Over 115 000 people are waiting for life-saving organ transplants, of whom a small fraction will receive transplants and many others will die while waiting. Existing efforts to expand the number of available organs, including increasing the number of registered donors and procuring organs in uncontrolled environments, are crucial but unlikely to address the shortage in the near future and will not improve donor/recipient compatibility or organ quality. If successful, organ bioengineering can solve the shortage and improve functional outcomes. Studying (...) manufactured organs in animal models has produced valuable data, but is not sufficient to understand viability in humans. Before risking manufactured organ experimentation in living humans, study of bioengineered organs in recently deceased humans would facilitate evaluation of the function of engineered tissues and the complex interactions between the host and the transplanted tissue. Although such studies do not pose risk to human subjects, they pose unique ethical challenges concerning the previous wishes of the deceased, rights of surviving family members, effective operation and fair distribution of medical services, and public transparency. This article investigates the ethical, legal and social considerations in performing engineered organ research on the recently deceased. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to strengthen the point made by Horty about the relationship between reason holism and moral particularism. In the literature prima facie obligations have been considered as the only source of reason holism. I strengthen Horty’s point in two ways. First, I show that contrary-to-duties provide another independent support for reason holism. Next I outline a formal theory that is able to capture these two sources of holism. While in simple settings the proposed account coincides (...) with Horty’s one, this is not true in more complicated or “realistic” settings in which more than two norms collide. My chosen formalism is so-called input/output logic. A bottom-line example is introduced. It raises the issue of whether the conventional wisdom is right in assuming that normative reasons run parallel to epistemic ones. (shrink)

Consider four elite female runners who trained hard for a 1500‐meter race. Runner 1 took extra‐strength aspirin before the race. Runner 2 has a genetic condition that results in greater levels of testosterone in her body than the typical range for a woman. Runner 3 has been on a carefully scheduled regimen of the hormone erythropoietin (EPO), which has increased her red blood cell count. Runner 4 has a team of diet, sleep, and exercise experts who ensured that she coordinated (...) the exactly right balance of carbs and protein with her rest and workouts. Which of them cheated? Thomas Murray's Good Sport: Why Our Games Matter—and How Doping Undermines Them does not answer this question, but it provides tools to figure it out, and it argues that trying to answer is important. (shrink)

Research involving recently deceased humans that are physiologically maintained following declaration of death by neurologic criteria—or ‘research involving the recently deceased’—can fill a translational research gap while reducing harm to animals and living human subjects. It also creates new challenges for honouring the donor’s legacy, respecting the rights of donor loved ones, resource allocation and public health. As this research model gains traction, new empirical ethics questions must be answered to preserve public trust in all forms of tissue donation (...) and in the practice of medicine while respecting the legacy of the deceased and the rights of donor loved ones. This article suggests several topics for immediate investigation to understand the attitudes and experiences of researchers, clinical collaborators, donor loved ones and the public to ensure research involving the recently deceased advances ethically. (shrink)

This paper discusses the relation between deontic logic and the study of conversational interactions. Special attention is given to the notion of remedial interchange as analysed by sociologists and linguistic pragmaticians. This notion is close to the one of contrary-to-duty (reparational) obligation, which deontic logicians have been studying in its own right. The present article also investigates the question of whether some of the aspects of conversational interactions can fruitfully be described by using formal tools originally developed in the study (...) of iterated belief change. I here adapt the latter tools to deontic logic, and attempt an account of remedial interchange (and, more generally, contrary-to-duty reasoning) in terms of commutation. This account brings the dynamics of obligations to the fore. (shrink)

Human-nonhuman chimeric research—research on nonhuman animals who contain human cells—is being used to understand human disease and development and to create potential human treatments such as transplantable organs. A proposed advantage of chimeric models is that they can approximate human biology and therefore allow scientists to learn about and improve human health without risking harms to humans. Among the emerging ethical issues being explored is the question of at what point chimeras are “human enough” to have human rights and (...) thus be owed higher standards of research protection than that currently afforded to nonhuman animals. However, this question and other related questions assume that the ethics of experimenting on nonhuman animals have been settled, which they have not. In this essay, we argue that it is imperative to give adequate attention to familiar questions about nonhuman animal research as well as new questions about chimera research and that failure to do so will result in a distorted understanding of the ethics of chimera research. (shrink)

How are we to understand the fact that the philosophical debate over nanotechnologies has been reduced to a clash of seemingly preprogrammed arguments and counterarguments that paralyzes all rational discussion of the ultimate ethical question of social acceptability in matters of nanotechnological development? With this issue as its starting point, the study reported on here, intended to further comprehension of the issues rather than provide a cause-and-effect explanation, seeks to achieve a rational grasp of what is being said through the (...) appeals made to this or that principle in the range of arguments put forward in publications on the subject. We present the results of the study’s analyses in two parts. In the first, we lay out the seven categories of argument that emerged from an analysis of the literature: the arguments based on nature, dignity, the good life, utility, equity, autonomy, and rights. In the second part, we present the background moral stances that support each category of argument. Identifying the different categories of argument and the moral stance that underlies each category will enable a better grasp of the reasons for the multiplicity of the arguments that figure in discussions of the acceptability of nanotechnologies and will ultimately contribute to overcoming the tendency towards talking past each other that all too often disfigures the exchange. Clarifying the implications of the moral arguments deployed in the debate over nanotechnologies may make it possible to reduce the confusion observable in these exchanges and contribute to a better grasp of the reasons for their current unproductiveness. (shrink)

T H McLaughlin; Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 75–83, http.

T H McLaughlin; Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 75–83, http.

Perhaps the greatest determinant of individual and societal welfare is who raises children and with what degree of discretion. Philosophers have endeavored in myriad ways to provide normative justification for ascribing a right to be a legal parent and to possess particular legal powers as a parent. This Article shows why they fail and offers an alternative theoretical framework for delimiting parental rights. The prevailing tendency in philosophical writing on the topic is to begin with observations and intuitions (...) specific to parent-child relationships. Against that tendency, this Article demonstrates the need to begin with principles at a high level of generality, covering a broad range of human relationships. This yields a much more limited moral right in connection with parenthood than do accounts that fail to generalize. (shrink)

The U.S. Supreme Court regards parental rights as fundamental. Such a status should subject any legal procedure that directly and substantively interferes with the exercise of parental rights to strict scrutiny. On the contrary, though, despite their status as fundamental constitutional rights, parental rights are routinely suspended or revoked as a result of procedures that fail to meet even minimal standards of procedural and substantive due process. This routine and cavalier deprivation of (...) class='Hi'>parental rights takes place in the context of divorce where, during the pendency of litigation, one parent is routinely deprived of significant parental rights without any demonstration that a state interest exists—much less that there is a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved in any less restrictive way. In marked contrast to our current practice, treating parental rights as fundamental rights requires a presumption of joint legal and physical custody upon divorce and during the pendency of divorce litigation. The presumption may be overcome, but only by clear and convincing evidence that such an arrangement is harmful to the children. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with the philosophical foundations of parental rights. Some commonly held accounts are rejected. The question of whether parental rights are property rights is examined. It is argued that there are useful analogies with property rights which help us to see that the ultimate justification of parental rights lies in the special value of parenthood in human life. It is further argued that the idea of generation is essential (...) to our understanding of parenthood as having special value and that parental rights properly belong, in the first instance, to natural parents. (shrink)

The article presents a theory of the basis and nature of parents’ rights that appeals to the goods distinctively produced by intimate-but-authoritative relationships between adults and the children they parent. It explores the implications of that theory for questions about parents’ rights to raise their children as members of a religion, with particular attention to the issue of religious schooling. Even if not obstructing the development of their children’s capacity for autonomy, parents exceed the bounds of their legitimate (...) authority in so far as they aim deliberately to influence their children’s religious views. Healthy familial relationships involve some identification of child with parent and require a sphere of spontaneous interaction between parent and child that are in any case likely to influence those views and constitute a standing threat to autonomy. Correcting over-deferential understandings of parents’ rights enables schools better to promote not only children’s autonomy but also other legitimate civic goals. (shrink)

Legitimate parental interests need to be distinguished from any putative rights parents qua parents may be said to possess. Parents have no right to insulate their children from conceptions of the good at variance with those of their own. Claims to the right to faith schools, private schools, home-schooling or to withdraw a child from any aspect of the curriculum designed to enhance a child’s capacity for autonomous decision-making, are refuted.

Summary Liberals, from Mill to Rawls see personal autonomy as paramount in civil society. They see human dignity to consist essentially in personal autonomy, that is, ?in the ability of each person to determine for himself or herself a view of the good life? (Taylor, C. (1992) p. 27). Multiculturalism and ?The Politics of Recognition? p. 57 (Princeton, Princeton University Press). This emphasis on personal autonomy underlies much of liberal emphasis on freedom of conscience, justice, rights and fairness. Its (...) core thesis is that a just society seeks not to promote any particular view of the good life, but enables its citizens to pursue their own ends consistent with a similar liberty for all others. Yet, when some citizens in America attempted to pursue their own view of the good life, they came up against head?on conflict with the liberal state. These groups saw civic education with its emphasis on individual choice, on reflecting and weighing of alternative viewpoints and on personal autonomy, as threatening to their way of life and to their fundamental religious beliefs, and consequently they challenged the state in the courts. What ensued raised profound educational problems for educating children, parental rights, and the right of the State in a liberal democratic society, which are discussed in this paper. (shrink)

Philosophical defenses of parents’ rights typically appeal to the interests of parents, the interests of children, or some combination of these. Here I propose that at least in the case of biological, non-adoptive parents, these rights have a different normative basis: namely, these rights should be accorded to biological parents because of the compensatory duties such parents owe their children by virtue of having brought them into existence. Inspried by Seana Shiffrin, I argue that procreation inevitably encumbers (...) the wills of children in otherwise morally objectionable ways. Such subjection generates duties to compensate children, even if the child’s life is on balance a benefit to her. The right to procreate is thus conditioned on prospective parent’s willingness to compensate for the harms of procreation. And because parents bear such compensatory duties, they must be accorded permissions (i.e., rights) to fulfill these duties. These rights include familiar exclusionary rights to promote children’s welfare, etc. Moreover, because subjecting children to harms or the risks thereof violates their autonomy, parental duties (and rights) include the provision of education and other goods that enable their subsequent autonomy as adults. Grounding parental rights in compensatory procreative duties avoids problems associated with appeals to the interests of children (e.g., that these interests do not seem to generate exclusive parental rights) or to the interests of parents (e.g., that these interests do not appear strong enough to permit the creation of a new, vulnerable human individual). (shrink)

Rights and Obligations of Parents Historically, philosophers have had relatively little to say about the family. This is somewhat surprising, given the pervasive presence and influence of the family upon both individuals and social life. Most philosophers who have addressed issues related to the parent-child relationship—Kant and Aristotle, for example—have done so in a fairly […].

This study provides a moral justification of the family as a child-bearing and child-rearing institution by arguing that procreation may entitle parents to their children. It begins by observing that the belief that parents have such a right is deeply ingrained in the laws and customs of Western civilization but that at present we have no satisfactory theoretical explanation of this belief; and it further underscores the need for such an explanation by pointing to the conflict between a commitment to (...) equal opportunity and the family. ;Part I first considers the historical arguments philosophers have made on behalf of the family and shows why they fail. It argues that the traditional property argument fails because it interprets parental rights in terms of an absolute property right which is incompatible with the child's rights; that natural affection fails because some parents abuse their children and because adoptive parents may display "natural affection"; and that the best interest of the child fails because it cannot provide parents with a unique claim to their children. ;It then develops the property argument in a new and fruitful way. By replacing the traditional concept of an absolute property right with the modern "bundle of rights" analysis of property, it provides a means of analyzing parental rights in a way that prohibits abuse and is therefore compatible with the child's basic rights. Finally, it examines entitlement theory and argues that, since procreation satisfies its conditions, parents who adequately care for their children are entitled to them. ;Part II examines the nature of the parental entitlement claim. It argues for the rights necessary for paternalistic agency, interprets them according to a standard analysis of ownership, and concludes that a parental right to rear the child according to parental values is consistent with the child's rights. Next it argues that, in excluding others, parents incur a special obligation to do as much as they reasonably can for their child. And finally, it places things in a historical context, argues against an interpretation of parental obligation in terms of needs, and shows how the theory might work in practice. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a theory of the acquisition of parental rights. According to this investment theory, parental rights are generated by the performance of parental work. Thus, those who successfully parent a child have the right to continue to do so, and to exclude others from so doing. The account derives from a more general principle of desert that applies outside the domain of parenthood. It also has some interesting implications for the attribution (...) of moral parenthood. In particular, it implies that genetic relationships per se are irrelevant to parental rights and that it is possible to have more than two moral parents. (shrink)

Eamonn Callan; McLaughlin on Parental Rights, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 111–118, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467.

Eamonn Callan; McLaughlin on Parental Rights, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 111–118, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467.

Peter Hobson; Some Reflections on Parents’ Rights in the Upbringing of their Children, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Page.

I criticise the ‘liberal’view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned by its producer. If (...) natural parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be ‘licensed’but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I approve. (shrink)

I criticise the ‘liberal’view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned by its producer. If (...) natural parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be ‘licensed’but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I approve. (shrink)

Peter Hobson; Some Reflections on Parents’ Rights in the Upbringing of their Children, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Page.

In law and common-sense morality, it is generally assumed that adults who meet a minimum threshold of parental competency have a presumptive right to parent their biological children. But what is the basis of this right? According to one prominent account, the right to parent one’s biological child is best understood as being grounded in an intimate relationship that develops between babies and their birth parents during the process of gestation. This paper identifies three major problems facing this view—the (...) explanatory, adjudicatory, and theoretical problems—and explains how an alternative autonomy-based account is capable of avoiding them. (shrink)

The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 established the norms for treating disabled newborns, but they did not address the treatment of premature babies. Parents and physicians need a framework for decisionmaking. A decision handed down recently by the Texas Supreme Court is a step forward.

The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 established the norms for treating disabled newborns, but they did not address the treatment of premature babies. Parents and physicians need a framework for decisionmaking. A decision handed down recently by the Texas Supreme Court is a step forward.