We discuss the probabilistic analysis of explanatory power and prove a representation theorem for posterior ratio measures recently advocated by Schupbach and Sprenger. We then prove a representation theorem for an alternative class of measures that rely on the notion of relative probability distance. We end up endorsing the latter, as relative distance measures share the properties of posterior ratio measures that are genuinely appealing, while overcoming a feature that we consider undesirable. They also yield a telling result concerning formal (...) accounts of explanatory power versus inductive confirmation, thereby bridging our discussion to a so-called no-miracle argument. (shrink)

This article interprets Ayn Rand's last novel, Atlas Shrugged, through the lens of Trauma Studies. The author argues that the novel reflects Rand's traumatic experiences of the February and October revolutions in Russia and can be viewed as the means by which the author engaged in the process of what Dominick LaCapra has called “working-through.”.

RESUMO:Na Carta a d’Alembert, Rousseau se coloca contra a ideia de um teatro enquanto instrumento de educação moral, porém, o posicionamento do filósofo não está em colocar essa atividade lúdica de ordem moral na categoria de atividade imoral, mas na de atividade artificial, e, talvez, isso gerasse efeitos imorais. Todavia, é preciso observar os verdadeiros efeitos do teatro, a partir de alguns argumentos que Rousseau resolve construir e analisá-los, contudo, apenas se trouxesse à tona a crítica de Rousseau ao romance, (...) na Carta a d’Alembert, que tem como contexto “a ideia negativa de privatização da cena”, pois o teatro destina uma excessiva importância à descrição do amor, obviamente, exagerando na representação, naquilo que é romanesco. Porém, se, na Carta a d’Alembert, o filósofo não expressa de forma direta que a teorização sobre o teatro também equivale ao romance, na Nova Heloísa, ou seja, no próprio romance, o autor faz essa ratificação, ao importar um longo comentário sobre o teatro que estava na Carta, afirmando que considera o mesmo da própria cena quanto à maioria dos novos escritos. O cidadão genebrino ataca os romances indiretamente e viceversa, porque é observado que tudo aquilo que diz sobre uma arte se aplica quase que integralmente a outra arte. E, como um povo galante deseja amor e polidez, Rousseau resolve fixar alguns termos, na tentativa de explicar suas críticas e argumentar a coerência de seu posicionamento, já que, se, em geral, a cena é um quadro das paixões humanas, cujo original está nos corações, se o pintor, porém, não tiver cuidado de acariciar suas paixões, os espectadores logo ficarão desgostosos e não desejarão mais se ver sob um aspecto que fizesse com que desprezassem a si mesmos. E pontua que essa linguagem não tem mais sentido, em seu século, pois é preciso falar as paixões, esforçando-nos para usar uma que melhor se compreenda, talvez o romance. ABSTRACT:In theLetter to d’Alembert, Rousseau argues against the idea of theater as a moral instrument of education. However, the position of the philosopher is not one of putting this playful activity in the category of immoral activity, but in the category of an artificial activity that perhaps generates immoral purposes. It is necessary to observe the true effect of the theater on the basis of some arguments that Rousseau decides to construct. These are analyzed here, bringing to the fore Rousseau’s critique of the novel in theLetter to d’Alembert. The letter has as its context “the negative idea of privatization of the scene”, as the theater gives an excessive importance to the description of love, obviously exaggerating the representation of romance. If, in theLetter to d’Alembert, the philosopher does not directly express that theorizing about the theater is equivalent to the novel, in theNouvelle Héloïse, that is, in the novel itself, the author does this. He adds to the novel a long commentary on the theater that was in theLetter, stating that he considers the theatrical scene itself to be the same as most new writing. He attacks novels indirectly, as well as the theatre, observing that everything said about one art applies almost entirely to another art. As a gallant people want love and politeness, Rousseau decides to fix certain terms in an attempt to explain his criticism and argue the consistency of his position. In general, the scene is a picture of human passions whose original is in the heart; if the painter is not careful in stroking these passions, spectators will soon become disgusted, not wanting to see themselves in such a way that they despise themselves. Rousseau points out that this language has no more meaning in his century, as it is necessary to speak the passions, striving to use language that best understands the passions, such as, perhaps, that of the novel. (shrink)

It was [Maria] Edgeworth’s deeply personal motive in writing Harrington that made possible the special self-reflexive quality that informs her novel. In the act of reviewing her role as a reader and a writer of anti-Semitic portraits, she was able to recognize a tradition of discourse she had at once inherited and perpetuated. And only by recognizing such a tradition was she able both to subvert it in Harrington and to articulate for future writers the way to move beyond (...) it. In short, she boldly turned her personal self-examination into a cultural critique: she diagnosed a disorder in “the imaginations of the good people of England,”4 and in so doing she issued a challenge and founded a new tradition. In Harrington Edgeworth inquires into the trials that the English imagination must undergo if it is to exorcise the powerful figure of Shylock, and thereby issues a challenge taken up in subsequent novels : the tradition I am designating “the novel of Jewish Identity” attempts to articulate, investigate, and subvert The Merchant of Venice’s function as the English master text for representing “the Jew.” Maria Edgeworth, Harrington, vol. 9 of Tales and Novels , p. 148; hereafter cited by page number. Michael Ragussis, professor of English at Georgetown University, is the author of The Subterfuge of Art: Language and the Romantic Tradition and Acts of Naming: The Family Plot in Fiction . He is currently working on a book-length study entitled “Figures of Conversion: Jewish Identity and British Fiction.”. (shrink)

Real Likenesses presents a radical new approach to artistic representation. At its heart is a serious reconsideration of the relationship between medium and content in representational art, which counters current dominant theories that make attention to the former inevitably a distraction from attending to the latter. Through close analysis of paintings, photographs, and novels, Michael Morris proposes a new understanding of the real likenesses we encounter in representational art; what they are, how they are made present to us, and how (...) they are created. The result is an intuitive way of thinking about how these art forms work. (shrink)

Non-fiction graphic novels about illness and death created by patients and their loved ones have much to teach all readers. However, the bond of empathy made possible in the comic form may have special lessons for healthcare providers who read these texts and are open to the insights they provide.

Many studies have suggested that the motor system is organized in a hierarchical fashion, around the prototypical end location associated with using objects. However, most studies supporting the hierarchical view have used well-known actions and objects that are highly over-learned. Accordingly, at present it is unclear if the hierarchical principle applies to learning the use of novel objects as well. In the present study we found that when learning to use a novel object subjects acquired an action representation (...) of the end location associated with using the object, as evidenced by slower responses in an action observation task, when the object was presented at an incorrect end location. By showing the importance of knowledge about end locations when learning to use a novel object, the present study suggests that end locations are a fundamental organizing feature of the human motor system. (shrink)

The article describes the way in which law-related events are represented in Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood. Based on a narrative analysis, the paper will posit that In Cold Blood played a particular role in originating and shaping an innovative mode of representing law-related events, a mode that was widely employed since, in various artistic mediums and in popular culture. As the paper further elaborates, Capote’s work paved new ways for challenging the conventional boundaries between “reality” and “fiction” with regard (...) to the representation of law-related events. The paper will also maintain that in addition to its contribution to the law and literature discourse, In Cold Blood can be also seen as an early prototype to the digital legal spectacles that are now common. Revisiting In Cold Blood reveals not only its standing as originating model of many present-day cultural representations of the legal system in action, but also the essential difference between the almost unrestrainedly produced digital law-related content, to a artistic enterprise, characterized by poetic distinctiveness. (shrink)

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is widely used to study decision‐making within healthy and psychiatric populations. However, the complexity of the IGT makes it difficult to attribute variation in performance to specific cognitive processes. Several cognitive models have been proposed for the IGT in an effort to address this problem, but currently no single model shows optimal performance for both short‐ and long‐term prediction accuracy and parameter recovery. Here, we propose the Outcome‐Representation Learning (ORL) model, a novel model that (...) provides the best compromise between competing models. We test the performance of the ORL model on 393 subjects' data collected across multiple research sites, and we show that the ORL reveals distinct patterns of decision‐making in substance‐using populations. Our work highlights the importance of using multiple model comparison metrics to make valid inference with cognitive models and sheds light on learning mechanisms that play a role in underweighting of rare events. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on what’s novel in the perspective that the prediction error minimization (PEM) framework affords on the cognitive-scientific project of explaining intelligence by appeal to internal representations. It shows how truth-conditional and resemblance-based approaches to representation in generative models may be integrated. The PEM framework in cognitive science is an approach to cognition and perception centered on a simple idea: organisms represent the world by constantly predicting their own internal states. PEM theories often stress the hierarchical (...) structure of the generative models they posit. The novel explanatory power of the PEM account derives largely from the way in which pairs of generative and recognition models interact. “Predictive coding” refers to an encoding strategy in which predicted portions of an input signal are subtracted from the actual signal received, so that only the difference between the two is passed as output to the next stage of information processing. (shrink)

The view developed in this book is that when looking at a representational painting we see a ‘real likeness’: something that is worked in paint, that really exists, that resembles what is depicted, and that, in virtue of that resemblance, counts as the same kind of thing as what is depicted. This Real Likeness view is applied not only to representation in painting, but also representation in photography and in novels. For each of these three art forms, the Real Likeness (...) view is presented as the best solution to a problem. A constraint on any plausible solution to that problem is ‘the Non Distraction Thesis’: (ND) Attending to the medium of a representational work cannot inevitably be a distraction from attending to its content, or vice versa. (p. 21) In this review, I present and discuss the problem, (ND) and the real likeness view in three consecutive sections. My focus will be Morris’s discussion of paintings, which constitutes the first part of the book and which is used when applying the view to photography and novels. Morris makes an interesting and significant contribution with his book, I think. However, to present his view as standing alone in opposition to the ‘dominant’ views of depiction, photography and literary fiction is, in my opinion, to exaggerate its novelty. The view has some (albeit perhaps not ‘dominant’) siblings in the literature on depiction and photography, notably Aasen (2015), Briscoe (2016), Martin (2012), Nanay (2016) and Wiesing (2009), who, like Morris, identify something which is seen in a picture or a photograph, is additional to it and what it represents and plays a vital representational role. Some issues in the philosophy of perception, attention and language, are also clearly relevant but not engaged with. While I mainly have to bypass these issues, towards the end of this review I will compare Morris’s view to its siblings in the depiction literature and try to identify something that I believe stands out about it. (shrink)

Mainstream teleosemantics is the view that mental representation should be understood in terms of biological functions, which, in turn, should be understood in terms of selection processes. One of the traditional criticisms of teleosemantics is the problem of novel contents: how can teleosemantics explain our ability to represent properties that are evolutionarily novel? In response, some have argued that by generalizing the notion of a selection process to include phenomena such as operant conditioning, and the neural selection that (...) underlies it, we can resolve this problem. Here, we do four things: we develop this suggestion in a rigorous way through a simple example, we draw on recent neurobiological research to support its empirical plausibility, we defend the move from a host of objections in the literature, and we sketch how the picture can be extended to help us think about more complex “conceptual” representations and not just perceptual ones. (shrink)

Despite its centrality in the philosophy of cognitive science, there has been little prior philosophical work engaging with the notion of representation in contemporary NLP practice. This paper attempts to fill that lacuna: drawing on ideas from cognitive science, I introduce a framework for evaluating the representational claims made about components of neural NLP models, proposing three criteria with which to evaluate whether a component of a model represents a property and operationalising these criteria using probing classifiers, a popular analysis (...) technique in NLP (and deep learning more broadly). The project of operationalising a philosophically-informed notion of representation should be of interest to both philosophers of science and NLP practitioners. It affords philosophers a novel testing-ground for claims about the nature of representation, and helps NLPers organise the large literature on probing experiments, suggesting novel avenues for empirical research. (shrink)

Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel argument against representationalism, the widespread view that cognition essentially involves (...) the manipulation of mental representations. Ramsey argues that although theories within the ‘classical’ tradition of cognitive science once posited structural representations, these theories are being superseded by newer theories, within the tradition of connectionism and cognitive neuroscience, which rarely if ever appeal to structural representations. Instead, these theories seem to be explaining cognition by invoking so-called ‘receptor representations’, which, Ramsey claims, aren’t genuine representations at all—despite being called representations, these mechanisms function more as triggers or causal relays than as genuine stand-ins for distal systems. I argue that when the notions of structural and receptor representation are properly explicated, there turns out to be no distinction between them. There only appears to be a distinction between receptor and structural representations because the latter are tacitly conflated with the ‘mental models’ ostensibly involved in offline cognitive processes such as episodic memory and mental imagery. While structural representations might count as genuine representations, they aren’t distinctively mental representations, for they can be found in all sorts of non-intentional systems such as plants. Thus to explain the kinds of offline cognitive capacities that have motivated talk of mental models, we must develop richer conceptions of mental representation than those provided by the notions of structural and receptor representation. (shrink)

The distinctive feature of Aristotle's philosophical discourse lies in its subtle transition, at a particular juncture, from metaphysical to ontological discourse. The proactive restoration of the original metaphysical framework pertaining to specific concepts facilitates the identification of the precise location or moment at which their spontaneous reinterpretation transpires. The recognition of the threshold of semantic "recalculation," employed as a hermeneutic procedure, constitutes a novel methodological approach to the analysis of Aristotle's works. In accordance with this approach, it is imperative (...) to regard the concepts and categories within Aristotelian philosophy, particularly those authored by Aristotle himself, not merely as representations of meanings unfolding within the primary text (a methodology not applicable in Aristotle's case), but rather as autonomous metatexts. The interpretation of these metatexts may initially appear as a thematically abstract exercise. Engaging with metatextual scenarios in Aristotle's philosophy unveils fresh perspectives, thereby enriching the understanding of his philosophical framework. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el acuario como una figuración espacial del imaginario social en tres novelas escritas por autores chilenos en las últimas dos décadas, El nadador de Gonzalo Contreras, La vida privada de los árboles de Alejandro Zambra y Monsieur Pain de Roberto Bolaño. Su finalidad es atisbar en la configuración imaginaria de los espacios de la intimidad y de la intemperie en la posdictadura chilena y, más generalmente, en el entorno global en que se desarrolla (...) la tercera fase del capitalismo multinacional. The aim of this article is to analyze the aquarium as a spatial figure of social imaginary in three novels written by Chilean authors in the past two decades, Gonzalo Contreras's El nadador , Alejandro Zambra's La vida privada de los árboles and Roberto Bolaño's Monsieur Pain . My purpose is to inquire about the imaginary configuration of spaces that refer to intimacy and the shelterless in the context of chilean postdictatorship and, more generally, in the global environment of the third stage of multinational capitalism. (shrink)

I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain (...) the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation. (shrink)

This volume offers novel views on the precise relation between reference to an object by means of a linguistic expression and our mental representation of that object, long a source of debate in the philosophy of language, linguistics, and cognitive science. Chapters in this volume deal with our devices for singular reference and singular representation, with most focusing on linguistic expressions that are used to refer to particular objects, persons, or places. These expressions include proper names such as Mary (...) and John; indexicals such as I and tomorrow; demonstrative pronouns such as this and that; and some definite and indefinite descriptions such as The Queen of England or a medical doctor. Other chapters examine the ways we represent objects in thought, particularly the first-person perspective and the self, and one explores a notion common to reference and representation: salience. The volume includes the latest views on these complex topics from some of the most prominent authors in the field and will be of interest to anyone working on issues of reference and representation in thought and language. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of representational unification, which we distinguish from integration. The dimensions of unity are simplicity, generality and scope, non-monstrosity, and systematization. In our account, unification is a graded property. The account is used to investigate the issue of how research traditions contribute to representational unification, focusing on embodied cognition in cognitive science. Embodied cognition contributes to unification even if it fails to offer a grand unification of cognitive science. The study of (...) this failure shows that unification, contrary to what defenders of mechanistic explanation claim, is an important mechanistic virtue of research traditions. (shrink)

This paper develops a theory of analog representation. We first argue that the mark of the analog is to be found in the nature of a representational system’s interpretation function, rather than in its vehicles or contents alone. We then develop the rulebound structure theory of analog representation, according to which analog systems are those that use interpretive rules to map syntactic structural features onto semantic structural features. The theory involves three degree-theoretic measures that capture three independent ways in which (...) a system can be more or less analog. We explain how our theory improves upon prior accounts of analog representation, provides plausible diagnoses for novel challenge cases, extends to hybrid systems that are partially analog and partially symbolic, and accounts for some of the advantages and disadvantages of representing analogically versus symbolically. (shrink)

This study examines the relationship between thought and language by considering the views of Kant and the later Wittgenstein along with many strands of contemporary debate in the area of mental content. Building on an analysis of the nature of concepts and conceptions of objects, Gillett provides an account of psychological explanation and the subject of experience, offers a novel perspective on mental representation and linguistic meaning, looks at the difficult topics of cognitive roles and singular thought, and concludes (...) with an outline of certain considerations relevant to skeptical arguments and the nature of perception. The resulting synthesis demonstrates interesting correlations with current work in cognitive and developmental psychology, and is directly relevant to continuing work in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophical psychology. (shrink)

Many have urged that the biggest obstacles to a physicalistic understanding of consciousness are the problems raised in connection with the subjectivity of consciousness. These problems are most acutely expressed in consideration of the knowledge argument against physicalism. I develop a novel account of the subjectivity of consciousness by explicating the ways in which mental representations may be perspectival. Crucial features of my account involve analogies between the representations involved in sensory experience and the ways in which (...) pictorial representations exhibit perspectives or points of view. I argue that the resultant account of subjectivity provides a basis for the strongest response physicalists can give to the knowledge argument. (shrink)

Whilst the topic of representations is one of the key topics in philosophy of mind, it has only occasionally been noted that representations and representational features may be gradual. Apart from vague allusions, little has been said on what representational gradation amounts to and why it could be explanatorily useful. The aim of this paper is to provide a novel take on gradation of representational features within the neuroscientific framework of predictive processing. More specifically, we provide a (...) gradual account of two features of structural representations: structural similarity and decoupling. We argue that structural similarity can be analysed in terms of two dimensions: number of preserved relations and state space granularity. Both dimensions can take on different values and hence render structural similarity gradual. We further argue that decoupling is gradual in two ways. First, we show that different brain areas are involved in decoupled cognitive processes to a greater or lesser degree depending on the cause (internal or external) of their activity. Second, and more importantly, we show that the degree of decoupling can be further regulated in some brain areas through precision weighting of prediction error. We lastly argue that gradation of decoupling (via precision weighting) and gradation of structural similarity (via state space granularity) are conducive to behavioural success. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The novel coronavirus pandemic is throwing into relief traditional notions and rhetorics of witness, visibility, recognition, and violence in human rights discourse. This essay articulates the ways in which the current pandemic is being framed rhetorically as a spectacular war, using rhetoric that obfuscates the structural violations that leads to the virus disproportionately impacting the precarious. It argues for a reframing of traditional paradigms of representation, recognition, and resistance toward a notion of everyday violence that accounts for the (...) accumulation of structural and material conditions of precarity as a human rights violation. (shrink)

Functional neuroimaging is sometimes criticized as showing only where in the brain things happen, not how they happen, and thus being unable to inform us about questions of mental and neural representation. Novel analytical methods increasingly make clear that imaging can give us access to constructs of interest to psychology. In this paper I argue that neuroimaging can give us an important, if limited, window into the large-scale structure of neural representation. I describe Representational Similarity Analysis, increasingly used in (...) neuroimaging studies, and lay out desiderata for representations in general. In that context I discuss what RSA can and cannot tell us about neural representation. I compare RSA with fMRI to a different experimental paradigm which has been embraced as being indicative of representation in psychology, and argue that it compares favorably. (shrink)

This book defends a novel view of mental representation—of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs—beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves—given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspective? (...) The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. The standard responses to this puzzle are either to deny that thought is essentially relational or to insist that it is possible to stand in relations to nonexistents. This book offers an error theory to the problem. The responses from this book arise from the same commitment: a commitment to treating talk of propositions—as the things towards which our beliefs are attitudes—as talk of entities that actually exist and that play a constitutive and explanatory role in the activity of thought. (shrink)

A novel algebraic structure of the genetic code is proposed. Here, the principal partitions of the genetic code table were obtained as equivalent classes of quotient spaces of the genetic code vector space over the Galois field of the four DNA bases. The new algebraic structure shows strong connections among algebraic relationships, codon assignment and physicochemical properties of amino acids. Moreover, a distance function defined between the codon binary representations in the vector space was demonstrated to have a (...) linear behavior respect to physical variables such as the mean of amino acids interaction energies in proteins. It was also noticed that the distance between wild type and mutant codons approach to smaller values in mutational variants of four genes, i.e., human phenylalanine hydroxylase, human β-globin, HIV-1 protease and HIV-1 reverse transcriptase. These results strongly suggest that deterministic rules must be involved in the genetic code origin. (shrink)

David Lewis (1974, 1994/1999) proposed to reduce the facts about mental representation to facts about sensory evidence, dispositions to act, and rationality. Recently, Robert Williams (2020) and Adam Pautz (2021) have taken up and developed Lewis’s project in sophisticated and novel ways. In this paper, we aim to present, clarify, and ultimately object to the core thesis that they all build their own views around. The different sophisticated developments and defenses notwithstanding, we think the core thesis is vulnerable. We (...) pose a dilemma by considering the two sides of a current epistemological controversy over the relation between evidence and rational belief: permissivism vs. uniqueness. As we argue, the prospects for the Lewisian project look dim when either supposition is clearly made. (shrink)

It is almost universally acknowledged that first-order logic (FOL), with its clean, well-understood syntax and semantics, allows for the clear expression of philosophical arguments and ideas. Indeed, an argument or philosophical theory rendered in FOL is perhaps the cleanest example there is of “representing philosophy”. A number of prominent syntactic and semantic properties of FOL reflect metaphysical presuppositions that stem from its Fregean origins, particularly the idea of an inviolable divide between concept and object. These presuppositions, taken at face value, (...) reflect a significant metaphysical viewpoint, one that can in fact hinder or prejudice the representation of philosophical ideas and arguments. Philosophers have of course noticed this and have, accordingly, sought to alter or extend traditional FOL in novel ways to reflect a more flexible and egalitarian metaphysical standpoint. The purpose of this paper, however, is to document and discuss how similar “adaptations” to FOL—culminating in a standardized framework known as Common Logic —have evolved out of the more practical and applied encounter of FOL with the problem of representing, sharing, and reasoning upon information on the World Wide Web. (shrink)

Leading theorists examine the self-representational theory of consciousness as an alternative to the two dominant reductive theories of consciousness, the representational theory of consciousness and the higher-order monitoring theory. In this pioneering collection of essays, leading theorists examine the self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that consciousness always involves some form of self-awareness. The self-representational theory of consciousness stands as an alternative to the two dominant reductive theories of consciousness, the representational theory of consciousness and the higher-order monitoring theory, combining (...) elements of both RTC and HOM theory in a novel fashion that may avoid the fundamental deficiencies of each. Although self-representationalist views have been common throughout the history of both Western and Eastern philosophy, they have been largely neglected in the recent literature on consciousness. This book approaches the self-representational theory from a range of perspectives, with contributions from scholars in analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and history of philosophy, as well as two longer essays by Antonio Damasio and David Rudrauf and Douglas Hofstadter. The book opens with six essays that argue broadly in favor of self-representationalist views, which are followed by five that argue broadly against them. Contributors next consider connections to such philosophical issues as the nature of propositional attitudes, knowledge, attention, and indexical reference. Finally, Damasio and Rudrauf link consciousness as lived with consciousness as described in neurobiological terms; and Hofstadter compares consciousness to the "strange loop" of mathematical self-reference brought to light by Gödel's incompleteness theorems. Contributors Andrew Brook, Peter Carruthers, Antonio Damasio, John J. Drummond, Jason Ford, Rocco J. Gennaro, George Graham, Christopher S. Hill, Douglas R. Hofstadter, Terry Horgan, Tomis Kapitan, Uriah Kriegel, Keith Lehrer, Joseph Levine, Robert W. Lurz, David Rudrauf, David Woodruff Smith, John Tienson, Robert Van Gulick, Kathleen Wider, Kenneth Williford, Dan Zahavi. (shrink)

I argue that the construction of representation theorems is a powerful tool for creating novel objects and theories in mathematics, as the construction of a new representation introduces new pieces of information in a very specific way that enables a solution for a problem and a proof of a new theorem. In more detail I show how the work behind the proof of a representation theorem transforms a mathematical problem in a way that makes it tractable and introduces information (...) into it that it did not contain at the beginning of the process. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce a novel difficulty for teleosemantics, viz., its inability to account for what we call unexploited content—content a representation has, but which the system that harbors it is currently unable to exploit. In section two, we give a characterization of teleosemantics. Since our critique does not depend on any special details that distinguish the variations in the literature, the characterization is broad, brief and abstract. In section three, we explain what we mean by unexploited content, (...) and argue that any theory of content adequate to ground representationalist theories in cognitive science must allow for it.1 In section four, we show that teleosemantic theories of the sort we identify in section two cannot accommodate unexploited content, and are therefore unacceptable if intended as attempts to ground representationalist cognitive science. Finally, in section five, we speculate that the existence and importance of unexploited content has likely been obscured by a failure to distinguish representation from indication, and by a tendency to think of representation as reference. (shrink)

We critically engage two traditional views of scientific data and outline a novel philosophical view that we call the pragmatic-representational view of data. On the PR view, data are representations that are the product of a process of inquiry, and they should be evaluated in terms of their adequacy or fitness for particular purposes. Some important implications of the PR view for data assessment, related to misrepresentation, context-sensitivity, and complementary use, are highlighted. The PR view provides insight into (...) the common but little-discussed practices of iteratively reusing and repurposing data, which result in many datasets’ having a phylogeny—an origin and complex evolutionary history—that is relevant to their evaluation and future use. We relate these insights to the open-data and data-rescue movements, and highlight several future avenues of research that build on the PR view of data. (shrink)