Consider predicates like 'is a fictional character' and 'is a mythical object'. Since their ascription entails a corresponding Negative Existential claim, call these 'NE-characterizing predicates'. Objectualists such as Parsons, Sylvan, van Inwagen, and Zalta think that NE-characterizing properties are genuine properties of genuinely non-existent objects. But how, then, to make room for statements like 'Vulcan is a failed posit' and 'that little green man is a trick of the light'? The predicates involved seem equally NE-characterizing yet on the surface (...) fail to mark a genuine property o f things. Instead, the truth of such predications strongly supervenes on types of referential failure. Kendall Walton's anti-objectualist account of talk about fiction provides a neat solution to this supervenience problem by invoking special games of make-believe. The present paper claims that while Walton's view thereby gains an important advantage over objectualism, the solution faces problems of its own. The rest of the paper desribes another solution, one that assigns a large role to the idea of metaphor. (shrink)

First it will be necessary to examine the argument, and the meaning of the argument, by which Mr. Ingram-Pearson is led to uphold such an unusual position. Using the statement, "fairies do not exist," as his example, he observes: "In order to achieve its obvious status as a denial this statement must have some object of reference for its subject term; for denials which are denials of nothing are not denials in any sense at all." What, then, is the designate (...) of the term "fairies"? It is, we are told, "an existent [italics mine] which at least one person believes to be present in the world and which another person at the same time and in the same context believes is not there." To say that "fairies do not exist" is therefore to say that "certain entities, designated by the term 'fairies,' are not present in the world," or "specific entities, designated by the term 'fairies,' are really absent from the world." The latter statement is positive, and Mr. Ingram-Pearson tells us explicitly that positive statements cannot "succeed in making intelligible" something made intelligible by negative statements about non-existents; but he has in mind such "ordinary" positive statements as "fairies are imagined beings." In other words, it is not that negative statements about. (shrink)

Despite its importance for early analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege's account of existence statements, according to which they classify concepts, has been thought to succumb to a number of well-worn criticisms. This article does two things. First, it argues that, by remaining faithful to the letter of Frege's claim that concepts are functions, the Fregean account can be saved from many of the standard criticisms. Second, it examines the problem that Frege's account fails to generalize to cases which involve (...) definite descriptions and proper names. To deal with this the proffered analysis deviates from the letter of Frege's views, while remaining within its spirit. It proposes, in opposition to Frege, that expressions which grammatically look like singular terms should not always be read as referring to objects, but are sometimes best analysed as indicating functions. (shrink)

Non-existence provides big problems for ontology and modest for logic. Logical problems of non-existence consist in licensing inferences in which sentences with empty terms are involved. The standard predicate logic solves this question by presupposing that every individual constant has an object to which it refers. This means that empty domains are excluded from semantics for the first-order logic. However, there is a temptation to consider logic without existential presuppositions.The ontological problem of non-existence leads to the question (...) of the meaning of 'nothing'. We encounter "various conceptions of nothing" in the history of philosophy from Parmenides to our times. However, nothing (or nothingness) is always a negation of being. Since we have distributive and collective (mereological) concepts of being, we also should distinguish nothing in the distributive and mereological meaning. This difference is important because only the former leads to the paradox of nothing of all nothings, analogical to the paradox of all sets. A closer analysis of the nothing in the distributive sense shows that any meaningful talk about non-existence requires a relativisation to a fixed domain of discourse. This seems; to entail that the empty set is the formal model of nothing what means that the concept of absolute nothing in the distributive sense is simply inconsistent. To some extent, being and nothing are mutually dual. This motivates that the concept of nothing is governed by so-called dual logic connected with processes of rejection. More specifically, statements on "nothing" are not asserted but rejected. (shrink)

Non-existence provides big problems for ontology and modest for logic. Logical problems of non-existence consist in licensing inferences in which sentences with empty terms are involved. The standard predicate logic solves this question by presupposing that every individual constant has an object to which it refers. This means that empty domains are excluded from semantics for the first-order logic. However, there is a temptation to consider logic without existential presuppositions.The ontological problem of non-existence leads to the question (...) of the meaning of 'nothing'. We encounter "various conceptions of nothing" in the history of philosophy from Parmenides to our times. However, nothing (or nothingness) is always a negation of being. Since we have distributive and collective (mereological) concepts of being, we also should distinguish nothing in the distributive and mereological meaning. This difference is important because only the former leads to the paradox of nothing of all nothings, analogical to the paradox of all sets. A closer analysis of the nothing in the distributive sense shows that any meaningful talk about non-existence requires a relativisation to a fixed domain of discourse. This seems; to entail that the empty set is the formal model of nothing what means that the concept of absolute nothing in the distributive sense is simply inconsistent. To some extent, being and nothing are mutually dual. This motivates that the concept of nothing is governed by so-called dual logic connected with processes of rejection. More specifically, statements on "nothing" are not asserted but rejected. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is a problem of talking about or otherwise representing things that not exist. But what exactly is this problem? This paper presents a formulation of the problem in terms of the conflict between the fact that there are truths about non-existent things and the fact that truths must be answerable to reality, how things are. Given this, the problem of singular negative existential statements is no longer the central or most difficult aspect of (...) the problem of non-existence, despite what some philosophers say. (shrink)

The argument is an investigation of the philosophy of Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong. There are three chapters. The first chapter argues that there are non-existent objects. It is argued that negative existential statements have a simple subject-predicate logical form. The conclusion follows from this premise, together with realist assumptions about truth and predication. Positive and negative existential statements have subject-predicate logical form, I argue, because; that is the grammatical form they appear to have, and the alternative analysis of (...) their logical form is unable to explain certain features of positive and negative existential statements. ;The second chapter presents Meinong's theory and explains his terminology. Meinong was primarily interested in the phenomenon of intentionality, and developed his own technical idiom. An assumption is a mental state, akin to judgment but without the element of conviction. It refers to a circumstance, which is a mind-independent arrangement of objects. Intending an object is a matter of assuming a circumstance. Two theses characterize Meinong's thought. The Principle of Independence: Objects can be in positive predicative circumstances, even when they are not in positive existential circumstances. And the Principle of Indifference: An object is equally adapted to entering into both positive and negative existential circumstances. ;The third chapter examines issues arising from charges that Meinong's theory is inconsistent. Meinong's theory is not inconsistent. Logical re-constructions of Meinong's theory, however, exploit primitive logical distinctions that lack a clear metaphysical justification. Meinong's technical notion of a modal moment is suited to the solution of difficulties Meinong was unaware of, and has been neglected by Meinong's other commentators. (shrink)

Of course it is necessary to distinguish clearly between statements which actually purport to be about non-existents and seemingly similar statements in which the question of non-existents is not in fact broached at all. These latter statements are to be distinguished from statements about non-existents, not in not being about non-existents and therefore being about existents, but in being distinct from the questions both of existence and nonexistence. They deal with another question altogether, namely that (...) of the various predicative uses of the substantive verb. The statement "fairies have wings," for instance, is a statement falling within this latter category: it is not concerned with the existential status of the objects of reference designated by the subject term nor indeed with any designation whatever; merely with the signification and analysis of the concept "fairy"; whether having wings is a subsidary and implicit description within the signification "fairy.". (shrink)

In the various texts the phrase “something does not exist there” was interpreted in the following way: “elephants, cows, etc.” (Cūlasuññata-sutta) “the imagined, or conceptualized” (Yogācāra tradition), “the five skandhas, the elements, the sensory fields as eternal and solid entities” (Abhidharmasamuccaya), “all conventional phenomena” (Dolpo-pa), “inherent reality” (rGyal-tshab-rje), “accidental pollution with regard to the tathāgatagarbha (Gung-thang). The phrase “something that remains there does exist as a real existent” was interpreted also in different ways: “monks, palace, world, etc” (Cūlasuññata-sutta), “the perfect, (...) or accomplished” (Yogācāra tradition), “the Selflessness” (Abhidharmasamuccaya), “the perfect, emptiness exists eternally” (Dol-po-pa), “the lack of inherent reality” (rGyal-tshab-rje), “the purity of tathāgatagarbha 's nature” (Gung-thang).This survey shows that the Buddhist tradition interpreted the same scriptural sentence in radically different ways. Each commentator attempted to present the scriptural statement in a way which suited best his own philosophical view. It is evident that no agreement with regard to the exegesis of this sentence can be obtained. After all, the Buddha has set up a model in the (Cūlasuññata-sutta), where he interpreted the statement in a process-manner. There is no definitive description of voidness. (shrink)

This work will focus on some aspects of descriptive names. The New Theory of Reference, in line with Kripke, takes descriptive names to be proper names. I will argue in this paper that descriptive names and certain theory in reference to them, even when it disagrees with the New Theory of Reference, can shed light on our understanding of (some) non-existence statements. I define the concept of descriptive name for hypothesised object (DNHO). My thesis being that DNHOs are, (...) as I will specify, descriptions: a proposition expressed by the utterance ‘n is F’, where ‘n’ is a DNHO, is not singular at all; it is a descriptive proposition. To sum up, concerning proper names, the truth lies closer to the New Theory of Reference, but descriptivism is not altogether false. As for DNHOs descriptivism is, in some cases, the right fit. (shrink)

Many believe that, if true, reason-statements of the form ‘that X is F is a reason to φ’ describe a ‘favouring-relation’ between the fact that X is F and the act of φing. This favouring-relation has been assumed to share many features of other, more concrete relations. This combination of views leads to immediate problems. Firstly, unlike statements about many other relations, reason-statements can be true even when the relata do not exist, i.e., when the relevant facts (...) do not obtain and the relevant acts are not done. Secondly, the previous combination of views also makes it very difficult to draw the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. I argue that we should think that the predicate ‘is a reason to’ creates non-extensional contexts in the statements in which it is used. This would both solve the previous problems and avoid the awkward consequences of the so-called slingshot argument. (shrink)

The problem of function statements in the Life Sciences may be stated as follows. Life Scientists make frequent and important use of statements of the form 'X is the function of Y', in explaining phenomena intimately connected with living organisms. The use of such statements, according to recent philosophical discussions suffers the defects of presupposing or committing the user to the existence of vital forces, purposive activity outside the realm of human action, or a special kind (...) of ';causal' nexus, i.e. final causality, or constitutes the basis for the irreducibility of the LIFE sciences to physics . ;Because scientists find such statements so useful they are not willing to throw these statements out altogether. Instead the philosopher embarks on a program to 'save' such statements by showing that upon analysis function statements do not really suffer the above-mentioned defects. This analysis of function statements into statements of efficient causality shows them to be causal in a way which does not commit one to vital forces, purposive activity outside the realm of human activity, or final causality, and does not provide ammunition for those who would resist the reduction of Biology to Physics. ;First I consider attempts which have been made in the philosophical literature to analyze function statements into regular causal statements. I provide in the course of these considerations a positive account of the legitimate use of function statements in the life sciences which is non-reductive yet does not involve any of the defects which motivate the standard philosophical analyses. This positive account sees function statements as compacted explanations which among other distinguishing uses and characteristics focus on a special class of consequences. (shrink)

[English abstract] In his last metaethical statement, Parfit revisits his earlier arguments for non-metaphysical normative non-naturalism , and points to the possibility of convergence between his view and Railton's non-analytical normative naturalism. I examine the basis of this convergence claim and find it unpersuasive, mainly because if their views converge on the same position, Parfit's non-natural norms exist only as predicates. In order to avoid this consequence, he needs to present a reason for believing in the existence of normative (...) properties . There is an indispensability argument implicit in his text, with concepts of sui generis normative ground and necessity at its centre. I discuss their main features and present problems besetting these concepts. (shrink)

The objective of this study is twofold: to examine the patterns that govern social reporting with reference to an Islamic framework and to identify the moral legitimacy factors that influence them. We select 146 publicly listed Sharia‐compliant companies and classify the disclosures in their annual reports according to an Islamic framework that categorises items as either Required, Expected or Desired to indicate the degree of importance each item carries from an Islamic perspective. Based on this framework, we then analyse moral (...) legitimacy factors, specifically the type of Sharia screening body and the proportion of Muslims in the population, that may influence the prioritisation of the different categories of social reporting. We find that disclosures that fall into the Required category of our framework—especially those that relate to companies’ involvement in “haram” activities (activities not permissible in Islam)—are still few among the companies studied. Our research also reveals that both moral legitimacy factors under investigation influence the three categories of social reporting, although in different ways. This research contributes to the existing literature by empirically examining how organisations prioritise their disclosure of virtues and the moral legitimacy factors that influence that prioritisation. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Plantinga's Responses to My Two Arguments Is Belief in God Non‐Inferentially Justified? The Argument from Evil Versus Justifications for Believing in the Existence of God Concluding Comment: Naturalism, Supernaturalism, and Theism.

This paper has a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that the Frege-Russell account of existence as a higher-order predicate is mistaken and should be abandoned, even with respect to general statements of existence such as “Flying mammals exist” (where statements of this sort are supposed to be best accommodated by the account). The Frege-Russell view seems to be supported by two ideas. First, the idea that existence is entirely expressed by the (...) existential quantifier of standard predicate logic. Second, the idea that the existential quantifier is a higher-order predicate, a predicate of predicates, not of individuals. I think that both ideas are wrong but will focus on the latter. By construing prima facie first-order statements such as “Flying Mammals exist” as higher-order predications such as “The Fregean Concept Flying Mammal maps at least one individual onto the True”, the Frege-Russell view commits one - merely on the basis of the meaning it assigns to the existence predicate – to abstract objects such as concepts (Gottlob Frege), or propositional functions (Bertrand Russell), or classes (Rudolf Carnap), or properties, kinds, and so on. This cannot be right, I think. The positive claim of the present paper is that, at least in the context of first-order discourse, the existence predicate is just what it seems to be: a bona fide first-order predicate (pace Kant, Hume, Frege, Russell and others). Three important ideas about existence are shared with the Frege-Russell conception of existence, though. (1) Being and existence are one and the same thing: there is no difference between “Unicorns are not”, or “There are no unicorns”, and “Unicorns do not exist”, or “There exist no unicorns”. (2) To be is to be the value of a bound variable, to belong to a domain of quantification (Willard Quine). (3) Anti-Meinongianism, the idea that there are no non-existent objects (Russell). However, we diverge from the Frege-Russell tradition with respect to the following claim. (4) The best concept of existence, in the sense of the one that is best understood and best enables us to formulate ontological disputes, is a purely logical first-level concept defined in terms of existential quantification and identity. First-order statements of existence and non-existence like “Flying Mammals exist” and “Unicorns do not exist” are accordingly taken at face value and analyzed in terms of a logical first-order predicate of existence, the predicate “is (identical to) something”. Reasons are given to prefer this notion of existence to other first-order non-logical notions that have been proposed in the literature, notions characterized in terms of predicates such as “is in space-time”, “is concrete”, “is causally efficacious”, “is actual”, “is real”, etc. (shrink)

It is clearly explained: -/- *What it is for a statement to be necessarily true, *Why necessity, possibility, existence, and non-existence are properties of propositions (truths and falsehoods), not of objects or states of affairs, *What conditions a class of expressions must meet if the expressions belonging to it jointly constitute a single language, *The significance for meta-linguistic research of the concepts of systematicity and productivity, as Chomsky defines these terms, and the relevance of these concepts to researches (...) into the nature of necessity, *Why Quine's attempt to prove the non-existence of analytic truth is not only false but self-defeating, and, finally, *Why empirical science relies on truths of purely conceptual, non-observational kind to organize the data at its disposal. (shrink)

In this paper I argue in favour of a new definition of presentism that I call ‘existence presentism’ (EP). Typically, presentism is defined as the thesis that ‘only present objects exist’, or ‘nothing exists that is non-present’.1 I assume these statements to be equivalent. I call these statements of presentism ‘conventional presentism’ (CP). First, in §2, I rehearse arguments due to Ulrich Meyer that purport to show that presentism is not adequately defined as CP. In §§2.1–2.4 I (...) show that considerations of the sort raised by Meyer infect attempts to define presentism, due to Thomas Crisp, Tom Stoneham, and Theodore Sider. Thus the first half of the paper is constituted by a negative project that looks to show how extant definitions of presentism fail. In the second half of the paper, I continue in the negative theme in §3, before laying out EP and demonstrating that it solves the problems faced by CP and offering explanations of how to make sense of certain key notions that lie at the heart of EP. I conclude that EP is preferable to CP. (shrink)

I propose understanding CP-law statements as statements that assert the existence of vague statistical laws, not by fully specifying the contents of those laws, but by picking them out via a description that is both self-referential and self-locating. I argue that this proposal validates many common assumptions about CP-laws and correctly classifies many examples of putative CP-laws. It does this while avoiding the most serious worries that motivate some philosophers to be skeptical of CP-laws, namely the worry (...) that they lack non-trivial truth conditions and that it is impossible for empirical evidence to disconfirm them. (shrink)

In what is portrayed as Buddha's first sermon, the Dhamma‐cakka‐ppavatana Sutta (DCPS), the Buddha highlighted four key aspects or dimensions of existence to which one needs to become attuned so as to become deeply spiritually transformed and end dukkha. Though the DCPS emphasizes dukkha, this is in fact only one of three related characteristics or “marks” of the five khandhas. These “three marks” of all conditioned phenomena are that they are impermanent, painful, and non‐Self. Buddhism emphasizes that change and (...) impermanence are fundamental features of everything. The Four True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled and statements which point to these realities, such as “This is dukkha,” form the structural framework for all higher teachings of early Buddhism. (shrink)

It is obvious that two contingent statements, each of which denies the existence of something, can be inconsistent with one another: for example, ‘There are no non-black ravens, and there is at least one raven’, and ‘There are no black ravens’. But it is also obvious that these two statements are inconsistent only because one of them, as well as denying the existence of something, asserts the existence of something. The mere denials of existence, (...) ‘There are no non-black ravens’ and ‘There are no black ravens’, are consistent with one another. Indeed, it must hold quite generally that two contingent statements cannot be inconsistent, where each is a mere denial of existence in the sense that it denies existence and does not also assert existence. For in order to be inconsistent with a mere denial of existence, a second statement must assert existence, whatever else it may do; and if it asserts existence, it is not itself a mere denial of existence. (shrink)

I am under no illusion that the statement of common issues will forestall controversy. On the contrary, one of the venerable devices of the experienced controversialist is to state all possible positions in his own terms. The three questions concealed behind the three terms in the title of this paper do not have a privileged or architectonic universality. They will not reconcile the oppositions of philosophic positions concerning the possibility, order, and relative importance of questions, and it is easy to (...) anticipate reassortments they will undergo, if they are thought worthy of the effort, in the types of philosophy for which they find a place. My starting-point is "what is," rather than "being" or "existence," and I depart radically, therefore, from some of the dominant fashions of metaphysical discussion as well as from the fashions of non-metaphysical discussion of metaphysical issues. As a mark of that departure, I shall not base what I have to say on exposure of errors in Descartes or on refinements of insights in Hume or Kant, and I shall not express myself in neologisms constructed to retain, in English, distinctions or paradoxes derived from Descartes, Kierkegaard, or Nietzsche, or profundities grasped from the exegesis of the analogies of poets or from the etymologies of words used by Greek philosophers. If I were to choose a dictum for aphoristic elaboration or paradoxical propulsion, I should interpret a statement from Avicenna: "That which the understanding conceives first and best, and into which it resolves all other conceptions, is 'that which is,' 'thing,' and 'necessary'." I should make this choice, not because I prefer or even understand Avicenna's position concerning that which is, but because I want to raise three questions which are suggested when Avicenna's statement is introduced in the context of problems of existence. (shrink)

Despite the otherwise-dominant trends towards physicalism and naturalism in philosophy, it has become increasingly common for metaphysicians to accept the existence either of modal facts and properties, or of Lewisian possible worlds. This paper raises the historical question: why did these heavyweight realist views come into prominence? The answer is that they have arisen in response to the demand to find truthmakers for our modal statements. But this demand presupposes that modal statements are descriptive claims in need (...) of truthmakers. This presupposition was, however, rejected by many earlier analytic philosophers, including the logical positivists, Wittgenstein, Ryle and Sellars, all of whom denied that modal statement were descriptive at all. Yet the non-descriptivist approach has largely fallen out of discussion and out of philosophical consciousness. In this paper I examine why non-descriptivist views first came into and then fell out of favor, and consider what the prospects are for reviving this more deflationary approach to modality. (shrink)

This essay offers a defence of the non-cognitivist approach to the interpretation of moral judgments as disguised imperatives corresponding to social rules. It addresses the body of criticism that faced R. M. Hare, and that currently faces moral anti-realists, on two levels, by providing a full semantic analysis of evaluative judgments and by arguing that anti-realism is compatible with moral aspiration despite the non-existence of obligations as the externalist imagines them. A moral judgment consists of separate descriptive and prescriptive (...) components and is to be understood as a declarative statement prefaced by an 'ideality operator'. Moral beliefs are genuinely representational, but their truth conditions can only be stated with reference to imaginary ideal worlds. Moral judgments are neither confirmed nor verified, but alternative moral positions are preferentially endorsed and adopted by individual agents on the basis of their perceived all-things-considered optimality. High aspiration moralities are normally very costly to agents in terms of their prudential and aesthetic interests, but they are theoretically as eligible as the adoption of other, less demanding sets of rules. (shrink)

We investigate the strength of the existence of a non-principal ultrafilter over fragments of higher-order arithmetic. Let [Formula: see text] be the statement that a non-principal ultrafilter on ℕ exists and let [Formula: see text] be the higher-order extension of ACA0. We show that [Formula: see text] is [Formula: see text]-conservative over [Formula: see text] and thus that [Formula: see text] is conservative over PA. Moreover, we provide a program extraction method and show that from a proof of a (...) strictly [Formula: see text] statement ∀ f ∃ g A qf in [Formula: see text] a realizing term in Gödel's system T can be extracted. This means that one can extract a term t ∈ T, such that ∀ f A qf). (shrink)

Problem: The question of the moral and social effects of non-dualism has not yet been clarified to the necessary extent. The relation of truth claims, power and violence has been simplified; critical questions of non-dualist practises have not yet been addressed. Approach: By discussing relevant philosophy and political theory, this paper draws the attention of non-realists towards the issues of power, conflict and discourse rules and asks to rethink the issue of the pragmatic justification of non-realist epistemology. Findings: (1) Constructivists, (...) as well as the non-dualist Josef Mitterer, are critical of the discursive effects of truth claims. Yet, neither constructivism nor non-dualism solve the power issues that are ascribed to realism by constructivists and dualism by Mitterer. Even if participants abstained from truth claims in discourses, many of the power issues would still be prevalent. (2) The question arises of whether a practical difference between non-dualism and dualism exists. (3) There is a tendency in constructivist and non-dualist theory to regard any form of influence on others as illegitimate. This tendency is not sound. Instead, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power is necessary in non-dualism as well. Implications: Constructivist and non-dualist theory need to scrutinise statements about the moral implications of the respective theories and to emphasise power issues not solely by extrapolating from epistemology, but by acknowledging the social dynamics of discourses and conflicts. Non-dualist social scientists could contribute to the discussion through empirical analyses of the effects of the use and the debunking of truth claims. (shrink)

In mathematics, when we want to introduce classes which fulfill certain conditions, we usually prove beforehand that classes fulfilling such conditions do exist, and that such classes are uniquely determined by the conditions. The statements which state such unicity and existence of classes are in mathematical logic consequences of the principles of extensionality and class existence. In order to illustrate how these principles enable us to introduce classes into systems of mathematical logic, let us consider the manner (...) in which Gödel introduces classes in his book on set theory.For instance, before introducing the definition of the non-ordered pair of two classesGödel puts down as its justification the following two axioms:By A4, for every two classesyandzthere exists at least one non-ordered pairwof them; and by A3,wis uniquely determined in A4. (shrink)

It is of common use in modern Venn diagrams to mark a compartment with a cross to express its non-emptiness. Modern scholars seem to derive this convention from Charles S. Peirce, with the assumption that it was unknown to John Venn. This paper demonstrates that Venn actually introduced several methods to represent existentials but felt uneasy with them. The resistance to formalize existentials was not limited to diagrammatic systems, as George Boole and his followers also failed to provide a satisfactory (...) symbolic representation for them. This difficulty points out issues that are inherent to the very nature of existentials. This paper assesses the various methods designed for the representation of existential statements with Venn diagrams. First, Venn’s own attempts are discussed and compared with other solutions proposed by his contemporaries and successors, notably Lewis Carroll and Peirce. Since disjunctives hold an important role in an effective representation of existentials, their representation is also discussed. Finally, recent methods for the diagrammatic representation of existing individuals, rather than mere existence, are surveyed. (shrink)

Corporate, Social, Ethical and Environmental Reporting should ideally discharge the accountability of an organisation to its stakeholders. Voluntary reporting has been characterised by a dearth of neutral and objective information such that the advocates of SEER recommend that it be made compulsory. Their underlying rationale is that legally specified disclosure requirements and enforcement mechanisms will enhance the quality of such reporting. This paper sets out to explore how realistic this scenario actually is, in view of the conflicting interpretations in the (...) literature on this subject. To that end, a survey of the reporting patterns of 78 of the largest Spanish companies between 2001 and 2003 examines the extent of their compliance with the ICAC-2002 standard, which obliged them to make environmental disclosures in their financial statements. The results suggest that progressive and improved regulation could increase the volume and quality of SEER disclosures. They also suggest, however, that persistent non-compliance means that the problems associated with voluntary disclosure still exist. Finally, through an impression management perspective, the study reveals, the diverse strategies, ranging from dismissal to concealment, that are employed by companies to avoid transparency. As regulation improves and enforcement expectations rise, it becomes more difficult to dismiss compulsory reporting norms. As a result, some firms engage in more complex concealment strategies to attain corporate legitimacy, depriving stakeholders of regulatory information. The latter point serves to reconcile apparently contradictory explanations in the literature as to whether legitimacy theory might explain partial compliance with SEER regulation. (shrink)

Scholars have pointed out that the arguments for not-self recurring in the Buddhist texts are meant to refute the “self” in the Upani?ads. The Buddha’s denial of the self, however, was not only pointed at Brahmanism, but also confronted various?rama?ic trends of thought against Brahmanism. This paper investigates the extant three versions of a Buddhist text which records a debate between the Buddha and Saccaka, an adherent of a certain?rama?ic sect, over the relationship of the self and the five aggregates. (...) There exist divergences among the three versions in regard to the account of this debate. The account in sutta 35 of the Majjhima Nik?ya is generally consistent with that in s?tra 110 of the Sa?yukta?gama in Chinese translation, whereas s?tra 10 of Chapter 37 of the Ekottarika?gama in Chinese translation tells a very different story. Judging from Saccaka’s title, Niga??haputta, and his background as given in the Pali commentary, he was an adherent of Jainism. This paper demonstrates that Saccaka’s view, which was refuted by the Buddha, as stated in the two similar versions has nothing to do with Jainism, but rather it is an “invention” created by distorting Brahmanical thought. This “invention” has led the Pali commentaries and contemporary scholars to interpret the ‘self’ denied by the Buddha as what comes under one’s mastery or control, and to understand the statement “Each of the five aggregates is not self” in the Buddhist texts as denying the idea that each of the five aggregates can be seen as what comes under control. This, however, misses the point. The mainstream thought in India at that time conceived the ‘self’ or the essence of the individual or of the universe as a ‘controller’, and it is this concept that the Buddha exerted all his energy to overturn. Therefore, the account in those two versions of the text apparently has some mistake. As to the Ekottarika?gama version of the text, Saccaka’s view as stated therein is very different from what is found in the above two versions. An examination of this version shows that the views rebutted by the Buddha are very similar to those of the?j?vikas. Since the Buddhist texts frequently confuse the?j?vikas with the Jains, it is very likely that Saccaka was actually an adherent of the?j?vika faith and that this discourse is meant to criticize the?j?vika doctrines. Since the Ekottarika?gama version seems to make better sense, this version may be fairly close to the original account, while the other two versions have considerably deviated from the original. By comparing these three versions of the text, I also attempt to explore some important issues regarding the sectarian development of Buddhism, and to shed some light on the unique values of the Chinese Ekottarika?gama, which is, in terms of sectarian affiliation, significantly distant from the Pali Majjhima Nik?ya and the Chinese Sa?yukta?gama that belong to two closely related schools. (shrink)

. In the XIXth century there was a persistent opposition to Aristotelian logic. Nicolai A. Vasiliev (1880–1940) noted this opposition and stressed that the way for the novel – non-Aristotelian – logic was already paved. He made an attempt to construct non-Aristotelian logic (1910) within, so to speak, the form (but not in the spirit) of the Aristotelian paradigm (mode of reasoning). What reasons forced him to reassess the status of particular propositions and to replace the square of opposition by (...) the triangle of opposition? What arguments did Vasiliev use for the introduction of new classes of propositions and statement of existence of various levels in logic? What was the meaning and role of the “method of Lobachevsky” which was implemented in construction of imaginary logic? Why did psychologism in the case of Vasiliev happen to be an important factor in the composition of the new ‘imaginary’ logic, as he called it? (shrink)

What, if anything, is the correlation between the specialized or technical ideas of the philosopher and the rest of his existence? His everyday life outside his philosophical role. In the specialized reality and reality constitution, when employing the discourse and discipline of philosophy, the philosopher subscribe to many things in an explicit manner and he employs a number of implicit things and assumptions that are not stated explicitly. These things concern the different branches, areas and domains of the philosophical (...) discourse, for example metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, ontology, cognition, consciousness, mind, perception, thinking, etc. Is there a relation between these technical 'beliefs' of the philosopher and other, not philosophical areas of his existence? Does and can all of his non-philosophical existence reflect his philosophical beliefs, statements and expressions? Is it possible that the everyday existence or life world of the philosopher can resemble, confirm and express his philosophical ideas? If this is not the case, what are the factors that are involved in such discrepancies? Do they imply a lack of integrity, of wholeness of integration on behalf of the philosopher? What are the causes of such an illogical or surprising lack of compatibility or similarity between these sets of two or more facts? What are the things that we can look for in such a lack of compatibility – things such as the following? - inconsistency, difference, disparity, variance, variation, deviation, divergence, -/- disagreement, dissimilarity, dissimilitude, mismatch, lack of similarity, contrariety, contradictoriness, disaccord, discordance, incongruity, -/- lack of congruence, incompatibility, irreconcilability, conflict, opposition? -/- I illustrate the above by means of four examples. 1 Let us assume that the embodied human person consists of both voluntary and involuntary processes and activities. Do the philosophy of an individual reflect or express these activities or is it completely or partially unrelated to them? Do the voluntary processes and activities or the voluntary aspects of perception, cognition, brain processes and other activities resemble or express the philosophy of a thinker? 2 Some thinkers are seriously concerned about the importance of discourse and dialogue and the equality of all those involved. We find their concern about the ideal discourse and dialogue described in their written work and talks, but to what an extend do their own discursive and dialogical actions and behaviour reflect the ideal situation they preach? 3 Ethics and morality can be find in and are emphasized in all sorts of disciplines, of course they are major subjects in providing ways to live off for philosophers and we even find institutions devoted to their teaching and investigation. Do the lives, the lived morality and ethics of those individuals who preach the ideals of ethics or ethical ideals reflect the ideals they preach and that provides them with ways to earn a living? Or, is it the case that morality and ethics are merely faked by those individuals living off their preaching of ethics? And, that they merely employ the values, norms, customs and attitudes of a culture, sub-culture, community, group or another social grouping? In other words are the preachers of ethics really more ethical than the rest of the community and society? 4 When the philosopher expresses his ideas by means of all sorts of philosophical tools he is aware of the fact that he employs them, or at least aware of some of them being intentionally employed by him while he is unaware of others that he employs. Do the tools the philosopher employs to theorize (identify problems, the nature of the questions he asks, the nature of his ways of questioning, the assumptions he makes, the forming and testing of hypotheses, the making of generalizations, etc) or philosophize (perceive things, think, think about things, reason, argumentation etc) resemble what he beliefs, asserts and says about thinking, perception, cognition, understanding, subjects, objects, relationships between subjects and objects and other features and processes of epistemology? In short – does the lived philosophy, ontology, epistemology, ethics etc of the philosopher resemble, represent, confirm, substantiate, back, endorse, support, authenticate and corroborate the ideas, assertions and speculations that are expressed by the statements his philosophy or philosophizing consist of? Does he walk the walk of his talk? Are they similar and identical, the same things and merely expressions of the same things in different mediums? (shrink)

This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology"--the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Aussersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.

Among the many assaults upon widely held views in social and political philosophy to be found in Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, is a novel criticism of the utilitarian deterrence theory of punishment. Nozick believes that this criticism is absolutely decisive, and, indeed, in his words, establishes the utilitarian deterrence theory's "non existence." The purpose of this paper is to show that Nozick's criticism rests upon a tacit crucial error about the nature of punishment. This error, while an (...) elementary one, is evidently easy to make since not only Nozick falls prey to it but also some prominent utilitarians themselves. Recognizing the error makes possible a more careful statement of the utilitarian deterrence theory that avoids Nozick's criticism. (shrink)

The following statement (A) is usually abbreviated with symbols: (A) There are items X and Y, each is F, X is not identical to Y, and everything F is identical to X or is identical to Y. (A) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of exactly two distinct things that are F. Some things are neither identical nor distinct. The difference between distinctness and nonidentity makes a difference in asking questions about counting, constitution, and persistence.

In some ways, I think, the analytic method in philosophy and science suffers from an embarrassment of riches. It has too many distinctions—in the sense that any distinction which is infirm, but which is yet carted about along with the necessary apparatus of a method, is superfluous. In these pages I propose to examine one such distinction.A principle which is subscribed to by almost all of the “analysers” with whose work I am acquainted is that which is constituted by a (...) certain kind of dichotomization between what we may for the present loosely characterize as the “formal” and the “non-formal.” Sometimes this distinction is presented as one existing between the “formal sciences” and the “non-formal sciences”; more frequently, perhaps, it is taken as a distinction holding between certain kinds of expressions, i.e., analytic and synthetic statements. It will be the thesis of this paper that there are good reasons for believing that this distinction in either of its forms is not a cogent one. (shrink)

Every function over the natural numbers has an infinite subdomain on which the function is non-decreasing. Motivated by a question of Dzhafarov and Schweber, we study the reverse mathematics of variants of this statement. It turns out that this statement restricted to computably bounded functions is computationally weak and does not imply the existence of the halting set. On the other hand, we prove that it is not a consequence of Ramsey’s theorem for pairs. This statement can therefore be (...) seen as an arguably natural principle between the arithmetic comprehension axiom and stable Ramsey’s theorem for pairs. (shrink)

The Knowability Paradox purports to show that the controversial but not patently absurd hypothesis that all truths are knowable entails the implausible conclusion that all truths are known. The notoriety of this argument owes to the negative light it appears to cast on the view that there can be no verification-transcendent truths. We argue that it is overly simplistic to formalize the views of contemporary verificationists like Dummett, Prawitz or Martin-Löf using the sort of propositional modal operators which are employed (...) in the original derivation of the Paradox. Instead we propose that the central tenet of verificationism is most accurately formulated as follows: if φ is true, then there exists a proof of φ Building on the work of Artemov (Bull Symb Log 7(1): 1-36, 2001), a system of explicit modal logic with proof quantifiers is introduced to reason about such statements. When the original reasoning of the Paradox is developed in this setting, we reach not a contradiction, but rather the conclusion that there must exist non-constructed proofs. This outcome is evaluated relative to the controversy between Dummett and Prawitz about proof existence and bivalence. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology" — the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Außersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.

In a non-German-speaking environment is Jaspers sometimes mistakenly called as an existentialist. But Jaspers saw himself as a philosopher of existence, and he sharply criticized existentialism. This error arose because of confusion in the translations of the names Existenzphilosophie and Existentialismus from German into other languages. The difference between these terms was actively discussed immediately after Sartre’s lecture on humanism, in which Sartre, as he thought, announced a new direction in philosophy — existentialism (Existentialisme), to which he also included (...) Jaspers as a religious member of this direction. The purpose of paper is to investigate and analyze Jaspers’ criticism of existentialism and his rejection of it. Because long before Sart re’s lecture, Jaspers wrote about the false philosophical method of the investigation of human being as opposed to the true way — the elucidation of existence (Existenzerhellung), and also noted that he created a new word to denote this false method — existentialism (Existentialismus). While Jaspers understood the elucidation of existence as self-reflection and self-experience, which deepen in the experiences of boundary situations (Grenzsituationen), he considers existentialism as the knowledge of human being as a certain object among other objects. Already later — after Sartre’s lecture — Jaspers began to criticize existentialism as a direction that arose under the influence of the philosophy of existence and as its decline. Jaspers connected existentialism mainly with Sartre and outlined the main grounds of his criticism: existentialism is based on bare abstraction and Sartre’s main slogan — existence (of personality) precedes essence — is an evidence of this; existentialism uses a certain poetic vagueness of some statements, and is an attempt to overcome nihilism through nihilism itself; this philosophy denies the existence of any transcendent basis of human and world. For these reasons, Jaspers rejected existentialism, which is fundamentally different from the philosophy of existence. (shrink)

Corporate, Social, Ethical and Environmental Reporting should ideally discharge the accountability of an organisation to its stakeholders. Voluntary reporting has been characterised by a dearth of neutral and objective information such that the advocates of SEER recommend that it be made compulsory. Their underlying rationale is that legally specified disclosure requirements and enforcement mechanisms will enhance the quality of such reporting. This paper sets out to explore how realistic this scenario actually is, in view of the conflicting interpretations in the (...) literature on this subject. To that end, a survey of the reporting patterns of 78 of the largest Spanish companies between 2001 and 2003 examines the extent of their compliance with the ICAC-2002 standard, which obliged them to make environmental disclosures in their financial statements. The results suggest that progressive and improved regulation could increase the volume and quality of SEER disclosures. They also suggest, however, that persistent non-compliance means that the problems associated with voluntary disclosure still exist. Finally, through an impression management perspective, the study reveals, the diverse strategies, ranging from dismissal to concealment, that are employed by companies to avoid transparency. As regulation improves and enforcement expectations rise, it becomes more difficult to dismiss compulsory reporting norms. As a result, some firms engage in more complex concealment strategies to attain corporate legitimacy, depriving stakeholders of regulatory information. The latter point serves to reconcile apparently contradictory explanations in the literature as to whether legitimacy theory might explain partial compliance with SEER regulation. (shrink)

The contents of linguistic and mental representations may seem to be individuated by what they are about. But a problem arises with regard to representation of the non-existent - words and thoughts that are about things that don't exist. Fourteen new essays get to grips with this much-debated problem.

Is it possible to prove or disprove God's existence? Arguments for the existence of God have taken many different forms over the centuries: in The Non-Existence of God, Nicholas Everitt considers all of the arguments and examines the role that reason and knowledge play in the debate over God's existence. He draws on recent scientific disputes over neo-Darwinism, the implication of 'big bang' cosmology, and the temporal and spatial size of the universe; and discusses some of (...) the most recent work on the subject, leading to a controversial conclusion. (shrink)

Does the real world, defined as a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities, really exist? Jan Westerhoff argues that we have good reason to believe it does not. His discussion considers four main facets of the idea of the real world, ranging from the existence of a separate external and internal world, to the existence of an ontological foundation that grounds the existence of all the entities in the world, and (...) the existence of an ultimately true theory that provides a final account of all there is. As Westerhoff discusses the reasons for rejecting the postulation of an external world behind our representations, he asserts that the internal world is not as epistemically transparent as is usually assumed, and that there are good reasons for adopting an anti-foundational account of ontological dependence. Drawing on conclusions from the ancient Indian philosophical system of Madhyamaka Buddhism, Westerhoff defends his stance in a purely Western philosophical framework, and affirms that ontology, and philosophy more generally, need not be conceived as providing an ultimately true theory of the world. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology" — the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Außersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.

In the article the basic procedures for finding of connective elements and resolving conflicts of references is analyzed. On the basis of this, a generalized algorithm is proposed that combines advantages of existing procedures for search for connective elements between phrases. The advantages of the selected procedures and their sequence are described, the formal description of input data and the results of the algorithm are presented. To optimize the procedure for scanning the text, the algorithm is performed as an iterative (...) reduction of the candidates for communication elements. This is achieved through the confirmation of non-conflict links and the gradual resolution of conflicts. (shrink)

Metaphysics relies on the presupposition of the non-being of the world: since the world has once not existed it is necessary to postulate a cause for its existence, i.e. an extrinsic principle to explain the absolute beginning of the causal series of all things that constitute the world. After the critique of theologizing metaphysics by authors like Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, the notion of an absolute beginning still persists though in a field in which it often goes as such (...) unnoticed, while it factually enjoys wide acceptance, namely in epistemology. It sounds as a truism that knowledge begins: personal inexistence (birth-death cycle) and the phenomenon of unconsciousness (sleep-wake cycle) seem to endorse the obviousness of that statement. Now, to link the beginning of the phenomenal series of subjective acts of knowledge with the existence of an external world that causes the specific content of our temporary cognitive acts relies, however, on two presuppositions, namely on the thesis of a complete non-being or nothingness of knowledge and, intrinsically related to this first presupposition, on the thesis of an absolute beginning of cognitive activity. If knowledge begins from its own nothingness, there must be a cause that is external to the totality of acts of knowledge, a cause that it doesn´t belong to the series of cognitive acts and, therefore, that it is not caused by any of them: this uncaused cause of contentful knowledge is supposed to be the real world external to the knowing subject. In my paper I make explicit the relation between realist-empiricist approachs to epistemology and the double presupposition of the nothingness and absolute beginning of knowledge, I explain the difficulties implied by these two presuppositions and, finally, I propose as a plausible solution to those difficulties some key theoretical claims of absolute idealism. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on two clusters of questions concerning existence. The first cluster concerns the scope of existence, examining how wide the domain of existing things is and whether it encompass absolutely everything. The second cluster concerns vagueness and indeterminacy, explaining whether vague things and vague categories of things are there or all vagueness is a matter of referring indifferently to a large number of absolutely precise things and showing the ultimate source of vagueness. There are two theories (...) of vagueness, epistemic and metaphysical. The chapter focuses on Meinongian definitions of 'existence' and examines four arguments in favor of Anti‐Actualism. The first and second respectively appeals to common sense and the need for intentional objects, that is, objects of certain mental attitudes. The third appeals to the need for fictional and illusory entities. And the fourth appeals to the need for non‐existent things as constituents of certain merely possible situations. (shrink)

That certain paper bills have monetary value, that Vladimir Putin is the president of Russia, and that Prince Philip is the husband of Queen Elizabeth II: such facts are commonly called ‘institutional facts’. IFF are, by definition, facts that exist by virtue of collective recognition. The standard view or tacit belief is that such facts really exist. In this paper we argue, however, that they really do not—they really are just well-established illusions. We confront realism about IFF with six criteria (...) of existence, three established and three less so but highly intuitive. We argue that they all tell against the existence of IFF. An obvious objection to IFF non-realism is that since people’s behaviour clearly reflects the existence of IFF, denying their existence leaves an explanatory gap. We reject this argument by introducing a variant of the so-called ‘Thomas Theorem,’ which says that when people collectively recognize a fact as existing, they largely behave accordingly, regardless of whether that fact really exists or not. (shrink)