Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. In this paper, I propose a unified framework for modelling levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and show that it can accommodate descriptive, explanatory, and ontological notions of levels. I further illustrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to some salient philosophical questions: (1) Is there a linear hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at the bottom? And (...) what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? (2) Are there emergent properties? (3) Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones? (4) Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains be viewed as one involving levels? Although I use the terminology of “levels”, the proposed framework can also represent “scales”, “domains”, or “subject matters”, where these are not linearly but only partially ordered by relations of supervenience or inclusion. (shrink)

This item was published as 'Appendix 3: An Implication of the k-option Condorcet jury mechanism for the probability of cycles' in List and Goodin (2001) http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/705/. Standard results suggest that the probability of cycles should increase as the number of options increases and also as the number of individuals increases. These results are, however, premised on a so-called "impartial culture" assumption: any logically possible preference ordering is assumed to be as likely to be held by an individual as any (...) other. The present chapter shows, in the three-option case, that given suitably systematic, however slight, deviations from an impartial culture situation, the probability of a cycle converges either to zero (more typically) or to one (less typically) as the number of individuals increases. (shrink)

Can there be a global demos? The current debate about this topic is divided between two opposing camps: the “pessimist” or “impossibilist” camp, which holds that the emergence of a global demos is either conceptually or empirically impossible, and the “optimist” or “possibilist” camp, which holds that the emergence of a global demos is conceptually as well as empirically possible and an embryonic version of it already exists. However, the two camps agree neither on a common working definition of a (...) global demos, nor on the relevant empirical facts, so it is difficult to reconcile their conflicting outlooks. We seek to move the debate beyond this stalemate. We argue that existing conceptions of a demos are ill-suited for capturing what kind of a global demos is needed to facilitate good global governance, and we propose a new conception of a demos that is better suited for this purpose. We suggest that some of the most prominent conceptions of a demos have focused too much on who the members of a demos are and too little on what functional characteristics the demos must have in order to perform its role in facilitating governance within the relevant domain. Our new proposal shifts the emphasis from the first, “compositional” question to the second, “performative” one, and provides a more “agency-based” account of a global demos. The key criterion that a collection of individuals must meet in order to qualify as a demos is that it is not merely demarcated by an appropriate membership criterion, but that it can be organized, democratically, so as to function as a state-like agent. Compared to the existing, predominantly “compositional” approaches to thinking about the demos, this agency-based approach puts us into a much better position to assess the empirical prospects for the emergence of a global demos that can facilitate good global governance. (shrink)

I model sequential decisions over multiple interconnected propositions and investigate path-dependence in such decisions. The propositions and their interconnections are represented in propositional logic. A sequential decision process is path-dependent if its outcome depends on the order in which the propositions are considered. Assuming that earlier decisions constrain later ones, I prove three main results: First, certain rationality violations by the decision-making agent—individual or group—are necessary and sufficient for path-dependence. Second, under some conditions, path-dependence is unavoidable in decisions made by (...) groups. Third, path-dependence makes decisions vulnerable to strategic agenda setting and strategic voting. I also discuss escape routes from path-dependence. My results are relevant to discussions on collective consistency and reason-based decision-making, focusing not only on outcomes, but also on underlying reasons, beliefs, and constraints. (shrink)

Social choice theory is the study of collective decision processes and procedures. It is not a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, preferences, judgments, welfare). Central questions are: How can a group of individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given set of options? What are the properties of different voting systems? When is a voting system (...) democratic? How can a collective (e.g., electorate, legislature, collegial court, expert panel, or committee) arrive at coherent collective preferences or judgments on some issues, on the basis of its members' individual preferences or judgments? How can we rank different social alternatives in an order of social welfare? Social choice theorists study these questions not just by looking at examples, but by developing general models and proving theorems. (shrink)

Humans routinely make many decisions collectively, whether they choose a restaurant with friends, elect political leaders or decide actions to tackle international problems, such as climate change, that affect the future of the whole planet. We might be less aware of it, but group decisions are just as important to social animals as they are for us. Animal groups have to collectively decide about communal movements, activities, nesting sites and enterprises, such as cooperative breeding or hunting, that crucially affect their (...) survival and reproduction. While human group decisions have been studied for millennia, the study of animal group decisions is relatively young, but is now expanding rapidly. It emerges that group decisions in animals pose many similar questions to those in humans. The purpose of the present issue is to integrate and combine approaches in the social and natural sciences in an area in which theoretical challenges and research questions are often similar, and to introduce each discipline to the other’s key ideas, findings and successful methods. In order to make such an introduction as effective as possible, here, we briefly review conceptual similarities and differences between the sciences, and provide a guide to the present issue. (shrink)

This chapter explores the relationship between Goldman's thesis and the classical jury theorem. It identifies the minimal modification needed in order to recover Goldman's thesis in a Condorcetian framework. Goldman's thesis can be recast as a generalization of the classical Condorcet jury theorem. The central move needed to recover Goldman's thesis from a generalized jury theorem is to replace Condorcet's assumption that there is a single truth to be tracked with the assumption of multiple such truths: one for each voter. (...) In Goldman's picture, there is still an indirect, derivative sense in which there exists an 'overall' truth about the correct outcome for the electorate in aggregate. This 'overall' truth is determined, of course, by the profile of voter‐specific truths and therefore depends on the identity of the electorate. The chapter also provides some numerical examples to illustrate the implications of the generalized jury theorem. (shrink)

Since Sen's insightful analysis of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Sen, 1970/1979), Arrow's theorem is often interpreted as a consequence of the exclusion of interpersonal information from Arrow's framework. Interpersonal comparability of either welfare levels or welfare units is known to be sufficient for circumventing Arrow's impossibility result (e.g. Sen, 1970/1979, 1982; Roberts, 1980; d'Aspremont, 1985). But it is less well known whether one of these types of comparability is also necessary or whether Arrow's conditions can already be satisfied in much narrower (...) informational frameworks. This note explores such a framework: the assumption of (ONC+0), ordinal measurability of welfare with the additional measurability of a 'zero-line', is shown to point towards new, albeit limited, escape-routes from Arrow's theorem. Some existence and classification results are established, using the condition that social orderings be transitive as well as the condition that social orderings be quasi-transitive. (shrink)

Arrow's account (1951/1963) of the problem of social choice is based upon the assumption that the preferences of each individual in the relevant group are expressible by a single ordering. This paper lifts that assumption and develops a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's framework. I show that, like Arrow's original framework, the multidimensional generalization is affected by an impossibility theorem, highlighting not only the threat of dictatorship of a single individual, but also the threat of dominance of a single dimension. In (...) particular, even if preferences are single-peaked across individuals within each dimension – a situation called intradimensional single-peakedness – any aggregation procedure satisfying Arrow-type conditions will make one dimension dominant. I introduce lexicographic hierarchies of dimensions as a class of possible aggregation procedures under intradimensional single-peakedness. The interpretation of the results is discussed. (shrink)

Most accounts of welfare aggregation in the tradition of Arrow's and Sen's social-choice-theoretic frameworks represent the welfare of an individual in terms of a single welfare ordering or a single scalar-valued welfare function. I develop a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's and Sen's frameworks, representing individual welfare in terms of multiple personal welfare functions, corresponding to multiple 'dimensions' of welfare. I show that, as in the one-dimensional case, the existence of attractive aggregation procedures depends on certain informational assumptions, specifically about the (...) measurability of welfare and its comparability not only across individuals but also across dimensions. I state several impossibility and possibility results. Under Arrow-type conditions, insufficient comparability across individuals leads to dictatorship of a single individual, while insufficient comparability across dimensions leads to dominance of a single dimension. Given sufficient comparability both across individuals and across dimensions, a range of possibilities emerges. I discuss the substantive implications of the results. (shrink)

Do hunting and fishing lead to the development of environmental virtues? This question is at the heart of philosopher Charles List’s engaging study, which provides a defense of field sports when they are practiced and understood in an ethical manner. In his argument, List examines the connection between certain activities and the development of virtue in the classical sources, such as Aristotle and Plato. He then explores the work of Aldo Leopold, identifying three key environmental virtues that field (...) sports instill in practitioners in the kind of conservation advocated by Leopold and others. After reviewing several powerful philosophical objections to his viewpoint, List considers the future of environmental sportsmanship. He suggests that, in order to incorporate a revived connection between field sports and environmental virtue, the practice of hunting and angling must undergo changes, including shifts that would impact hunter education, civic engagement, the role of firearms, our understanding of “game” animals, and alliances with other sorts of outdoor recreation. _ Hunting, Fishing, and Environmental Virtue_ will appeal to academics interested in the ethical issues surrounding hunting and fishing, professionals in wildlife management, and hunters and anglers interested in conservation. (shrink)

In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ - cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen’s triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a (...) new characterization theorem: for a large class of domains, if there exists any aggregation function satisfying some democratic conditions, then majority voting is the unique such function. Taken together, our results provide new support for the robustness of majority rule. (shrink)

A framing effect occurs when an agent's choices are not invariant under changes in the way a decision problem is presented, e.g. changes in the way options are described (violation of description invariance) or preferences are elicited (violation of procedure invariance). Here we identify those rationality violations that underlie framing effects. We attribute to the agent a sequential decision process in which a “target” proposition and several “background” propositions are considered. We suggest that the agent exhibits a framing effect if (...) and only if two conditions are met. First, different presentations of the decision problem lead the agent to consider the propositions in a different order (the empirical condition). Second, different such “decision paths” lead to different decisions on the target proposition (the logical condition). The second condition holds when the agent's initial dispositions on the propositions are “implicitly inconsistent,” which may be caused by violations of “deductive closure.” Our account is consistent with some observations made by psychologists and provides a unified framework for explaining violations of description and procedure invariance. (shrink)

In solving judgment aggregation problems, groups often face constraints. Many decision problems can be modelled in terms the acceptance or rejection of certain propositions in a language, and constraints as propositions that the decisions should be consistent with. For example, court judgments in breach-of-contract cases should be consistent with the constraint that action and obligation are necessary and sufficient for liability; judgments on how to rank several options in an order of preference with the constraint of transitivity; and judgments on (...) budget items with budgetary constraints. Often more or less demanding constraints on decisions are imaginable. For instance, in preference ranking problems, the transitivity constraint is often contrasted with the weaker acyclicity constraint. In this paper, we make constraints explicit in judgment aggregation by relativizing the rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure to a constraint set, whose variation yields more or less strong notions of rationality. We review several general results on judgment aggregation in light of such constraints. (shrink)

Condorcet’s voting paradox shows that pairwise majority voting may lead to cyclical majority preferences. In a famous paper, Sen identified a general condition on a profile of individual preference orderings, called triplewise value-restriction, which is sufficient for the avoidance of such cycles. This note aims to make Sen’s result easily accessible. We provide an elementary proof of Sen's possibility theorem and a simple reformulation of Sen’s condition. We discuss how Sen’s condition is logically related to a number of precursors. Finally, (...) we state a necessary and sufficient condition for the avoidance of cycles, and suggest that, although there is still some logical space between that condition and Sen’s sufficient condition, Sen’s condition cannot be further generalized in an appealing way. (shrink)

We introduce two extreme methods to pairwisely compare ordered lists of the same length, viz. the comonotonic and the countermonotonic comparison method, and show that these methods are, respectively, related to the copula T M (the minimum operator) and the Ł ukasiewicz copula T L used to join marginal cumulative distribution functions into bivariate cumulative distribution functions. Given a collection of ordered lists of the same length, we generate by means of T M and T L two probabilistic (...) relations Q M and Q L and identify their type of transitivity. Finally, it is shown that any probabilistic relation with rational elements on a 3-dimensional space of alternatives which possesses one of these types of transitivity, can be generated by three ordered lists and at least one of the two extreme comparison methods. (shrink)

We introduce two extreme methods to pairwisely compare ordered lists of the same length, viz. the comonotonic and the countermonotonic comparison method, and show that these methods are, respectively, related to the copula TM (the minimum operator) and the Ł ukasiewicz copula TL used to join marginal cumulative distribution functions into bivariate cumulative distribution functions. Given a collection of ordered lists of the same length, we generate by means of TM and TL two probabilistic relations QM and QL (...) and identify their type of transitivity. Finally, it is shown that any probabilistic relation with rational elements on a 3-dimensional space of alternatives which possesses one of these types of transitivity, can be generated by three ordered lists and at least one of the two extreme comparison methods. (shrink)

This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or ‘higher-order epistemic attitudes’, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order (...) epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITYVolume 9, Issue 3Allan HazlettDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.11Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITYVolume 9, Issue 3Allan HazlettDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.11Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITYVolume 9, Issue 3Allan HazlettDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.11Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Theories of writing and mind have proposed that the uses of literacy give rise to a distinct repertoire of cognitive skills, attitudes, and concepts. This paper reconsiders the earliest lexical lists of the Ancient Near East as one type of evidence on writing and mind. Past and present conceptions of the lists are briefly reviewed. Early views cast the lists as reflecting a Sumerian mentality or a uniquely literate mode of thought, while recent accounts suggest they may simply be routine (...) scribal exercises. A view from the philosophy of science, on which lists are considered a sub-type of ordering system, suggests a way of aligning a scribal practice account with aspects of earlier views by articulating the nature of list entries and the intentions of the list makers. On this account, the Ancient Near Eastern lists can be seen both as uniquely literate and as uniquely informative on the role of writing in mind. (shrink)

Theories of writing and mind have proposed that the uses of literacy give rise to a distinct repertoire of cognitive skills, attitudes, and concepts. This paper reconsiders the earliest lexical lists of the Ancient Near East as one type of evidence on writing and mind. Past and present conceptions of the lists are briefly reviewed. Early views cast the lists as reflecting a Sumerian mentality or a uniquely literate mode of thought, while recent accounts suggest they may simply be routine (...) scribal exercises. A view from the philosophy of science, on which lists are considered a sub-type of ordering system, suggests a way of aligning a scribal practice account with aspects of earlier views by articulating the nature of list entries and the intentions of the list makers. On this account, the Ancient Near Eastern lists can be seen both as uniquely literate and as uniquely informative on the role of writing in mind. (shrink)

Previous experiments have shown a serial-position effect (SPE) in paired-associate (PA) learning where the pairs contained stimuli pre- viously learned in serial order. The present experiment extended the number of pairs from 10 to 14. Pairs containing stimuli from terminal serial positions were learned with significantly fewer errors than pairs whose stimuli derived from central positions. The latter produced a dip in the PA error distribution suggesting the presence of sequential associations in SL between items occupying central positions.

We study the Katětov order on Borel ideals. We prove two structural theorems, one for Borel ideals, the other for analytic P-ideals. We isolate nine important Borel ideals and study the Katětov order among them. We also present a list of fundamental open problems concerning the Katětov order on Borel ideals.

RATIONALE, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES: This paper deals with the problem of surgical waiting lists and is aimed, in particular, at comparing two different prioritization approaches: (1) the clinical assessment of treatment urgency aimed at categorizing patients into urgency-related groups (URGs) with a given recommended maximum waiting time for treatment; and (2) the implementation of an original prioritization scoring algorithm aimed at determining the relative priority of each patient in the waiting list and the corresponding order of admission. METHODS: A (...) modelling exercise based on a cohort of 236 patients enrolled on the waiting list of a surgical department in an Italian public university hospital, from 1 January to 30 June 2004, is presented. The comparison is based on a measure called need-adjusted-waiting-days, which allows to take into proper account both urgency and priority. RESULTS: The results show that both methods should be implemented simultaneously for increasing the department's performance in terms of both efficiency--outcome gained from a given amount of resources--and equity--how patients are admitted according to their need. CONCLUSIONS: Waiting list prioritization should not be limited to classifying patients into URGs, but to using a scoring system as well, in order to schedule patient admissions in an explicit and transparent way. (shrink)

Surrogate selection can be extremely consequential for patients. Most surrogates are selected by default, so we should care about whether legal provisions for default surrogate selections are ethically justified. Most U.S. states use an inflexible, prioritized list of relationships, that is, a hierarchical list where eligible classes of higher-ranked individuals must be selected before lower-ranked individuals. I argue that while some inflexible, prioritized lists may roughly reflect the order that many patients would select, there is a significant minority (...) that inflexible lists systematically disempower. This is morally unacceptable given the availability of less morally problematic alternatives. One alternative is a flexible, prioritized list, which provides conditions for lower-ranked individuals to be selected ahead of higher-ranked ones. I argue that since all the U.S. states that currently have an inflexible, prioritized list systematically disempower a significant proportion of their residents, they have good reason to adopt a flexible, prioritized list instead. Furthermore, the Universal Law Commission currently recommends that states adopt an inflexible, prioritized list, so they have good reason to change their recommendation. (shrink)

Moeser suggested participants default to linear ordering elements but they can be primed to impose either linear or partial ordering. This study seems problematic insofar as ‘greater than’ might be understood to incline participants to favor linear orderings. Recent follow-up studies strongly suggest participants do not default to linear ordering. It seems plausible, moreover, that the observed priming effect is far more pervasive than Moeser countenanced. The present work explores the extent to which priming for linear or partial orders conflicts (...) with the construction of linear or partial ordering lists. Our two experiments suggest friction between priming and task, and also show once the priming tasks are cleared of potentially confounding semantic content, participants perform equally with respect to constructing linear or partial orders under similar priming conditions. (shrink)

After a concise description of issues concerning the causal and the deductive-nomological models of explanation, the flaws in the alternative view centred on relevance-to-context are examined. The paper argues for the need of a wider spectrum of options which takes into account both the Local/Global and the Internal/External aspects in order to determine the sense and the adequacy of any explanation. As a test for this argument, some specific problems are considered about the range of causal bonds, the admission of (...) top-down causation, the appeal to emergence, the shift from explanation to explainability, the equivalence classes referred to as “cause” and “effect”. Finally, the paper deals with the comparison between inequivalent explanations and lists three remaining issues to complete the picture. (shrink)

Beginning with the Ciceronian divisions of rhetorical and dialectical topics as found, respectively, in the De inventione, the De oratore, the Partitiones oratoriae and the Topica, the purpose of this study is to collect all the lists that have been transmitted from Antiquity to the early Middle Ages in order to observe — mainly through the help of several diagrams put in the appendix — their alteration, as well as their preservation.

Bradeen and McGregor with exemplary skill and patience re-examined the almost desperately worn front face of ATL ii List 26. They were able to prove that the lines of its prescript were precisely forty-seven letters long. This excludes the possibility of dating this list 430/29 or 428/7 B.C., since only six spaces are available for the first numeral. They rightly maintained that the ATL Lists 25 and 26 must be kept together, but unlike them I would challenge the (...) ATL numbering and order. I still think that this should be reversed. (shrink)

Due to the dissolution of Parliament, election diate had to be advanced. As parties did not dispose of a long time in order to constitute their candidates-lists, their leadership were compelled to abandon all kinds of consultation of their members. They therefore used the technique of indirect vote, by asking the active militant core to approve a test-list of candidates selected by the leadership.

The fundamental question in reverse mathematics is to determine which set existence axioms are required to prove particular theorems of mathematics. In addition to being interesting in their own right, answers to this question have consequences in both effective mathematics and the foundations of mathematics. Before discussing these consequences, we need to be more specific about the motivating question.Reverse mathematics is useful for studying theorems of either countable or essentially countable mathematics. Essentially countable mathematics is a vague term that is (...) best explained by an example. Complete separable metric spaces are essentially countable because, although the spaces may be uncountable, they can be understood in terms of a countable basis. Simpson gives the following list of areas which can be analyzed by reverse mathematics: number theory, geometry, calculus, differential equations, real and complex analysis, combinatorics, countable algebra, separable Banach spaces, computability theory, and the topology of complete separable metric spaces. Reverse mathematics is less suited to theorems of abstract functional analysis, abstract set theory, universal algebra, or general topology.Section 2 introduces the major subsystems of second order arithmetic used in reverse mathematics: RCA0, WKL0, ACA0, ATR0 and – CA0. Sections 3 through 7 consider various theorems of ordered group theory from the perspective of reverse mathematics. Among the results considered are theorems on ordered quotient groups, groups and semigroup conditions which imply orderability, the orderability of free groups, Hölder's Theorem, Mal'tsev's classification of the order types of countable ordered groups. (shrink)

This article examines the methodology of a core branch of contemporary political theory or philosophy: “analytic” political theory. After distinguishing political theory from related fields, such as political science, moral philosophy, and legal theory, the article discusses the analysis of political concepts. It then turns to the notions of principles and theories, as distinct from concepts, and reviews the methods of assessing such principles and theories, for the purpose of justifying or criticizing them. Finally, it looks at a recent debate (...) on how abstract and idealized political theory should be, and assesses the significance of disagreement in political theory. The discussion is carried out from an angle inspired by the philosophy of science. (shrink)

We exhibit a finite list of first-order axioms which may be used to define topological spaces. For most separation axioms we discover a first-order equivalent statement.

Our task is the preservation of historic towns. In America as in Europe historic town centers are surrounded by recent additions and suburban sprawl. It is tempting to imagine the task of preservation as protecting our historical heritage from a featureless wave of mediocrity, as the worldwide commercial civilization overwhelms local cultures. This story is familiar from the writings of Kenneth Frampton and others: sprawl, homogenization, loss of distinctive local and regional form. I want to disagree with this story. From (...) what force are we trying to save the historic towns? Might not that force have its own new kinds of order? Might that new order be already at work inside the historic towns? Are its effects only negative? I want to question a presupposition common in many discussion of historic preservation. This is the presupposition that a spatially distinct historic center belongs to a single community that possesses a unified self-consciousness and a unified aesthetic self-image. Local communities less and less correspond to bounded spatial areas, and spatial areas contain less and less homogeneous communities. There is growing a new kind of discontinuous unity, which is the theme of this essay. (shrink)

A questionnaire probing the distribution of authorship credit was given to postdoctoral associates (“postdocs”) in order to determine their awareness of the professional society’s ethical statement on authorship, the extent of communication with their supervisors about authorship criteria, and the appropriateness of authorship assignments on submitted papers. Results indicate a low awareness of the professional society’s ethical statement and that little communication takes place between postdocs and supervisors about authorship criteria. A substantial amount of authorship credit given to supervisors and (...) other workers is perceived by the postdocs to violate the professional society’s ethical statement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Old Orders for New Ecology, Animal Rights, and the Poverty of HumanismCary Wolfe (bio)Luc Ferry. The New Ecological Order. Trans. Carol Volk. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995.1Early on in The New Ecological Order, the French philosopher Luc Ferry characterizes the allure and danger of ecology in the postmodern moment. What separates it from various other issues in the intellectual and political field, he writes, is thatit can call (...) itself a true “world vision,” whereas the decline of political utopias, but also the parcelization of knowledge and the growing “jargonization” of individual scientific disciplines, seemed to forever prohibit any plan for the globalization of thought.... At a time when ethical guide marks are more than ever floating and undetermined, it allows the unhoped-for promise of rootedness to form, an objective rootedness, certain of a new moral ideal.[xx]As we shall see, for Ferry—a staunch liberal humanist in the Kantian if not quite Cartesian tradition—this vision conceals a danger to which contemporary European intellectuals are especially sensitive: not holism, nor even moralism, exactly, but that far more charged and historically freighted thing, totalitarianism. Ferry’s concern is that such “world visions,” incarnated in contemporary environmentalism in movements such as Deep Ecology and ecofeminism, threaten “[o]ur entire democratic culture,” which “since the French Revolution, has been marked, for basic philosophical reasons, by the glorification of uprootedness, or innovation” [xxi]. Ferry’s thesis—it becomes quite explicit in his comparison of environmental legislation under the Third Reich with tenets of Deep Ecology in the book’s second section—is that Deep Ecology and its ilk have moved in to occupy the space left open by the passing of the political imaginaries of fascism and communism, so that denunciations of liberalism (and its corollary in political praxis, reformism) may now be unmasked for what they are: critiques “in the name of nostalgia, or, on the contrary, in that of hope: either the nostalgia for a lost past, for national identity flouted by the culture of rootlessness, or revolutionary hope in a radiant future, in a classless and free society” [xxvi]. To which Ferry responds—literally—“Grow up!” Late in the book, he tells us that we must see through “the adult development of the secular and democratic universe” [137] by rejecting totalizing revolutionary visions of the sort purveyed by Deep Ecology, and by adhering instead to liberal reformism, “the only [End Page 21] position consistent with leaving the world of childhood” [138].Ferry is certainly right to draw our attention to the often uncritical nostalgia and romantic holism of some varieties of environmental thought—problems that have been noted before by critics from points on the map very different politically from Ferry’s avowed liberal humanism. And it is certainly understandable, given the historical context, that he would join a long list of other European intellectuals in pointing out the manifold dangers to democratic society of totalizing moral schemes—dangers often represented for liberal intellectuals like Ferry by the rise of the Greens in European politics. 1 We do well to remember, too (as Fredric Jameson and others have pointed out), that for European intellectuals such as Ferry, liberalism retains, for understandable historical reasons, a viability and a promise about which many American intellectuals are skeptical or even jaded. European intellectuals, conditioned by the experience of fascist authoritarianism and the strong but problematic presence historically of the Communist party in social and intellectual life, may find in liberalism a refreshing and indeed radical democratic openness and dynamism, while American intellectuals, conditioned to the absence of any other major political contenders, have long since grown accustomed to liberalism as the name for that “end of ideology” position which, as Jameson puts it, “can function more effectively after its own death as an ideology, realizing itself in its most traditional form as a commitment to the market system that has become sheer common sense and no longer a political program” [249, my emphasis].But in defending democratic difference, everything hinges, of course, on precisely how such terms are framed and how difference is articulated—an index of which often may be found in how its imagined... (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to define and study a particular variety of Montague-Scott neighborhood semantics for modal propositional logic. We call this variety the first-order neighborhood semantics because it consists of the neighborhood frames whose neighborhood operations are, in a certain sense, first-order definable. The paper consists of two parts. In Part I we begin by presenting a family of modal systems. We recall the Montague-Scott semantics and apply it to some of our systems that have hitherto (...) be uncharacterized. Then, we define the notion of a first-order indefinite semantics, along with the more specific notion of a first-order uniform semantics, the latter containing as special cases the possible world semantics of Kripke. In Part II we prove consistency and completeness for a broad range of the systems considered, with respect to the first-order indefinite semantics, and for a selected list of systems, with respect to the first-order uniform semantics. The completeness proofs are algebraic in character and make essential use of the finite model property. A by-product of our investigations is a result relating provability in S-systems and provability in T-systems, which generalizes a known theorem relating provability in the systems S 2° and C 2. (shrink)

The article attempts to examine the impact of banks' specifics and board of directors' characteristics on directors' remuneration (REM) of 38 Indian listed banks from 2010 to 2019. The current study is based on secondary data that are extracted from the Prowess IQ database. Fixed effect model is used for analysing the data and generalised method of moment is applied for dealing with endogeneity problem. Finally, the sample is classified into three groups in order to check the robustness of the (...) results. Results revealed that return on assets, size, and market capitalisation positively and significantly impact directors' REM of Indian listed banks. While banks' age, capital adequacy, current ratio, and board of directors' composition have an insignificant impact on directors' REM of Indian listed banks. The findings of the study provide new evidence about the impact of banks' specifics and board of directors' characteristics on directors' REM in the Indian banking sector. The findings suggest that firms' specifics are significant determinants of directors' REM. (shrink)

Distributed cognition refers to processes which are (i) cognitive and (ii) distributed across multiple agents or devices rather than performed by a single agent. Distributed cognition has attracted interest in several fields ranging from sociology and law to computer science and the philosophy of science. In this paper, I discuss distributed cognition from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. Drawing on models of judgment aggregation, I address two questions. First, how can we model a group of individuals as a distributed cognitive system? Second, (...) can a group acting as a distributed cognitive system be ‘rational’ and ‘track the truth’ in the outputs it produces? I argue that a group’s performance as a distributed cognitive system depends on its ‘aggregation procedure’ – its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ inputs into collective outputs – and I investigate the properties of an aggregation procedure that matter. (shrink)