This paper begins by taking seriously former slave and abolitionist Frederick Douglass’ response in his What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? to systematic violence and oppression. He claims that direct argumentation is not the ideal mode of resistance to oppression: “At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed.” I will focus on a few elements of this playful mode of resistance that conflict with the more straightforward strivings for abstract, universal, objective, convergent, absolute (...) thinking that champions reason over emotion, logic over narrative, and science over lived experience. In contrast, the type of protest employed by people like Douglass can utilize aesthetics and logic, playfulness and seriousness, emotion, even anger, and reason. Douglass provides examples of humorous, sincere parrhesia, oscillating between the lexicon of the dominant sphere and the critical reflection from a trickster on the margins. This will require an analysis of Michel Foucault’s conception of parrhesia: courageous truth-telling in the face of powerful people or institutions. It is a study of humor in the parrhesiastes, an element I think neglected by Foucault. I argue that the humorous parrhesiastes offers a mode of resistance which can subvert oppressive power structures that perpetuate injustice, revealing the fact that humor can be integral in courageous truth-telling. (shrink)

El propósito principal de este escrito será abordar la posibilidad de una educación parrhesiástica en la actualidad. La dificultad se presenta a la hora de considerar los métodos educativos contemporáneos, ya que estos poseen un enfoque práctico y controlador. Sin embargo, creo que la posibilidad de pensar una pedagogía parrhesiástica implica considerar otros métodos educativos, menos convencionales, en específico el del filósofo Matthew Lipman. Entonces, este artículo apunta a rescatar caracteres de la parrhesía presentes en dicho programa y notar la (...) importancia de una formación con la presencia de la parrhesía. (shrink)

Parrhesia, or frank speech, is usually understood as a practice intimately connected to Athenian democracy. This paper begins by analysing parrhesia in non-democratic regimes. Building on that analysis, I suggest that most accounts of parrhesia overlook the degree to which its practice at Athens implied a comparison of the demos to an unaccountable ruler -- a tyrant. As a practice, parrhesia was paradigmatically undertaken by speakers addressing an audience with the power to sanction them in the (...) event that their advice proved uncongenial. As such it could be useful in both democracies and autocracies, serving as a possible counterweight to flattering rhetoric. But in both regime types it was in essence a remedial virtue, necessitated by a basic structural feature common to both autocratic and Athenian democratic decision procedures: at the centre of both was an unaccountable decision maker able to hold its advisors to account. (shrink)

En el marco de una crisis democrática que ha hecho cuestionarnos la forma en que estamos llevando a cabo este sistema de gobierno, la presente investigaciónpretende retomar la vieja noción de la parrhesía griega como el ethos que debiera guiar el debate político, pero también como un principio que debe estar presente en aquellos que hacen filosofía. Un cruce entre la acción comunicativa habermasiana y las palabras de Vattimo acerca del rol de la filosofía nos ayudarán a elucidar cómo abordar (...) esta crisis: desde la discusión política para llegar al consenso, que forzosamente debe estar alineado con este potente concepto de parrhesía. (shrink)

According to some interpreters, Foucault's encounter with the Greek and Roman ethics led him to reconsider his earlier work and to turn away from politics. Drawing mostly from Foucault's last and hitherto unpublished lecture course, this paper argues that Foucault's turn to ethics should not be interpreted as a turn away from his previous work, but rather as its logical continuation and an attempt to resolve some of the outstanding questions. I argue that the 1984 lectures on parrhesia should (...) be interpreted as Foucault's philosophical apology, as an attempt to defend himself against the charges of moral and epistemological nihilism, which were raised in response to his earlier work. In his last lectures, the Nietzschean Foucault somewhat surprisingly describes his earlier work as authentic Socratic philosophy and as ethical practice of freedom. In the conclusion, I assess the plausibility of Foucault's apology and speculate in which direction his work might have developed, had it not been cut off by his death. (shrink)

En este texto examinaremos la relación problemática entre parrhesía, necropolítica y víctima. Nuestro trabajo estará radicado en una examinación de la necropolítica y su íntima relación con el biopoder foucaultiano, sus resistencias y efectos. Una resistencia particular está contenida en la noción de parrhesía, la cual recibirá su respectiva modificación modal ante los efectos de la necropolítica bajo las circunstancias examinadas. Con lo anterior, nuestra intención sería retratar una teoría de "víctimas y parrhesía" bajo el contexto de lo necropolítico y (...) la no–filosofía. Nos "serviremos" de la manera más ética posible de material visual, entablando unos respectivos límites teóricos. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone estudiar la dramática del discurso verdadero en los desarrollos foucaultianos de los años 1978 a 1984. La hipótesis que busca señalar es que cada capítulo de esta historia admite actos de producción de verdad para gobernar, y modos en que esa verdad puede ser disputada. En su desarrollo, primero aborda los lineamientos generales de los últimos años del pensamiento de Foucault, y después se detiene en los tres capítulos de la dramática del discurso verdadero: la parrhesía (...) en la antigua Grecia, las contra-conductas sobre el poder pastoral, y la crítica en la Modernidad. En la conclusión se busca ver qué lugar ocupa dentro de esta historia la apuesta de Foucault. (shrink)

Embodied self-reflection goes beyond strictly rational thinking – we are thinking beings after all, for it includes our tacit concrete knowledge, as Michael Polanyi and David Bohm would describe the thinking that is implicit in our abilities to know how to do things such as knowing how to ride a bicycle. Polanyi describes this knowledge as: “[knowing] more than we can tell.” To become aware of the thinking below the surface of rational thinking is very challenging. Yet that is exactly (...) what is required for any kind of self-awareness and self-transformation to take place. To become aware of our own thinking essentially means becoming aware of oneself as a witness to our own thinking in the process of thinking. Bohm understands thinking as a movement and similarly to becoming aware of our physical movements through proprioception, so too can we become aware of our thinking as a movement. Proprioception of thinking implies proprioception of embodied thinking. -/- (Self-)reflection is (self-)examination or (self-)scrutiny is a process that requires the courage to question one’s self and with it the touchstones underlying our identity. This process is a form of parrhesia, for parrhesia is essentially also a form of infinite questioning, and which can also be applied to questioning the self. (shrink)

In seinen letzten beiden Vorlesungen untersucht Foucault anhand der historischen Praxis des freimütigen Sprechens auch seine eigenen methodologischen Begriffe. An den aus den antiken Quellen herausgearbeiteten Formen der parrhesia – als demokratische Politik, als philosophische Subjektivierungstechnik und als kynische Kritik – prüft Foucault so zugleich sein eigenes Vorgehen, Philosophie als Politik der Wahrheit zu betreiben.

This study examines the Foucauldian notion of “parrhesia” within the context of curricular practices through a renewal of scholarly interest in Islamic metaphysics as represented by the Avicennean modalities of reality: necessity, contingency, and possibility. It explores the role of contingency in advancing educational practices that generate inclusive dissemination of knowledge that captures the language of Tajdeed (legitimate renovation) in Islamic education. This article argues that contingency, as a causality-oriented modality, determines whether meaning is relative or absolute, while necessity, (...) as an acknowledgment of universal truth, slips into demagoguery that can be used to canonize strict textualism and absolutism. Contingency is defined here as a practice that stimulates synthesis and dialogical understanding of knowledge. Accordingly, the study asks the following questions: How does infusing the Avicennean concept of contingency into curriculum practices offer opportunities for inclusivity and free speech? How can revisiting Islamic cosmological modalities help Muslim educators and curriculum writers move into the broader path of inclusive pedagogies? From an educational position, the article introduces a curriculum of metaphysics that advocates the implementation of contingency, which is considered essential to parrhesia and democracy. It also draws attention to an anti-metaphysical attitude that is generally present in curriculum theorizing. Accordingly, Metaphysics is invoked to challenge a state of flux or hegemonized assumptions; hence, metaphysics validates parrhesia. (shrink)

This study examines the Foucauldian notion of “parrhesia” within the context of curricular practices through a renewal of scholarly interest in Islamic metaphysics as represented by the Avicennean modalities of reality: necessity, contingency, and possibility. It explores the role of contingency in advancing educational practices that generate inclusive dissemination of knowledge that captures the language of Tajdeed (legitimate renovation) in Islamic education. This article argues that contingency, as a causality-oriented modality, determines whether meaning is relative or absolute, while necessity, (...) as an acknowledgment of universal truth, slips into demagoguery that can be used to canonize strict textualism and absolutism. Contingency is defined here as a practice that stimulates synthesis and dialogical understanding of knowledge. Accordingly, the study asks the following questions: How does infusing the Avicennean concept of contingency into curriculum practices offer opportunities for inclusivity and free speech? How can revisiting Islamic cosmological modalities help Muslim educators and curriculum writers move into the broader path of inclusive pedagogies? From an educational position, the article introduces a curriculum of metaphysics that advocates the implementation of contingency, which is considered essential to parrhesia and democracy. It also draws attention to an anti-metaphysical attitude that is generally present in curriculum theorizing. Accordingly, Metaphysics is invoked to challenge a state of flux or hegemonized assumptions; hence, metaphysics validates parrhesia. (shrink)

In his late lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault underpins the pre-eminence of art as the modern site of parrhesia. He omits, however, the aesthetic question: how does parrhesia work through art? A compelling question, firstly, because “truth-telling” seems to be at odds with art as an imaginative process. Secondly, because parrhesia implies a transformation in the listener, while Foucault’s limited notion of discourse precludes transformation beyond discourse. This essay hypothesizes that parrhesiastic art effects a transformation (...) in the imagination, without dismissing this transformation as unreal. As Foucault’s utterances about the imagination are restricted to his earliest publications, this essay features a combined reading of Foucault’s early and late discussions of art. To further analyze the elusive role of the imagination in the late discussions, the essay employs the Deleuzian notion of “dramatization”, an epistemological method that draws on the imagination to escape representational thought. The essay thus aims to demonstrate that parrhesia mirrors the artwork in its intuitive and dynamic relation to truth. Subsequently, it argues that Foucault and Deleuze, respectively proceeding from a limited and an unlimited mode of thinking, come infinitely close in their thinking of art. (shrink)

Résumé En général, la plupart des objections aux écrits d'Henry Thoreau se penchent sur ses provocations « inamicales ». Dans cet article, je propose que nous examinions son style par rapport à la pratique de la parrhésie, c'est-à-dire l'expression de la vérité d'après la tradition socratique de la philosophie. La parrhésie est la pratique consistant à dire la vérité dans le but de prendre conscience de l'importance de changer sa propre vie. La transformation envisagée par Thoreau dépend de l'acquisition d'un (...) savoir-faire à l’égard de la culture des sens, et ce, à travers ce qu'il appelle « l'excursion ». Voilà ce qui constitue sa contribution fondamentale à ladite tradition. (shrink)

In his late lectures, Foucault developed the ancient Greek concept of parrhesia, a courage to speak the truth in the face of danger. While not entirely uncritical of the notion, Foucault seemed to find something of an ideal in the political and aesthetic ideal of franc-parler, of speaking freely and courageously. Simultaneously, the post-1968 political valorized the ideal of parrhesia, or “speaking truth to power”: parrhesia seemed inherently progressive, the sole preserve of the left. But a cursory (...) inspection of the annals of Nazism and fascism shows that these movements also aligned themselves with parrhesiastical modes of expression. The fragmented, disparate strands of today’s neo-fascist revival, too, are closely imbricated with the notion of speaking valiantly in the face of supposed orthodoxies: in many ways, the preeminent parrhesiasts today are found on the neo-fascist side. This points to an essential weakness in the concept of parrhesia, particularly in terms of its value and valence as a strategy for the political left. Perhaps it matters less how we speak—being caught up in language games—than what policies and programs we enact. Žižek’s plea for a renewed dogmatic orthodoxy and Chesterton’s criticism of heresy offer ways out of the parrhesiastical trap. (shrink)

This paper considers Foucault’s remarks on Euripides and parrhesia in order to reflect on the deeper relation between tragic speech and truth-telling. It argues that: a) tragedy is a privileged mode of truth-telling, since the tragic fall always involves the hero’s passion for truth; and b) parrhesia is inherently tragic, insofar as it endangers its agent. By focusing on the Bacchae, which Foucault sidesteps, I maintain that this play exemplifies the tragic structure of parrhesiastic conduct, while staging the (...) passage of parrhesia from the temple to the city, and thus also from religion to politics and philosophy. (shrink)

La parrhesía constituye una práctica de “decir veraz” que Michel Foucault investiga genealógicamente en sus últimos seminarios del Colegio de Francia, como una de las maneras originales de constitución de uno mismo en la cultura grecolatina antigua. En este trabajo, dicha noción de parrhesía es desplegada en toda su contemporaneidad política, afirmándose que constituye un complemento fundamental para la tesis agonísitica de la democracia, en especial la defendida por Chantal Mouffe. El “decir veraz” del parrhesiasta, al interpelar de manera radical (...) el statu quo de la identidad colectiva constituida en el proceso de politización propio de la democracia radical, subvierte y transforma dicha identidad en un objeto permanente de disputa. Se recupera así el sentido del polemos propio de la práctica democrática. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article considers Michel Foucault's theories of ethical speech and militant life in the context of Occupy Wall Street's encampments in Zuccotti Park. Focusing on the encampments and the production and circulation of resources to meet bodily needs, the article concludes that occupation was a self-inflicted form of precarity as well as an extension of an already existing vulnerability, a living that is at once a form of social death. I read the occupations as a mode of militant life, (...) which is to say, that which enacts precarity while at the same time transforming it into the object of radical speech. (shrink)

Translation into Russian by Dr. Sergey Borisov -/- Аннотация Понятие «парресия» впервые появляется в греческой литературе в V в. до н. э. Парресия — это возможность говорить свободно и открыто, не считаясь с авторитетами, говорить то, что без этого права может привести к наказанию или смерти. Парресия позволяла говорить правду властям, принося пользу тому, кто властвует, кому зачастую не хватает понимания сути реального положения дел. -/- Перевод статьи выполнен С. В. Борисовым по изданию: Tillmanns, Maria daVenza (2022). “How Parrhesia (...) in Doing Philosophy With Children: Develops Their Touchstones of Reality”. International Journal of Philosophical Practice, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1-11. В своей книге «Занятия философией с детьми в начальной школе: сложная деятельность» Берри Хисен утверждает, что занятие философией с детьми является формой парресии, поскольку побуждает детей говорить свободно и открыто. Парресия изменяет отношения между взрослым и ребенком. Серьезное отношение взрослых к детям как полноправным гражданам дает детям возможность серьезно относиться к себе, а также нести ответственность за свои мысли и чувства. Обосновывая свои мысли и чувства и прислушиваясь к мнению своих сверстников, дети становятся критическими слушателями не только других, но и самих себя. Они узнают, что то, что они думают и чувствуют, имеет вес, имеет значение в глазах других, что повышает самооценку. В процессе философствования дети также вырабатывают свои собственные критерии («пробные камни») реальности. Более того, для ощущения целостности и обоснованности того, кто мы есть, необходимо самопознание, что дает нам осознание цели и направления развития. (shrink)

Foucault makes clear in his later lectures that the notion of parrhesia has a long and varied history, which he merely sketches in his investigations of ancient politics and philosophy. Recent research extends and modifies Foucault’s genealogy of parrhesia as an aspect of the practice of the adviser or counsellor of a monarch or prince, showing how parrhesia informed notions of counsel at other times: in later antiquity, the middle ages as well as early modern Europe. Here (...) we seek to show that the ancient notion of parrhesia reappears as a graft in another domain of modern truth telling: that of bureaucracy in Britain, in the debates over the organisation of the offices of government, with the middle years of the nineteenth century a decisive moment of rupture. We consider the fate of bureaucratic frank counsel in our own era. Interpreters of Foucault’s later lectures on governmentality have analysed the consequences of neoliberal rule for the government of public servants during the era of Margaret Thatcher. Presenting a reappraisal of the era, we show how important counter-discourses also emerged in this era, bringing the ethics of office to the fore, as civil servants argued for the formal codification of bureaucratic ethics, including frank counsel, as they tried to defend their professional ethics. Our discussion therefore addresses a key, early moment in the emergence of the ideal of codifying frank counsel and bureaucratic ethics. We consider the consequences of codification, arguing that a deep ambivalence now characterises the way in which political authorities seek to govern this domain of ethical practice. (shrink)

Este artigo interpreta a quarta conferência de uma série de seis pronunciadas por Foucault em Berkeley (Universidade da Califórnia) de outubro a novembro de 1983. A problemática da parrhesia retomada pelo filósofo francês do diálogo Laques, de Platão, suscita uma discussão sobre os sentidos de democracia, sistema político em baixa na Atenas do final do século V a.C. Articulando os discursos cômico e filosófico, evidenciam-se, ao mesmo tempo, a força e as lacunas do texto de Foucault. Se, por um (...) lado, o interesse foucaultiano pela verdade força um retorno ao “falar franco”, por outro, falta, nesta conferência, um olhar de conjunto mais amplo que dê conta da parrhesia como sintoma de uma falta e da decadência do espírito democrático ateniense nos termos propostos no Laques. Deriva dessa falta, por exemplo, a ideia de que, do ponto de vista conceitual, o Laques seria “um fracasso”. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Democracia; Discurso; Parrhesía; Verdade. (shrink)

In a 2014 article in The Guardian, an Indigenous shaman of the Yanomami people of the Amazon rainforest named Davi Kopenawa offers a devastating critique of white society. It is formed of excerpts from multiple interviews, which form the basis of his memoir The Falling Sky, compiled and translated by his French anthropologist collaborator Bruce Albert. Here I bring the dual lenses of philosophy and dance studies to explore how Kopenawa’s lifelong interaction with white people facilitated his reworking of Yanomami (...) shamanic discourse into a parrhesia against the “epidemic fumes” of climate change, on behalf of the Yanomami of the Amazon, white people, and all the beings of the earth. (shrink)

Resumen La parrhesía constituye una práctica de "decir veraz" que Michel Foucault investiga en sus últimos seminarios del Colegio de Francia, como una de las maneras originales de constitución de uno mismo en la cultura grecolatina antigua. En este trabajo, dicha noción de parrhesía es desplegada en toda su contemporaneidad política y se afirma que constituye un complemento fundamental para la tesis agonísitica de la democracia, en especial la defendida por Chantal Mouffe. El "decir veraz" del parrhesiasta, al interpelar de (...) manera radical el statu quo de la identidad colectiva constituida en el proceso de politización propio de la democracia radical, subvierte y transforma dicha identidad en un objeto permanente de disputa. Se recupera así el sentido del polemos propio de la práctica democrática.The parrhesia is a practice of "true-telling" that Michel Foucault researches in his last courseof the College of France, as one of the most singulars ways of becoming oneself in the ancient Greco Latin culture. In this paper, such notion of parrhesia is developed in its whole political contemporaneity, and it is assumed as a key component for the agonistic thesis of democracy, especially in Chantal Mouffe's work. The "true-telling" of parrhesiast, while contesting in a radical way the status quo of the collective identity formed in the own process of politization of radical democracy, it subverts and transform this given identity in an object of constant dispute. The polemos sense characteristic of democracy is in that way recovered. (shrink)

This paper argues that the educators' vocation, in the Arendtian sense, is to prepare and cultivate in students the love for the world – amor mundi. Educators are responsible for introducing the world to students through the conservation and preservation of human tradition and the 'realm of the past.' Thus, it requires a practice of truth-telling or parrhesia. However, this parrhesiastic activity is not explicit in Arendt. This paper also invokes Foucault's account of parrhesia to emphasize another main (...) point of this paper, i.e., Arendt's conservationist view of education implies or presupposes the practice of truth-telling. If such an idea is correct, the positioning of education becomes ambiguous. For Arendt, education is located 'in between' the realms of the pre-political and political. However, suppose this implicitness of truth-telling is proven to be correct and affirmed. In such a case, we can say that education and its main motor – educators as intellectuals/scholars have a quasi-political role in society. (shrink)

In The Use of Pleasure, Michel Foucault suggests that it is possible to read Walter Benjamin’s writings on Baudelaire as a contribution to a genealogy of ethics. This article experiments with reading Benjamin in this way. It shows that a distinctive analysis of each of the four elements of Foucauldian ethics can be found in Benjamin’s work on Baudelaire and the Paris arcades. Specifically, the article makes the case for reading Benjamin in terms of his valuable contribution to understandings of (...) the role played by art in modern forms of ‘parrhesia’, or courageous truth-telling. However, whereas Foucault’s notion of ‘arts of living’ focuses on challenging actual relations of power, Benjamin’s focuses on activating potential forms of power. In this way, Benjamin’s ethical framework tests the limits of Foucault’s conceptualization of the government of self and others. (shrink)

Este artículo se centra en el análisis hermenéutico focaultiano de cuatro nociones del pensamiento griego clásico: La Parrhesía o discurso veraz, la Paideia o educación, la Psicagogia o conducción de las almas, y por último la Epimeleia Heautou o el cuidado del sí mismo. Se esboza que mediante el discurso verdadero un mentor conduce el alma de su discípulo en su propia construcción o transformación, emergiendo un sujeto político que será apto para gobernar las almas de los otros hombres, mediante (...) la verdad, la ética y la política. (shrink)

In his recent books under the main title “Homo sacer”, Agamben focuses on the concept of form-of-life. With this article I provide an account of the meaning of this concept, arguing that its origins can be traced back to Foucaults “Lives of infamous men”.

파레시아(parrhēsia)는 통상 발화자가 권력자 앞에서 위험을 무릅쓰고 용기를 발휘해 자신의 생각을 있는 그대로 솔직하게 말하는 것으로 이해되며, 소크라테스는 그런 파레시아를 행하는 자의 전형으로 평가된다. 그러나 플라톤의 대화편에서 보여지는 소크라테스의 모습은 과연 그러한가? 이 논문에서는 첫째, ‘솔직하게 말하기’만으로는 플라톤의 파레시아를 온전히 이해하기 어려움을 밝힌다. 플라톤은 무분별하게 ‘무엇이든 모두 말할 자유’를 경계하며, 그의 파레시아는 언제나 진실 탐구라는 목적과 관련하여 작동하기 때문이다. 파레시아는 단순히 솔직하게 말하기가 아닌 진실을 구하기 위해서라면 무엇이든 말하는 행위이며, 여기에는 ‘말하지 않음’의 발화 행위와 아이러니의 사용 등도 포함된다. 둘째, 플라톤에 (...) 따르면 진실은 논박당하지 않는 것으로, 그 내용은 나라와 시민들에게 ‘좋은’ 것이어야만 한다는 점을 밝힌다. 그러한 진실을 말하기 위해서 필요한 덕목은 절제(sōphrosynē)이며, 이는 발화자와 청자 모두에게 요구된다. (shrink)

Focusing on his last courses at the Collège de France, the present paper aims at exploring the strategic role the notion of parrhesia plays in the elaboration of Foucault’s critical project, according to which parrhesia is what enables the pas- sage from the concept of problematization as an archaeo-genealogical target of inquiry to the idea of problematization as a verbal act of investigation. To this end, the article argues that parrhesia is the condition of possibility for the (...) problematization of one’s mode of subjectivation, whereby it comes to describe a transformative practice of resistance against the existing power regimes in charge of truth. After tracing the seminal formulation of such a form of resistance in the Socratic imperative of taking care of oneself, the paper then concludes by briefly pointing to the importance of Socrates’ parrhesiastic philosophy for the development of Foucault’s own critical ethos. (shrink)

In the late seventies and early eighties, two subjects became recurrent in the interventions made by Foucault on interviews, conferences and his lessons at Collège de France: a particular approach to the text Was ist Aufklärung?, written by Kant, and the conscious study of the forms adopted by the Greek Parrhesia. Even though both subjects are anchored to different historical foundations, there is a noticeable the effort made by Foucault with aims at determining —into the theoretical and practical place (...) of his crossing-over thinking— a specific sense for the philosophical enterprise he was personally involved. Unfortunately, his death in 1984 left the new working program incomplete. The objectives of this writing are: 1) to shallowly characterize both of this notions and 2) to articulate some of the crossing points between Aufklärung and Parrhesía, in order to reactivate the problem of the specificity of the philosophical work, according to the line being followed by this French philosopher. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to study parrhesia as a form of political performativity. The study of parrhesia as a speech act has been inaugurated by the researches of Lorenzini, who has proposed an in-depth analysis of the parrhesiastic speech act: we nonetheless believe that some features of parrhesiastic performativity urge us to broaden some aspects of his theory. In the first section of this article we will study the nature of parrhesiastic utterance, where Lorenzini’s theses will (...) be discussed through the use of Butler’s approach. In the second section, we will examine the characteristics of Cynic performativity through our theoretical framework, in order to give an example of its effectiveness. We will put forward, then, an overall interpretation of parrhesia, which will be redefined as a communitarian performativity and, furthermore, as an innovative model of radical democracy. (shrink)

This paper draws attention to Foucault’s genealogy of critique. In a series of inquiries, Foucault traced the origins and trajectories of critical practices from the ancient tradition of parrhesia to the enlightenment and the (neo)liberal critique of the state. The paper will elucidate the insights of this history and argue that Foucault’s turn to the genealogy of critique also changed the valence of his theoretical assumptions. Foucault developed a more affirmative practice of genealogy that not only discredits truth claims (...) by tracing them back to their inglorious origins. Rather, he presents a politics of truth as a complex interaction of (governmental) power-knowledge and critique that questions the power effects of truth and rationality. This genealogy of critique contributes to current problematizations of critique by thinkers like Boltanski, Latour and Rancière in highlighting the role of epistemological and technical critique of social rationalization and political reason. (shrink)

While the subject of women’s activity in historical and contemporary punk scenes has attracted significant attention, the presence of trans women in punk has received comparatively little research, in spite of their increasing visibility and long history in punk. This article examines the conditions for trans women’s entrance in punk and the challenges and opportunities that it offers for their self-assertion. By linking Michel Foucault’s notion of parrhesia with the way trans women in punk do their gender, an attempt (...) is made at showing how the embodied experience of a trans woman making herself heard from the punk stage can serve as a site of ‘gender pluralism’. (shrink)

Foucault’s discussions of parrhesia provide fertile ground for raising a number of classical and pertinent issues in political theory related to critique, citizenship, and political authority. Foucault situates parrhesia in his analytical grid of power/knowledge/ethics, which maps political participation and experience, and he looks at how those who pursue or contest political power articulate and integrate these three facets of politics, which might well pull in opposite directions. Power concerns the ability and the audacity to face up to (...) important political tasks and to take action at the right time authoritatively and with resolve. Knowledge is vital for telling the truth from a partisan viewpoint and for making informed and balanced decisions. Ethics concerns the trustworthiness of those who either exercise or criticize political power and touches upon their dedication, sense of judgement, and personal integrity. The personal integrity of the citizen acting politically as well as his or her responsibility to the political community are among the main issues to be raised in relation to these themes. The same goes for the issues related to the nature of the political community, its institutional set-up and its culture, and whether it is authoritarian and marked by hierarchy and obedience or democratic and egalitarian. Thus, parrhesia captures some of the most vital dimensions of political life of how to exercise the political power of authority in a way that is both truthful and trustworthy. Foucault’s discussions of parrhesia shed light on the democratic challenges and possibilities related to political power as governmentality. (shrink)

Speaking freely is considered an essential component of academic freedom and freedom of inquiry. Unfortunately, historically as well as currently, the right to speak freely has often resulted in polemics and disputes between scholars. But the entire purpose of frankness in speech, whether in the academic or the political realm, is to persuade the person or people addressed to adopt a particular course of action. The concept of frank speaking, or parrhesia, first appeared among the Greeks as a political (...) virtue, one exercised among free men in the public assembly for the common good. But parrhesia also was prized in the more private arena of the philosophical schools, where it was associated with the art of moral guidance. The philosophers were united in regarding frank criticism as the mark of true friendship. The consensus among them appears to have been that frank criticism was best employed with sensitivity to the situation, privately in the context of the philosophical community, and with due attention to the abilities, vulnerabilities, and needs of the person being corrected, so that he or she might heed the advice given. Modern academics likewise should strive to express their frank opinions in a way that will commend their ideas to others, speaking freely in the explicit service of persuasion for the common good. When frankness is teamed with persuasion, academic freedom finds its true purpose, and this article recommends the long-forgotten concept of parrhesia as a means to these ends. (shrink)

Neste artigo procuro mostrar que, embora Sócrates tenha sido um crítico da democracia ateniense, seu pensamento, como conhecido a partir dos primeiros diálogos de Platão, coaduna-se com os valores fundamentais da cultura democrática de Atenas. Para defender essa interpretação, focalizo um dos princípios mais importante da democracia grega: a liberdade de expressão. Primeiro, examino o conceito de liberdade de expressão. Esclareço que, no contexto político democrático, dois termos gregos comunicam dois sentidos conexos mas distintos da liberdade de expressão: isēgoría, que (...) significa a igual oportunidade de todos os cidadãos falarem nas assembleias políticas; e parrhēsía, franqueza, a liberdade para criticar e para uma pessoa dizer a verdade como a ver. Em seguida, trato de três aspectos interligados do pensamento socrático: o método da refutação, a noção de “cuidado de si” e o ideal da vida examinada para evidenciar como eles pressupõem ou se assentam no valor da liberdade de expressão. Destaco que é preciso que a pessoa esteja seriamente comprometida a perseguir e exprimir a verdade para que seja capaz de avaliar suas crenças e livrar-se daquelas que são falsas. Consequentemente, esta pessoa pode prestar conta da própria vida expondo se seu pensamento, discurso e atos estão em acordo, assim como ela é capaz de levar a vida examinada, pondo sob escrutínio a si mesmo e os outros, praticando o pensamento crítico que é essencial para o aperfeiçoamento moral e a formação de um bom cidadão para uma sociedade democrática. Concluo que, na medida em que promove o dizer a verdade, a atitude crítica socrática não é somente coerente com os preceitos básicos do regime democrático, mas também útil à democracia. Palavras-chave : Sócrates. Democracia. Parrhesía. Elenchos. Vida examinada. (shrink)

‘The enigma of revolts.’ You can almost hear the sigh at the end of this sentence. Foucault is making a statement here, published under the title ‘Useless to Revolt’, on that ‘impulse by which a single individual, a group, a minority, or an entire people says, “I will no longer obey”’. In this short piece, I question the two sides of the enigma—how to label the revolt—is the act of rioting, such as what we witnessed in Ferguson, Missouri in August (...) 2014 ‘proper resistance’—and, how to understand the ēthos of the rioter. The label of counter-conduct, I argue clarifies the enigma as it allows us, challenges us even, to see the event as political. Counter-conduct provides a new framework for reading spontaneous and improvised forms of political expression. The rioter can then be seen as political and rational, as demonstrating ethical behavior. The ēthos of this behavior is represented as an ethics of the self, a form of parrhēsia where the rioter risks herself and shows courage to tell the truth, the story of her community. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Transgressive Translations:Parrhesia and the Politics of Being UnderstoodTim R. JohnstonAuthor And Activist Julia Serano’s spoken word poem “Performance Piece” is a smart and passionate polemic against people who say that “all gender is performance” (Serano 2010, 85). In response to those who treat gender as an endlessly mutable fiction, performance, or facade Serano says:Sure, I can perform gender: I can curtsy, or throw like a girl, or bat (...) my eyelashes. But performance doesn’t explain why certain behaviors and ways of being come to me more naturally than others. It offers no insight into the countless restless nights I spent as a pre-teen wrestling with the inexplicable feeling that I should be female. It doesn’t capture the very real physical and emotional changes that I experienced when I hormonally transitioned from testosterone to estrogen. (Serano 2010, 85–86)My first reaction to this understanding of performativity was to get defensive, immediately thinking of all the ways in which it reflects a poor reading of Judith Butler and is an incorrect use of the concept. Yet, to make that argument would mean arriving late to the party. Many theorists, notably Jay Prosser and Viviane Namaste, have made similar arguments about performativity to which Butler and many others have responded. I am not interested in joining this debate by defending or critiquing performativity; instead, I want to take seriously Serano’s criticism of the way performativity functions as a “mantra” for [End Page 84] “queerer-than-thou hipsters” (Serano 2010, 87). The fact is, concepts that help people make sense of their experience are often taken up piecemeal. They gain traction, get printed on posters, discussed in safe-spaces, taught in intro classes, and yelled at parents. They take on a life of their own and are queered again and again. It may not be anyone’s fault that performativity has come to signify a kind of insincerity, detachment from the body, linguistic constructionism, or a play of surfaces, but for many people this is exactly what it means. What follows is inspired by the questions at the heart of Serano’s poem: “Can’t we find new ways of speaking? Shouldn’t we be championing new slogans that empower all of us, whether trans or non-trans, queer or straight, female and/or male and/ or none of the above?” (Serano 2010, 87). I depart slightly from Serano insofar as I am not interested in replacing performativity as a concept. Instead, I am interested in locating other concepts that could be useful in understanding and communicating our multiple experiences of gender.Serano’s concern is not only the depth and conviction with which she experiences gender, but also the communicability of this conviction. We are social beings. We seek out the company of other people, animals, and objects. In order to flourish we need to feel understood by our surroundings. We are creatures that need to be connected, and connection requires translating our subjective experiences into a communicable, socially understandable register. How does this translation occur? How do we make ourselves understandable? What external forces regulate or influence this translation? And, crucially, how can we construct philosophical concepts that do justice to our need to feel that our interior selves are understood? What concept could we cast out into the world that might answer Serano’s call for new ways of speaking? What follows is an attempt to think through this question by looking at the relationship between the medicalization of trans people, Michel Foucault’s writings on parrhesia, and coming out.The first half of this essay examines the ways in which the medical apparatus that manages transitioning attempts to control transsexual coming-out narratives, an example of what Foucault calls biopower. I argue that the medicalization of transitioning has created a legible transsexual identity structured on the distance between our interiority and the world external to the self. The trans person’s claims about their interior sense of self are the only evidence needed to access medical technologies such as hormone therapy or surgery. But oftentimes such claims are only accepted as valid if they conform to certain scripts—scripts that are... (shrink)

Abstrak: Paper ini berbicara mengenai parrhesia, salah satu dari sekian banyak istilah teknis utama dari Michel Foucault. Parrhesia merupakan seminar terakhir yang didiskusikan Foucault di Universitas Calofornia di Berkeley, USA, di bawah judul: ‘Discourse on Truth: The Problemati- zation of Parrhesia.’ Seri seminar ini dan seksualitas sebagaimana didiskusikan dalam History of Sexuality vol. 2 dan 3, berikut semua bahan kuliah dan interviu selama dua tahun terakhir sebelum kematiannya, dilihat sebagai puncak dari tiga jurus berpikir Foucault, terutama dalam (...) hal ini jurus subyektivitas dan etika. Di sini terlihat, bagaimana manusia menyadari diri sebagai subjek bagi dirinya sendiri atau menjadi subjek etika. Ini berarti bahwa individu, berdasarkan kebebasan dan kema- tangannya, secara praktis mampu berhubungan dengan dirinya sendiri (rapport a soi). Dengan itu, ia dapat disebut sebagai parrhesiast, yang tidak hanya menyampaikan kebenaran kepada orang lain, tetapi juga mampu menyampaikan kebenaran kepada dirinya sendiri. Dengan kata lain, supaya bisa disebut sebagai parrhesiast, seorang individu harus memper- lihatkan dalam dirinya suatu hubungan erat antara apa yang ia katakan dengan apa yang ia perbuat. Teori dan praktek selalu harus berjalan beriringan. Seseorang boleh berbicara secara meyakinkan, namun ia juga harus bertindak dan berlaku benar dan baik. Kata-kata kunci: Foucault, parrhesia, intelektual, subyek, etika. Abstract: The paper presents one of Foucault’s many pregnant technical terms called πάρήσίά (parrhesia). Parrhesia is the main topic of his last seminar delivered at the University of California in Berkeley, USA, entitled “Discourse on Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia.” These series of seminar and the issue of sexuality as discussed in his History of Sexuality vol. 2 and 3, added with all his lectures and interviews during the last two years before his death, are seen as the peak of his three axes of thought, namely the axis of subjectivity and ethics. There, we see how humanbeing is aware of him/her self as subject of him/her own self or of being the subject of ethics. This means that the invididual, based on his freedom and maturity, is practically able to relate with him/her self (rapport a soi). He is then to be called the parrhesiast, who not only tells the truth to other people, but also be able to tell the truth to him/her self. In other words, in order to be a parrhesiast, an individual should show in his/her life a correspondence between what he/she speaks and what he/she does. Theory and practice should go hand in hand. One can speak convincingly, yet is also to behave well. Keywords: Foucault, parrhesia, intellectual, subject, ethics. (shrink)

In this article, we entangle with Aaron Kuntz’s book The Responsible Methodologist, extending the conversation beyond research into the realms of teaching, learning, and daily lived practices as twenty-first century academics. Kuntz advocates for parrhesiastic living and inquiry, defined as truth-telling and intervention toward ends of disrupting normative practices of knowing and being and enacting socially just ends. We grapple with three philosophical ∼ theroetical propositions made by Kuntz: entangled knowing ∼ being; citizenship; and logics of extraction. Utilizing examples from (...) our own lived experiences, pedagogy, and inquiry, we open a series of philosophical and theoretical dialogues around these three topics to better understand their possibilities and limitations, grappling, and debating how they are jumping off points for living more parrhesiastically. (shrink)