Toshimasa Yasukata approvingly reads the parable of the rings as illustrative of Lessing's view of a "true religion" that "transcends all of the historical religions and yet underlies the truth of each.... [A] religion based on real and universal humanity."4 Astrid Oesmann, in her article "Nathan der Weise: Suffering Lessing's 'Erziehung,'" develops a similar interpretation but then, based upon it, turns a critical eye toward such a project as it requires Nathan to suppress his Judaic identity—not merely in his confrontation with Saladin but additionally by suppressing his suffering [End Page 139] at the hands of a Crusader pogrom that took the lives of his wife and seven children.5 For both these commentators, Lessing's Nathan the Wise champions a vision of a universal religion based on reason alone, for good or for ill.With this interpretation of Lessing's Nathan in the background, I intend to highlight moments in Lessing's Nathan that invite a more pluralistic reading. Both readings above interpret the ambiguous ending of the parable in light of the teleological history of revealed religion constructed by Lessing in "The Education of the Human Race" thus, implying there remains a singular, genuine, ring, i.e., a "true" religion that even may be identifiable with one of the three in question. The reading developed here interprets the ambiguous ending of the ring parable in light of the final scenes of Nathan, focusing on Recha's rich genealogical origins and her universal regard among persons of diverse faiths. The question as to which is the correct [recht] ring gives way to the question of which bearer(s) possesses a genuine [echt] ring, a significant shift in focus and reflective of Lessing's "primacy of ethics" over explanation in an approach to the plurality of revealed religions.6 Second, though both an Enlightenment reading and the present reading move the focus of religion away from orthodoxy towards a primacy of ethics, the present reading would be better equipped to respond to a charge like Oesmann's that defusing inter-religious tensions in a multicultural polity can come only by the sacrifice of one's cultural and historical particularity as Jewish, Muslim, Christian.INathan the Wise is set in Jerusalem during the close of the Third Crusade (1189–1192). A cease-fire has just been breached by the Knights Templar. Each side prepares to resume the hostilities. Previous acts of internecine violence reverberate throughout the play. Several of the play's characters suffer from (Nathan) and perpetrate (the Templar, the Sultan) sectarian violence. We discover in the first act that Saladin has just executed nineteen prisoners of war, sparing only one Templar. We discover in the fourth act that Nathan's entire family had been murdered by Crusaders roughly eighteen years previous. The political, pragmatic peace between rival parties is unraveling.The action begins when Nathan, a wealthy Jewish merchant, returns from his... (shrink)

3 Mart 1924 tarihinde ilan edilen Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu’nun uygulama boyutu Cumhuriyet Tarihi boyunca devam eden tartışmaların çıkış noktası olmuştur. Kanuna dayandırılarak medreselerin kaldırılması ardından açılan yeni din eğitimi kurumlarının da bir müddet sonra kapatılması ve din derslerinin de aşamalı olarak eğitim programlarının dışında bırakılması din derslerini uzun yıllar eğitimin bir parçası olmaktan çıkarmıştır. Çoğulcu demokrasi fikrinin ortaya çıkardığı ifade hürriyeti ve bunun sosyal ve siyasi hayattaki yansımalarının bir sonucu olarak din dersleri yeniden gündem konusu haline gelmiştir. Bu makalede Türkiye’de (...) çok partili hayata geçişin sağlanmasıyla birlikte din dersleri konusunda yaşanan gelişmeler ve din eğitimi veren kurumların geçirdiği yeniden yapılanma süreci kronolojik bir yöntemle sunulmuştur. Makale çerçevesinde 1924’ten 1946 yılına kadar olan süreçte din dersleri konusunda yaşanan gelişmeler kısaca anlatılmış, ardından 1960 yılına kadar olan süreç incelenmiştir.As we analyze the history of Republic of Turkey, the year 1946 and the following years have become the milestone for the transition process to pluralist democracy. This period of time could be regarded of a crucial influence on political and social transformation. Within the article, developments taken place in religion classes and re-construction period of the institutions taught religion after the transition process to pluralist democracy from single party regime have been chronologically presented. The article looks through the developments in religion classes from 1924 until 1946 and then analyzes the period up until 1960. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of the physician in a pluralistic community. A personal and communal sense of identity must resolve a vast array of often conflicting backgrounds and contexts in order to function smoothly. Physicians are neither entitled to impose their own moral views on their patients nor expected to surrender their own moral agency. Several illustrative cases are given. The solution of inevitable conflicts is embodied within the context of the situation, but since irreconcilable differences remain, a resolution (...) is not always possible. Tolerance for such differences and ways of dealing with them allows the integrity of both parties to remain intact. (shrink)

Feminist Policymaking in Turbulent Times offers a unique and timely reflection of the critical debates around the institutionalisation of feminist and gender-focused ideas and norms into policy. Many states and non-governmental organisations are increasingly invested in 'feminist policymaking' at the domestic and international levels. Yet, this liberal (feminist) agenda is also vastly disputed by critical, intersectional and decolonial voices on the one hand, and by anti-gender movements around the world on the other. Indeed, while opposition to 'gender ideology' is mounting (...) from reactionary, religious and secular forces, feminist policymaking is also being challenged in important ways from within. Thus, this book situates feminist policymaking in a challenging and 'turbulent', global context. This book explores feminist policymaking in multiple areas of policy, examining various gender-focused programmes that states and international organisations have undertaken in the last decade, offering critical interventions and rethinking the relationship between feminism and policy. The book not only reflects on the advances of feminist policymaking globally, but also critically assesses the intersectional challenges embedded within it and lying ahead. It moves the field forward by creating opportunities, based on lived experiences, for re-imagining the transformative potential of the nexus between feminism and policymaking. Interdisciplinary in scope and bringing to the fore the voices of both academics and practitioners, the book is the product of an international collaboration, forging links and dialogue that are increasingly necessary to question some of the exclusionary, militaristic and hierarchical assumptions of policymaking which is labelled as feminist. Feminist Policymaking in Turbulent Times will be of interest to all scholars, students and practitioners interested in the role of gender in policymaking and concerned with contestations around gender-focused projects. (shrink)

In this paper I critically explore the possibility that the hope for engaging in democratic discourse and coalition-building across deep— potentially irreconcilable— moral, religious divisions in current U.S. public life depends less upon further calls for “more tolerance,” and instead in thinking creatively and transformatively about how to democratize and constructively utilize conflict and intolerance. Is it possible to distinguish between constructive and destructive forms of intolerance? If so, what are the prospects for re-orienting analysis of democratic practices and processes (...) so that what typically appear as forms of simple intolerance (and thus, as candidates for marginalization or exclusion from political processes) might be reconceived and re-directed for the purposes of constructively transforming those practices and processes? Further, what would an analytical framework that aimed to distinguish and cultivate “healthy conflict” in contrast to degenerative or destructive conflict look like? How would such an approach facilitate efforts on the ground to recognize, understand and transform religiously-motivated conflict? I pose answers to these questions by bringing strands from the “religion in public life” debates that have unfolded over recent decades among ethicists and political philosophers into conversation with conflict transformation literature in peace studies. Bridging these resources will help to re-conceptualize basic assumptions about tolerance and conflict as a pivotal first step in constructively transforming conflicts motivated by, or identified with, moral commitments and religious identities. (shrink)

This article considers the difficult question of whether there are any reasons for theocratic religious devotees to affirm liberalism and liberal institutions. Swaine argues not only that there are reasons for theocrats to affirm liberalism, but that theocrats are committed rationally to three normative principles of liberty of conscience, as well. Swaine subsequently discusses three institutional and strategic implications of his arguments. First, he outlines an option of semisovereignty for theocratic communities in liberal democracies, and explains why an appropriate valuation (...) of liberty of conscience may justify a standard of that kind. Second, he addresses the question of permissible government aid for religion and symbolic endorsement of religious groups. Third, Swaine considers innovations and new approaches that could be employed internationally to better display liberal government's affirmation of religiosity, to promote liberty of conscience, and to help improve relations between liberal and theocratic parties around the globe. (shrink)

While discussing critical individuality as oneof the main goals of liberal education, theemphasis has usually been on direct educationalmeasures. Much less attention has been given tothe social preconditions for its development.This paper discusses the societal aspect of thequestion by employing the notion of spherepluralism. The attempt is to point out someways in which the diversified nature of societycan be employed in its full potential for thedevelopment of critical individuality. Thearticle aims to outline a form of spherepluralism, which is based on (...) structuraldifferentiation, cultural diversity, communalvitality, confessional pluralism andcross-communal criticism. The suggestion isthat the critical potential of sphere pluralismpresupposes a proper balance between sphereautonomy and inter-sphere criticism as well asthat between social construction of meaning andobjective-structural constraints. (shrink)